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ABSTRACT 
 
 
TRANSFORMATION OF SOVEREIGNTY DISCOURSE IN TURKISH POLITICS 
 
Domaniç, Seda Saadet  
PhD, Political Science 
Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Dr. Hasan Bülent Kahraman 
Fall 2007, viii + 282 pages 
 
This dissertation offers an analysis of the transformation of sovereignty discourse 
in Turkey and illustrates the various discursive utilizations of the concept in connection 
with purposes of competing ideologies in turning points of Turkish politics. Rather than 
discussing whether or not sovereignty is obsolete in the face of growing globalization 
and fragmentation, this study underlines the need to reappraise the implications of the 
role that sovereignty plays in conditioning the coherence of opposing political 
ideologies.  
To this end, four critical ‘moments’ are studied by employing a discourse-
theoretic approach: dislocation brought by the Ottoman disintegration; creation of the 
Turkish nation-state; disruption engendered by globalization during the post-1980 
Turkey; transformation unleashed by Turkey’s ‘Europeanization’ during the 2000s.  
By illustrating the historico-political production/reproduction of sovereignty in 
relation to ideologies of Ottomanism, Turkish Nationalism, Populism, Statism, Second 
Republicanism and Europeanism, the findings refute the conventional view that presents 
sovereignty as a fixed, neutral and timeless organizing principle of modern politics. 
Instead, it is shown that sovereignty acts as an empty-signifier embodying a broad 
plurality of meanings to allow power blocs to produce political frontiers and uphold 
associated antagonisms. It is argued that only by deconstructing this highly politicized 
and contentious nature of the concept that we can start to question the unconditional, 
absolute and state-centric doctrine of sovereignty prevailing in Turkey. 
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ÖZET 
 
 
TÜRK SİYASETİNDE EGEMENLİK SÖYLEMİNİN DÖNÜŞÜMÜ 
 
Domaniç, Seda Saadet  
Doktora, Siyaset Bilimi  
Danışman: Doç. Dr. Hasan Bülent Kahraman 
Güz 2007, viii + 282 sayfa 
 
Bu tezin ana konusu Türk siyasetinin önemli geçiş dönemlerinde egemenlik 
söyleminin dönüşümü ve bu söylemin farklı ideolojilerin siyasi hedefleri ile bağlantılı 
olarak oynadığı rollerin bir analizidir. Giderek yaygınlaşan küreselleşme ve parçalanma 
süreçleri karşısında egemenlik kavramının sonunun gelip gelmediğini tartışmak yerine, 
bu çalışma egemenlik söylemi ile karşıt siyasi ideolojilerin söylemsel bütünlüğünün 
sağlanması arasındaki ilişkiyi irdelemektedir.     
Bu amaçla, Türk siyasetinde dönüm noktası olarak belirlenen dört dönem söylem 
kuramı yöntemi kullanılarak incelenmektedir. Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nun çöküşü, Türk 
ulus-devletinin inşası, 1980 sonrası Türkiye’nin küreselleşmesi, ve 2000 sonrası 
Türkiye’nin Avrupa ile bütünleşmesi egemenlik söyleminin dönüşümü açısından ele 
alınan dönemler arasında yer almaktadır.      
Araştırma sonucunda elde edilen bulgular, egemenlik kavramının içeriğinin 
Osmanlıcılık, Milliyetçilik, Halkçılık, Devletçilik, İkinci Cumhuriyetçilik ve 
Avrupalıcılık ideolojileri ile ilintili siyasi amaçlar bağlamında sürekli olarak yeniden 
üretildiğini belgelemektedir. Bu doğrultuda, tezin bulguları egemenliği tarafsız, doğal, 
ve ebedi bir kavram olarak kabullenen çalışmaların sorgulanmasını sağlayarak, özcü 
yaklaşımların aksine, egemenlik kavramının içinde birçok anlamı ve siyasi değeri 
barındıran ve bu kapsaycı özelliği ile farklı güç odakları tarafından siyasi sınırlar ve 
ilişkili karşıtlıklar oluşturulmasına destek olan bir “boş-gösteren” (empty-signifier) 
görevi üstlendiğine işaret etmektedir. Sonuç olarak Türkiye’de mevcut mutlak, şartsız 
ve devlet-merkezli egemenlik doktrininin dönüştürülebilmesi için ilk önce kavramın 
siyasetle olan yakın ve tartışmalı ilişkisinin çözümlenmesi gerektiği savunulmaktadır.   
 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Egemenlik, Milliyetçilik, Ulus-Devlet, Küreselleşme 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
1.1. Objective of Research 
 
 
 
Since the 1920s, the fundamental dictum of Turkish polity has been “Sovereignty 
is vested Fully and Unconditionally in the Nation,”1 expressed for the first time by 
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in the context of a national movement of resistance organized 
against the partition of Ottoman lands by the Allies of the World War I. The centrality 
of this maxim in Turkish politics has been made evident by its eternal inscription on the 
podium wall of the Turkish Grand National Assembly; nevertheless, its main 
assumptions and underpinnings have so far not been adequately discussed from the 
perspective of political theory. Our research on the available Turkish political literature 
points to the fact that while there has been some scholarly undertakings2 focusing on the 
                                                 
1The translation of the original maxim “Egemenlik Kayıtsız Şartsız Milletindir” is 
taken from the official translation of the 1982 Constitution published on the website of 
the Office of the Prime Minister of Turkish Republic, Directorate General of Press and 
Information, “The Constitution of the Republic of Turkey,” http://www.byegm. 
gov.tr/mevzuat/anayasa /anayasa-ing.htm. 
2An on-line research of YÖK Dissertation Center reveals the fact that since 1987 
there has been only nine doctoral dissertations written in Turkey treating the subject of 
sovereignty, none of which offers a comprehensive political theoretical analysis of the 
divergent discursive utilizations of the concept of sovereignty in Turkish political life. 
The list of the dissertations on the subject includes: H. E. Beriş, “Egemenliğin 
dönüşümü: Tarihsel ve siyasal açıdan egemenlik kavramının yeni anlamı” (PhD diss., 
Ankara University, 2006); F. M. Sancaktar, “II. Meşrutiyet'ten Cumhuriyet'e Türk 
aydınında milli egemenlik düşüncesinin gelişimi (1908-1924): Hüseyin Cahit (Yalçın) 
örneği” (PhD diss., İstanbul University, 2005); A. Akıl, “Küreselleşen hukuk ve ulusal 
egemenliğe etkisi” (PhD diss., İstanbul University, 2002); A. Pamir, “İslam 
Hukukun`da ve Osmanlı Devleti`nde egemenlik anlayışı” (PhD diss., Ankara 
University, 2001); A. İnan, “Çağdaş egemenlik teorisi ile Kur`an'ın hakimiyet 
kavramının karşılaştırılması” (Ankara University, 1999); T. Türcan, “İslam Hukukunda 
devletin egemenlik unsuru ve egemenlikten kaynaklanan yetkileri -Batı ve Türk 
Hukuku ile mukayeseli bir inceleme” (PhD diss., Süleyman Demirel University, 1999); 
 2
issue of the comparison of Ottoman and Islamic understandings of sovereignty with 
Western notions of sovereignty, or on the issue of the transformation of the concept 
within the context of changing dynamics of international relations/international law, 
these studies tend to focus on either historical/‘internal’ or legal/‘external’ aspects and 
treat sovereignty as an “essentially uncontested concept”,3 leaving aside a questioning 
of its seemingly steady foundations from the angle of political theory. 
This study aims to contribute to the fulfillment of this need by proposing first to 
rethink sovereignty as a problematical, yet a resilient political concept, the discursive 
utilization of which should be put under critical scrutiny to expose and explore its 
constitutive roles in the formation of political frontiers and identities within Turkish 
politics. Hence, the novelty of this research in part lies in its attempt to force open the 
overdetermination of sovereignty as an essential and absolute political principle, and 
instead in its reassessment of the meaning of the discursive persistence of the concept 
due to the pivotal role it plays in the construction of antagonistic political camps in 
Turkey.  
The timing of the study also enhances its significance: As it has been the case 
with many other EU member states4, questions related to sovereignty emerge as one of 
the most contentious and divisive subjects of political discussion during the period of 
European accession. The European integration process involves a challenge posed to the 
state-centric absolute notion of sovereignty in the context of a new and pluralistic 
political order that have been created within the European Union. Much of this 
                                                                                                                                               
B. A. Ünal, “İlk devir İslam düşüncesinde hakimiyet kavramı ve tezahürleri” (PhD diss., 
Dokuz Eylül University, 1997); S. Akkuş, “Modern egemenliğin doğuşu: Pratik ve 
kavramsal belirlenme” (PhD diss., İstanbul University, 1995); F. Ayşen, “İngiliz 
analitik pozitivizmi: John Austin'in hukuk ve egemenlik teorisi” (PhD diss., Ankara 
University, 1996). 
3R.B.J. Walker, Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 1. 
4Some of the noteworthy articles that treat the issue of national sovereignty within 
the context of the European integration process include Geoffrey Howe, “Sovereignty 
and Interdependence: Britain’s Place in the World,” International Affairs 66, no. 4 
(1990): 675-695; Robert Jackson, “Sovereignty in world politics: a glance at the 
conceptual and historical landscape”, Political Studies 47, (1999): 431-456; William 
Wallace, The sharing of sovereignty: the European paradox. Political Studies 37, 
(1999): 503-521; Hans Lindahl, “European integration: popular sovereignty and a 
politics of boundaries”, European Law Journal. 6, no. 3 (2000) 239-256; and James 
Caporaso, “Changes in the Wesphalian order: territory, public authority and 
sovereignty,” International Studies Association 2, no.2 (2000): 1-23. 
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challenge relates to the novel and definitionally unprecedented nature of the Union’s 
structure, which does not fit into the conventional categories of a state, a federation, or a 
confederation, yet it can neither be described as a traditional alliance of nation states. As 
Ulrich Preuss aptly puts it, the European Union “is a political form which is dynamic, 
heterogeneous and non-hierarchical and polycentric.”5 Hence, the impact of the 
European Union over the notion of sovereignty centers mainly on the following 
questions: (1) Can the traditional understanding of sovereignty as a zero-sum concept be 
sustained in face of the deepening and widening European Union? (2) How much 
national sovereignty should and could be ‘pooled’ in order to achieve a right balance 
between securing advantages to the Member States and ensuring an effective 
governance structure for the EU? (3) Is there a way to reconfigure and reconceptualize 
sovereignty beyond the nation-state? 
In this respect, Turkish integration into the European Union revitalizes the debate 
on sovereignty in Turkish politics, making it an interesting and key subject for political 
analysis. The new focus on the functioning of multilevel governance models at the 
European level challenges the classical conceptualization of sovereignty as a zero-sum 
notion, and at the same time destabilizes its exclusive relationship to the nation-state. 
This destabilization further politicizes the concept, making it a central signifier in 
discursive struggles that either try to defend or transform the prevailing doctrine of 
sovereignty in Turkey. This intensified debate simultaneously contributes to the 
resurfacing of perennial political conflicts surrounding the notion of sovereignty in the 
Turkish polity and thereby raises questions worth serious academic consideration. 
To this end, this dissertation offers an analysis of sovereignty as the ‘nodal point’ 
of evolving discursive formations in support of competing political values and demands 
as they take shape in the critical moments of Turkish political history. In so doing, the 
study in question focuses on the constitutive episodes of Turkish political life that are 
crucial to our understanding of what has become problematic about the concept of 
sovereignty today. In a ground-breaking book entitled Inside/Outside: International 
Relations as Political Theory, R.J.B. Walker states:   
   “Not surprisingly, the most perplexing problems associated with the 
concept of sovereignty arise precisely when this convergence on a 
monopoly of power and legitimate authority in a specific territory is 
challenged, whether on the basis of externality (by other competing 
                                                 
5Ulrich Preuss, “Two Challenges to European Citizenship,” Political Studies 44, 
(1996), 550. 
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sovereignties, which, by definition, are not supposed to be in the same place 
at once) or of hierarchical conceptions of authority (against which the 
exclusive claims of sovereignty were articulated in the first place).”6  
Agreeing with Walker’s assertion, the research conducted for the dissertation in 
question also observes that the discursive utilization of sovereignty becomes all the 
more central during periods when a certain form of ‘organic crisis’7 emerges in the 
prevailing order and a simultaneous need arises to reconstruct hegemonic formations to 
determine the course of the upcoming political order. Accordingly, this study identifies 
and concentrates on four crucial ‘moments’ or ‘episodes’, in which the diversified 
signifying roles of sovereignty and their lasting implications on the Turkish polity 
become crystallized: 
The first ‘moment’ focuses on the dislocations brought by the disintegration 
process of the Ottoman Empire, going hand in hand with efforts of modernization and 
Westernization given impetus through the Tanzimat period with the purpose of ‘saving 
the State’. In the context of a distressed search for a basis of political unity to assure the 
continuity of the multi-ethnoreligious Ottoman state, the Western-educated Ottoman 
intellectuals and statesmen of the period discover the solidifying and empowering 
potential that the idea of ‘popular sovereignty’ embodies and thereby discursively 
utilize it in the articulation of their demands for the introduction of a 
liberal/constitutional order against the absolutist dynastic rule of the Ottoman polity. 
Henceforth, the concept of sovereignty becomes a pivotal signifier within the ongoing 
political debate on how to ‘save the State’ polarized among the two antagonistic camps: 
On the one side, an Ottoman/Islamic version of ‘liberals’ (grouped under the label of 
Young Ottomans) propagating a constitutional order that would embody a certain notion 
of popular sovereignty vs. ‘conservatives’ safeguarding the traditional dynastic 
sovereignty, reflecting a unique synthesis of Islamic theology, Central Asian tribal 
                                                 
6R.B.J. Walker. Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 66. 
7In an attempt to situate the Gramscian notion of ‘organic crisis’ within discourse 
analysis and to reconfirm its continual relevance, Laclau and Mouffe provide a 
redefinition of the concept in the following way: “A conjuncture where there is a 
generalized weakening of the relational system defining the identities of a given social 
or political space, and where, as a result there is a proliferation of floating elements, is 
what we call following Gramsci, a conjuncture of organic crisis” quoted in Ernesto 
Laclau and Chantal Mouffe. Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical 
Democratic Politics. (London, New York: Verso, 1985), 136. 
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practices and Turco-Persian state traditions, as the best means to ensure the survival of 
the Empire.  
The second ‘moment’ concentrates on the creation of the Turkish nation-state 
through two parallel processes, namely an ‘external’ war of national independence 
fought against the Allies to define and consolidate the territorial frontiers of the new 
republic, along with an ‘internal’ battle to form a unified political bloc to be able to 
effectively construct a ‘nation’ out of the remains of the Ottoman population. In this 
critical conjuncture, the idea of ‘national sovereignty’ constitutes the nodal point of the 
newly emerging nationalist/republican discourse, constructed by the ideologues and the 
activists of Turkish nationalism against both the ‘external’ and the ‘internal’ enemy in 
order to sustain the legitimacy of its political project of demarcating and securing the 
boundaries of the new Turkish Republic both in terms of territory and population.  
The third ‘moment’ centers on the disruption engendered by the transition from a 
closed economic and political system to an increasingly globally integrated society, 
accompanied by a parallel transition from military rule to functioning party politics 
during the post-1980 Turkey. The challenge that this contradictory progression of 
globalization and fragmentation poses on the prevailing model of Turkish nation-state 
simultaneously exposes the ongoing tension over the legitimate source and location of 
sovereignty in the Turkish polity, debated within the context of a resilient conflict 
between ‘public will’ vs. ‘raison d’etat’. Consequently, the Turkish political space once 
again becomes increasingly divided and shaped along two opposing discourses 
produced by a ‘democratic’ coalition vs. ‘statist/republicanist’ coalition, where both 
camps instrumentalize the concept to hegemonize the shifting political order by 
articulating their own competing and irreconcilable demands around the nodal of 
sovereignty. 
The fourth and the final ‘moment’ of research deals with the transformation 
unleashed by Turkey’s ‘Europeanization’ and the accompanying ‘democratization’ 
process during the 2000s. Intensifying the political rupture created and sustained 
throughout the 1980s and the 1990s, this double movement leads to a dichotomically 
divided political space among the advocates of ‘full independence’ arguing that the EU 
integration means an ‘end’ to or ‘loss’ of national sovereignty vs. the advocates of ‘full 
membership,’ defending ‘pooling of sovereignty’ to the EU in return for further 
democratization and global integration of Turkey. At the same time, dynamics of the 
‘sovereignty battle’ instigated by the European integration process blurs the distinction 
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between the inside/outside, bringing forth a critical questioning of the domestic political 
system in place, which in return inevitably involves the problematization of the 
prevailing doctrine of sovereignty in Turkey.     
As the foregoing ‘moments’ reveal, sovereignty acts as an ‘empty-signifier’8 
within differing hegemonic ideological formations of Turkish politics such as 
Ottomanism, Turkish Nationalism, Republicanism, Statism, Second Republicanism 
(propagating a version of liberal democracy) and Europeanism, thereby assuming a 
constitutive function in the construction/reconstruction and the 
subversion/reconstitution of political frontiers and identities. Hence, as the Turkish 
cases under study illustrate, a critical questioning of the concept of sovereignty requires 
a break away from a legalistic and an essentialist approach, and instead making use of 
discursive methods to expose its problematic yet resilient function as an ‘empty-
signifier’, the conceptual content of which constantly becomes produced and 
reproduced to fulfill the exigencies of the competing ideologies of Turkish politics. This 
compelling task demands the clarification of two underlying assumptions made so far: 
(i) that sovereignty is a problematic, yet a resilient concept; and (ii) that discourse 
analysis/theory provides insightful methodological tools and logics necessary to address 
this paradox. Now we will turn our efforts to the substantiation of these assumptions:   
 
 
1.2. Rethinking Sovereignty as a Problematic, yet a Resilient Concept 
 
 
First, let us try to explain what is problematical about the concept of sovereignty: To 
start off, the concept of sovereignty is problematic because it is an “aggregate concept,” 
representing a definitional tangle made up of separate components at times in 
                                                 
8‘Empty-signifier’ is a conceptual tool offered within the discourse theory 
developed by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe in a number of critical texts, the most 
important ones being Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist 
Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics (London, New York Verso, 1985); 
Ernesto Laclau, Emancipation(s) (London, New York Verso, 1996); and Ernesto 
Laclau, On Populist Reason (London, New York Verso, 2005). This assertion will be 
taken up in detail in the section on methodology. 
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convergence with, yet at times in divergence from each other.9 The bringing together of 
distinct elements of territory, population (community, nation), authority, recognition 
and autonomy under a unitary principle proves particularly questionable when these 
components become more and more detached from each other in our contemporary 
polities. Given the contested nature of sovereignty and its embracement of a wide range 
of conflicting and mutually exclusive meanings, there are strong views, even in the 
early 20th century, arguing in favor of the disposal of the concept.10  More recently, the 
ambiguous nature of sovereignty has also been presented as a barrier to a serious 
political analysis; some arguing that its utilization should be avoided in scholarly works, 
leaving the concept for the rhetorical use of politicians.11 In fact, one commentator 
compared the concept of sovereignty to a Lego: “it is relatively a simple idea, but you 
can build almost anything with it, large or small as long as you follow the rules.”12 
Second, sovereignty is a problematic concept because its defining attributes – its 
indivisibility, inalienability and infallibility – are increasingly challenged in face of the 
growing plurality of today’s political life. In the current era characterized by a 
postmodern political order, the conceptualization of sovereignty as an illimitable and 
indivisible form of political power is undermined by a dual process: Sovereignty, 
conceived as tied to the nation state, (a) is challenged from above by forces of 
globalization and international forms of multilevel governance, (b) is challenged from 
below by increasing representational demands of regional/local groups and individuals. 
This double-sided erosion makes it necessary to treat sovereignty as a concept in 
                                                 
9James A. Caporaso, “Changes in the Wesphalian order: territory, public authority 
and sovereignty” International Studies Association 2, no.2 (2000): 1-23. 
10Some of the most important early critiques of the theory sovereignty can be 
found in Harold J. Laski, The foundations of sovereignty and other essays. (New York: 
Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1921); Baron S. A. Korff, “The problem of 
sovereignty,” The American Political Science Review 17, no.3 (1923): 404-414; Jacques 
Maritain, “The concept of sovereignty,” The American Political Science Review 44, no. 
2 (1950): 343-357; Stanley I. Benn, “The uses of sovereignty,” Political Studies 3, no.2 
(1955): 109 -122 
11This line of argumentation can be found in Richard Falk, “Sovereignty,” in The 
Oxford Companion to Politics of World, ed. Joel Krieger (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1993); Michael Newman, Democracy, Sovereignty and the European Union, 
(New York: St. Martins Press, 1995); Clive Crook, “When Confusion about 
Sovereignty Reigns,” National Journal 33, no.28 (2001): 2215-2216. 
12Robert H. Jackson, “Sovereignty in World Politics: A Glance at the conceptual 
and historical landscape,” Political Studies 47, (1999): 431. 
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continuous transformation and accordingly puts its seemingly stable foundations and 
attributes under question. Henceforth, the problematic nature of sovereignty, 
particularly crystallized within the current conditions of intensified fragmentation and 
globalization, lead many contemporary scholars to suggest its ‘end’.13  
Nevertheless, sovereignty endures as a pivotal concept in politics despite its 
alleged demise. The persistence of sovereignty can in part be explained in linkage to its 
institution into effective and evolving discourses in support of specific ideologies. Here 
it is useful to first return to the ideas of Michel Foucault, where he extends a 
genealogical critique to conventional theory of state, the underlying assumption of 
which rests on the formal acceptance of the principle of sovereignty. In this regard, the 
collection of his lecture notes from College de France (1975-1976) under the title 
Society Must Be Defended offers a path-breaking insight as to the way in which the 
concept of sovereignty should be reviewed and rethought in relation to its 
embeddedness into discourses and systems of power.  
Foucault’s critical re-theorization treats the problem of sovereignty outside of the 
legal domain and involves a diversion of attention to the often neglected national 
dimension of sovereignty. In so doing, Foucault’s main interest lies in showing the 
complex relationship between the theory of sovereignty and the contemporary questions 
of identity and authority. Empowered by the principle of sovereignty, a concept which, 
in Foucault’s view, has become the protective embodiment of central state power and 
collective identity, the nation-state creates “spatiotemporal forms of exclusion and 
judgment.”14 For Foucault, in order to be able to analyze the intricate web of power 
relations embedded in our contemporary world, we should start off by thinking juridico-
political theory of sovereignty as an ideology and as an organizing principle behind the 
great juridical codes.  
After a lengthy exposition of the various historical roles that the theory of 
sovereignty has played in support of changing authority structures ranging from the 
                                                 
13Examples of this suggestion can be found in Joseph A. Camilleri and Jim Falk, 
The end of sovereignty?: the politics of a shrinking and fragmenting world. (Aldershot 
and Hants, England: E. Elgar, 1992); Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized 
hypocrisy. (Princeton, N.J. Chichester: Princeton University Press, 1999) and Stephen 
D. Krasner, “Sovereignty,” Foreign Policy 122, (2001): 20-27.  
14Andrew W. Neal, “Cutting off the King’s Head: Foucault’s Society Must be 
Defended and the Problem of Sovereignty,” Alternatives 29, (2004): 395. 
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reinforcement of absolute monarchies to the creation of Republics,15 Foucault tries to 
explain why and under what conditions the concept has survived, despite the fact that 
the introduction of a new power regime in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (a 
disciplinary system based on constant surveillance and power exercised over bodies 
through a multitude of techniques and procedures) challenged the power system based 
on the Hobbesian-derived conception of sovereignty. Below is conclusion that Foucault 
reaches, expressed in his own words:            
   “I think there are two reasons. On the one hand, the theory of sovereignty 
was, in the seventeenth and even the nineteenth century, a permanent 
critical instrument to be used against the monarchy and all the obstacles that 
stood in the way of the development of the disciplinary society. On the 
other hand, this theory, and the organization of a juridical code that centered 
upon it, made it possible to superimpose on the mechanism of discipline a 
system of right that concealed its mechanisms and erased the element of 
domination and the techniques of domination involved in discipline, and 
which finally guaranteed that everyone could exercise his or her own 
sovereign rights thanks to the sovereignty of the State.”16  
Here, it is important to underline that the primary function of the theory of 
sovereignty is conceived to help conceal the mechanisms of domination present in our 
societies. In the Foucauldian approach, it is in this framework of concealment of power 
relations that the theory of sovereignty becomes incorporated in the juridical apparatus 
and thereby manages to persist until the present. Thus, in order to disclose the 
prevalence of power relations today, Foucault suggests that we need to first finally 
discard the theory of sovereignty – or to put it more symbolically, we need to really “cut 
off the king’s head” – and replace it by a theory of domination. This replacement would 
reveal relations of domination rather than sources of sovereignty, where we would no 
longer “try to trace their origins back to that which gives them their basic legitimacy” 
but instead, we would “identify the technical instruments that guarantee that they 
function.”17 Yet Foucault himself admits the difficulty of getting rid of the concept of 
sovereignty since it has become one of the most indispensable instruments of a 
‘normalizing society’ intertwined with the concept of governmentality:  
                                                 
15Michel Foucault, Society must be defended: lectures at the Collège de France, 
1975-76, ed. Mauro Bertani and Allessandro Fontana, trans. David Macey (London: 
Allen Lane, The Penguin Press, 2003): 35-40.   
16Michel Foucault, Society must be defended: lectures at the Collège de France, 
1975-76), 37. 
17Ibid. 46. 
 10
   “The notion of a government of population renders all the more acute the 
problem of the foundation of sovereignty (consider Rousseau) and all the 
more acute equally the necessity for the development of discipline (consider 
all the history of the disciplines, which I have attempted to analyze 
elsewhere).  
   Accordingly, we need to see things not in terms of replacement of society 
of sovereignty by a disciplinary society and the subsequent replacement by 
a society of government; in reality one has a triangle, sovereignty-
discipline-government, which has its primary target the population and as its 
essential mechanism the apparatuses of security.”18  
Following the direction of Foucault, the leading representatives of the 
deconstructionist approach to the question of sovereignty such as R.B.J. Walker, Jens 
Bartelson, Thomas J. Biersteker and Cynthia Weber profoundly challenge the 
conventional understanding that presents the concept as ‘fixed’, ‘natural’ and ‘neutral’. 
Instead, they expose the various dimensions of the historical construction of sovereignty 
by particular societies and for the purposes of shifting ideologies and argue that 
sovereignty is first and foremost a political concept with a full history of contestation, 
colonization and radical transformation.19  
The two remarkable books, State Sovereignty as Social Construct20 and 
Simulating Sovereignty21 offer a Foucauldian approach to the question of sovereignty, 
where the writers utilize poststructuralist techniques to theorize and illustrate the 
practices which have socially constructed, reconstructed and deconstructed various 
conceptions of sovereignty. Biersteker and Weber’s approach is particularly important 
for underlining the central role of social recognition as a vital component of sovereignty 
along with territory, population and authority.22 By analyzing diplomatic documents and 
practices in three distinct periods, namely during the Concert of Europe, President 
                                                 
18Michel Foucault, “Governmentality.” The essential works of Michel Foucault, 
1954-1984.  Ed. Paul Rabinow. (New York: New Press, 1997), 219. 
19Among the leading representative works of the deconstructionist approach are 
Jens Bartelson, Genealogy Sovereignty. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1995); Thomas J. Biersteker and Cynthia Weber, eds., State sovereignty as social 
construct. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) and R.B.J. Walker, 
Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1993). 
20Thomas J. Biersteker and Cynthia Weber, eds., State sovereignty as social 
construct. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 
21Cynthia Weber, Simulating sovereignty: intervention, the state, and symbolic 
exchange. (Cambridge, UK and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995). 
22Thomas J. Biersteker and Cynthia Weber, eds., State sovereignty as social 
construct, 3. 
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Wilson’s rule, and the Reagan and Bush administrations’ interventions in Panama, 
Weber reveals that “discourses on sovereignty have been the deliberations of political 
leaders according to their shifting political needs” and that “the meaning of sovereignty 
becomes fixed or stabilized historically to write the state via practices of political 
intervention.”23 Rather than trying to define what sovereignty is, these writers attempt to 
deconstruct the concept by problematizing its historical foundations, particularly 
questioning its exclusive linkage to the modern nation-state. R. B. J. Walker also 
problematizes the ‘modern’ approach to sovereignty by arguing that: 
   “The principle of state sovereignty is less an abstract legal claim than an 
exceptionally dense political principle. As a response to the problem of 
proliferating autonomies in a world of dissipating hierarchies, it articulates 
a specifically modern account of political space, and does so through the 
resolution of three fundamental contradictions. It resolves in brief, the 
relation between unity and diversity, between the internal and the external 
and between space and time.”24  
Given its function in reinforcing antagonisms, Walker offers to rethink 
sovereignty as a “barrier concept”, promoting a divisive political culture between 
nationalist exclusionism on one hand, and international engagement at the level of the 
modern state on the other. At a time where nation-states possess less and less capacity 
and absolute authority to resolve contradictions between humanity, national citizenship 
and local identities, the continuous utilization of the concept of sovereignty is closely 
linked to the need to uphold ‘barriers’ between ‘the inside’ and ‘the outside’ and to this 
end provides nothing much more than ‘a basis for rhetoric and chauvinisms’.25 One 
other work worth mentioning here is Jens Bartelson’s A Genealogy of Sovereignty: 
Building on the theoretical approach provided by Foucault, Bartelson offers a 
genealogical critique of the modern notion of sovereignty by illustrating that 
sovereignty and knowledge implicate each other logically and produce each other 
historically in various turning points throughout the European past including the 
Renaissance, the Classical Age and the Modernity. In Bartelson’s account too, the 
discourse on sovereignty functions to separate the outside from the inside by acting like 
a ‘parergon,’ – a frame that separates a painting from its outer surrounding. By 
highlighting the discursive shifts in the historical usage of the principle of sovereignty, 
                                                 
23Cynthia Weber, Simulating sovereignty: intervention, the state, and symbolic 
exchange. 
24R.B.J. Walker, Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory, 154. 
25Ibid. 155.    
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Bartelson asks the question whether or not we have come to a stage in our ‘post-
modern societies’ where we should start conceptualizing political order beyond or 
without the state.  
In short, all the above-mentioned works contribute to the exposition of the 
discursive usage of sovereignty in accordance with the exigencies of altering time, 
space and political system. Faced with the uncertainty of social and political change, 
constantly evolving practices of statesmen and ideologues instrumentalize the concept 
of sovereignty in relation to attempts to create and fix frontiers between external vs. 
internal, friend vs. enemy, state vs. society, individual vs. community. The fluidity 
created by the constant construction, reconstruction, definition and redefinition of 
sovereignty by shifting political motives, in return, assures its survival. In a way, the 
vagueness associated with the concept of sovereignty functions as its strategy of 
perpetuation, confirming the below assertion by Bartelson: 
“Thus, ambiguity and centrality go hand in hand, and concepts which are 
both central and ambiguous tend to become constitutive and foundational, 
and conversely.”26  
Thus, the significance of sovereignty prevails as its conceptual content changes 
through endless discursive reconfigurations of its components to respond to new 
historical and political circumstances. This is the paradox - the problematic yet the 
persistent character of sovereignty - that makes it an interesting object of study. Now, 
we will approach the question of method that will be utilized in this research to 
investigate the repercussions of this paradox within the critical turning points in Turkish 
politics. 
 
1.3. Methodology of Research  
 
While falling into the general category of interpretive theory,27 this study makes 
use of post-structuralist paradigms and insights that particularly focus on explaining the 
production and logic of discourses. More specifically, informed by the Foucauldian 
                                                 
26Jens Bartelson, The Critique of the State. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2001), 11. 
27A detailed account on the ‘interpretive theory’ within methods and approches to 
political science can be found in David Marsh and Gerry Stoker, Theory and Method in 
Political Science. (Hampshire, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 1995c) 
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archeological and genealogical approaches to discourse analysis, the Lacanian 
psychoanalysis, and the deconstructive techniques of Derrida, this dissertation takes its 
methodological lead from Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe’s discourse-theoretic 
approach to social inquiry, a research project which has now become institutionalized 
within ‘Essex School’.28 Laclau and Mouffe’s method of studying political discourses 
involves a set of key categories and underlying assumptions, which need some further 
elaboration here since they are central to the theoretical framework applied within this 
study:  
To start off, we need to clarify what Laclau and Mouffe mean by a discourse: A 
discourse is conceptualized as a “structured totality resulting from the articulatory 
practices that establish a relation among elements such that their identity is modified as 
a result of this articulatory practice”.29 To be more lucid, a discourse can be conceived 
as a historically specific system of meaningful practices that form the identities of 
subjects and objects. Within this perspective, the category of ‘discourse’ is not confined 
to the area of speech and writing, but refers to “any complex of elements in which 
relations play the constitutive role”.30 Taken in this broader sense, a discursive analysis 
concentrates on the dislocation, creation, disruption, and transformation of political 
frontiers and identities and in this respect the analysis of relations built around the 
primacy of political concepts such as hegemony and antagonisms become pivotal.  
By exposing the innate instability and contingency of these relations over time, 
this anti-foundational approach to discourse analysis puts special emphasis on the 
contextual dimension of the construction and formation of identities and systems 
through ongoing historical and social change as a result of political practices. At the 
same time, the production and penetration of novel ideologies31 into social relations 
                                                 
28One of the most important books that collects together a number of valuable 
articles that apply Laclau and Mouffe’s methodological approach to discourse analysis 
is David Howarth, Aletta J. Norval, and Yannis Stavrakakis, Discourse theory and 
political analysis: Identities, hegemonies and social change. (Manchester and New 
York: Manchester University Press, 2000). For a critical evaluation of the ‘Essex 
School’ please see Jules Townshend, “Laclau and Mouffe’s Hegemonic Project: The 
Story So Far”, Political Studies 52, (2004): 269–288.  
29Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards 
a Radical Democratic Politics. (London, New York: Verso, 1985): 105. 
30Ernesto Laclau, On Populist Reason. (London, New York: Verso, 2005): 68. 
31Ideologies are not thought of as ‘simple systems of ideas’ but as they become 
inscribed in institutions and social practices, as discussed in Ernesto Laclau and Chantal 
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through time - where ideologies cannot be separated from such relations but should be 
conceived as constitutive of them - emerge as a crucial area of research within the 
discourse-theoretical framework. In so doing, discursive methods bring ‘history’ back 
into political science.32  
Laclau and Mouffe employ a number of other key categories that constitute the 
conceptual framework of the method; yet here we will only concentrate on the basic 
concepts that are relevant to the purposes of this study: 
 
1.3.1. Antagonisms and Logics of Equivalence and Difference  
 
Discourses are engendered through the construction of antagonisms, which 
become produced when “the presence of the “Other” prevents me from being totally 
myself. The relation arises not from full totalities, but from the impossibility of their 
constitution”.33 Thereby, the concept of antagonism offers one of the main tools to help 
understand the process of identity formation through its exposition of this ongoing 
tension between the self and the other. Antagonisms rise from this impossibility of a 
final suture and “an antagonistic camp is fully represented as the negative reverse of a 
popular identity, which would not exist without that negative reference”.34 As there 
would be no possibility of totality without exclusion,35 the upholding of an antagonistic 
frontier requires a heterogeneous other that inevitably destabilizes the ‘inside’ or as 
Laclau expresses it, “the opaqueness of an irretrievable ‘outside’ will always tarnish the 
very categories that define the inside’.36 
Given this constitutive and therefore irrevocable conflict between the 
inside/outside, Laclau and Mouffe offers two opposed, yet related ways of constructing 
discursive systems that attempt to hegemonize social space: In the first mode, a logic of 
                                                                                                                                               
Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics, 
109. 
32Jules Townshend, “Laclau and Mouffe’s Hegemonic Project: The Story So Far,” 
286. 
33Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards 
a Radical Democratic Politics, 109. 
34Ernesto Laclau, On Populist Reason,140. 
35Ibid.78. 
36Ibid.152. 
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difference is employed to weaken and displace antagonistic polarities to create a 
fissureless society. Thus, “the moment of homogeneity coincides with the logic of 
difference”, where identities become constructed through non-adversarial, ‘positive’ 
differences, relegating political confrontation to the periphery of society.37 The second 
contradictory way, which is labeled as the logic of equivalence, condenses meaning 
around two antagonistic camps by stressing the sameness of particular demands and 
identities as a result of a perceived common ‘negative’, threat or enemy. Thereby, this 
second logic seeks to simplify and divide social space through an antagonistic political 
frontier, which requires ‘the partial surrender of particularity of social demands’ and 
puts emphasis on ‘what all particularities have equivalentially in common’. 38 
To clarify how these two conceptual frameworks operate within politics, Laclau 
and Mouffe present the two ‘extreme’ cases, namely the millenarian movement vs. 
Disraeli’s project to create ‘one nation’.39 The millenarian movement constitutes an 
example of a logic of equivalence that divides social space around two antagonistic 
poles first through a chain of equivalences that it constructs around the peasant culture; 
next, through the creation of a political frontier between this structured totality of the 
‘peasant culture’ vs. the ‘urban culture’ incarnating all evil. In the opposite direction, 
Disraeli, in order to overcome the division of society among the poor and the rich and to 
construct ‘one nation’ out of this rupture, attempts to break the system of equivalences 
through differential absorption and simultaneous transformation of demands into 
‘positivities’. Disraeli’s project is conceived as instrumental in preparing the 
groundwork for the later development of the Welfare State, which represents “the 
moment of the positivist illusion that the ensemble of the social can be absorbed in the 
intelligible and ordered framework of a society”.40 
However, it should also be underlined that the relationship between the two logics 
is not mutually exclusive, instead a complex interaction between the equivalential and 
differential logics is foreseen, where all identity becomes constructed within this 
ongoing tension. Even a neo-liberal ideology undertaking a logic of difference can 
create the necessary conditions for the emergence of Thatcherism, which in turn 
                                                 
37Ernesto Laclau, On Populist Reason,155. 
38Ibid. 78. 
39Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards 
a Radical Democratic Politics, 129-130. 
40Ibid.129. 
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employs an aggressive discourse of social division based on a new political frontier 
created between the ‘parasites of the social system’ and the ‘responsible citizens’.41 
While the concepts of antagonism, differential and equivalential logics contribute to the 
explanation of discursive methods, these practices make use of certain privileged 
signifiers or reference points, which help to bind together a ‘chain of signification’, 
making the creation of frontiers and thereby the formation of social identities possible. 
This is what we will focus on next:  
 
1.3.2. Empty-Signifiers, Floating-Signifiers and Nodal Points 
 
Laclau provides a detailed elaboration on the category of the ‘empty-signifier’ in a 
section entitled ‘Why do Empty Signifiers Matter to Politics?’ in Emancipation(s) and 
develops this concept further in relation to populism in his latest book On Populist 
Reason. Empty-signifiers constitute and simultaneously express the equivalential 
chains, the necessary articulatory practices for conditions of hegemonic identity 
formations to emerge. Thus, operation of hegemonic logic depends on the 
production/reproduction of this emptiness, conceptualized not as a structural location 
but rather as a type of identity42 that can never fully become fixed or stabilized. In the 
most simplistic form of explanation, “empty-signifiers arise from the need to name an 
object which is both necessary and impossible.”43 As discourse theory reveals, based on 
the premises of Lacanian psychoanalysis,44 since the social can never come to a closure, 
it is the practices within the field of discursivity that endeavor to ‘fill’ this lack of social 
suture by producing ‘empty-signifiers’. In this framework, empty- signifiers function as 
nodal points that weave together a chain of equivalences around which hegemonic 
                                                 
41Ernesto Laclau, On Populist Reason, 79. 
42Ibid.166. 
43Ibid. 72. 
44Here, Laclau and Mouffe draw their ideas from Lacanian psychoanalysis, where 
individual’s desire for ‘fullness’ is never realized since a stable identity constructed in 
oneness with the ‘other’ is unattainable due to the “the primordial ‘lack’. As a result, the 
self never ceases to seek full recognition by the ‘other’ and therefore remains always in 
doubt, (Jacques Lacan, Ecrits: A Selection. (London: Tavistock, 1977)). From this 
hypothesis, Laclau and Mouffe conclude that the ‘other’ in all its symbolic forms is 
always blamed for the impossible wholeness of the self identity (Ernesto Laclau and 
Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic 
Politics, 125); ergo, the ongoing and irrevocable tension between the inside/outside.  
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discursive practices attempt to manage societies on the basis of such (impossible) ideals, 
or horizons.45  
In the below passage, Laclau explains how ‘order’ and ‘justice’ can function as 
‘empty-signifiers,’ through which different political movements aim to fulfill their own 
political objectives. In other words, competing political forces make use of these same 
‘empty-signifiers’ in trying to formulate hegemonic practices that try to partially 
‘totalize’ the social:     
   “It would be a waste of time trying to give a positive definition of 
‘order’ or ‘justice’ – that is to ascribe to them a conceptual content, 
however minimal it might be. The semantic role of these terms is not to 
express any positive content but as we have seen, to function as names 
of a fullness, which is constitutively absent. It is because there is no 
human situation in which an injustice of some kind or another does not 
exist that ‘justice’ as a term makes sense. Since it names an 
undifferentiated fullness, it has no conceptual content whatsoever: it is 
not an abstract term, but, in the strictest sense, empty. A discussion of 
whether a just society will be brought about by a fascist or a socialist 
order does not proceed as a logical deduction starting from a concept of 
‘justice’ accepted by the two sides, but through a radical investment 
whose discursive steps are not logico-conceptual connections but 
attributive-performative ones.”46 
For the purposes of this research, two very important underlying assumptions of 
the above argumentation of Laclau should be particularly underlined: (i) it is precisely 
this ‘conceptual emptiness’ that contributes to solidify a political camp and gives it a 
coherent unity to carry on its totalizing effects. In this sense, the ‘vagueness’ and the 
‘indeterminability’ of the ‘empty-signifiers’ should not be associated with any 
ideological or political under development, but on the contrary these attributes indeed 
work to strengthen their ‘totalizing’ potentials.47 (ii) Second, emphasis should be put on 
the fact that the ‘empty-signifier’ does not have a positive identity of its own, but rather 
similar to that of Lacan’s object petit a, or Zizek’s quilting point, it becomes a name for 
constituting that much-needed unity. In Laclau’s own words, “The impossibility of 
fixing the unity of a social formation in any conceptually graspable object leads to the 
centrality of naming in constituting that unity while the need for a social cement to 
                                                 
45David Howarth, Aletta J. Norval, and Yannis Stavrakakis, Discourse theory 
and political analysis: Identities, hegemonies and social change, 8. 
46Ernesto Laclau, On Populist Reason, 96 – 97. 
47Ibid.98-99. 
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assemble the heterogeneous elements once their logic of articulation (functionalist or 
structuralist) no longer gives this affect its centrality in social explanation”48  
Thus, naming and the addition of an affective component are exactly the crucial 
attributive-performative practices that establish the link between discourse theory and 
rhetorical strategies and devices.49 Here, it should be especially stressed that the 
construction of ‘people’ and political frontiers cannot be conceived possible or 
successful without this so-called radical investment that builds the following signifying 
chain: a discursive or hegemonic formation, articulated by differential or equivalential 
logics, depends upon the production/reproduction of ‘empty-signifiers’, which in return 
is incoherent without naming and is ineffective without the dimension of affection.50  
With regards to conceptual tools that will be used in the context of this 
dissertation, one final categorical distinction is in order, namely that of between the 
‘empty-signifier’ and the ‘floating-signifier.’ The core of this distinction lies in the 
developing complexity and the multi-faceted nature of political frontiers. Laclau argues 
that whereas ‘empty-signifiers’ function more effectively in cases of more pronounced 
and fixed political frontiers between the two antagonistic camps, ‘floating-signifiers’ 
assume more preeminence within the complex web of political/social/economic 
relations of our world of ‘globalized capitalism,’ where the shifting interaction between 
the global and the local, or between the particular and the universal, requires constant 
production/reproduction, construction/deconstruction of these frontiers.51 
Thus both empty and floating signifiers form nodal points, “privileged signifiers 
or reference points (‘points de capiton’ in the Lacanian vocabulary) in a discourse that 
bind together a particular system of meaning or ‘chain of signification.”52 As a result, 
all the foregoing logics and concepts link up and interact to produce and sustain a 
hegemony, where in return the survival of this hegemonic formation depends on its 
ability to constantly create and stabilize nodal points, underlining the interdependence 
between the two processes. As Laclau and Mouffe express:  
                                                 
48Ernesto Laclau, On Populist Reason, x.  
49Ibid.106-108. 
50Ibid.110.    
51Ibid.133. 
52David Howarth, Aletta J. Norval, and Yannis Stavrakakis, Discourse theory and 
political analysis: Identities, hegemonies and social change, 8. 
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   “Thus the two conditions of a hegemonic articulation are the presence of 
antagonistic forces and the instability of frontiers that separate them. Only 
the presence of a vast area of floating elements and the possibility of their 
articulation to opposite camps – which implies to constant redefinition of 
the latter – is what constitutes the terrain permitting us to define a practice 
as hegemonic. Without equivalence and without frontiers, it is impossible to 
speak strictly of hegemony.”53  
While the above discussion provides an overview of the main theoretical concepts 
and logics of the discursive research method that will employed throughout the study in 
question, this dissertation, as any social inquiry based on discourse theory would, will 
consider a wide range of linguistic and non-linguistic data as its materials of analysis. 
In terms of linguistic data, along with an investigation of canonical texts; newspaper 
articles, speeches, party programs, manifestos, reports, interviews and some legal 
documents such as the respective Turkish Constitutions will be analyzed. As this study 
approaches discourse analysis in the broader sense defined above, its research will not 
be limited to textual materials, but will also include different sets of signifying 
practices such as historical events, policies, and at times institutional structures as long 
as they are deemed relevant to the emergence and persistence of discourses under 
scrutiny.  
In order to achieve the above-outlined objective through the application of the 
theoretical framework and conceptual tools provided by discourse analysis, this study 
will be structured in five main chapters, along with an introductory and a concluding 
section: The first chapter will offer a critical evaluation of the modern theories of 
sovereignty as they become constructed into divergent political discourses in Europe 
with the advent of the central state. This survey is deemed important since in many 
aspects the European discourses on sovereignty offer arguments and ideas that prove 
influential in and instrumental for the way in which the modern idea of sovereignty 
takes root in Turkish politics. The in-built strengths and weaknesses associated with the 
modern European conceptions of sovereignty are in many ways reflected on to the 
discursive formations and usages of the concept of sovereignty in the Turkish polity. 
The remaining four chapters concentrate on the critical ‘moments’ of dislocation, 
creation, disruption and transformation in Turkish politics as they have been discussed 
and contextualized in the first section of this introduction. The textual evidence treated 
in these cases confirm the above discussed assertion that it is precisely the conceptual 
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‘vagueness’ and ‘indeterminability’ of ‘empty-signifiers’ that enhance their strength 
and ability in uniting disparate movements into hegemonic discursive formations that 
attempt to ‘totalize’ social space in the shape of their competing political ideals.   
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2.  BACKGROUND: HISTORICO-THEORETICAL CONSTRUCTION OF 
SOVEREIGNTY IN MODERN POLITICS 
 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
 
This chapter surveys the historico-theoretical construction of sovereignty into one 
of the cornerstones and organizing principles of modern politics. In so doing, it 
critically examines the ideas of the leading theoreticians and ideologues of Western 
political thought, which have been influential upon the demarcation of various 
discursive utilizations of the concept from the 16th century to the early 20th century. 
Henceforth, rather than attempting to offer a single authoritative definition of 
sovereignty, the chapter seeks to highlight multiple roles that the concept has played 
within changing social and political circumstances, particularly in relation to its 
association with the ideologies of absolutism, constitutionalism, republicanism and 
nationalism.  
The chapter also focuses on the modus operandi through which the modern 
concept of sovereignty has become tied to the idea of the nation-state, with the purpose 
of supporting the legitimacy of the efforts at ‘nation’ and ‘state’ building, the reigning 
twin ideals in continental Europe from the 17th until the 20th centuries. To this end, the 
evolving sources, loci, and attributes of sovereignty subject to shifting political needs in 
question are examined. The chapter concludes with an elaboration on the works of the 
early critiques of sovereignty at the outset of the 20th century in order to illustrate the 
existence of a thought-provoking counter discourse in opposition to the predominant 
views on sovereignty during the era of the triumphant nation-state. Building onto the 
works of Locke, the early critical theories expose the inherent inhibiting features and 
fragile foundations of the concept of sovereignty and present an alternative, though 
feeble, discourse on the problems associated with the prevailing doctrine of sovereignty.  
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Before proceeding, two methodological precautions are in order: First, since 
sovereignty is one of the most-debated key concepts of modern political theory, the 
selection of representative theoreticians unavoidably involves some element of 
arbitrariness. However, the below identification of theoreticians represents the results of 
a through examination of studies considered now classical on the history of the theories 
of sovereignty,54 and, as it will be argued later in the chapter, each of these writers mark 
a decisive turning point in the construction of fundamental conceptualizations of 
sovereignty. Second, since the dissertation in question remains within the discipline of 
political science, it should be underlined that the below analysis concentrates mainly on 
the political theories of sovereignty, leaving aside in most cases legal and international 
relations theories and debates surrounding the principle of sovereignty. 
 
 
2.2. Absolutism and the Discourse on Sovereignty  
 
 
The concept of sovereignty has begun its long career as one of the cardinal 
concepts in modern thinking about the state at the time when feudal forces were losing 
ground and chaos was reigning over Europe. With the revitalization of Roman law and 
the heightened interest in the writings of Aristotle, and along with theoretical 
advancements on the necessity of a central authority, sovereignty gradually developed 
into a customary principle throughout the 16th century into the 17th century. In the 
development of sovereignty into a concrete principle of international politics, two 
important historical events need to be pointed out: the Treaty of Augsburg (1555) and 
the Peace of Westphalia (1648). The Treaty of Augsburg, which granted each German 
principality the right to determine whether or not its territory would be Lutheran or 
Catholic, served to affirm the independence of each ‘state’ from external interference. 
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The Peace of Westphalia, which  terminated the Thirty Years War, as well as the the 
Eighty Years' War by the signing of Treaty of Osnabrück and the Treaty of Münster 
among the Holy Roman Emperor, Ferdinand III Habsburg, the other German princes, 
Spain, France, Sweden and the Dutch Republic, opened the way to the establishment of  
an international system of states based on the concept of sovereignty.55 While these 
historical events introduced the principle so-called ‘Westphalian sovereignty’ resting on 
the twin notions of territoriality and the exclusion of external actors from domestic 
decision-making structures, it is widely accepted that the notion of sovereignty found its 
first elaborate theoretical formulation in the works of Jean Bodin.  
Bodin wrote his seminal work Les Six Livres de la Republique (The Six Books of 
the Commonwealth) in 1576, in times of great political instability characterized by a 
widespread religious hostility and a fierce conflict between feudal forces in face of 
demise of the royal authority in France. The forty years old civil war between Catholics 
and Huguenots was at its peak and the situation in France resembled the period of War 
of the Roses and the Puritan Revolution in England.56 Surrounded by such conditions, 
Bodin, a fervent supporter of les Politiques, the nationalist party that saw the interests of 
the State clearly above religious or individual concerns, felt the urgency of devising a 
theory that would establish a unique and indisputable source of authority to maintain 
law and stability.  
In order to avoid chaos, the central authority should exercise supreme authority 
(summa potestas) in a given territory; yet this authority had to be legitimate and 
therefore given legal recognition. To Bodin, a jurist by education, the solution was in 
the establishment of a principle that he called souveraineté. He described sovereignty as 
the “absolute and perpetual power of a Commonwealth (Republique).”57   
                                                 
55A further elaboration of the emergence of sovereignty as an international 
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the politics of a shrinking and fragmenting world, 12-15.  
56 William A. Dunning, “Jean Bodin on sovereignty,” Political Science Quarterly 
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57 In the later Latin translations of The Six Books of the Commonwealth, 
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Sovereignty since Rousseau, 7. 
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In Bodin’s formulation, one of the underlying attributes of sovereignty was its 
absoluteness. The defining essence of sovereignty was closely related to the idea of 
legibus solutus, referring to a supreme authority without constraints. Naturally for 
Bodin, sovereignty was located in the monarch, which was to be free from any higher 
lawgiver in a given territory. Although he admitted that aristocracy or democracy might 
be endowed with attributes of sovereignty, his deep distrust for the rule by the people 
guided his preferences towards monarchy. In fact, for Bodin, the idea of a public, a 
populus, was very similar to a disorderly mob.58  
While different readings on the relation between the Sovereign and citizens exist 
within the rich body of literature on Bodin’s conceptualization of sovereignty, most 
agree that Bodin sees the Sovereign separate from and transcendent over the people. As 
Maritain explains,  
   “Since the people have absolutely deprived and divested themselves of 
their total power in order to transfer it to the Sovereign, and invest him 
with it, then the Sovereign is no longer a part of the people and the body 
politic: he is “divided from the people.” He has been made into a whole, a 
separate and transcendent whole – ruling entire body politic from above. 
That is why this power is absolute and consequently unlimited as to its 
extension as well as to its duration and unaccountable anything on 
earth.”59   
In a certain way Bodin presented the subjection to power of the Sovereign as the 
sole test of citizenship. There can be no right to rebellion, Bodin argued, only except 
against a “tyrant without a title”.60 The locus of supreme legislative power resided in the 
Sovereign and the only constraints that could limit his authority were the divine or 
natural laws. In addition to the laws of God and Nature, Bodin held that the Sovereign 
could be also be limited by the laws of the Nation, the customary laws of the land often 
known as the leges imperii, though he was quite unclear about their exact content.61 In 
as much as Bodin imposed certain limitations on the Sovereign, he nevertheless failed 
to explain the consequences of a possible transgression of these limits. Yet evidently, 
the Sovereign was placed above the law in Bodin’s account. While the Sovereign was 
portrayed as being subordinate to the law of god, nature and the nation, the question of 
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what would happen if the sovereign will violated the law remained unanswered in 
Bodin. As Hearnshaw rightly points out: 
   “Bodin ends, in spite of all his apparent concessions and seeming 
surrenders, with a strong affirmation of the supreme authority of the secular 
sovereign. There are many things, it is true which the Sovereign Power 
ought not to do; it ought not to violate the laws of God, Nature, or Nations; 
it ought not to depart from such fundamental constitutional customs as the 
Sallic Law; it ought not to interfere with the patria potestas; it ought not to 
meddle with private property; it ought not to tax subjects without their 
consent; it ought not to legislate without consulting the Estates and so on. 
But if it does any of these things which it ought not to do, there is no earthly 
power capable of calling it into account.”62  
Besides its absoluteness, in Bodin’s system of thought, sovereignty was also 
featured as indivisible. In a given polity, there could be only one Sovereign, whose 
supreme power could not be shared nor divided. Moreover, for Bodin, the sovereign 
authority was perpetual, not confined to a certain period time. The person endowed with 
sovereignty ought to exercise it throughout his whole life. While Bodin clearly defined 
the nature of sovereignty as absolute, indivisible and perpetual, his remarks were less 
clear as to its inalienability.  
The theory of sovereignty, thus formulated in the works of Bodin, emerged as a 
useful tool to legitimize the reign of the monarchs in France and provided the theoretical 
basis for the development of absolutism into a concrete ideology. Faced against the 
power of feudal localities, Bodin’s theory of sovereignty supported the idea that the 
state power should be free from external and internal constraints and that the political 
power should be vested in a single source. In so arguing, Bodin provided the necessary 
theoretical tools in defense of the central authority against the forces of particularism 
and regionalism, and thereby helped to counter the balance in the name of the former.  
Coming almost eighty years after Bodin’s influential writings, Thomas Hobbes’s 
Leviathan offered one of the most precise logical theories on the basis of political 
legitimacy and on the need of establishing a Sovereign.63 Similar to Bodin, Hobbes also 
wrote Leviathan in times of civil war in England and his main objective was to rid the 
English polity from any kind of dualism inherent in the notion of a body politic made up 
of a monarch and the people. For Hobbes, an omnipotent sovereign was the only 
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alternative against anarchy and the establishment and the maintenance of an orderly 
state was closely linked to the institution of sovereignty. Unlike Bodin, Hobbes made 
the origin and the source of sovereignty very clear: a contract through which all rights 
and powers of individuals would be transferred to a Sovereign, the Leviathan, in 
exchange of safeguarding of security and order. In one of the infamous passages of 
Leviathan, Hobbes declares: 
   “The only way to erect such a Common Power, as may be able to defend 
them from the invasion of Forraigners, and the injuries of one another, and 
thereby to secure them is such sort, as that by their owne industrie, and by 
the fruites of the Earth, they may nourish themselves and live contentedly; 
is, to conferre all their power and strength upon one Man, or upon one 
Assembly of men, that may reduce all their Wills, by plurality of voices unto 
one Will…This is more than consent, or Concord; it is a real Unitie of them 
all, in one and the same person, made by Covenant of every man with every 
man, in such manner, as if every man should say to every man, I Authorise 
and give up my Right of Governing my selfe, to  this Man, or to this 
Assembly of men, on this condition, that thou give up thy Right to him and 
Authorise all his Actions in like manner. This done, the Multitude so united 
in one Person, is called a COMMON-WEALTH, in latine CIVITAS. This is 
the Generation of that great LEVIATHAN, or rather (to speak more 
reverently) of that Mortall God, to which we owe under the Immortall God, 
our peace and defense. …. And he that carryeth this Person, is called 
SOVERAIGN, and said to have Soveraigne Power; and every one besides, 
his SUBJECT.”64  
To Hobbes, the nature of this sovereign power was absolute, inalienable, unified, 
and based upon a voluntary, but an irrevocable contract. Since the contract was made 
among the individuals and not between the ruler and the ruled, the Sovereign was not 
bound by its terms. While Bodin believed that the sovereign could be limited by divine 
and natural laws, in the Hobbesian conceptualization, no limits could be imposed upon 
the Sovereign once a contract was made among individuals to establish it. Moreover, 
Hobbes’s theorization left out any restriction of the Sovereign by the law of the land, 
leges imperii. As Hobbes saw it, “Law, properly, is the word of him that by right hath 
command over others.”65  
One of the most problematic parts of Hobbesian constitution of the Sovereign was 
the eradication of the distinction between society and the state. The people and the 
Sovereign were simultaneously created through the enactment of a covenant; in other 
words, they had no existence prior to the contract and their being depended upon one 
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another. They were melted into a unitary whole, embodied in the figure of the 
Leviathan. Since, viewed from the Hobbesian position, people were never endowed 
with inalienable rights prior to the establishment of the Sovereign, they neither 
possessed the right to abolish it. Following this logic, Hobbes denied individuals’ right 
to resistance and spared the Sovereign from any claims and challenges to his recognized 
authority. The end product of the contract, the Sovereign, not the people, was granted 
inalienable rights such as the right to law-making, carrying on war, appointing offices, 
deciding what doctrines are fit to be thought among subjects. Since the Sovereign 
enjoyed inalienable rights by the nature of the contract, he could not commit injustice 
and thereby could not be punished.66  
In many ways, Hobbesian theory represented a further step towards the 
justification of secular and modern absolutism. Departing from the traditional 
understanding, power and utility, not justice and morality occupied a central role in 
Hobbes. Though the starting point of Hobbes was the individual and his rational 
consent, his theory ended up with unyieldingly subjecting the individual to the rule of 
the Sovereign. Hobbes left no room of vagueness or indecisiveness as to the location of 
the supreme authority and to this end eliminated any in-between spaces and spheres, 
where particular interests or desires could be expressed.  
In short, both in Bodin and Hobbes, a unified and central supreme authority 
prevailed as the essence of sovereignty, defined as the highest, final and supreme 
political and legal authority and power within a given territory and over a defined body 
of subjects. It is also through the works of Bodin and Hobbes that the doctrine of 
sovereignty assumed certain fundamental features such as indivisibility, absoluteness 
and inalienability. In so arguing, the theories of Bodin and Hobbes founded the defining 
tenets of the modern doctrine of sovereignty and thereby provided a theoretical support 
for spreading of the ideology of absolutism in Europe. Particularly evoked in times of 
conflict over the locus of supreme power in a given polity, the principle of sovereignty 
developed from the ideas of Bodin and Hobbes was put to use as a legal and at times 
constitutional justification of absolute political power.67 
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2.3. Constitutionalism and the Discourse on Sovereignty 
 
  
The works of John Locke present a radical break from the theories offered by 
Hobbes and Bodin and open another significant venue in the conceptualization of 
sovereignty. Locke’s theory proves very critical not only for providing the basis for the 
later development of the doctrine of popular sovereignty, but also for laying down the 
main principles of another important understanding of sovereignty often associated with 
the liberal constitutional school of thought. In a recent attempt to re-examine theories of 
sovereignty from the classical age into the present, Hinedaki Shinoda differentiates 
between two main traditions within the evolution of the concept, namely constitutional 
sovereignty vs. national sovereignty,68 and accordingly places the theorization of Locke 
within the constitutional tradition along with Grotius and Montesquieu. What 
differentiates the constitutional understanding of sovereignty is the special place 
endowed to the rule of law: Fundamental laws are deemed superior to the sovereign, 
thus framing the power of the ruling authority within constitutional limits. Shinoda 
describes the understanding of sovereignty within the constitutional school of thought as 
such:  
   “The conceptual premise of constitutionalism resides in the distinction 
between two concepts of ‘the state’. One is a political community as a 
whole. The other is the government that organises but exists within the 
community. Under the premise of constitutionalism, what the government 
can do is to exercise state sovereignty. The fundamental authority remains in 
the whole community; any power derives from the source of state 
sovereignty that can authorise the exerciser of sovereignty. What is useful to 
systematise the logic of constitutionalism is Grotius’ distinction of the two 
subjects of the highest power (summa potestas). Grotius calls them the 
‘common’ and the ‘proper’ subject. While the proper subject is one or more 
persons, according to the laws and customs of each country, the common 
subject is the state (civitas), i. e. ‘a perfect society’. Grotius’ conception of 
civitas does not possess its own ‘will’ like the modern nationstate. It is 
merely a juristic person. Indeed, Grotius adds that civitas is not a nation. 
This formal notion of the common subject interpreted as ‘a perfect society’ 
corresponds with the source of sovereignty, while the particular subject, 
namely government, corresponds with the exerciser of sovereignty.”69  
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Locke’s theory challenges the fundamental attributes so far articulated with the 
notion of sovereignty: absoluteness and indivisibility. Furthermore, with Locke, the 
location of sovereignty moves from the monarch towards the people. In his The Second 
Treatise of Government, Locke offers an account of a justification for limited 
government, refuting the arguments in favor of political absolutism. Locke also rejects 
prior views, which see the locus of sovereignty in the monarch, and argues against an 
understanding of unlimited and uncontrolled sovereignty.70   
In Locke’s view, humans are naturally equal to one another and by birth they are 
endowed with inalienable natural rights. Since individuals are equal right-bearers, they 
cannot be subject to the rule of a political authority without their consent. In contrast to 
Hobbes and Bodin, Locke locates the real source of sovereignty in the individuals and 
contends that it should be up to people to decide about the institutional form of 
sovereignty. To this end, he develops a novel idea of a two-tiered social contract; one 
made among the individuals, and the other between the society and the ruler. Starting 
off by envisioning a state of nature where individual rights are imperfectly safeguarded, 
Locke argues that rational human beings would agree to enter into a contract to establish 
a political society, which then would consent to the authority of a law-making body in 
order to ensure the protection of life, liberty and property. This body, the Legislature, 
would represent the ultimate governmental power and would be the source of Law. 
 It should be stressed here that unlike the views of his formers, the establishment 
of political authority is conceived as a mere instrument for Locke, not an end in itself, 
for the protection of the inalienable rights of each individual. Different from Hobbes, 
who left the Sovereign outside of the contract, Locke makes the ruling power a liable 
party to the contract and henceforth imposes limits on his authority. Through this two-
tiered contract, Locke also dismisses the totality and the wholeness between the ruler 
and his subjects, and instead re-institutes the division between society and the state. 
Hence, the community corresponds to the constitutive power of political society and 
represents an unalterable foundation for the protection of individual rights. Again unlike 
the Hobbesian theory, the political society retains its right of resistance and right to 
overthrow the authority in case of unjust or incompetent treatment. For Locke, since the 
government is a mere trustee, citizens always retain their right to appeal to heaven. 
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While the Sovereign was unitary and omnipotent in earlier theories of Hobbes and 
Bodin, in Locke, we can identify multiple loci of sovereignty arranged in a reverse 
hierarchical order. As Julian H. Franklin notes “Locke eschewed the term sovereignty 
and located supreme governmental authority in the legislative with a reversionary 
supremacy in the people.”71 In fact, according to Charles E. Merriam, Locke not only 
reverses the hierarchy, but also differentiates between different functions of sovereignty 
and relocates it in three realms:  
   “As the lowest term, then, in the series of sovereigns stands the king as the 
formal or legal sovereign, supreme while within the limits of law. Next in 
order comes the legislative body, the sovereign among the governmental 
powers, and so far absolute, or as we might say, the governmental 
sovereign. The Legislature is, however, only a “fiduciary body” entrusted 
with certain powers, and hence is in a sense subordinate. Back of the 
Legislature stands another body, which is ultimately the true sovereign. This 
is the civil or political society which has instituted the Legislature and might 
be called the political sovereign.”72  
By reformulating the concept of sovereignty, Locke provided a support for the 
major objective of constitutionalism, the safeguarding of individual rights from the 
abuse of public power. Locke invoked the idea of Salus Populi Suprema Lex, the safety 
of the people is the supreme law, and thereby placed the constitutional order above the 
sovereign will. In sum, Locke’s liberal contractrianism presented a diverse perspective 
on the meaning, origin and locus of sovereignty and brought forth challenges to the 
defining features of the concept. With Locke, sovereignty now resided with the people 
and became framed within constitutional limits.  
Locke’s ideas had a pervasive influence particularly in the Anglo-American 
political culture. His views provided justification for the overthrow of the Stuarts during 
the English Revolution of 1688. Later, the implications of his theory served the 
American aspirations in their revolt against England. Also through the works of Locke, 
the political discourse witnessed the birth of the doctrine of popular sovereignty parallel 
to the spread of conviction of free and equal individuals endowed with individual rights. 
While earlier theories of sovereignty had no connection to the idea of democracy, the 
new doctrine introduced the idea that the state derives its authority from the consent of 
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the people, innovatively linking the concept of sovereignty with democracy and the 
discourse on individual rights. 
 
 
2.4. Republicanism and the Discourse on Sovereignty  
 
 
While Locke introduced the idea that sovereignty could be derived from the 
consent of each individual, Jean Jacques Rousseau developed the idea of popular 
sovereignty into a full new doctrine in the 18th century. His ideas on the meaning of 
sovereignty were fully elaborated in his infamous book Social Contract published in 
1762. Similar to Locke, Rousseau took the individual as a point of departure for his 
theory and envisioned a contract where each human being would surrender his private 
will for the pursuit of the common good for the society.73 This contract would entail a 
set of procedural rules for making further substantive rules and the end product would 
be the creation of a body politic, called the State when passive and the Sovereign when 
active. This body politic would transform the individuals from a mere aggregate into a 
moral and cultural community. The sovereign decisions of this community would find 
expression in the General Will, representing ‘the soul and spirit of the sovereign state.’74  
Thus, in contrast to Locke, sovereignty would not be vested in the will of each 
individual and neither in the will of all, but rather it would be located in the General 
Will. Thus, in Rousseau’s account sovereignty and the Sovereign would in a certain 
way reside in the same essence: Volonté Général. It should be emphasized here that for 
Rousseau, General Will represents something beyond the mere addition of each 
individual will: it reflects the unchallengeable will of the community of citizens as a 
collective body. General Will, embodying the will of ‘the people’ as a whole, has an 
identity of its own, distinct and above the particular interests of its members. Thus, 
although Rousseau himself declares that “while uniting himself with all, may still obey 
himself alone and remains free as before,” the individual in Rousseau is inherently 
subordinated and subjected to the General Will. Rousseau feels that “each citizen is 
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nothing and can do nothing except with all the others.”75 In Rousseau’s account, 
sovereignty becomes the exercise of the General Will, ‘the people’ applying their 
collective capacity for deliberation and decision to the direction of the state.  
While Rousseau concedes that certain functional powers can be divided between 
the legislative and the executive in a body politic, the General Will - the sovereignty 
itself - cannot be divided due to its unitary nature. The superior will within a community 
is one or not in existence. Further, sovereignty is not only indivisible but it is also 
absolute. It cannot be subject to limits since the General Will must remain free. The 
only constraints that can curtail the authority of the sovereign is the iron rule that it shall 
always act for the common good and that it shall not discriminate between various 
classes of citizens. Yet, what the common good entails is always up to the judgment of 
the sovereign.76  
In addition to the defining attributes of indivisibility and absoluteness, Rousseau 
adds another original dimension to the features of sovereignty: infallibility. He declares 
that the sovereign will is always right and always tends towards the general welfare. 
Thus, sovereignty is unlimited not only in the sense that it has an inalienable right to 
make any decision, but also that it would make every decision right. While endowing 
Sovereignty with infallibility, Rousseau admits:   
   “From the preceding it follows that the general will is always upright and 
always tends to the public utility: but it does not follow from it that the 
people’s deliberations are always equally upright. One always wants one’s 
good, but one does not always see it: one can never corrupt the people, but 
one can often cause it to be mistaken, and only when it is, does it appear to 
want what is bad.”77  
Hence, the possible incapability of individuals to identify the best for their 
common interests and the related possibility of manipulation open a room for guidance, 
a certain kind of paternalism, in Rousseauian theorization. In order to save the General 
Will from the potential blindness or manipulation of the people, Rousseau endows a 
special role to ‘the Law Giver’. Rousseau describes the Law Giver as a person of “a 
superior intelligence who saw all of man’s passions and experienced none of them, who 
had no relation to our nature yet knew it thoroughly, whose happiness was independent 
of us and who was nevertheless willing to care for ours; finally one who, preparing his 
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distant glory in the progress of times, could work in one century and the enjoy the 
reward in another…”78  
The Law Giver is to shape the people into a moral and cultural community and to 
this end he could make use of songs, dance, games and rituals. Since rational self-
interest alone cannot suffice to melt the wills of each individual into a larger unitary 
whole, the Law Giver could enhance feelings of patriotism and facilitate social 
cohesion. Although Rousseau approves of embracing diversity in religious opinion in 
the section on civil religion in Social Contract, he nevertheless sees also a use in 
religion in transforming the divisive aspects of individualism into the cohesiveness of 
communitarianism. 
In Rousseauian understanding, sovereignty cannot be alienated since the will 
cannot be transferred or represented. There is much disagreement in the political theory 
literature about the implications of the inalienability of sovereignty in Rousseau. While 
some theorists argue that the strict adherence to the inalienability of sovereignty restricts 
the possibility of a representative government in Rousseau, the others bring forth 
Rousseau’s important distinction between the Sovereign and the government as an 
evidence of his concession to representative government. For Merriam, since the 
delegation of sovereignty is prohibited in Rousseau, the possibility of representative 
government is eternally impeded.79 He argues that Rousseau intentionally introduces the 
idea of inalienability of sovereignty of the people to refute the Hobbesian view that the 
will of the community might be vested in some particular person or persons. In support 
to Merriam’s views, Ali A.Mazrui also contends that Rousseau puts forth the idea of 
self-government in place of representative government by introducing the notion of 
inalienable popular sovereignty. He in fact takes this argument a step further to suggest 
that the Rousseauian doctrine of inalienable popular sovereignty indeed proves 
incompatible with the doctrine of inalienable individual rights advocated by Locke.80  
Yet for other political theorists such as Christopher Bertram and Frank Marini, 
Rousseau’s rejection only involves the representation of sovereignty by another body 
other than the people, while he leaves room for the possibility of representative 
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government responsible for the administration and the execution of laws.81 Rousseau’s 
form of government is an aristocracy made up of magistrates, who have power to enact 
decrees, but not laws. Thus, in these accounts, Rousseau emerges as being not against 
representative government but against representative sovereignty. 
However, the discussions whether or not Rousseauian understanding allows a 
representative government does not spare his theory from bearing implications of a 
totalitarian kind of democracy. In Social Contract, Rousseau very explicitly warns 
against the detrimental influence of factions. He explains that the power of divisive 
forces could be naturally curtailed only if people were informed properly and could take 
political decisions without any outside influence or interference. In other words, if the 
sovereign General Will were properly exercised through transparent and independent 
public debate, preferably in a small and homogenous state, the General Will would pose 
no danger to individual freedom. Yet since, for Rousseau, individual opinions are 
subject to acts of manipulation by particular interests, factions would destabilize and 
interfere with the normally reliable mechanism of public deliberation. In extension of 
the similar logic, Rousseau remains hostile to the role of political parties in a polity. All 
these pitfalls in Rousseau lay the groundwork for the later concerns that link the ideas of 
Rousseau to popular tyranny.   
To sum up, it is significant to note that through Rousseau another fundamental 
attribute is added to the conceptualization of sovereignty: Now, besides being 
indivisible, unlimited and inalienable, sovereignty becomes also infallible. Moreover, 
the location of sovereignty once again shifts: this time it becomes vested in the will of 
the community, ‘the people’ perceived as a moral and cultural unity. Furthermore, the 
Rousseauian theory serves two related but not necessarily complementary roles in the 
evolution the concept of sovereignty. First, by connecting sovereignty to the idea of the 
demos and locating it precisely in the exercise of the general will of ‘the people,’ 
Rousseau’s doctrine of popular sovereignty consolidates the link between sovereignty 
and the democratic theory.82 Yet at the same time, the dubious constitution and the 
content of the General Will and the special role designated for the Law Giver opens the 
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way for dictatorships supported by majorities, particularly when faced and coupled with 
nationalist currents.  
 
 
2.5. Nationalism and the Discourse on Sovereignty  
 
 
Rousseau’s ideas on popular sovereignty were fundamental in shaping the theory 
of sovereignty in the direction of national sovereignty, which found its vivid expression 
in the French Revolution and its aftermath. Rousseauian ideals were later formulated in 
France into the justification of the ultimate power claimed in the name of the nation, 
represented by the Third Estate and its ‘will’ exercised first by the Jacobins and later by 
the Bonapartists. The developments following the French Revolution revealed that, 
once in the authoritarian hands, the principle of popular sovereignty could indeed help 
justify dictatorships deriving its strength from ‘the will of the nation.’  
The ideas of Sieyès were instrumental in assuring the transition from the idea of 
popular sovereignty to the principle of national sovereignty. During the French 
revolution, in a famous pamphlet titled Qu'est-ce que le Tiers Etat?, Abbé Sieyès 
(Emmanuel Joseph Sieyès) conceptualized the Third Estate as the very totality of 
citizens, together constituting a nation, whose interests were to be represented by the 
establishment of a national assembly. For Sieyès, the powers of the sovereign nation 
could not be subordinated to another body, nor to the law itself since “the national will 
needs only its reality to be always legal, it is the origin of all legality”83  
Sieyès took active part in the drafting of Declaration of the Rights of Man and 
Citizen and the constitution of 1791. Influenced by the ideas put forward by Sieyès and 
his supporters, Article III of the ‘Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen’ of 
1789 declared “The principle of all sovereignty resides essentially in the nation. 
Nobody, no individual can exercise authority unless it is its express emanation.”84 The 
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constitution of 1791 advanced the principle of national sovereignty by positing 
“sovereignty is one, indivisible, inalienable and imprescriptible” (Tit. III. Art. 1). The 
principle of national sovereignty was exalted to an even more radical level by the 
Constitution of 1793, the Article 27 of which stated “every individual who usurps the 
sovereignty may be at once put to death by freemen.” Following Sieyès’ logic, as 
Bartelson aptly puts it: 
   “The sovereign authority of the state becomes premised upon the identity 
of a nation as much as the identity of the nation becomes a derivative of the 
sovereign authority of the state. The concept of nation state comes to 
express nothing more than a vaguely tautological relationship between two 
entities which are merely numerically distinct from each other.” 85 
The principle of national sovereignty was further put to use in France by 
Revolutionaries in the reconstruction of the domestic order. In opposition to the liberal 
idea of inalienable individual rights, sovereignty as an inalienable right was bestowed 
upon the nation itself. The principle of national sovereignty provided a useful political 
and philosophical basis from which the legitimacy of the new order could be derived. 
As Stanley Hoffman questions: 
   “Why the Revolution, as it evolved, made of the nation a mirror image of 
the old monarchy, with the absolute and indivisible sovereignty of the king 
transferred to the nation, is perhaps the most fascinating question in the 
history of modern France. Was it simply the imprint of centuries of 
monarchic rule justified by légistes and preachers? The imprint of another 
illiberal and authoritarian institution, the Church? Was it as for Sieyès in 
1789 -the fear that a set of liberal institutions, with all their checks and 
balances, might actually impede the huge task of overhauling all existing 
barriers to unity, allow the supporters of feudalism to entrench themselves in 
part of the legislature or to barricade themselves in their unbreachable 
rights? Was it because of the unwillingness of the court, of many of the 
nobles, of much of the Church, to accept the rules of the game that 
liberalism presupposes? In every one of these hypotheses, the stake is the 
same: the capacity of the revolutionary state to carry out its program of 
reshaping French social and political institutions.”86  
National sovereignty thus became a weapon to combat forces of particularism and 
fractionism in the public sphere that could threaten the basis of the unity of the French 
polity. Moreover, national sovereignty helped the building of the French state by 
offering a principle, the attributes of which could act as a mechanism of exclusion. The 
notion of sovereignty, which embodied the unified and indivisible will of the nation, 
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made it easier for the identification of ‘the enemies of nation,’ the ones who acted 
against the volenté générale.  
The conceptualization of national sovereignty through the political developments 
following the French Revolution paved the way for sweeping changes in the notion of 
sovereignty as the concept of sovereignty became linked to the currents of nationalism 
and questions of nationhood. Bernard Yack highlights this close association as such: 
   “That popular sovereignty plays a crucial role in the rise and spread of 
nationalism is something of a common place in the scholarly literature. Hans 
Kohn for example, proclaims that nationalism is incoherent without popular 
sovereignty. And Huge Seton-Watson claims that nationalism represents 
nothing more than “the application to national community of the 
Enlightenment doctrine of popular sovereignty.”87  
Accompanied by the rise of nationalism all around the continental Europe and the 
tide of imperialism, the principle of national sovereignty was often invoked by 
theoreticians, diplomats and politicians to serve the interests of a particular nation-state, 
or sometimes the interests of secessionist movements, which sought independence by 
referring to their right to national self-determination, a principle which was derived 
from the notion of national sovereignty.   
While nation-states emerged as the core political actors, the doctrine of national 
sovereignty gained further ground in the late 19th and the early 20th centuries during the 
victorious era of the nation-state. Building onto the theory of popular sovereignty first 
suggested by Rousseau and later elaborated by the works of Sieyès and the 
revolutionaries, the idea that linked sovereignty to the nation-state came to dominate 
European politics and jurisprudence. In 1886, Henry James Sumner Maine writes in his 
book Popular Government: 
   “The States of Europe are now regulated by political institutions 
answering to the various stages of transition from the old view that “rulers 
are presumably wise and good, the rightful rulers and guides of the whole 
population,” to the newer view, that “the ruler is the agent and servant, and 
the subject the wise and good master, who is obliged to delegate his power 
to the so-called ruler because, being a multitude he cannot use it himself.” 
Russia and Turkey are the only European states which completely reject the 
theory that governments hold their powers by delegation from the 
community, the word “community” being somewhat vaguely understood, 
but tending more and more to mean at least the whole of males full age 
living within certain territorial limits. This theory, which is known on the 
Continent as the theory of national sovereignty, has been fully excepted in 
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France, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Holland, Belgium, Greece and the 
Scandinavian states. In Germany it has been repeatedly repudiated by the 
Emperor and his powerful minister, but it is to a great extent acted upon.”88   
In order to illustrate the consolidation of the link between sovereignty and the 
nation-state, the following section will examine some leading French, British and 
German theoreticians whose works had a notable impact in shaping the theory of 
sovereignty in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.  
To this end, first the ideas put forth by Adhémar Eismein, an authoritative French 
jurist during the 1910s, will be brought to fore as a fairly typical and at the same time 
influential representative of the doctrine of national sovereignty in the early 20th century 
France.89 Eismein took Rousseau as his starting point and since Rousseau’s ideas were 
being increasingly criticized for subordinating the position of the individual to the 
community and thereby alienating individual rights in the name of the maintenance of 
the cohesiveness of the political community, he set out to save the Rousseauian project 
by introducing a new logical ground for the doctrine of national sovereignty. For 
Eismein, the Sovereign was the legally organized nation, and the state was the juridical 
personification of the nation. 
   “That which constitutes a nation in law is the existence of in a society of 
men of an authority superior to individual wills which recognizes no force 
superior or concurrent in the sphere where it acts. This superior authority is 
called sovereignty. It has two aspects, internal sovereignty, or the right to 
command all the citizens composing the nation, or even all who reside on 
the national territory; and external sovereignty, or the right to represent the 
nation and obligate it in its relations with other nations.”90  
 His equation of state with the nation and the principle of national sovereignty as 
their sovereign expression served a twofold purpose. First, since the life of the nation is 
perpetual, the state should also have a continuous life irrespective of the governments 
changing either due to elections or revolutions. Through the embodiment of sovereignty 
in the perpetual institution of the nation state, Eismein sought to provide a lasting and 
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legitimate basis for a stable polity. Second, this equation served to discredit the 
hereditary rule of absolute or constitutional monarchs since only national sovereignty 
personified in the entity of the republican French State could maintain a continuous 
activity.91  
For Eismein, Rousseau’s theory also ran into difficulty since Rousseau associated 
only the legislative power, the expression of will with sovereignty. He wanted to 
remedy this problem by conceiving the functions of the executive also as manifestations 
of sovereignty. Influenced by the ideas of Montesquieu, Eismein’s theory also allowed a 
room for the separation of powers. Despite his advocacy of the separation of powers 
between executive and legislative bodies, Eismein was nevertheless hostile to the 
interests of the minorities and argued that since unanimity was impossible in a given 
state, the will of the majority could be assumed as the will of the nation; as the general 
will.92 Since sovereignty resided in the nation as a whole, Eismein strongly opposed the 
representation of minority interests in the legislative body. He declared that election of 
special representatives for the representation of minority interests was a violation of the 
principle since it allowed the representation of something besides the nation. To this 
end, Eismein opposed proportional representation and posited that the exercise of 
national sovereignty would require single member district voting.93 Furthermore, he 
opposed universal suffrage and argued that the exercise of voting should not be seen as 
an inherent right but rather as the fulfillment of a social function.94 
Convinced that any organized resistance would challenge the principal of the 
supremacy of the nation, Eismein objected to the right of resistance. He condemned any 
such act of resistance as illegal even if it was to be carried out within legal limits. As 
Hymen Ezra Cohen explains, for the proponents of national sovereignty such as 
Eismein,  
   “the state cannot commit or permit suicide; since the act has consequences 
for the nation. The nation, theory runs, is composed not only of the past and 
present generations but of the future generations. From these the present can 
never steal the birthright –the inalienable right to the exercise, in their turn, 
of the national sovereignty.”95 
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Although Britain was originally the cradle of constitutional understanding of 
sovereignty, the doctrine of national sovereignty also had a notable impact in Britain in 
the 19th and into the 20th centuries. John Austin, a famous English jurist, gave the 
concept of sovereignty a legal perspective, arguing that for the maintenance of stability 
and coherence in a polity, there should be only one central reference for law. In his 
lectures on jurisprudence, he posited the need of a sovereign who would command all 
laws in a given state where this “determinate human superior (i.e. man or body of men) 
not in the habit of obedience to a like superior” would receive “habitual obedience from 
the bulk of a given society.”96 This determinate human superior was the Sovereign, his 
authority would be defined as sovereignty. For Austin, only the rules that the sovereign 
endorses would be the law. Accordingly, the sovereign could not be subject to any 
external constraints or penalties. Moreover, international law would not mean anything 
since there was no sovereign to enforce it. Austin’s theory of legal sovereignty 
particularly endowed the nation-states with full legal authority and autonomy and 
worked to strengthen their position at the expense of international and supranational 
organizations.  
Building on the works of Austin, Albert Venn Dicey brought in a novel 
understanding of sovereignty, by positing that in Britain sovereignty belonged to the 
Parliament, composed of the king, the House of Lords and the House of Commons. In 
Dicey’s account parliamentary sovereignty was the supreme authority and could not be 
subjected to any legal limits and he thereby objected the idea of ‘limited sovereignty,’ 
viewing it inherently contradictory in terms. He also distinguished between legal and 
political sovereignty in order to ensure the absoluteness of the sovereignty represented 
by the Parliament.97 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
96John Austin, Lectures on Jurisprudence, rev. and ed. Robert Campbell, 4th 
edition. (London: John Murray, 1873): 226. 
97Hinedaki Shinoda, Re-examining sovereignty: from classical theory to the 
global age, 131. 
 41
 
2.6. Nation-State and the Discourse on Sovereignty 
 
 
Rejecting the British principle of parliamentary sovereignty or the French 
principle of national sovereignty, the German political theorists advanced a different 
conceptualization, which located sovereignty directly in the State itself. The State was 
viewed as a living organism, endowed with a personality, a spirit and a will of its own. 
The spirit of the state was represented by the nation and for the healthy functioning of 
the German polity, the ultimate political authority was to be exercised by the nation 
state, or as Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel put it, by “das Volk als Staat.” In his 
Philosophy of Right (1821), Hegel declares:  
   “the nation state is the spirit in its substantial rationality and immediate 
actuality and is therefore the absolute power on earth; each state is 
consequently a sovereign and independent entity in relations to others. The 
state has a primary and absolute entitlement to be a sovereign and 
independent power in the eyes of others, i.e. to be recognized by them.”98  
With Hegel, sovereignty has become located firmly in the state, which, in Hegel’s 
thought, was attributed with many important inherent qualities. Hegel idealized the state 
as an ethical entity and placed it above the civil society, which, for Hegel, was a mere 
instrumental platform for the expression of private interests. Thus, the important 
distinction between state and society was reintroduced, yet this time the state was 
hierarchically prioritized over civil society.99 In contrast to the egoistic nature of civil 
society, the interests of the state were to be regarded with highest esteem and 
safeguarded with up most caution. The preservation of the state and the concept of 
raison d’etat occupied a central significance in Hegel’s political philosophy.  
Hegel welcomed the Rousseauian innovation of introducing the will as the 
principle of the state, but criticized his portrayal of the general will arising out of the 
public deliberations of individual wills and accused Rousseau for denying an inherent 
rationality and infinity for the state in and for itself.100 Hegel also extended a fierce 
                                                 
98Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Elements of the philosophy of right, trans. 
H.B.Nispet and ed. Allen W. Wood, Ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1991, original work published 1821): 367. 
99Joseph A. Camilleri and Jim Falk, The end of sovereignty?: the politics of a 
shrinking and fragmenting world,  21. 
100Hegel, Elements of the philosophy of right, 278. 
 42
criticism towards the works of Herr von Haller on the grounds that Haller consciously 
dismissed the rational content of the state and thereby failed to understand the inner 
nature and the essence of the state. In contrast to Rousseau and Heller, for Hegel, in the 
foundation of the state lies “the power of reason actualizing itself as will.”101 The 
evolution of the political order towards the establishment of the state is seen not only as 
a consequence of individual reason, but as a part of natural historical process dictated by 
the so-called “world reason.” Thus, in Hegel, the state attains a transcendental attribute, 
becomes an Idea, since it is regarded as the inevitable expression of universal reason. 
Hegel declares: “for the state is as far above physical life as spirit is above nature” and 
“the state must be regarded as a great architectonic edifice, a hieroglyph of reason 
which becomes manifest in actuality.”102  
For Hegel, the state achieves its actuality in three realms. First, through the self-
related organism of the individual state as it establishes itself through the constitution or 
constitutional law. Second, the state interacts with other states, thus enters into the 
realm of the international law. Third, it represents the universal idea as a genus – “the 
spirit which gives itself its actuality in the process of world history.” 103 
Through these realms, Hegel distinguishes internal sovereignty from external 
sovereignty. The internal sovereignty of the state is constituted both through the 
interdependence of the particular functions of the state and in the unity of particular will 
of individuals. Hegel seeks to show that in the feudal times, the state enjoyed an 
external sovereignty yet “internally neither the monarch himself nor the state was 
sovereign.” The state was not an organism but rather a mere aggregate of particular 
functions and powers of independent corporations and communities.104  
In contrast, Hegel advances the organic theory of state by comparing the state to 
an organism whose parts cannot function independently but only as indispensable parts 
of a larger unity. Hegel frequently refers to the words such as disease, health and death, 
suggesting that he conceives of the state as a living entity. Certain institution can carry 
out specific functions and tasks within a state with the end purpose of producing and 
preserving the universal in the state; but as soon as they attempt to break away, their 
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raison d’etre ceases. In so arguing, Hegel rejects the idea of separation of powers, 
especially when this separation serves to impose limits on the central authority. Hence, 
the ‘health’ of the state is assured when these powers are not viewed as self-sufficient 
and in negative relation to one another, but rather when they serve the interests of a 
single individual whole. It should be stressed here that Hegel allows the division of 
labor between the executive  and legislative branches, yet for Hegel, the objective of the 
division is to strengthen the sovereign, not to weaken it.105 
Hegel further divides the political state into three realms: a. the legislative power 
which is endowed with the power to identify and construct the universal b. the executive 
power, the duty of which includes the subsumption of particular spheres and individual 
cases under the universal c. the power of the sovereign represented by a constitutional 
monarch, and possessing the ultimate right to decide and express the universal will.  
Hegel places the constitutional monarch at the apex of the sovereign state and 
bestows upon him the unity of all different powers.106 For Hegel, the power of 
sovereign enjoys “three moments of totality within itself, namely the universality of the 
constitution and laws, consultation as the reference of the particular to the universal, and 
the moment of ultimate decision as the self determination to which everything else 
reverts and from which its actuality originates.”107 
The State is sovereign in the abstract, but in practice statehood and sovereignty 
finds expression in the person of the king. However, the role of the monarch should not 
be exalted to a supreme place in Hegel’s thought, for monarch himself is viewed as a 
mere instrument for being able to identify who will speak in the name of the state. In 
other words, the state, as it naturally evolves into and manifests itself as the rational 
organization of particular wills into a unitary organism, is the ultimate source of all 
decisions. It is just that someone is needed to utter the words ‘I will’ and express a 
decision in the name of the wholeness, the organically developed state. Therefore, 
Hegel refutes the views that oppose the necessity of a monarchial order on the basis that 
the monarch might be corrupt or incompetent by arguing that, in a fully organized state, 
the particular character of the sovereign proves rather trivial.108 Moreover, one should 
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not mistake the practical exercise of sovereignty for despotism in Hegel; for it does not 
simply refer to mere arbitrary power, but rather to an exercise of power within 
legitimate limits. As Cary J. Nedeman comments on Hegel, “absolutism is only a start, 
it is eventually washed away, to be replaced by a fully articulate constitutional 
system.109 In fact, Jean-Francois Kervegan argues that Hegel belongs to a tradition of 
“authoritarian liberalism” expounded by some prominent German theorists who 
welcome “the institution of constitutional monarchy, social and administrative reforms, 
and the setting up of a system of representation based neither on more-or-less 
generalized universal suffrage nor on “estates” in the ancient manner but on Berufstande 
or occupations.”110 Hegel holds the executive power responsible for carrying out the 
application of the sovereign’s decisions and for performing the transition from the 
universal to the particular. He also places the functions of the judiciary and the police 
under the executive branch. In Hegel’s account, civil servants are the delegates of the 
executive power and they are often the selected among the representatives of the 
educated and politically conscious middle class. The bourgeois class assumes a vital 
importance in Hegel’s thought, since they are the ones who can successfully execute the 
tasks and functions on behalf of the sovereign. For instance, he links the 
underdeveloped status of Russia to the absence of a middle class mediating between the 
mass of serfs and rulers. Thus, in Hegel’s opinion the supporting of the development of 
a middle class serves the interest of a state well. 
Hegel approves the usage of ‘popular sovereignty’ only in relation to the 
characterization of a certain nation as a self-sufficient entity for external purposes; to 
indicate the existence of a certain nation-state distinct from other states. Other than this 
external use, the doctrine of popular sovereignty does not make much sense, especially 
when it is posited as the “opposite of that sovereignty which exists in the monarch.”111 
In Hegel’s own words, 
   “In this oppositional sense, popular sovereignty is one of those confused 
thoughts which are based on a garbled notion [Vorstellung] of the people. 
Without its monarch and the articulation of the whole which is necessarily 
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and immediately associated with monarchy, the people is a formless 
mass.”112  
In so arguing, Hegel declares it to be pointless to elaborate more upon whether 
monarchy or democracy is superior, with his preference clearly lying with the form of 
constitutional monarchy. Hegel also rejects the Rousseauian idea of self-government, 
and accuses him for introducing “a democratic element devoid of rational form.”113 
Since all citizens cannot be expected to be experts on governmental issues, Hegel 
stresses the need for authorized deputies. Nevertheless, these deputies would not 
represent the interests of individuals, but rather the interests of “the essential spheres of 
society, of its major interests.”114 Further, in Hegel, the individual becomes a unified 
acting subject only by submitting himself to the universality of the state. His 
membership to the state enables him to have objectivity, truth and ethical life.115  Hence, 
the union with the state is seen as a destiny for individuals and the nation state stands 
out as the only ideal form in which the individual can achieve freedom. 
   “The state is the actuality of the substantial will, an actuality which it 
possesses in the particular self-consciousness when this has been raised to 
its universality; as such, it is the rational in and for itself. This substantial 
unity is an absolute and unmoved end in itself, and in it, freedom enters into 
its highest right, just as this ultimate end possesses the highest right in 
relation to individuals, whose highest duty is to be members of the state.”116  
Henceforth, Hegelian position unites the duty and the right within the state in one 
and the same relation and this union gives both the state and the individual their inner 
strengths. It is a reciprocal relation that mutually empowers the state and the individual: 
While the individual gain security and welfare by performing his duties as a citizen, the 
state becomes preserved and safeguarded through the fulfillment of the duties of its 
subjects:   
   “Just as right in itself becomes law in civil society, so too does my 
individual right, whose existence was previously immediate and abstract, 
acquire a new significance when its existence is recognized as a part of the 
existent universal will and knowledge.”117  
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While Hegel characterizes internal sovereignty as the constitution of the state in 
and for itself, as a unified acting subject, the external sovereignty refers to the relation 
of state as an individual entity in negative relation to other states.118 The independence 
and ‘supreme dignity of nation’ is realized though the practice of external sovereignty 
of the state. Hegel views the international order as Hobbes sees the state of nature, as a 
potential war of all against all. In this chaotic structure, it is up to subjects, the citizens 
to defend the independence of their nation-state vis-à-vis the other, even if this defense 
requires the sacrifice of their life and property.119 Wars can serve a twofold purpose: can 
pacify internal turmoil and help solidify national unity through the identification of a 
common external enemy and also can help individuals to gain strength through the 
pursuance of a common objective.120 In this respect, Hegel contrasts his view of 
international order with that of Kant’s proposal of attaining a perpetual peace through 
the enactment of a league of sovereigns to settle disputes among states. To Hegel, this 
agreement “would always be dependent upon particular sovereign wills, and would 
therefore continue to be tainted with contingency.”121       
Given the particularity of nations, Hegel advocates that each nation should draw 
up a constitution that is specific to its customs and consciousness. In support of this 
argument, Hegel brings forth the example of Napoleon’s attempt to dictate a 
constitution to Spain a priori to the Spaniards themselves deciding upon its content and 
contends that this was a failed attempt with detrimental consequences. He further argues 
that the defining features of each historical epoch are characterized by a dominant 
nation and that the modern times point to the supremacy of the Germanic realm. As 
Bartelson explains, through Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, 
   “the assimilation of the concept of the nation to the concept of the state is 
brought to completion through the mutual implication and opposition 
between the sovereign state and what is external to it. The state is ‘the spirit 
of the nation ….which permeates and all relations within it and also the 
customs and consciousness of the individuals who belong to it.”122  
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2.7. Raison D’Etat, Politics of the Exception and the Discourse on Sovereignty 
 
 
The Hegelian views on the State and its sovereignty have been pervasively 
influential in the determination of the direction to be followed by political theory in the 
20th century. His idea that the State constituted a rational organism has found a strong 
recognition among other German political theorists such as Friedrich Schelling, Johann 
Caspar Bluntschli and Otto Friedrich von Gierke. As Merriam explains, 
   “The State, Bluntschli maintains, is an organism, though not a natural 
growth merely, but in a higher sense a moral and spiritual organism. He 
enumerates three marks of an organism which he holds are also to be found 
in the State, namely: the union of material elements and vital forces; the 
possession within the whole of special organs performing various functions; 
the growth from within outwards… Under this conception, then, to whom 
belongs the sovereignty? Bluntschli expressly denies the sovereignty of the 
people (Volkssouveränetät), the sovereignty of the nation (National-
souveränetät), the sovereignty of right or justice, and that of the monarch 
alone. The true sovereign is, he holds, “the State as a person.”123  
Heinrich Gotthard von Treitschke’s writings further strengthen the link between 
sovereignty and the exercise of state power in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. 
Advocating the unity of Germany under the leadership of Prussia, Treitschke seeks to 
solidify the power of the state and to this end further advances the theory of organic 
state. Placing the state above the society and the individual, Treitschke is convinced that 
the state should constitute the center of the lives of its subjects, and the citizens in return 
should sacrifice their lives and property for its maintenance. For Treitschke sovereign 
states enjoy a right to repudiate treaties and can declare war when deemed necessary. 
He also rejects the constitution of any kind of checks and balances on the sovereign 
rule. Criticizing the liberal view of international order, Treitschke advocates the rise of 
Germany to the status of a strong imperial power. In this perspective, his nationalist 
views on the state function to reinforce German aspiration to become an imperial power 
and thereby to attain a privileged global status. 
The influence of the school that advocated an organic and monistic theory of the 
state over the development of the theory of sovereignty has been persistent and 
invasive. Through their works, the notion of raison d’etat became the new ideal that 
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laid the foundation of the prevalent understanding of sovereignty in the late 19th and 
early 20th centuries. In the leading German theorization of the period, sovereignty 
became firmly linked to the nation state and in a way was utilized both to consolidate 
German unity and served the imperialistic aspirations of German theoreticians and 
statesmen alike.   
In the early 20th century, the theory of sovereignty acquired a powerful, yet at the 
same time all the more problematic features through the works of Carl Schmitt. 
Schmittian theory presented a serious challenge to the liberal constitutional conception 
of sovereignty and in a certain novel way reinstated the original articulation of 
sovereignty with absolutism. Schmitt, himself, did not shy away from admitting that his 
ideas were immensely influenced by the thought of Hobbes. The central question for 
Schmitt, similar to Hobbes, was how to safeguard political unity and strength in the face 
of the demise of state power intrinsically embodying a potential to ignite anarchy and 
chaos in Germany.  
Schmitt’s ideas on the nature of sovereignty were particularly influenced by the 
profound defeat of Germany in World War I and when Schmitt set out to write Political 
Theology in the early 1920s, his primary concern was to formulate a novel and solid 
understanding of sovereignty, which could be put to use to save the Weimar Republic 
from political frailty and indecisiveness. To this end, Schmitt innovatively declared in 
the opening sentence of Political Theology that “Sovereign is he who decides on the 
exception.”124 
By formulating sovereignty in terms of the ability to decide in circumstances of 
economic and political turmoil, Schmitt desired to dismiss the liberal conception of 
sovereignty, which conceived and prisoned it within the limits of constitutionalism. 
Schmitt accused the liberal tradition for subordinating the sovereignty of state to the 
sovereignty of law, thereby reducing the principle to a mere abstraction. Sovereignty 
should not be viewed as an abstract concept, as Schmitt puts it, but rather as a 
borderline concept, the definition of which should be associated neither with norms nor 
with the routine but with exceptional cases. This is what the political realities of the day 
called for: “an understanding of sovereignty as a concrete application, that means who 
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decides in a situation of conflict what constitutes the public interest or interest of the 
state, public safety and order, le salut public and so on.” 125 
 Schmitt portrays the carrier of the sovereignty in a constant struggle between the 
liberal tradition that attempts to impose limits upon the principle and the absolutist 
school, (originating in Bodin and Hobbes and later defended by reactionaries such as de 
Maistre, Bonald and Donoso Cortes) which tries to bestow sovereignty with 
indivisibility and infallibility. Schmitt holds that in the original historical development 
of the notion, the ability to decide in the case of exceptions was indeed a defining 
attribute of sovereignty. To prove his point, he refers to the works of Bodin and sees 
Bodin’s main success in the incorporation of the role of decision into the concept of 
sovereignty. Building on Bodin, Hobbes contributes to this decisionist understanding of 
sovereignty by locating sovereignty in an absolute and indivisible authority and by 
endowing it with an unlimited capacity to decide. In reverence to Hobbes’ famous 
dictum, Schmitt subordinates de jure authority to de facto power and declares 
“autoritas, non veritas facit legem.”126  
Departing from Hobbes, Schmitt seeks to show that with the advent of liberal 
political thought, the concept of sovereignty was denied the privilege of enjoying a clear 
domination over decision making. As Schmitt emphasizes, the central place of 
exception vanishes in Lockean theory and emergency law becomes no law at all for 
Kant.127 Schmitt criticizes Locke on the grounds that: 
   “he did not recognize that the law does not designate to whom it gives 
authority... The legal prescription, as the norm of decision, only designates 
how decisions should be made, not who should decide. In the absence of 
pivotal authority, anybody can refer to the correctness of the content.”128  
In so arguing, Schmitt further rejects the neo-Kantian theories of Krabbe and 
Kelsen on the basis of their keenness to subject the ruler to constitutional checks and 
balances and thereby blurring the immanent location of sovereignty, the place of 
absolute authority in a given polity. To Schmitt, formalists like Kelsen and Krabbe try 
to solve the problem of sovereignty by negating it; by negating the state vis-à-vis law.129 
Their delegation of the state power over to law and their reduction of the role of the 
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state to a mere law-maker, which does not necessarily decide on the content of law, 
according to Schmitt, result in the elimination of the personal element from the concept 
of the state. As a result of the discarding of the personal element, the unity and the 
strength of political authority are irrevocably damaged. As Schmitt suggests, “a 
distinctive determination of which individual person or which concrete body can 
assume such an authority cannot be derived from the mere legal quality of a maxim.” 130  
In Schmitt’s view, this is a critical problem that neo-Kantians ignored.  
In contrast to the liberal views, in the essence of the Schmittian understanding of 
sovereignty resides the monopoly to decide and “the decision parts here from the legal 
norm, and (to formulate it paradoxically) authority proves that to produce law it need 
not be based on law.”131 Schmitt extends his attack on the liberal tradition by arguing 
that the Article 48 of German Constitution of 1919 (the Weimar Constitution), where 
the exception is declared by the President of the Reich but is under the control of the 
parliament, the Reichtag, which any time can demand its suspension, is in fact a 
dangerous product of this limited understanding. As Schmitt notably remarks: “This 
provision corresponds to the development and practice of liberal constitutional state, 
which attempts to repress the question of sovereignty by a division and mutual control 
of competences.”132  
Schmitt advances his ideas on the nature of political power in Concept of the 
Political (1927) by conceptualizing the political in terms of the primordial and seminal 
antithesis between ‘friend’ and ‘foe’: “just as in the field of morals, the ultimate 
distinctions are between good and evil, in aesthetics, beautiful and ugly, in economics, 
profitable and unprofitable, so the political distinction is between ‘friend’ and ‘foe’. 
While he makes the binary opposition between friend and enemy the basis of politics, 
he further suggests that since the state is the body possessing a monopoly over politics, 
it is only up it to distinguish between friend and foe. Schmitt’s infamous distinction 
does not only pertain to the international order, but also proves to be a critical 
conceptualization in the domestic context since he elaborates convincingly upon the 
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state’s responsibility to identify the ‘internal enemy’ for the maintenance of unity and 
strength.133 
Schmitt extends his criticism of liberalism in his book The Crisis of 
Parliamentary Democracy (1923), where he defines liberal democracy as a non-viable 
regime since liberalism negates democracy and democracy negates liberalism.134 
Particularly, he criticizes the pluralistic and individualistic aspects of liberalism, which, 
in Schmitt’s view, inhibits the democratic homogeneity that is necessary for a well-
functioning system. Schmitt also object to liberal doctrines of the rule of law and 
separation of powers on the grounds that they lead to depoliticization and neutralization. 
Instead, Schmitt attempts to construct a unified polity based on exclusion, where a line 
is clearly demarcated between friend and enemy, between the individual who belongs to 
the demos and who do not. Democracy, as Schmitt defines, becomes an attempt to 
create a homogeneous identity with a common general will.   
The political implications of Schmitt’s views had a lasting and profound influence 
over the 20th century German and continental European thinking. Even in his own time, 
Schmitt utilized his conceptualization of sovereignty as the ability to decide on the 
exception, strengthened with the decision to designate the domestic enemy, in support 
of his positions in domestic politics. In 1932, Schmitt formulated his notion of ‘equal 
chance’ with the objective of preventing the participation of extreme political 
movements in German political life by arguing “an equal chance should be given only 
to those parties committed to the safeguarding of the existing constitutional order.” 135 
Furthermore, Schmitt’s ideas served to discredit the formalistic and legalistic 
conceptions of sovereignty, particularly during an era of prevailing constitutionalism in 
the Anglo-American world. As Shinoda puts, the implications of Schmittian 
understanding for the internal order proved detrimental: 
   “When the exception occurs, the fragile structure of international 
constitutionalism will give way to the decision of the sovereign. The 
theorists who see the restriction of sovereignty will know from the exception 
that the international constitution established by the Anglo-American world 
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is not permanent. This is a manifest invasion of the Anglo-American world 
by the spirit of Carl Schmitt. Sovereignty always functions in an 
autonomous entity. It determines the location of the supreme government. It 
is an invisible substance that must exist somewhere in a state. Even if it 
cannot be found behind constitutional rules, it will appear in a crisis.”136  
In short, Schmitt sacrificed the rule of law in the name of essentially realistic 
vision of politics and opened up a trans-legal space both for international and domestic 
context. Schmitt’s ideas subverted the liberal theory of state and in the end subordinated 
law to politics. According to Andreas Kalyvas, in Schmittian theorization, sovereignty 
acquires a hegemonic character. As he summarizes: 
   “Against the formalistic, universal, general, and abstract qualities of legal 
positivism and the rule of law, which aspires to replace the central authority 
and the rule of men with the impersonal function of asset of procedural 
mechanisms and legal determinations in order to impose effective limits on 
political power, Schmitt sought to re-define sovereignty as the contingent, 
unpredictable subjective moment of the concrete manifestation of an 
undetermined will, which in the form of a decision, and like a miracle, is 
able to overstep legal and institutional limits.”137  
In a certain way, Schmittian ideas take the modern political construction of the 
dominant discourse on sovereignty to a completion: Schmitt clearly places the concept 
of sovereignty in the realm of politics, a field characterized by the distinction between 
friend and enemy. Building on the works of Bodin, Hobbes and Hegel, in Schmitt, 
sovereignty becomes a monopolized capacity of the nation state to decide and to act 
upon its decisions, destroying the possibility of challenge directed to its preservation 
and unity.  
  
2.8. Early Critiques of the Prevailing Discourses on Sovereignty 
 
 
As it is shown above, the sovereignty of the nation state became a generally 
accepted norm and remained unchallenged throughout most of the 19th and the early 
20th centuries, though there were a few notable efforts to undermine the now-perceived 
naturalness of national sovereignty as a timeless principle. In the following concluding 
section of the chapter, these efforts, which put the prevalent understanding of 
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sovereignty under critical scrutiny will be brought to fore as to show that even as early 
as 1920s, the notion of sovereignty was subject to some profound critique.     
One strand of challenge to the notion of sovereignty embodied in the unitary 
structure of the nation state came from a school known as the pluralists. In The 
Foundations of Sovereignty (1917), Harold J. Laski provides a powerful critique of the 
monistic theory of the state and the classical conception of sovereignty based on the 
assumption of unitary state. Laski contends that the theory of sovereignty has lost its 
central place as the founding principle of political order, since its main assumptions of 
indivisibility and absoluteness have been increasingly questioned in the face of 
heightened demands for pluralistic representation characterizing the early 20th century. 
For there is no harmony of interests in the modern state, the theory of absolute 
sovereignty cannot be tenable. As he comments,  
   “When we examine the historic perspective of sovereignty, it becomes 
sufficiently obvious that its association with the modern state is no more 
than the expression of a particular environment which is already passing 
away. Sovereignty, after all, is no more than the name we give to a certain 
special will that can count upon unwonted strength for its purposes. There is 
nothing sacred or mysterious about it; and, if its sense is to be at all 
meaning, it can secure obedience only within limits.”138  
In aiming to illustrate the instrumental nature of sovereignty, Laski points out that 
the emergence of the theory of sovereignty indeed coincides with times of great 
turbulence, where the fundamental wish of its theoreticians is the restoration of order 
and stability. In so arguing, Laski cites the following examples:  
   “Bodin, as is well known, was of that party which, in an age of religious 
warfare, asserted, lest it perish in an alien battle, the supremacy of the state. 
Hobbes sought to the means of order in a period when King and Parliament 
battled for the balance of power. Bentham published his Fragment on the 
eve of the Declaration of Independence…Hegel’s philosophy was the 
outcome of a vision of German multiplicity destroyed by the unity of 
France. Austin’s book was conceived when the middle classes of France and 
England had, in their various ways, achieved the conquest of a state hitherto 
but partly open to their ambition. It seems of peculiar significance that each 
assertion of the monistic theory should have this background.”139  
Throughout his writings, Laski attacks the doctrine of popular sovereignty, the 
origins of which he attributes to the ideas of Rousseau. He challenges the Rousseauian 
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theory on the grounds that it fails to offer a workable hypothesis. In other words, in 
Laski’s account the Rousseauian ideal of self-government becomes an impossible 
fiction given the complex nature of governance in modern polity and thereby his 
ultimate distinction between the state and the government where the former is endowed 
with unlimited power proves impossible. For Laski, the device of representation cannot 
be avoided. He extends his criticisms to later advocates of popular sovereignty such as 
Bosanquet by showing that these theories wrongly treat popular sovereignty as a legal 
dogma which in fact, from the view of Laski, has no juristic worth:  
   “It is, by its very nature, incapable of translation into terms of some 
specific authority to whose enactments the courts may look for final 
reference… It is indeed obvious that the ay in which our political institutions 
function renders it impossible at any moment to ascribe to their true author 
the roots of any political act.”140  
Besides his criticism of the doctrine of popular sovereignty, Laski sets out to 
discredit the absolute theory of sovereignty of the unitary state by revealing the fragile 
and contingent nature of its foundations. To this end, he targets the works of Hegel, 
whom he identifies as the main proponent of the doctrine of the unity of the state and 
argues that through his conceptualization, “the monistic theory of the state was elevated 
from the plane of logic to the plane of ethics. Its rights then became matter of right. Its 
sovereignty became spiritualized into moral preeminence.”141 He further destabilizes 
Hegelian association of the ultimate objective of the state with the pursuance of good 
life, contending that it is not only impossible to objectively know the meaning of good, 
but also difficult to identify the methods of achieving it.  
Thus, in contrast to the theories advocating the unity of the state, Laski seeks to 
expose the complexity of irreconcilable interests underlying the political structure, be 
they associated with religious organizations, syndicates, trade unions or universities. In 
order to cope with the exigencies of plurality, Laski approves of decentralization of 
political authority and to this end envisions sovereignty partitioned upon the basis of 
function.142 Convinced that the division of power would make officials more competent 
and sensitive to popular demands, Laski calls for the revitalization of federalism in the 
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United States. In the absence of division of power, Laski argues, there would be 
despotism and paternalism, inhibiting not only efficiency but also freedom. 143     
All these criticisms extended to the nature of sovereignty lead Laski to conclude 
that the 20th century marks an end of sovereignty conceived in its classical conception. 
Instead, the way forward for Laski points to the multiplication of centers of authority, 
which impose certain limits upon the exercise of sovereignty. The writings of Laski 
have certainly had a significant impact particularly in Britain and America with their 
stress on a pluralistic understanding of the state and with their capacity to expose the 
complexities of contemporary political order. Yet, Laski was criticized heavily for 
giving way to anarchistic tendencies by undermining the unity of the state. Particularly, 
faced with growing influence of socialist movements, the restriction of the central 
authority of the state was deemed detrimental to both domestic and international liberal 
order.  
While ideas of Laski offer an innovative and powerful pluralistic challenge from 
the Anglo-Saxon world to theories of sovereignty prevalent in his times, Leon Duguit, 
in his 1919 book The Law of the Modern State carries out a through critique of the 
doctrine of state sovereignty from a different angle in France, namely from the 
dimension of the rule of law. Duguit places the locus of sovereignty within law and 
clearly advocates the subjection of state and the associated powers to law. He further 
rejects the views that endow the state with a personality and regard it as an end-in-itself. 
Instead, for Duguit the state can only be an instrument to advance social solidarity.144 A 
follower of August Comte and a legalist adhering to the ideas of Emile Durkheim, the 
main objective of Duguit is to enhance social cohesiveness and to prevent any damage 
to the moral and cultural solidarity of the society. To this end, his theory does not shy 
away from subjecting the individual interests to needs of society, yet at the same time, 
he also subordinates the role of governors to an ultimate authority, which, in his 
theorization, is the law itself. Challenging the views that associate sovereignty with the 
nation or the state, with Duguit, sovereignty comes to be located in the supermundane 
body of law.145 Based on his sociological perspective, Duguit also sees the classical 
conception of sovereignty as a historical product that is doomed to disappear. As he 
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claims, one would naturally expect sovereignty to vanish away once the era of absolute 
monarchies came to an end, yet, sovereignty continued to be an effective notion due to 
the replacement of the king with the nation.  
This formalistic attack on sovereignty also finds recognition in Germany and 
Austria, particularly among the neo-Kantians such as Hans Kelsen and Hugo Krabbe. 
Extending the views of Duguit, Kelsen situates the international law above the state and 
locates sovereignty in the continuance of this international legal order. Through Kelsen, 
the notion of sovereignty becomes divorced from politics and is reduced to a mere 
juristic essence. Another similar challenge to the concept of sovereignty comes from an 
American international relations theorist, Baron S. A. Korff, in his article entitled “The 
Problem of Sovereignty” published in 1923. It is interesting to note here that even at the 
same year that the principle of national sovereignty has become the official doctrine of 
the newly established Turkish Republic, the prevailing doctrine of sovereignty was 
being increasingly put under critical scrutiny, particularly in the Anglo-Saxon countries, 
exposing the inherent dangers associated with the concept. Posing the immanent 
question whether or not the ideals of democracy require the curtailment and restriction 
of the state sovereignty, Korff summarizes the divergent positions on the notion of 
sovereignty at the outset of the 20th century as such:  
   “One of the most difficult problems of modern political science is that of 
sovereignty. The commonly accepted theory contains many elements that 
seem to be in obvious contradiction to our ideals of democracy; some of 
them do not fit into the present-day conception of state and government, 
while others are plain remnants of feudalism and autocracy… As often 
happens in cases where political questions are involved, the theory of 
sovereignty has two extreme wings of opponents. On the one hand there are 
theorists who defend an all-powerful state and make of the idea of 
sovereignty the emblem and symbol of the all-power state authority. On the 
other hand, there have appeared recently many writers, who believe that 
dangers lurk in the views of the first-mentioned school…They distrust the 
theory of sovereignty, because of its association with unlimited power, 
consequently they deny the existence of sovereignty altogether, asserting 
that it has no place whatever in the modern theory of the state.”146  
Korff associates the first school mainly with the political theorists of Germany, 
while he cites theories of Duguit, Laski and Krabbe as examples of the second 
school.147 Instead, he offers as a solution a midway in theorization of sovereignty by 
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arguing that a distinction should be made between the political and legal aspects of 
sovereignty.148 To this end, he invokes the distinction between de jure sovereignty and 
de facto sovereignty: de jure sovereignty refers to the creation of law by a defined legal 
lawmaking body, whereas de facto sovereignty refers to the uncertain and vague terrain 
of “sum-total of influences behind the law.”149 Due the dangers that de facto 
sovereignty poses upon the ideals of democracy, Korff concludes that discussions over 
political aspects of sovereignty should be discarded as much as possible from the 
political science literature, while legal aspects of the theory of sovereignty can serve 
some purpose, particularly when exposed to certain limits. In Korff’s account, these 
limits include first the relationship between the state and the individual citizen, second 
refer to federal structures, and third relate to not a negative limitation but a positive role 
that legal sovereignty can play in the context of international law.150 
In sum, while a few notable theoretical attacks on sovereignty advanced by 
pluralists, formalists and international relations theorists were available in the beginning 
of the 20th century, the prevailing discourse on the doctrine of sovereignty was 
dominated by the idea, which vested the location of sovereignty in the nation 
personified in the body of the state and linked its exercise to the end product of this 
unity: the triumphant entity of the nation state in modern Europe.  
 
 
2.9. Conclusion 
 
 
To sum up what has been discussed so far, it is widely accepted that the modern 
notion of sovereignty first emerged to eradicate the reigning uncertainty and confusion 
around the question of authority during the middle ages. By arguing that there should be 
a single, absolute and perpetual power in a republic, the initial formulation of 
sovereignty by Bodin supported the establishment of central state ruled by a monarch. 
Hobbes further precised the logic on the need to establish a Sovereign and thereby 
founded one of the most influential theories on political obligation and legitimacy based 
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on absolutist premises. Hence, the theory of sovereignty served the purposes of 
absolutism until popular will and consent became an issue of concern.  
Towards the end of the 17th and during the 18th centuries, a new ideal emerged 
within the British and French political discourses parallel to the spread of conviction of 
free and equal individuals endowed with inalienable individual rights: the doctrine of 
popular sovereignty. While earlier theories of sovereignty had no connection to the 
democratic ideology, the ideas put forth by theoreticians such as Locke introduced the 
conception that the state derives its authority from the consent of the people through a 
two-tiered contract, the first made among the individuals, and the second between the 
society and the ruler, innovatively linking the concept of sovereignty with democracy, 
constitutionalism and the liberal discourse on individual rights.  
Building upon the ideas of Rousseau on the ‘General Will’, following the French 
Revolution the rising bourgeois class this time claimed sovereignty in the name of the 
Nation as an abstract totality. Hereafter, sovereignty was described in the French 
Constitution of 1791 as: “Sovereignty is one, indivisible, unalienable and 
imprescriptible; it belongs to the Nation; no group can attribute sovereignty to itself nor 
can an individual arrogate it to himself.” Throughout the currents of nationalism during 
the 19th and 20th centuries, sovereignty continued its flourishing career in the hands of 
ideologues and political activists, becoming formulated into the doctrine of national 
sovereignty at times helping the cause of imperialists, at times the cause of young 
nations in search of self-determination and at times dictators supported by majorities.  
One other important strand of political theorization contributed to the 
consolidation of nation-state’s ultimate domestic authority over other competing 
loyalties and ensured their independent status in the evolving international order: the 
theory of organic state developed through German Idealism and Romanticism. 
Sovereignty thus came to be located directly in the State, which was perceived as a 
living organism, endowed with a personality, a spirit and a will of its own. In this 
respect, raison d’etat came to be associated with the theory of sovereignty, which was 
put to use to combat forces of particularism and fractionism in the public sphere that 
could pose a ‘threat’ to the well-being of das Volk als Staat. 
Carl Schmitt took the modern political construction of the dominant discourse on 
sovereignty to a near completion: Clearly locating sovereignty in the realm of politics, a 
field characterized by the distinction between friend and enemy, sovereignty has been 
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finally linked to the monopolized capacity of the nation-state to decide and act upon its 
decisions, given the right to obliterate challenges directed to its preservation and unity.  
As a result of this historico-theoretical construction, sovereignty of the nation-
state has come to be a generally accepted norm and remained mostly unchallenged 
throughout the 19th and the 20th centuries, though there were a few notable efforts to 
undermine the now-perceived naturalness of sovereignty as a timeless principle. As this 
brief trajectory illustrates, the capability of shifting discourses to produce seemingly 
fixed and stable meanings of sovereignty for the purposes of the prevailing ideology in 
a given spatio-temporal coordinate, while at the same time universally managing to 
evade rigid and confining definitions for the concept have ensured the continuous role 
of sovereignty occupying the heart of politics.  
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3.  DISLOCATION: THE OTTOMAN DISINTEGRATION AND THE 
POLITICAL DISCOURSE ON SOVEREIGNTY 
 
 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
 
The genesis of the discussion on the modern concept of sovereignty in Turkish 
politics is closely linked to the consequences of a period of transformation initiated with 
the proclamation of a reforming Imperial Rescript, Gülhane Hatt-ı Hümâyunu, in 1839 
and lasting until the end of World War I. Motivated by a troubled search for a solid 
basis of political unity to ensure the survival of the multi-ethnoreligious Ottoman state, 
the era following Tanzimat witnesses an unprecedented public deliberation on what 
constitutes the appropriate source and locus of sovereignty in the Ottoman polity. 
Within this context, the subsequent analysis critically explores the political debate 
surrounding the notion of popular sovereignty in the Ottoman polity during the period in 
question and reveals the various dimensions of its ensuing institution into an influential 
discourse in support of the newly produced ideology of Ottomanism. As it becomes 
clear, posed against the traditional Ottoman concept of dynastic sovereignty, popular 
sovereignty represents a new empowering conceptual tool for the Ottoman intellectuals 
and statesmen in pursuance of the main political motive of the time: the deterrence of 
the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire.  
In order to appreciate the innovative nature of this mid-19th century debate, the 
chapter begins with an examination of the classical Ottoman understanding of 
sovereignty, the origins of which rest upon an amalgamation of three distinct 
conventions, namely Central Asian tribal practices, Islam and Turko-Persian state 
traditions. Next, the political conditions that gave rise to a new ‘liberal’ political 
discourse in the Ottoman polity are discussed and in this context the reasons behind the 
growing preoccupation with the concept of sovereignty are highlighted. A great bulk of 
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the chapter is devoted to a discursive analysis to explain the logics in which Ottoman 
opinion leaders of the time discursively made use of the concept of sovereignty. More 
specifically, these two sections of the chapter investigate answers to the following 
questions: (i) what kind of social and political conditions made it simultaneously 
necessary and possible to challenge the prevailing doctrine of sovereignty in the 
Ottoman polity; (ii) what kind of instrumental merits and possibilities did the novel 
ideal of ‘popular sovereignty’ offer?; (ii) who were the main proponents and opponents 
of this ideal, and for which motives were they in favor or against? The chapter ends 
with an analysis on the main shortcomings of this discursive construction and 
underlines the implications of its in-built limitations on the subsequent political 
developments in Turkey.  
 
 
3.2. Classical Ottoman Conceptualizations of Sovereignty 
 
 
Before delving into further analysis, it should be noted at the outset that as the 
Ottoman Empire transforms from a small fief of Seljuk’s in Asia Minor to a rising state 
and then again from a reigning Empire to the “sick man of Europe” over the time span 
of over 600 years, the conceptualization of sovereignty changes to correspond to the 
evolving political conditions. Although the following part tries to illustrate this 
continual reconfiguration of the understanding of sovereignty in the Ottoman polity 
rather than providing a single description, it is nevertheless confined to a brief analysis 
since the main focus of this chapter lies within the discursive production of the concept 
of popular sovereignty during the last century of the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, the 
following section should mostly be treated as a tool of comparison between the 
conventional Ottoman doctrine of sovereignty and the newly emerging idea of ‘popular 
sovereignty’ as it takes root in the psyche of the Ottoman elite during the last half of the 
19th century, and not as a complete theoretical survey of the understanding of 
sovereignty throughout the ‘Ottoman Centuries’ stretching from the early 14th to early 
20th centuries: 
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3.2.1. Origins: Tribal Practices, Islam and Turko-Iranian State Tradition 
 
The classical Ottoman understanding of sovereignty is mainly derived from a 
unique integration of three distinct traditions, namely the ancient Turkish tribal 
practices of high Eurasian steppes prior to the acceptance of Islam, the Islamic political 
theology and the Turko-Iranian-Mongolian tradition of state supremacy. Therefore, the 
grasp of various Ottoman articulations of sovereignty first requires a brief look at how 
sovereignty is conceived in these traditions:   
As the evidence gathered from the ancient Turkish engravings of Orhun 
Kitabeleri151 reveals, sovereignty in old Turkish tribes belongs to a single ‘holy’ family, 
which is chosen by Gök Tanrı, the highest Schamanic deity. Khan, the selected chieftain 
representing the family is said to possess Kut, a divinely source of a combination of 
good will, luck and political wisdom, which makes him the uncontestable sovereign of 
the land.152 Through the possession of Kut, Khan represents God on earth and therefore 
is endowed with a divinely sovereignty.153  Khan is at once the lawgiver, the military 
chief and the highest judge.154 The exercise of sovereignty, for the Turkish tribes, 
overall means the ultimate wisdom and power to make and enforce laws (töre) and the 
ability to ensure the loyalty of tribal members in times of war.  
                                                 
151Orhun Kitabeleri are six stone memorials dating back from 7th and 8 th centuries 
and are believed to be built and engraved by the rulers of  II. Göktürks (682-744), an 
ancient Turkic state established in the northeast of today’s Mongolia. These stone 
memorials provide the earliest clues on the political systems of Turkish tribal states. 
152‘Kut’ is a very significant concept for the understanding of sovereignty in the 
Turkic tribal tradition. Although almost all scholars agree upon its pivotal role, there are 
various interpretations of its meaning. For a detailed discussion, please see Halil İnalcık, 
“Osmanlılarda Saltanat Veraseti Usulu ve Türk Hakimiyet Telakkisiyle ilgili,” Ankara 
Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi 13, no.4, (1958): 69-94; Ümit Hassan, 
“Düşünce ve bilim tarihi: Osmanlılık öncesinde Türklerin kültür kökenlerine bir bakış,” 
Türkiye tarihi: Osmanlı Devletine kadar Türkler. (İstanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 2000) and 
Aybars Pamir, “İslam Hukukun`da ve Osmanlı Devleti`nde egemenlik anlayışı,” (PhD 
Diss., Ankara University, 2001). 
153Please see Halil İnalcık, “Osmanlı Hukukuna Giriş,” Ankara Üniversitesi 
Siyasal Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi 14, no.1 (1959): 102-126; Ahmet Mumcu, “Osmanlı 
İmparatorluğunda egemenlik kavramı ve gelişmesi,” Milli Egemenlik Sempozyumu 24-
25 Nisan 1985. (Ankara: TBMM, 1985): 34 and Ümit Hassan “Düşünce ve bilim tarihi: 
Osmanlılık öncesinde Türklerin kültür kökenlerine bir bakış,” 310-319. 
154Mahmut Arslan, “Eski Türk devlet anlayışı ve çifte hükümdarlık meselesi,” 
Fırat Üniversitesi Tarih Metedolojisi ve Türk Tarihinin Meseleleri Kollokyumu, (Elazığ, 
1990): 225-226. 
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Although Khan enjoys a divine right to rule, sovereignty is not conceptualized as 
indivisible in the ancient Turkish tribes: the sovereign right of Khan over his territory 
and population can be shared with other members of the family, enjoying autonomous 
powers and jurisdiction over their given lands. According to the system of ülüş, which 
stands for the division of the land and its administration among the male members of the 
‘holy’ family, the state is seen as a shared property. Thus, while Khan’s powers are 
conceived as limitless in theory, his claim to absolute sovereignty over the whole 
territory is indeed curtailed by members of his family acting as nomadic proto-feudal 
leaders. In fact, these leaders often could decide on the selection of the following Khan 
and sometimes, when Khan was not strong enough, could partition the land and declare 
their full independence from the central authority.155  
The classical doctrine of sovereignty in the Ottoman State does not only depend 
upon Turkish traditions, but also on the Islamic tradition. Islamic theology’s approach 
to sovereignty has been constituted by a number of complementary sources, namely the 
Koran, the holy text of Islam, Sunna, the Prophet’s conduct that had been established as 
a model for others to follow, İjma, consensus of the Islamic scholars of a particular 
region as embodying their sunni practice and Qiyas, comparative legal arguments of 
prominent Islamic jurists.156 Since the inception of Islam, many scholars have sought 
the source of sovereignty in the Koran and the Koran has left no doubt as to its source 
and locus:   
   “God has sovereignty over the heavens and the earth. God has power over 
all things.” (Âl-Imrân 3:189)157 
   “Say: ‘Lord, Sovereign of all sovereignty, You bestow sovereignty on 
whom You will and take it away from whom You please; You exalt 
whomever You will and abase whomever You please. In Your hand lies all 
that is good; You have power over all things.” (Âl-Imrân 3:26)158  
As it is clearly spelled out in many parts of the Koran, sovereignty (mülk) belongs 
to God and it is absolute and indivisible. No human being can claim a share in God’s 
sovereignty: 
                                                 
155Ahmet Mumcu, “Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda egemenlik kavramı ve gelişmesi,” 
34-35; Coşkun Üçok, Ahmet Mumcu and Gülnihal Bozkurt, Türk hukuk tarihi. (Ankara, 
1996): 19. 
156Wael B.Hallaq, The origins and evolution of Islamic law. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005): 207-208. 
157Translations of all Koranic verses are taken from The Koran, trans. N.J. 
Dawood. (Penguin Books, London, 1990).  
158The Koran, trans. N.J. Dawood, 3:26.  
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   “Blessed be He who has revealed Al-Furqan to His Servant, that he may 
warn the nations, Sovereign of the heavens and the earth, who has begotten 
no children and has no partner in His sovereignty; who has created all things 
and ordained them in due proportion.” (Âl-Furqan 25:1)159  
   “Blessed be He who in his hands holds all sovereignty; He has power over 
all things.”160  
The Koranic statements, which prohibit claims to sovereignty in the name of God, 
set the Islamic tradition apart from the Western idea of sovereignty based on the ‘divine 
right of Kings.’ From the perspective of classical Islamic theology, the leaders of the 
Islamic community cannot possess divine authority and henceforth they are regarded as 
mere administrators and executioners of the laws of God: they are conceived more as 
loyal delegates, not as the owners of sovereignty. The appointed leader of the Islamic 
world cannot make new laws and he is seen inherently bound by the Islamic law. 
Moreover, classical Islam opposes hierarchical structures, declaring everyone equal in 
front of the sovereignty of God.161 Hence, this understanding denies the existence of 
chosen families and accordingly opens the way for the election of its rulers by the 
leading members of the Islamic community, rather than referral to the practice of 
hereditary power.  
According to some contemporary jurists of Islam, the above-stated theoretical 
aspects bring the classical Islamic theory akin to democratic principles, and that the rule 
of Muhammad and the following reigns of the first four caliphs of Islam exemplify 
these democratic dimensions.162 The election of successive caliphs introduces a 
“popular” aspect and brings in a contractarian element into the Islamic theory of 
government. Thus, as some Islamic scholars argue based on historical experience, Islam 
places significance upon consultation (mashwara) and thereby upon the role of advisory 
councils with the aim of keeping rulers within the framework of Islamic law and 
minimizing the possibility of arbitrary rule.163 In this respect, the main responsibility of 
                                                 
159The Koran, trans. N.J. Dawood, 25:1. 
160Ibid. 67:1. 
161Hayreddin Karaman, Mukayeseli İslam hukuku. (İstanbul: İrfan Yayınevi, 
1974): 47-49; Charles J. Adams, “Islamic faith,” in Introduction to Islamic civilization, 
ed. Roger M. Savory. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976): 36-37. 
162Ahmet Mumcu, “Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda egemenlik kavramı ve gelişmesi,” 
35-37. 
163Şerif Mardin, The Genesis of Young Otoman Thought: A Study in the 
Modernization of Turkish Political Ideas. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000): 
91-92 
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the Islamic ruler lies in the institution and safeguarding of peace, order, justice and 
equality in lands of Islam.  
However, one should keep in mind that while orthodox Islamic theory outlaws 
tyranny and arbitrary rule, it nevertheless leaves little room for a theory of justified 
resistance since the individual is expected to completely surrender to the authority of 
God. Aware of the potential dangers associated with the absence of a theory of 
resistance, the jurists of Islam revert to the analogy of trusteeship and to the idea of biat 
(contract of investiture) by arguing that the ruler is in fact only a trustee of God’s 
authority on earth and that in case of maltreatment of this delegated authority, the 
breach of contract by the Islamic community can be justified.164  
Yet, as the historical evidence shows, the political experience of Islamic states 
with sovereignty differs in many fundamental aspects from the orthodox Islamic theory. 
Starting with the Abbasids (750–1258), the Islamic rulers in search of solid grounds for 
legitimacy of their political rule begin to claim sovereignty in the name of God. Their 
adoption of “grandiloquent honorific titles expressing relationship to the deity such as 
al-Muntasir billâh (He who is made victorious by God)” represents the Abbasids’ will 
for the sacrelization of their rule.165 Furthermore, in conflict with the classical Islamic 
rejection of hereditary transfer of power, Abbasid caliphs follow father-son succession 
and gradually consolidate absolute sovereignty in the name of their dynastic family.  
Nonetheless, this divergence never carries to the extent of a denial of the theory of 
Islam. Instead, in order to legitimize their power, Abbasid rulers look for support in the 
statements of religious leaders, some of which argue that while the Koran gives absolute 
cosmic sovereignty to God, political sovereignty has been left to humans. Building onto 
the experiences of the Abbasids and distancing away from the classical Islamic 
theology, the sovereignty of the ruler within the Turko-Iranian state tradition, like in the 
case of Seljuks, comes to be absolute.  
As Şerif Mardin indicatively highlights, this absolutization of dynastic 
sovereignty finds support in the ideas of prominent Islamic philosophers (Falasifa) such 
as Al-Farabi, İbn Sina and Al-Dawwani, injecting secular elements into Islamic political 
                                                 
164Şerif Mardin, The Genesis of Young Otoman Thought: A Study in the 
Modernization of Turkish Political Ideas, 95. 
165Clifford Edmund Bosworth, “The historical background of Islamic civilization,” 
in Introduction to Islamic civilization, ed. Roger M. Savory. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1976): 20. 
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theory.166 Thus, when speaking about the Islamic heritage over the Ottoman 
conceptualization of sovereignty, it becomes important to keep in mind this critical 
duality between the orthodox Islamic theory and the Turko-Iranian state tradition, which 
increasingly incorporates secular aspects of Islamic philosophers’ thoughts into political 
practice.  
 
3.2.2. Synthesis: The Early Ottoman Conceptualization of Sovereignty 
 
The early Ottoman understanding of sovereignty in effect represents a synthesis of 
ancient Turkish traditions and Islamic practices. Particularly during the establishment 
period, the Ottoman founders often refer to old Turkish traditions in their formulation of 
dynastic sovereignty. The influence of ancient Turkish approach to sovereignty is 
visible in the early Ottoman polity in several related ways: Similar to the Turkish 
tradition, sovereignty is claimed in the name of the ‘holy’ House of the Ottoman, or in 
other words in the name of the Ottoman dynastic family, which, according to the 
Ottoman rulers, had a direct lineage from the famous ancient Turkish ruler, Oğuz Khan. 
The founder Osman Ghazi was said to descend from Kayı Khan, the son of Gün Khan, 
who was the eldest son of Oguz Khan.167 This legend comes to be frequently utilized in 
the Ottoman historiography as a basis of legitimacy for the sovereignty of the Ottoman 
dynasty, particularly starting with the reign of Murat II (1421-1451) during the 15th 
century, when Ottomans are trying to strengthen their power in the Eastern Turkic and 
Mongol lands vis-à-vis the threatening moves of Timur and his sons.168 
 Sovereignty belongs to the family of Osman, but it is exercised by one person, 
the Sultan, whose authority depends on two major sources: military and religion. The 
political culture of the rising Ottoman State relies upon the concept of conquest carried 
out in the name of Islam (gaza). As one of the founding myths puts it based on a 
legendary dream of Osman I revealed in the house of the Muslim Sheikh Edebali, the 
                                                 
166Şerif Mardin, The Genesis of Young Otoman Thought: A Study in the 
Modernization of Turkish Political Ideas. 94-95. 
167Bernard Lewis, The emergence of modern Turkey. (London; New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1968), 332 
168Halil İnalcık, “Osmanlılarda Saltanat Veraseti Usulu ve Türk Hakimiyet 
Telakkisiyle ilgili,” 78-79.  
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Ottoman Ghazis, “the warriors of Islamic faith,” are endowed with the mission to spread 
Islam to the whole world. 
It is important to underline that while the Islamic idea of jihad provides a solid 
and uncontested objective for the reign of the Ottoman Sultans, the sovereignty of the 
Sultan is in effect not conceived as absolute during this early period: First, it is subject 
to Islamic limits, at least in theory. The Sultan is obliged to abide by and preserve 
Shariat, the Islamic law and the way of living, and he is expected to exercise his rule 
within the limits of Shariat.169 However, since no effective mechanism for executive 
and control is in place, the only constraint for the Sultan proves moral.  
Second, in the early Ottoman polity, similar to the old Turkish tradition, 
sovereignty over territory is not conceived as indivisible. The common application of 
the practice of ülüş (Turkish system of territorial division) testifies to this 
conceptualization. During this period, the sons of the Ottoman rulers are appointed as 
sanjak-beys, as governors of sanjaks, basic units of provincial government in the 
Ottoman State, and they are given special and autonomous jurisdiction over their 
assigned territory.170  
 
3.2.3. Raison d’Etat and Justice: Foundations of Absolute Sultanic Sovereignty  
 
Two concepts prove critical in transforming the early Ottoman understanding of 
sovereignty: the newly emerging idea of raison d’etat and a model of societal order 
based on the Ottoman concept of justice. This transformation, namely the absolutization 
of sovereignty personified in the figure of the Sultan during the 15th and 16th centuries, 
is a result of a number of political and theoretical advancements. First is the gradual 
development of Örf-i Sultani, the secular rule of the Sultans issued in forms of 
Kannunnâme, complimenting the religious source of law, Shariat. According to Metin 
Heper, 
   “Justification for such a practice could be found in the earlier Muslim 
states where the sovereign in practice enjoyed ‘virtually unlimited 
                                                 
169Recai Okandan, Amme Hukukumuzun Anahatları: Türkiye’nin Siyasi Gelişmesi. 
(İstanbul: Fakülteler Matbaası, 1977): 25-26; Ebubekir Sofuoğlu, Osmanlı Devletinde 
Islahatlar ve I. Meşrutiyet. İstanbul: Gökkubbe Yayınları, 2004): 160-163.   
170Metin Kunt, “Siyasal tarih: 1600 – 1789,” Türkiye tarihi: Osmanlı Devleti: 
1600 – 1908. (İstanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 2000): 135-136; Halil İnalcık, “Osmanlılarda 
Saltanat Veraseti Usulu ve Türk Hakimiyet Telakkisiyle ilgili,” 82-85.  
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discretionary power to complete the sacred law in matters directly affecting 
the state –above all, war, politics, taxation, and crime.’ The Ottomans in 
addition maintained the earlier Turkic-Iranian state traditions: if the public 
interest or the raison d’etat required it, the ruler could take measures that 
could conflict with the sacred law. Particularly critical was the idea that 
came from Persians- ‘the idea of Abbasid caliphs that the ruler was absolute 
and all acts of law and justice were favors emanating from his absolute 
power.”171  
Motivated by the idea of raison d’etat and influenced by the Turko-Iranian state 
tradition, the Ottoman Sultans manage to enlarge their area of sovereignty beyond 
Shariat, and accordingly they transform from mere guardians and executioners of the 
Islamic law to actual Lawgivers. In this sense, the period of Mehmet the Conqueror 
(1451-1481) marks a turning point in the Ottoman understanding of sovereignty, where 
Örf-i Sultani assumes new levels of significance. Strengthened by the success of his 
military conquests and the related ability to provide for the well-being of his subjects, 
Mehmet does not shy away from enacting a series of secular laws that in return 
consolidates his absolute rule over the Ottoman territory and people (Schacht, 1964: 
91). The absolute sovereignty of the Ottoman Sultan is further reinforced during the 
reign of Suleiman I, also known as the Suleiman the Lawgiver, effectively ruling over a 
giant Empire running from the shores of the Caspian Sea in Asia to the Arabian 
Peninsula and from North Africa to the gates of Vienna in Europe. During this period, 
the Sultans posses all political might, allowing no separation of powers between the 
legislative, executive and judicial branches.172 
The prevailing political thought of the time also supports the practice of absolute 
sultanic sovereignty in the Ottoman polity: As Tursun Beg, an influential Ottoman 
historian and statesman of the late 15th century, argues in his Tarih-i Ebulfeth (1490?), 
the Islamic law is to be respected and regarded as ultimate with regards to private life, 
yet it increasingly proves inadequate for public matters. Influenced by the earlier 
theories of Nasireddin Tûsi (1201-1274) in Ahlak-i Nasiri and Djalal ad-Din Dawwani 
(1427-1502) in Ahlak-i Celali, for Tursun Beg, the safeguarding of societal order and 
giving everyone their due first and foremost require the institution of a Sovereign, the 
Sultan. Therefore in every period, God appoints and empowers one person to become 
the Sultan. In a Hobbesian manner, Tursun Beg believes that human beings would 
                                                 
171Metin Heper, The state tradition in Turkey. Beverley, North Humberside: 
Eothen Press, 1985): 24. 
172Metin Kunt, “Siyasal tarih: 1600 – 1789,”86. 
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revert to chaos and conflict in the absence of the Sultan, and accordingly the needed 
world order (nizâm-i alem) and societal solidarity could not be sustained.  
Tursun Bey conceptualizes politics (siyaset) as a form of precaution (tedbir), the 
main function of which is to bring order to the world and to direct humans to harmony 
and mutual help. According to Tursun Beg, there can be two forms of precaution 
(tedbir): (i) divine politics (siyaset-i ilahi) that refers to practice of the Islamic law and 
way of living; (ii) sultanic politics (siyaset-i sultani or yasag-i padişahi), which refers to 
the secular laws of the Sultan enacted on reason and necessity.173 This necessary 
duality, as Tursun Beg sees it, allows the Sultans to supplement the Sacred Law when 
the rasion d’etat requires.174 Through Tursun Beg, the guiding principle of raison d’etat 
permeates into the psyche of the Ottoman elite and thereby constitutes one of the 
longest enduring tenets of Turkish politics.  
Hence, as the Sultans strengthen their rule through the enactment of personal 
laws, their relation to Shariat also becomes rather ambiguous. While Shariat provides a 
mechanism of control to keep Sultans away from arbitrary rule - especially when the 
Shey-ül-İslam (the head of religious hierarchy) is a strong persona -, the Sultanic control 
over the appointment and the dismissal of Shey-ül-İslam limits the effectiveness of this 
regulatory control in practice. In fact, as the Ottoman history illustrates, the relationship 
between the Islamic tradition and the Ottoman understanding of sovereignty is rather 
complex and subject to changing degrees of convergence and divergence based on the 
political exigencies of the time. It can indeed be assumed that the link between the 
Islamic and Ottoman approaches to sovereignty becomes closer when the Ottoman State 
is in a politically feeble situation, whereas the link grows apart once the House of 
Osman enjoys strength and stability.  
An example to the conflicting acts of Ottomans Sultans in relation to Shariat can 
be found in the practice of fratricide. Detaching not only away from the Islamic theory, 
but also from the ancient Turkish tribal practices, the acts of fratricide start in the 
Ottoman state with Mehmet I, the son of Beyazid I and continue as a common practice 
until the 17th century when the procedure of ekberiyet (where the oldest male member of 
                                                 
173Halil İnalcık, “Osmanlı Hukukuna Giriş,” Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilimler 
Fakültesi Dergisi 14, no.1 (1959):125. 
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the Ottoman dynasty is identified as the legitimate designate of the throne) emerges as 
the agreed upon principle of heredity.175 
Another area in which the Ottoman understanding of sovereignty becomes 
absolutized and personified can be found in the relationship between the Sultan and the 
Ottoman dynastic family during the period in question. Along with the increasing acts 
of fratricide, the ancient Turkish system of ülüş is gradually abandoned in the Ottoman 
polity, and by the 1600s the sons of the Sultan are no longer appointed as governors.176 
As Heper puts it, “having brought under close control, not only the religious institution 
but also the old Ottoman aristocracy, the Ottoman, rather than the French, case is an 
example of the sovereign and autonomous state par excellence.”177  
The absolutization of the concept of sovereignty is further sustained by the model 
of societal order prevailing in the classical period. As it is conventionally asserted by 
the scholars of Turkish political history, the political authority of the Sultans remains 
unchallenged as long as they do not fail to perform their conceived basic duty: the 
securing of order, and the distribution and maintenance of justice in society.  
In a very unique way, the ideal of justice lies at the heart of the Ottoman 
understanding of sovereignty:  This innate relationship between sovereignty and justice 
is discursively validated by one of the most enduring cliché statements of Turkish 
political thought, which declares ‘adalet mülkün temelidir’ (justice forms the basis of 
sovereignty). However, it is important to understand that the Ottoman conceptualization 
of justice differs in many key aspects from that of the Western understanding, which 
equates justice with equality:178  
In the Ottoman polity, justice refers to keeping society in harmony by giving each 
societal category no less and no more than its function and status deserve. The Ottoman 
thinkers, mainly influenced by the teachings of earlier Islamic theoreticians such as Ibn 
Sina and Dawwani, divide the Ottoman society into four categories each corresponding 
to the four main elements present in the world, namely fire, water, air and earth 
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representing soldiers, intellectuals, tradesmen and farmers.179 This social stratification 
model is evident in many earlier classical works of Turko-Iranian political theory such 
as Siyasetname of the Seljuk Grand Vizier Nizam ül-Mülk (1092) and Kabus Name 
(1082) of Kai Ka’us Ibn Iskandar.180 Based on these “mirror for prince” theories, the 
main responsibility of the Ottoman rulers is perceived to keep the ‘circle of justice’ 
(daire-i adalet) running along the following lines: a ruler can have no power without 
soldiers, no soldiers without money, no money without the well-being of his subjects 
and no popular well-being without justice.181 The works of prominent Ottoman 
statesmen such as Lütfü Pasha (Grand Vizier of Suleiman I), Katip Çelebi and Hasan 
Kafi also confirm the lasting prevalence of the theory of ‘four orders’ (erkan-ı erbaa) 
and the circle of justice in the Ottoman state practice.182  
Accordingly, this societal model based on the idea of Ottoman justice helps the 
institution of absolute sovereignty of the Sultan vis-à-vis the society since individuals 
making up the Ottoman society are always viewed as subjects in obedience to the 
absolute rule of the Sultan as long as he provides justice and order. In a way, justice 
becomes linked to the concept of had, accepting one’s given place and status in society 
and not attempting to transgress boundaries unless above infused disruptions to societal 
harmony occur. In this respect, the liberal Western political preoccupation with striking 
a balance between authority and freedom never constitutes a concern for the Ottomans: 
In the classical Ottoman polity, justice, order, and obedience represent the highest 
political values underpinning the concept of sovereignty; not freedom, participation and 
equality.  
 
3.2.4. From Dynastic Sovereignty towards the Sovereignty of the Ottoman State 
 
Ironically, yet expectedly, the birth of the concept of state sovereignty in the 
Ottoman political life corresponds to a period in which the classical Ottoman state 
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system disintegrates and the Sultans lose their grip over effective governance. Since it is 
not within the aim of this chapter to discuss the reasons for this regression, here it will 
suffice to state that the end of 17th and the 18th centuries witness the breakup of the 
socio-economic system of the Ottoman Empire due to both endogenous and exogenous 
factors, destabilizing not only the balance that was struck in the central government 
between the Sultan, the ulema and the military structure, but also between the forces of 
the center and the periphery. In fact, what we see now is that sultans are seldom 
engaged in law and policy-making, often leaving the business of government to viziers 
and other high-ranking Ottoman bureaucrats. The Imperial Council (Divan-i Hümayun) 
ceases to meet in the Imperial Palace after the 18th century, and the Ottoman civil 
service gradually seizes political sovereignty in the name of the Ottoman State, Devlet-i 
Aliyyei Osmaniye. This change in the balance of powers proves also critical for opening 
up a period of gradual transformation in relation to the issue of sovereignty.  
In order to understand the shifting locus of sovereignty from the Sultan to the idea 
of ‘the state,’ it is worthy to note the increasing numbers of coup d’etat, the objective of 
which is often justified as to put an end to an incompetent and degenerate rule of the 
Sultan in the name of ‘saving the state.’ It should be stressed, however, that these 
revolts are directed against the rule of a specific Sultan, and never against the institution 
of the Ottoman Sultanate. Hence, while the sovereignty is closely associated with the 
persona of the Sultan during the 15th and 16th centuries, in the period to follow, political 
sovereignty is increasingly seen as an attribute of the state, rather than the Sultan 
himself.   
Another example of this transformation can be found in the text of Charter of 
Alliance (Sened-i İttifak), an agreement drawn up in 1808 between the Sultan and the 
local notables (ayans) to determine the relationship between the center and the 
periphery. For the first time, the Ottoman State, not the Sultan himself, comes to be 
recorded as a party to a legal contract.183 In fact, Sened-i İttifak is significant for the 
Ottoman conceptualization of sovereignty not only in terms of understanding the 
increasing importance of the State as opposed to the Sultan, but also for noting the 
rising importance of peripheral forces vis-à-vis the central authority. This is of course a 
direct consequence of the gradual decentralization process that takes place throughout 
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the 17th and the 18th centuries.184 With the granting of territorial rental rights that could 
last for life tenure and can be transferred to children, a new class of local notables 
(ayans) assumes increasing political power in the periphery of the Ottoman Empire. The 
initial support from the central and religious authorities also helps ayans to establish 
small local dynasties, where they claim sovereignty over the subjects residing within the 
territorial borders under their control. According to Tanör, ayans represent the strongest 
class as the semi-feudal rural aristocracy of Anatolia and Balkans in the 18th century 
Ottoman Empire.185 Sened-i İttifak reveals the rising power of the local notables to the 
extent that the Sultan has to agree to refrain from arbitrary punishment of ayans 
(Charter of Alliance, Article 4 and 5)186 in return for their pledged allegiance to the 
Ottoman central authority both in terms of military support and taxation (Charter of 
Alliance, Article 1, 2, 3).  
Some scholars of Ottoman history argue that Sened-i İttifak in a certain way 
represents the Turkish version of Magna Carta187  and that it constitutes an important 
step towards to the final acceptance of national sovereignty and democracy in 
Turkey.188 Although not to deny the significance of this agreement for the Ottoman 
political development, two facts challenge its overvaluation: (i) it is important to note 
that popular demands play no role in the drafting of the charter; Sened-i İttifak is a mere 
contract between the central authority and local authorities defining their mutual 
obligations and spheres of jurisdiction, (ii) the agreement is never put into effect,189 
since rather than agreeing to strike a balance between the political role of the center and 
the periphery as the central authority loses effective power, instead the Ottoman Sultans 
increasingly revert to personal despotism.  
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Here, it is also interesting to note that it is first during the 18th century that the 
Ottoman Sultans start to systematically use the religious title of caliph.190  In search of 
compensation for “the loss of suzerainty abroad and diminution of sovereignty at 
home,” Sultans increasingly refer to the title of the caliphate.191 It is now argued that the 
Sultans are ‘the shadow of God on the face of earth’ and their personal figure is said to 
represent divine sovereignty. According to Bernard Lewis,   
   “The claim by the Ottoman Sultan to a kind of religious pontificate 
extending over Muslims other than his own subjects was new and 
unprecedented. Since the extinction of the classical Islamic Caliphate in 
medieval times, there had been no single, universally recognized titular head 
of the whole Islamic community, and each monarch had become, in effect, a 
Caliph in his own realms, using some of the titles and exercising some of the 
prerogatives of the Caliphate, but only as an adjunct to his secular 
sovereignty. The assertion of religious authority beyond the frontier was a 
radical departure –an attempt, for the first time since the fall of Abbasids, to 
establish a universal Islamic leadership, and to claim it for the House of 
Osman…In the hard time that lay ahead, the Ottoman claim to Muslim 
leadership was to arouse growing enthusiasm at home, and win increased 
acceptance abroad.”192  
However, even the claim to the caliphate proves inadequate to restore the Sultan 
as the locus of sovereignty in the Ottoman polity.193 Thus, when we come to “the 
longest century of the Ottoman Empire,” the 19th century, the general political picture 
finally looks ripe for the genesis of a new discussion on sovereignty:194 The authority 
and the charisma of Sultans decline while their despotism rises; domineering, yet 
‘incompetent’, bureaucracy increasingly gains monopoly over governmental affairs; all 
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considered, the Ottoman polity suffers from an ineffective central authority in handling 
demands of non-Muslim and Muslim communities as well as the peripheral forces 
within the Empire. Distancing away from the Islamic tradition, the violation of basic 
individuals rights becomes a common practice, and the system of justice, which formed 
the basis of the classical Ottoman doctrine of sovereignty, comes to a near collapse.195 
Faced against a failing, yet at the same time oppressive regime, an unprecedented 
preoccupation with political change starts to take root. It is in against this background 
that a novel discussion over the concept of sovereignty begins. 
 
 
3.3. Prelude: Political Legitimacy, Public Opinion, and Ideology 
 
 
As it has been discussed in the introduction of this study, sovereignty is an 
aggregate concept made up of distinct components that not always move in an identical 
way. The concept involves constituent elements such as territory and population, and 
components such as authority and autonomy. While autonomy mainly refers to an 
external understanding of sovereignty including effective control over borders, external 
recognition, and capacity to exclude external authority structures from internal decision-
making, authority relates to an internal dimension of ruling involving questions of 
control and legitimacy. Given the profound and swift changes in the composition of 
both territory and the population of the Ottoman empire during the 19th century and the 
related erosion of both political autonomy and authority, three correlated developments 
prove conducive for the production of a new political discourse in which a novel ideal 
of sovereignty starts to formulate: (i) rising concern for political legitimacy in relation 
to growing interest in ‘the people’, (ii) birth of ‘public opinion’; (iii) emergence and 
growing influence of political ideologies in pursuit of a solid basis for political unity.   
At this point, it is worthwhile to look a little closer to the ideas of Sadık Rıfat Paşa 
(1807- 1858), one of the leading architects of Tanzimat, a reform era that appears as a 
pioneer in inducing interest in the question of ‘the people’. In this regard, selected 
works of Sadık Rıfat Paşa collected in a book entitled Müntehabat-ı Âsar provide 
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remarkable insights into the Tanzimat psyche. Being an ambassador in Vienna, Sadık 
Rıfat mainly derives his political ideas from his on-sight European observations and 
sees in himself a mission to transfer these valuable opinions for a governmental reform 
to his Ottoman counterparts. What stands out as one of the most striking elements of 
Sadık Rıfat Paşa’s arguments, found in one of his most important articles, “Avrupa 
Ahvaline Dair Risale” (also described as one of the two most important texts of Turkish 
westernization by A.H. Tanpınar), is that for the first time, a rupture in the exclusive 
relationship between the concept of sovereignty and territoriality of the Ottoman Empire 
is detected. Instead, the unity and prosperity of the population emerges as a new 
concern. Contrary to what was commonly held, in Sadık Rıfat Paşa, the raison d’etat 
becomes linked to the provision of the welfare of the population and the protection of its 
rights. In opposition to the traditional Ottoman understanding of political rule, Sadık 
Rıfat asserts: 
   “No individual subject and likewise, no country were created for the sake 
of states. On the contrary, since states are simply graces of God granted to 
worldly rulers to protect and safeguard the welfare and well-being of their 
domains, in the administration of state affairs they have to act in conformity 
with the rights of their people and the laws of the state; and therefore no 
arbitrary or despotic act can be observed…. Since these matters are 
reckoned as the fundamentals of the major policies for the civilized nations 
of Europe, it is an indispensable urgency to endeavor and make utmost 
efforts so as to prepare the necessary conditions for the Ottoman State 
(Devlet-i Aliyye) to attain all these.”196  
Going further, Sadık Rıfat innovatively underlines the necessity for the Sovereign 
to win over the hearts of the population making up the Ottoman Empire. For Rıfat, a 
good government cannot stay aloof from the interests and demands of the people and 
that both the state and the bureaucracy should be the servants of the Ottoman population 
regardless of their ethnic and religious origins.197 It is the responsibility of political 
rulers to grant individuals their due natural rights: the protection of life, property and 
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honor. As Rıfat sees it, it is the stress on the well-being and the protection of rights of 
individuals that sets Europe apart from the Ottoman polity and lies behind its success:198  
   “In accordance with its methods to ensure safety and progress, the 
contemporary European civilization has sought to promote its essential 
interests only through increasing its population, improving public works in 
their domains and countries, and through ensuring law and order. Now, 
thanks to their ample means, they can easily accomplish all these and 
achieve progress through such abundant interests, thus are able to compete 
with each other for status and prestige. And the very basis of this substantive 
state of affairs is that they intend to fully safeguard life, property, honor and 
reputation for each and every people and nation; namely, to exercise 
thoroughly the essential rights of freedom. Furthermore legal independence 
is much respected and esteemed; in other words, all individual subjects and 
countries were not simply designed and created for the sake of states. 
Apparently, by the perfect wisdom of God, Sovereign of the Universe, so 
many worldly rulers were divinely entrusted only to ensure and supervise 
the prosperity and improvement of lands. Therefore, in the administration of 
state affairs, they all act in accordance with national laws, so that no kind of 
unjust and coercive treatment is observed.”199 
As the above quote clearly shows, Sadık Rıfat places utmost significance upon the 
rule of law and accordingly contends that governments should by all means refrain 
from unlawful acts. In fact, it would be justified to state that the idea of human rights 
and the rule of law, as well as the concept of hürriyet (freedom) first infuse into the 
Turkish mind through writings of Sadık Rıfat.200 In this respect, more than Mustafa 
Reşit, Âli and Fuad Paşa, it is Sadık Rıfat’s ideas that guide the text of the Imperial 
Rescript of Tanzimat, introducing the idea of rights and opening the way towards the 
institution of the rule of law in the Ottoman political system. Inspired by earlier 
proposals of Sadık Rıfat, Tanzimat Rescript identifies the preservation and 
guaranteeing of life, property and honor of all subjects as a precondition of assuring 
loyalty to Devleti Aliyye. Besides spelling out - though indirectly - the rights of the 
people, the Rescript also underlines their duties to the state in terms of taxation and 
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military service.201 Thus, it is first through this Rescript that the traces of a novel 
approach to the relationship between the state and the ‘people’ is discovered in the 
Ottoman polity.202  
Yet of course, both the Tanzimat Rescript and Sadık Rıfat Paşa’s focus on 
freedom and rights should be read with caution. First, as for Sadık Rıfat, it should not be 
forgotten that Metternich, the great Austrian champion of state centralization, 
constitutes his role model for competency in Ottoman rule.203 Moreover, the abundance 
of Islamic motifs in his thought also indicates Sadık Rıfat’s conservative stance with 
regards to the idea of a regime change. As it becomes apparent, Sadık Rıfat’s ultimate 
aim lies in offering proposals for a governmental restructuring and restrengthening. In 
this sense, it is appropriate to read his concern for ‘the people’ in association with his 
will to introduce new and effective governance techniques based on an original idea: 
continuity of the state through public participation. 
A similar strand of conservatism can also be found in the Tanzimat Rescript: To 
begin with, it should be noted that it is the Sultan himself who makes this proclamation, 
with ‘all rights reserved’ to annul its effects. Thus, it is indeed a document of auto-
limitation drafted by a few Ottoman bureaucrats under the pressure of European powers 
and proclaimed by the consent of the Sultan. Seen from this perspective, Tanzimat 
Rescript is a far cry from a constitution; it cannot even be considered as a bill of rights: 
Popular demands and participation play no role in its materialization.204 Even the 
limited audience during its proclamation, the dignitaries of the Porte and the foreign 
diplomats,205 testify to its distance from the interest of the general public.  
It should also be underlined that Tanzimat Rescript and Islahat Fermanı, the 
second complementary rescript proclaimed in 1856, bring no immanent changes in the 
conceptualization of sovereignty. This situation can in part be explained by the fact that, 
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as our research reveals, the idea of popular sovereignty never appeals to the famous 
state figures of Tanzimat such as Mustafa Reşit Paşa, Âli Paşa, Fuad Paşa and Ahmet 
Cevdet Paşa. For instance, while Mustafa Reşit advocates the institution of consultative 
assemblies in the Ottoman polity based on the administrative conclusions that he 
derives from his experiences in Europe, he nonetheless makes no referrals to the idea of 
popular sovereignty in his writings. For Reşit, in contrast to the European model of 
popular election based on the concept of popular sovereignty, the members to these 
consultative bodies can only be appointed by the Sultan in the Ottoman case, since it is 
the Sultan who holds sovereignty in trust in the name of God.206  
As the arguments of Âli Paşa in his ‘political will’ also display, the main political 
concern of Tanzimat statesmen remains within the maintenance of the sovereignty of 
the Ottoman Sultan vis-à-vis external and internal powers, and the will of safeguarding 
the unity of the Ottoman state represents the overall objective of all the reform process 
throughout the Tanzimat era. The below lengthy excerpt from Âli Paşa illustrates this 
reasoning very lucidly: 
   “Whilst we were struggling against the problems abroad, the 
administration of the country itself had always been a question we were 
preoccupied with. To be informed about and obviate the demands of people, 
to monitor the intellectual developments among them and to find out what 
their needs were: All these had always been among our responsibilities, 
which was an ungrateful task though. Because we had to prevent ourselves 
from falling into the trap set by all European countries, some utopists and 
short-sighted diplomats. For them we, immediately and unpreparedly, had to 
introduce European customs, traditions and policies into Turkey. There had 
been times we did yield so as to counteract the disturbances by acting 
moderately and when the demands made seemed rightful to us. At the same 
time, we always guarded the general interests of our State and accepted what 
was most necessary. First and foremost, we sought to govern properly what 
belonged to the Sultan and reconcile the requirements for sovereignty with 
concessions demanded by both the people and the Europeans. Since absolute 
sovereignty was by no means negotiable and our gracious sultans had 
always exercised their sovereignty with kindness, it was inconceivable for 
them to share any part of these rights with someone else. The sultan 
regarded them as ancient, divine and sacred rights. So many efforts were 
made and so much pain was taken to enforce the measures required by the 
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circumstances. In fact, the main objective and the result of all of these had 
ultimately been the consolidation of the sovereignty in question.”207  
Thus, given the conservative motives of its architects and their staunch stance 
against compelling changes in the prevailing regime, Tanzimat era indeed ends up with 
the affirmation of the absolute sovereignty of Bab-ı Âli bureaucrats, rather than leading 
to a new political order based on the idea of popular sovereignty, a form of 
parlamentarism and public freedoms. In this respect, the outcome of Tanzimat 
constitutes a complete disappointment for the majority of the Ottoman ‘men of pen’: 
The reforms fall short of ensuring their most basic promise of safeguarding the life, 
honor and property of all Ottomans; furthermore they also fail in setting up an efficient 
political order to invigorate the Ottoman State. Instead, Tanzimat opens the way for a 
despotic rule exercised by incompetent bureaucrats of Bab-ı Âli, who gradually take 
control and establish their illegitimate and oppressive authority not only over the 
population, but also over the Sultan:208  
“Had the Gülhane Rescript not confined the general ordinances of the 
Sharia, which it claimed to reestablish in its preamble, only to the notion of 
individual freedom that was interpreted simply as protection of life, property 
and honor, and had it also fully proclaimed many other principles such as 
freedom of thought, popular sovereignty and the method of consultation 
[usul-i meşveret], then it could have served as a fundamental law (a 
preliminary constitution) for the Islamic caliphate.”209 
Hence, particularly seen from the standpoint of the newly emerging group of 
lower ranking, yet ‘enlightened’ bureaucrats of the early 19th century, the loss of 
political legitimacy emerges as one of the fundamental stumbling blocks in front of the 
possibility of progress. In fact, it may not be appropriate to label this condition as ‘a loss 
of legitimacy,’ since indeed this period is the first time that the question of political 
legitimacy emerges as a matter of serious concern in the Ottoman context. As it is 
generally agreed, the concept of political legitimacy primarily refers to public 
acceptance and recognition of right to rule. Thus, political legitimacy can become an 
issue only in cases where public opinion exists and matters. Yet for in reality, up until 
the 19th century, public opinion is virtually absent in the Ottoman polity. It is only with 
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the development of independent press accompanied with the emergence of a self-
sufficient intelligentsia that public opinion, or efkâr-ı umumiye as the Ottomans of the 
time coined it, comes into sight and gains significance in the production and 
dissemination of political demands. The mobilization and manipulation of masses to 
take action against the degeneration of the Ottoman Empire through the utilization of 
autonomous media constitutes a significant new current with a profound impact upon 
the consequent political developments.  
The examples of independent dailies and magazines are first published by non-
Muslim minorities and foreigners in the early 19th century. The first independent daily, 
Ceride-i Havadis, appears in 1840 under the administration of a British migrant named 
Churchill. However, the influence of these first papers is limited due to low levels of 
circulation.210 It is in effect with İbrahim Şinasi’s two leading dailies, Tercüman-ı Ahval 
(1860) and Tasvir-i Efkâr (1862) that the press steadily obtains a key role in shaping 
and guiding the political agenda of the time.211 Thus, as Mardin aptly puts it, it is 
through the pioneering efforts of Şinasi that “the birth of the public opinion” occurs in 
the Ottoman polity.212 Accordingly, the press offers two unique opportunities: (i) for the 
first time it gives ‘the men of pen’ a possibility of economic independence from the 
state, and thereby helps the emergence of a new class of intelligentsia; (ii) it provides an 
effective platform through which ideas of intelligentsia could be expressed, paving the 
way for courageous governmental opposition.  
Yet of course, the development of public opinion cannot in itself explain the 
sudden appearance of innovative theoretical arguments utilizing unprecedented political 
concepts such as ‘popular sovereignty’. The question thus arises as to where these ideas 
came from and how were they systematized into a new discourse. As it is often 
expressed, until the mid 19th century, the Ottoman political and intellectual class stayed 
aloof from Western political thought currents and prevailing ideologies of the period.213 
In fact, the stale condition of Ottoman political thought was marked not only by 
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isolation from the Western intellectual developments, but also by an absence of any 
kind of political ‘ideology.’ Islam, in a certain way, represented the only ‘soft ideology’ 
guiding the lives and the minds of the Ottomans.214 The subsequent formulation and the 
growing impact of “hard” political ideologies in the Ottoman Empire during the 19th 
century such as Ottomanism, Westernism and Islamism stand out as another key factor 
that helps explain the political motives behind the emergence of an unprecedented 
public discussion on sovereignty.  
In part, the development of ‘hard ideologies’ in the Ottoman Empire should be 
seen as an indirect result of the gradual westernization process starting as early as the 
reign of Selim III, a period that coincides to the immediate aftermath of the French 
Revolution. The introduction of a new secular education system, first initiated by the 
schools established during the reign of Mahmut II, and the parallel intensification of 
cultural encounters with Europe through increasing numbers of mutual visits and 
diplomatic exchanges all play a significant role in the penetration of Western ideas into 
the Ottoman psyche and support the continuous injunction of innovative political ideas 
onto the Ottoman public agenda. 
During this period, many Ottoman men of pen start to learn European languages, 
French being the most preferred one of all. The establishment of a Translation Bureau 
within the cadres of Bab-ı Âli and the following oppositionary activities of the 
bureaucrats ‘raised in’ this bureau in itself reveal the growing influence of the Western 
inspired proposals in the Ottoman political life. In addition, the independent press also 
contributes greatly to the dissemination of European political ideas.215 For instance, it is 
first through Şinasi’s Tasviri Efkar that the Ottoman elite can read the influential book 
of Vattel on the natural law theory, which the newspaper publishes in a series of 
articles. 
Political visits, sometimes in the form of appointed governmental posts and 
sometimes in the form exile also constitute a vital factor of exposure, which immensely 
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contributes to the infiltration of Western political ideas into the Ottoman mind during 
the period in question. It should be remembered that almost all leading figures of the 
reform movement, both the Tanzimat statesmen and the subsequent genres of Ottoman 
intelligentsia, spend years in European capitals and accordingly gain considerable 
insights into the available European political theories. For instance, the Young 
Ottomans, the first influential group of ‘autonomous’ Ottoman intellectuals in 
opposition to the Tanzimat regime, establish the foundations of their political views 
during their stay in cities such as Paris and London. The frequent usage of novel 
Turkish words corresponding to popular Western concepts such as liberté (hürriyet), 
patrie (vatan), nation (millet), public (umum), souverainité (hakimiyet) in the writings of 
the Young Ottomans, coupled with their widely read (among the elite) translations of 
leading European theoreticians such as Rousseau, Montesquieu and Volney all indicate 
an unparalleled exposure to European influence.216  
The process of westernization of the Ottoman political life cannot of course only 
be seen as an outcome of endogenous developments. For in reality, it should be 
underlined that starting with the late 18th and the early 19th century, the political 
pressure exerted by European powers becomes a weighty factor behind the motor of 
change in the Ottoman polity. Just to cite one example, it is a very well known fact that 
the Ottoman Empire is first officially accepted into the ‘European family of states’ in 
1856 in return for the concessions that the Sultan makes to religious minorities in the 
Reform Edict (Islahat Fermanı) of 1856 recognizing their equality with the Muslim 
community.  
In effect, it is very important to understand that a dialectic relationship between 
the Ottoman elite and the West occupies the backstage of all these developments. In 
other words, it is through the Western lens that the Ottomans see, describe and change 
themselves. Even the increasing usage of the term Turc or Turquie, as exemplified by 
the names that reformists identify themselves with, reflects a mirror image of the 
Western perception of the Ottomans. As it is well documented, it is mostly in the 
writings of the Orientalists that we come across a wide- spread utilization of terms such 
as Turc, Turkey or Turquie (Mardin 2001, 43-44). Thus, when analyzing the political 
ideas of this period, the dialectic internalization of Western inspired ideas should be 
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taken into consideration and a form of reverse orientalization should be seen as the 
leitmotif of the emergence of a new Ottoman weltanschauung.  
 
 
3.4. Discursive Discovery of Popular Sovereignty: A way out of the impasse? 
 
 
The beginning of a debate as to what constitutes the appropriate source and locus 
of sovereignty in the Ottoman polity can in one way be attributed to the anxious search 
of Ottoman intellectuals and statesmen for a new focus of allegiance to maintain and 
strengthen the Ottoman State. This pursuit finds its best expression in Ottomanism, a 
novel ideology that guides the political motives of leading Ottoman elites up until the 
1910s. Ottomanism, or ittihad-ı anasır as it was called at the time, aims to ensure the 
survival of the multi-ethnoreligious Ottoman Empire through the introduction of the 
concept of ‘Ottoman citizenship.’ Faced with the growing separatist demands of 
different ethnic and religious groups living under the Ottoman rule and the increasing 
imperialist pressures of Western powers, the ideology of Ottomanism represents an 
innovative solution: If only all the Ottoman subjects - Muslims, Christians, Jews - could 
be persuaded and turned into ‘Ottoman citizens’ under a constitutional order with equal 
rights and duties, then it would be possible to reaffirm their loyalty to the House of the 
Ottoman. This new concept of citizenship thereby would provide the needed cement to 
unite the population, joining together the pieces of a collapsing Empire. The idea of the 
unification of all Muslim and non-Muslim groups would serve the interests of all, since 
in the absence of unity, it was argued, all groups would fall prey to the imperialist 
intentions of stronger European states. In return, the harmony of all ethnic and religious 
groups of the Empire would help Ottoman Empire to regain its long-lost strength and 
pave the way for a return to its glorious past.217 
 Within this framework, it is not difficult to understand why the idea of popular 
sovereignty constitutes a new empowering discursive tool for the Ottoman intellectuals 
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in pursuit of the goals of Ottomanism: First, it serves to curtail the absolutist tendencies 
of the ruling bureaucrats and opens the way for a more participatory and effective 
government. Second, it helps to diffuse multi-ethnoreligious identities into the inclusive 
concept of ‘the people.’ By locating the sovereignty in the people, the idea of popular 
sovereignty simultaneously gives various communities a say in governmental affairs 
and holds them responsible for the political faith of the Ottoman polity. Hence, in a 
way, the concept of popular sovereignty contributes to the widening of the popular base 
of the Ottoman state and accordingly provides political legitimacy to the Empire. Seen 
from this perspective, it ultimately ensures the continuity of the State. As Niyazi Berkes 
explains, in the new context of the 19th century:  
   “Sovereignty can no longer be conceived as an imposition of authority 
from above, but rather it needs to be reestablished and be based upon the 
elevation of natural rights to the political level. There can be no superior 
locus for sovereignty beyond and above the will of the public.”218  
 
 
3.4.1. In the midst of the earthly and the divine: Where to look? 
 
Thus, it is within the context of a troubled search for a regime change that the 
discussion on sovereignty comes to fore and eventually leads to a continual construction 
of a new discourse with lasting impacts upon the ideology of the revolutionist elite that 
establishes the Republic of Turkey from the ashes of a collapsed empire. As a survey of 
Turkish political thought during the 19th century reveals, it is first in the writings of the 
Young Ottomans that the idea of political reform based on a novel understanding of 
sovereignty is systematically treated. Suffused by the ideology of Ottomanism and 
utilizing the new means of independent press, the writings of Namık Kemal, Ali Suavi 
and Ziya Paşa, the leading representatives of the Young Ottoman movement, fuse 
together in a public call for a profound transformation of the political order. Yet, how 
could this objective of a regime change be achieved?  
The pursuit of an answer first and foremost requires a discussion as to where the 
source and locus of sovereignty should be located in the Ottoman polity to put an end to 
the regression and to ensure the survival of the Empire. Among the men who 
participated in a progressive search for answers to these overarching questions, Namık 
Kemal stands out as the most important figure, who has had a pervasive influence in 
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introducing and extending the meaning of popular sovereignty in Turkish political 
thought. Kemal’s attempt to analyze the origins of government and to formulate policy 
proposals to revitalize the ‘contract’ between the Ottoman rulers and the public 
constitute a major contribution to opening the way for a new conceptualization of 
sovereignty in Turkey.  
In the below excerpt from “Wa-shawirhum,” one of the most original and 
significant articles of Namık Kemal appearing in Hürriyet newspaper, he offers an 
explanation of why sovereignty should belong to public, basing his conclusion upon 
premises unprecedented in Turkish political thought:  
   “The Almighty created man bestowing freedom upon him. And naturally 
he cannot choose but benefit from this divine grace. Public freedom can 
only be preserved within the society itself, for only the society is capable of 
breeding an overpowering force to safeguard one individual from the 
offense of another. As is understood, the purpose of society in the world 
simply consists of devising such an overpowering force to preserve freedom, 
on which the survival of the mankind depends. Thus sovereignty, which 
serves to substitute for rights and to reject falsehood, is composed of the 
sum all powers possessed by all individuals. Therefore, since not only the 
natural right of the person over his own self but also collective forces 
concern all individuals, sovereignty belongs to the public in every 
community (ümmet).”219  
Taking off from the inviolability of the private person, Kemal ends up with a 
novel understanding of sovereignty, its source firmly and uniquely located in the 
people. For Kemal, the addition of individual powers that all together make up the body 
public represents the real essence of sovereignty and thereby, he concludes, in all 
communities the right of sovereignty belongs to the public. It is rather evident from the 
above passage that Kemal derives his line of argumentation on popular sovereignty 
from Western social contract theories of the 17th and 18th centuries. Most particularly, it 
is the political ideas of Rousseau and Locke that serve as the most pervasive source of 
inspiration for Kemal. Although secondary literature analyzing Kemal’s political theory 
often treat and prioritize the influence of Rousseau over Kemal,220 nevertheless in our 
view, Kemal’s notion of popular sovereignty, though originally driven from Rousseau, 
diverge in several important aspects from that found in the French theorist and prove in 
some ways akin to the views expressed by Locke. Yet of course, as it will be discussed 
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in detail later in this chapter, Kemal’s ideas embody severe limitations, which prevent 
probably the most important Ottoman political theorist of the 19th century from reaching 
liberal conclusions on solid foundations that could have had a lasting influence over 
Turkish political life. But now, let us concentrate on several original elements in 
Kemal’s conception of sovereignty that are noteworthy: 
First is his stress on the individual and the natural entitlement of the individual to 
freedom as a point of departure. As the initial line of Kemal’s passage suggests, by 
virtue of being a creation of God, each person is endowed with an inalienable right to 
liberty. Similar to the Lockean position, there is a theological connection in Kemal 
between the possession of natural rights by birth and the equal and free standing of 
every individual. Here in Kemal’s mind, the Western tradition of natural rights with the 
Islamic theological principle of the inviolability of the individual merges221  to conclude 
that since individuals are free and equal right-bearers, they cannot be subject to the rule 
of any political authority without their consent. Of course, at the heart of Kemal’s belief 
in the idea of popular sovereignty lies his fight against absolute and unjust political 
authority and his wish to bring in constitutional limits to the rule of Bab-ı Âli 
government. In this sense, the Western tradition of constitutionalism, particularly as 
represented by the line associated with Grotius and Locke, provide Kemal with 
necessary tools. In common with liberal constitutional thinking, for Kemal the 
establishment of political authority is necessary primarily to prevent violation of 
freedoms and to ensure limited, yet effective government void of arbitrary rule.  
Seen from this perspective, the idea of popular sovereignty represents a 
reconciliatory solution for the simultaneous need to protect the inalienable liberties of 
individuals and at the same time to avoid absolutist political tendencies. Thus, what is 
important to note here is that, most probably for the first time in Ottoman political 
thought, it is in Kemal’s political views that the main objective of the constitution of 
society and political authority becomes the assurance of freedom and rights, not the 
maintenance of order and justice. As Kemal sees it, the peaceful coexistence of 
individuals can only be ensured in a society that consents to the establishment of a 
political authority based on popular sovereignty.  
For Kemal, popular sovereignty represents the addition of the power and will of 
all individuals making up the society. This definition brings us to the second innovative 
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point of Kemal’s understanding of sovereignty: It is interesting to take notice of the fact 
that Kemal conceptualizes sovereignty as a right, which undeniably belongs to the 
public as an end product of the freedom of each individual. Here, it should be 
emphasizes that while Kemal embraces the idea of popular sovereignty as a new 
organizing political principle of the Ottoman polity, he nonetheless delicately refrains 
from instituting the concept of the ‘people’ into a new despotic entity. Although there 
are some divergent views in the secondary literature as to Kemal’s stance towards the 
balance between the community and the individual,222 in our reading, Kemal’s oft-cited 
concerns over the potential tyranny of the majority indicate his cautiousness in not 
placing the will of the ‘people’ above the will of the individual. The below passages 
taken from two different articles written four years apart testify to Kemal’s enduring 
reluctance to locate the source of sovereignty in any authoritative body, which in turn 
could tyrannize individual freedom:  
   “However, it is a precept of reason that ‘regardless of the time, the place 
or the method used, the government should choose the road which will least 
limit the freedom of the individual. No community can agree on, or confirm 
in the office, an individual as an absolute ruler, nor can it bestow legislative 
powers on a single individual. And even if it so desires, it cannot rightfully 
do so. For it neither has the right to tyrannize an individual nor to violate the 
rights of all.”223  
   “The sovereignty of the people, which consists in that the source of the 
power of the government is the people, and which is called biat in the 
religious law, is not a power that derives from the abstract meaning attached 
to the conceptions such as the ‘majority’ or the ‘people’. It is a right, which 
derives from the congenital independence with which every individual is 
endowed at his creation, and follows from personal independence. 
‘Everyone is the ruler of his own world.”224  
What is remarkable here is that, while Kemal is clearly influenced by Rousseauian 
ideas on popular sovereignty, he nevertheless dismisses the gist of the Rousseauian 
conception: the idea of the general will. As discussed in the first chapter, in contrast to 
Locke, for Rousseau, popular sovereignty represents something beyond the mere 
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addition of each individual will: it reflects the unchallengeable will of the community of 
citizens as a collective body, expressed as an entity in itself, as Volonté Général. The 
doctrine of inalienable popular sovereignty represented in the General Will sets 
Rousseau apart from and in effect sometimes in conflict with the doctrine of inalienable 
individual rights advocated by Locke. Thus, while Rousseau subordinates the individual 
will to the General Will, in Kemal’s conception, we do not come across such subjection. 
This is in part related to Kemal’s emphasis on personal freedom, and in other part it is 
related to an absence of a theory of state in Kemal’s thought, which is probably a direct 
consequence of a lack of an organic theory of state in Islam.225  
Kemal mostly develops his ideas on the relationship between the state and the 
individual in a series of articles published in İbret.226 Through these articles, it becomes 
apparent that neither the state nor the community is elevated to a separate and 
transcendent existence in Kemal’s account. In other words, the totality does not 
constitute anything more in itself than a mere addition of its parts. Kemal’s usage of the 
terms “state” and “government” interchangeably also reveals the lack of a conception of 
the state in and for itself. This does not mean that Kemal rejects romantic appeals to 
unifying themes such as the fatherland (vatan) and religious community (ümmet); on the 
contrary, it is Kemal who popularizes the idea of allegiance to the fatherland in the 
Turkish mind. In effect, currents of European romanticism and liberalism merge 
together in Kemal’s expression of his thoughts on the Ottoman polity; however, in his 
explanation of origins of political obligation, neither the state nor the community is 
presented as entities located above and different from the individuals:   
“State is not an entity separate from the people. It cannot have any interest 
for its own sake, because subjects do not levy any kind of tax upon 
themselves. The term ‘state’ thus indicates no other entity but the public.”227 
His attempt to safeguard the individual vis-à-vis the community and the state has 
to be placed in the forefront when considering how far Kemal’s ideas go beyond from 
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those established in writings of other Young Ottomans and the subsequent generation of 
Young Turks. At this point, it becomes apposite to compare the ideas of Namık Kemal 
on sovereignty with those of other prominent members of the Young Ottomans such as 
Ziya Paşa (1825 –1880) and Ali Suavi (1839-1878):  
Being a public administrator rather than a political theorist, Ziya Paşa is mainly 
focused on extending a criticism of the ruling bureaucrats and the government, trying to 
highlight ill practices and to recommend policies for betterment.228 Besides his 
influential articles in papers such as Muhbir and Hürriyet, Ziya Paşa is also well known 
for his poems that help familiarize the concepts like freedom, rights, law and 
civilization in the Ottoman mind. Yet, neither his political writings, nor his poems reach 
the level of originality present in Kemal. While Ziya Paşa supports Kemal’s ideas on 
popular sovereignty and contributes a great deal to the popularization of the term, he 
nonetheless lacks a genuine interest in elaborating a full-fledged theory of sovereignty, 
where the people are identified as the fundamental source of political authority. 
However, one element in Ziya Paşa’s thought is worthy of mention: his discussion on 
the inalienability of sovereignty. Under the influence of Rousseau and his close 
acquaintance with Rousseau’s Emile and Discours sur l’Inégalité, in a series of articles 
that appeared in Hürriyet from December of 1868 until May of 1869,229 Ziya Paşa 
explains in detail how he sees the original constitution of political society and its 
consecutive degeneration into a despotic rule. Here, Ziya Paşa builds on Kemal’s ideas 
on popular sovereignty by emphasizing the inalienability of sovereignty of the people, 
an idea that he most probably derives from Rousseau. He reminds everyone that 
Kings/Sultans were at first the ‘paid servants’ of their community, yet in time people 
became subjects of political rulers, forgetting the contractual origins of their political 
obligation. Similar to Kemal and Suavi, Ziya Paşa believes that the Sultans of the 
Ottoman Empire up until the 16th century were in effect similar to those found in early 
Islam; never acting as rulers with absolute rights, but rather as the administrators of the 
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religious community.230 Within this context of political degeneration, Ziya Paşa 
fervently dismisses the irrevocable delegation of sovereignty of the people; instead he 
holds the rulers continuously responsible.  
Ziya Paşa’s ideas on the responsibility of the rulers prove also similar to, and 
according to Mardin goes beyond, the liability of rulers conceived in Locke.231 In Locke 
too, we come across a similar relationship of trusteeship between the society and the 
government: In transition from the state of nature towards the creation of civil society, 
individuals make a contract with one another as equals, yet when it comes to the 
establishment of a political authority, the agreement takes a form of a trusteeship 
granted to the government by the society. In other words, dissimilar to the members of 
society, the government in itself does not bear inalienable rights, but rather the authority 
that it is endowed with is revocable and subject to certain conditions.  
The opinions of Ali Suavi with regards to the issue of sovereignty stand in 
opposition to the ideas of Ziya Paşa and Namık Kemal. As a matter of fact, Suavi’s 
stance on the source of sovereignty represents one of the clearest points of rupture with 
Kemal and Ziya. While Suavi believes in the significance of reaching out and 
awakening ‘the public’, he nevertheless opposes the idea of ‘popular sovereignty’ on the 
basis of its incompatibility with the precepts of Islam. Although it is rather difficult to 
categorize the political thought of Suavi since, as one of the most debated figures of the 
Young Ottoman movement, he is bequeathed with conflicting representations ranging 
from an Islamist232 to a secular modernizer;233 from a democratic revolutionary234 to a 
Turkish nationalist,235 as far as his ideas on sovereignty are concerned, the Islamic 
tradition clearly provides the necessary concepts and tools constituting the fundamental 
base of Suavi’s political conceptualizations.  
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Despite his outright rejection of the idea, interesting discussions on sovereignty 
nevertheless appear frequently in Suavi’s writings in newspapers such as Le Mukhbir 
and Ulum, both of which he publishes in Europe. In one of the most important articles 
he wrote on sovereignty, “El Hâkimu Hüvallah,” Suavi explicitly underlines the fact 
that in Islam sovereignty can only belong to God, and accordingly sees no value in the 
discussion of a political order based on the idea of popular sovereignty:    
   “There exists a term which has gained considerable notoriety nowadays, 
‘popular sovereignty’ as the expression goes. This term is a translation from 
the French. Its original reads: ‘souveraineté du peuple.’ Now let us inquire 
into the meaning of these French words. What does souveraineté mean? This 
word is originally from the Latin ‘soprenos’ which means ‘does what he 
desires.’ Sole master of his self [hâkim-i binnefs], absolute authority [amiri 
mutlak], free in his actions [fail-i muhtar]. Well what is it, in fact, that rules 
by itself and has absolute power over things? Something, which cannot be 
qualified with any attribute other than that of Divinity. Thus, in this sense, 
there does not exist a single human being who possesses souveraineté.”236  
   “So who is the one ruling by his own nature, exerting his entire will upon 
all beings? Possessing this attribute, there is no one else but God the 
Exalted. Thus, in this sense, there is no individual possessing sovereignty. 
Because no person is absolute neither in his consciousness nor in his 
willpower. Then what does “sovereignty” mean and to whom does it 
belong? It naturally belongs to a supreme power, who is not human. This 
owner is greater than all beings, he is the sovereign, utterly just, free from 
grudge; thus, He is Allah. The teaching ‘Allah is the sovereign’ [El Hakimu 
Hüvallah] was revealed to our Prophet (peace be upon Him), who is the true 
master of Sharia. Islamic jurisprudence is entirely based upon this 
principle.”237  
As illustrated, Suavi firmly rejects Kemal’s hypothesis, which locates the source 
of sovereignty in the individual, and instead posits that according the Islamic tradition 
there can be only one source and locus of sovereignty and that would be within God. 
Since in Islam individuals are expected to submit to the absolute authority of God and 
therefore cannot be the masters of themselves, they cannot posses sovereignty. 
Furthermore, building upon the Islamic tradition where all human beings are deemed as 
equals of one another, Suavi contends that no individual can claim supremacy and 
domination over others. In this respect, Suavi also refutes the understanding that locates 
sovereignty in the Sultan or, in a similar logic, in the parliament.  
While the influence of Western liberal currents can be readily found in Kemal and 
Ziya Paşa’s ideas on sovereignty, Ali Suavi’s logic in this regard in many ways displays 
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similarities to the teachings of the French traditionalist school developed in reaction to 
the French Revolution, the main representatives of which include Joseph de Maistre and 
Louis de Bonald. Coming from a staunch catholic position, de Maistre and his followers 
refute the most cherished notion of the French Revolution, the doctrine of popular 
sovereignty, by arguing that sovereignty can only belong to God. The children of God 
are born together with his sovereignty and therefore a separate claim to sovereignty by 
the people can only be absurd, as well as impossible. By being a possession of God, 
sovereignty can only be absolute and indivisible. It should be remembered that the 
ultimate objective of the French traditionalist school was in fact to restore the divine 
authority of the monarch and to fill in the political vacuum by “whatever seemed 
supreme and adequate to the notion of absolute sovereignty” 238 to overcome the chaos 
followed by the Revolution. In a similar fashion, Ali Suavi’s referral to the 
transcendental notion of God can be seen in connection with his wish to fill the vacant 
seat of the Sovereign239 with an effective figure of absolute unity, a vacancy that caused 
much harm to the Ottoman polity. In effect, in Hüseyin Çelik’s view, Suavi advocates a 
political regime that may be entitled nomocracy, where the divine source of sovereignty, 
God, is placed above everything else and the rulers are mere administrators responsible 
for executing God’s laws on earth.240   
Yet of course, the apparent difference between Suavi and Kemal is not such that 
Kemal’s conception of sovereignty is based on secular premises, while that of Suavi is 
deeply rooted in an Islamic understanding. On the contrary, as it is often mentioned in 
later interpretations of Namık Kemal, and correctly so, Kemal’s liberal conception of 
popular sovereignty is also confined by an incessant attempt to justify his political ideas 
through referral to Islamic traditions. In fact, it is worthy to note that the titles of the two 
most important articles “Wa-shawirhum fi’l-‘amr” (Take counsel with them in the 
conduct of affairs)241 and “al-Hâkim Huwullâh” (the Sovereign is God), in which Suavi 
and Kemal elaborate most perceptibly on the subject of sovereignty, are verses directly 
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taken from the Koran. Despite the contradictory conclusions driven from the verses, the 
mutual search for Islamic justification is obvious. In fact, the thought of all members of 
Young Ottomans is heavily permeated by Islamic motifs. However, it is early Islam that 
appeals to them: Young Ottomans’ search for justification for their liberal ideas mostly 
focuses on early Islamic theology and practice; they often accuse the later Turko-
Mongo-Persian state tradition for introducing an absolutist tendency and thereby for 
corrupting political rule.  
In many instances, Kemal tries to show that, in its original and pure form, Islam 
does not stay distant to the idea of popular sovereignty and that original Islamic 
practices such as biat (contract of investiture) and meşveret (consultation) all point to 
the significance of ‘the people’ in governmental affairs. The institution of Biat, which 
can be thought as a form of a social contract between the caliph and the community 
ensuring obedience in exchange for justice, provides a legitimate basis from which 
Kemal can justify the crucial position he appoints to the consent of people in his 
political thought (Akşin, 2000: 348). In response to questions extended as a critique of 
the idea of popular sovereignty, Kemal writes:  
   “As long as popular sovereignty is acknowledged, then should the 
people’s right to have a republic not be recognized? Just the 
opposite….Who on earth can deny that right? Was Islam not a sort of a 
republic in its earlier phase anyway? 
   Does popular sovereignty mean unfair submission? As a matter of fact, we 
are the sovereigns ruling over our domains. Actually we all take part in the 
government. Yet, through a legitimate covenant [biat-i meşrua] we entrusted 
the execution of state affairs to House of the Ottoman. 
   Can the attainment of the method of consultation [usul-ü meşveret] be 
only possible by imitating the parliaments currently existing in Europe? Yes, 
inevitably, it will be the only way to achieve that. Because up until the 
Janissaries were done away with, the Ottoman State had been ruled 
according to the consent of the ummah, and thus the method of consultation. 
The people exercised themselves their right to rule, which they would 
otherwise confer upon the members of the parliament.”242 
Although Ali Suavi, Ziya Paşa and Namık Kemal have divergent opinions as to 
the source of sovereignty in a political community, their ideas merge together in the 
specific form of the political system, which would be held responsible for the exercise 
of sovereignty. The people’s right to sovereignty would be exercised by consultative 
assemblies carrying out the legislative function. In their call for the constitution of a 
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consultative assembly, the Islamic concept of “meşveret” forms a bridge among the 
Young Ottomans’ thought. In search for an Islamic justification for the introduction of a 
parliamentary system in the Ottoman Empire, Young Ottomans utilize the terminology 
of "Usûl-i Meşveret" for the first time in 1867 in Muhbir, a Young Ottoman newspaper 
published in London under the editorial leadership of Ali Suavi. In a series of articles 
published in Muhbir in 1868 under the title of "Emrâz-ı Dahiliyye" (19th and 20th 
issues), and in an article named “Usul-i Meşveret” (27th issue), the system of meşveret is 
shown to be in line with Islamic theology and in fact to be a common practice in early 
Islam, particularly in its golden days during the reign of Prophet Muhammad and the 
following four caliphs. Departing from a sense of nostalgia for a return to the ‘golden 
age’, the abandoning of the system of mesveret is identified as one of the underlying 
reasons for the current backwardness of the Ottoman polity. 
In fact, Kemal sees much merit in the notion of separation of powers between 
different political functions. Kemal derives his ideas on separation of powers from the 
French theorist Montesquieu and as he himself admits, the two significant works of 
Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws and Considerations on the Grandeur and the 
Decadence of the Romans prove decisive in shaping his ideas in this direction. For 
Kemal, since legislation is an expression of popular sovereignty, it has to be separated 
from the execution.243 But here too, similar to his earlier attempts at justifying new 
concepts in reference to old Islamic or Ottoman traditions, Kemal asserts that up until 
the 17th century, there was a well functioning separation of powers between the Sultan, 
the ulema and the janissaries in the Ottoman State, yet this balance was gradually 
disrupted by later developments.244 To achieve a form of separation of powers, Kemal 
envisages the establishment of a representative government based on three consultative 
mechanisms: a council of state (Şuray-i Devlet) in charge of drafting of legislation and 
the members of which are to be appointed and dismissed by the Sultan; a parliamentary 
chamber (Meclis-i Şura-yı Ümmet) with a right to approve or deny legislation prepared 
by Şuray-i Devlet and the members of which are to be chosen by popular election; and a 
Senate made up of the family of the Sultan, high ranking religious and military leaders 
and local notables. In Kemal’s view, this body would be responsible for keeping a 
balance of power between Şuray-ı Devlet and Şuray-ı Ümmet. Similar to Rousseau, 
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Kemal believes that since there is no possibility of direct rule in a big state such as the 
Ottoman Empire, people inevitably need to delegate the execution of sovereignty to a 
government. For Kemal, a mixture of the political systems of France and England, a 
monarchy supported by a parliamentary system, can exemplify the best form of 
government for the Ottoman Empire.245  Thus, in Kemal’s vision, while the right of 
sovereignty belongs to the people, its practice is not conceived as indivisible and 
absolute. 
   “Because the people do not have any actual opportunity to exercise the 
duties entailed by that right of sovereignty, it is indispensable that an imam 
should be designated and a government should be formed, which is nothing 
but the fact that the society entrusts some individuals with the exercise of 
the mentioned duties.”246  
In their various writings, Young Ottomans go in great detail in highlighting the 
differences between Usul-i Meşveret, conceptualized as a form of parliamentary 
assembly, and hükümet-i mutlaka (absolute government) or hükümet-i şahsiyye 
(personal government).247 As Ziya Paşa explains in the 32nd issue of Muhbir, the good 
government is a form of representational government supported by a constitutional 
assembly, which would eventually lead to the maturation of the people and the 
realization of their will.248 Ziya Paşa further compares the Ottoman political system to 
those in Europe and concludes that a parliamentary system would indeed help the 
Ottomans to progress. Ziya Paşa holds: 
   “Now let us take a look at the states situated on the continent of Europe. 
Has there remained any absolute state other than Russia? And has even that 
government not gradually been striving to imitate the laws prevailing in 
other European states? In as much as the course of development in the 
public opinion of Europe is like an overwhelming flood….. And given that 
the Ottoman State, too, is considered as belonging to the family of Europe, it 
is totally unlikely that we will be able to resist against the world and 
survive.”249 
Yet, in this newly envisaged political system, none of the Young Ottomans dare 
touch the privileged position of the Ottoman Sultan. While all concede to the position of 
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the Sultanate, their ideas differ only with regards to the level of his involvement in day-
to-day politics. While Kemal and Ziya foresee a role for the Sultan similar to that of the 
British monarch, for Suavi, this role goes beyond a symbolic crown.250 Yet even Suavi, 
a fervent believer in the institution of Sultanate, denies limitless and arbitrary political 
power gathered in the hands of a monarch. To this end, he makes a clear distinction 
between despotism and constitutional monarchy, advocating the latter.  
However it should be underlined that although Suavi condemns despotism,251 he 
disagrees with Kemal on the necessity of separation of powers and accordingly never 
accepts the principle of checks and balances. Departing from the idea of “the unity of 
imamate” in Islam, Suavi rejects Kemal’s proposals urging for an effective cross checks 
and balances between the powers of legislative, executive  and the judiciary. Suavi 
evades the possibility of an institution of a non-hierarchical governmental functions by 
arguing that since Islam already permits and exercises a separation of power between 
müftü (the interpreter of Shariat), the kadı (the judge of Islamic court) and the valis (the 
governor acting as the arm of the executive), it makes no sense to have checks and 
balances from the point of Islamic order.252  
   “Although we acknowledge that the offices of the Grand Vizier and the 
Şeyhülislam should be separated for the affairs to be properly managed, 
nevertheless, execution depends on verdict, verdict on fatwa, fatwa on the 
Sharia and the law, and Sharia and the law on the principle of eternal justice, 
respectively. Here the principle of unity of imamet [Vahdet-i İmamet] 
originates in the above-explained sequence.”253 
As a number of contradictions in the above-presented debate reveal, even the 
Young Ottomans, which are often labeled as the members of the first “democratic 
intelligentsia movement”254 directed against the absolutist, yet inefficient rule of the 
Ottoman polity, disagree upon the main premises of the regime that they are seeking to 
establish. In this perspective, it is now appropriate to turn our attention to the critical 
question that was raised in the introduction of this chapter: what are the main 
shortcomings of this theoretical construction process and what do these shortcomings 
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imply for the subsequent political developments. However, before delving into an 
analysis of the in-built limitations of the Young Ottoman thought, it is first necessary to 
look at the general reception of the idea of popular sovereignty in the Ottoman political 
life to understand the extent of its influence. The objections raised by conservative 
Ottoman statesmen, in fact representing the majority of the Ottoman decision makers, 
also highlight some of the reasons why the principle of popular sovereignty could not in 
the end be embraced in the Ottoman context of the late 19th century. 
  
 
3.5. Opposition: Islam, Consultation and the Position of Millet-i Hakime 
 
 
Systematic objections to the new conceptualization of sovereignty come to fore 
particularly during the heated discussions on the proposals originated by the Young 
Ottomans for the introduction of a constitution and a parliamentary assembly. At this 
stage, the meaning of the Koranic verse of "Wa-shawirhum fi’l-‘amr" (Take counsel 
with them in the conduct of affairs), which also refers to the title of Kemal’s most 
discussed article, occupies the central stage of deliberations on whether or not a form of 
parliamentary system based on popular sovereignty with the participation of all millets 
making up the Ottoman Empire can be a suitable political panacea for an Islamic 
empire. As discussed, Young Ottomans interpret this verse as an evidence of Islam’s 
sympathy towards a regime of consultation and accordingly project this ‘legitimate 
basis’ on their further call for the setting up of a constitutional assembly.255 Others point 
to its context in the Koran, which reveals no relation to a discussion of politics, let alone 
a possibility of a consultative and representative government.256 The verse becomes 
intensely debated not only from the perspective of whether or not Islam allows 
consultation, but also from the perspective of who would constitute the consultative 
assembly, or in other words who would represent the adjective of hum (they) in the 
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verse.257 In this respect, Ahmet Mithat’s book Üss-ü İnkılab clearly demonstrates the 
positions of the opposing camps. As it becomes apparent, the conservative statesmen 
and religious leaders, a few representatives of which include Ahmet Cevdet Paşa, Rüşdü 
Paşa, Halil Efendi, Nusret Paşa and Mahmut Celaleddin Paşa, object to the ideas of 
popular sovereignty and constitutional assembly and criticize the advocates like Young 
Ottomans for trying to induce democratic and liberal elements into the Ottoman mind 
under the misleading forgery of Islam:258   
To begin with, as exemplified by the ideas of the leading ulema of the time like 
Nusret Paşa and Mustafa Sabri,259 they find the principle of popular sovereignty 
incompatible with the Islamic tradition and accordingly dismiss the idea of a 
constitutional regime on the grounds that it would establish a regime based on popular 
sovereignty, replacing the regime of the Sultan/Caliph. Going further, for the opposition 
who identifies all these new political ideas as bid’at (a form of heresy), drafting of a 
constitution means the destruction of the monopoly of Shariat in the Ottoman polity and 
thereby it opens the way towards deviation from Islam.  
In fact, for most of the Ottoman statesmen, whether or not Islam allows it, the 
current ill state of the public can in no way lead to the construction of an effective 
political system. In their view, in a polity where ‘the people’ cannot be entrusted with 
consultation, a regime based on popular sovereignty cannot be sustained. As Ahmet 
Mithat explains, even the statesmen like Mütercim Rüştü Paşa, Halil Efendi and Ahmet 
Saib, who finally yield to the idea of constitution and the opening up of a consultative 
assembly out of obligations to raison d’etat, nevertheless retain their general distrust of 
the public.260  
Another area of concern on the concept of popular sovereignty refers to the 
participation of non-Muslims in the decision-making process. Since a parliamentary 
assembly based on the principle of popular sovereignty would inevitably include non-
Muslims, the religiously oriented conservatists reject such a practice on the basis of its 
potential destabilization of the innate link between the Ottoman state and Islam. For 
statesmen such as Mahmut Celaleddin Paşa, even if the verse of “Wa-shawirhum fi’l-
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‘amr” indicates some form of consultation, the adjective of hum (they) can only point to 
Muslims, and no one else: 
   “Our Sultan is the caliph of our prophet and the leader of the believers; his 
orders which are in accordance with Islam are to be obeyed; and it is a 
religious duty to remain loyal to Islam, which is our foothold. If it is 
required to establish a parliament, which may be permitted provided that it 
will only be composed of Muslims. Otherwise, it could not be deemed 
permissible to admit non-Muslim subjects to such a parliament and to 
entrust them with the state administration.”261   
In a certain way, the notion of popular sovereignty remains void of content once 
the idea of equality of individuals and their equal right to political participation remains 
as a contested premise. In fact, the fear over the loss of the sovereign and dominant 
position of the Islamic community within the ranks of the Ottoman Empire, conceived 
in the concept of millet-i hakime, is a determining phenomenon eroding the basis of the 
concept of popular sovereignty during the period in question. Ahmet Cevdet Paşa, one 
of the most powerful critiques of the reform movement, vividly expresses the 
widespread concerns over the newly developing idea of equality (müsavat) of religious 
communities following the proclamation of the Reform Edict of 1856 in the following 
passage taken from his famous book on the Ottoman history, Tezâkir: 
   “This firman brought full legal equality between Muslim and non-Muslim 
subjects, which seriously upset the people of Islam. Previously, the 
privileges granted to Christians constituted one of the four principles which 
were established as the basis of peace provided that these would not 
encroach upon the sovereignty of the state. Yet, the question of privileges is 
now bygone. All of a sudden, non-Muslim subjects happened to be regarded 
as equal to the people of Islam in all political rights. Many Muslims began 
to grumble, saying ‘Today we have lost the sacred rights of our community, 
which were won with the blood of our fathers and forefathers. Once the 
Muslim millet was the ruling community, now it has been divested of such a 
sacred right. For Muslims, this is a day to weep and mourn.”262 
Ahmet Cevdet himself refutes the Young Ottomans ideas on popular sovereignty 
on the grounds that they would eventually lead to the demise of the Ottoman Empire. 
As Cevdet sees it from the traditionalist perspective of an Ottoman statesman, it would 
be impossible to revitalize the Ottoman strength, make the state structure efficient and at 
the same time ‘democratize’ the political system. For Cevdet, the Western originated 
concepts of liberal Ottoman citizenship and the civic association with the idea of patrie 
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cannot provide the Ottoman Empire with the necessary cement. It is only in Islam that 
Cevdet perceives such a potential; Islam represents the real ‘volkgeist’ of the Ottoman 
Empire.263   
   “Let us assume that we now introduce the concept of patrie. Even if it in 
time takes root in the public opinion and comes to attain the level of prestige 
it has in Europe, it will never be as strong as the religious zeal. It will not at 
all supersede that notion. Furthermore, so much time will be needed to 
achieve it. And up until then, our armies will lose the spirit to fight.”264  
Accordingly, in Cevdet’s account, the panacea for the Ottoman revival cannot be 
found in Western concepts and civilization since the political culture of the West 
irreconcilably differs from that of the Ottomans. For instance, where there is a 
separation of spiritual and political leadership in the West, they are merged together in 
the Ottoman context; where the classes are important political actors in the West, the 
Ottoman polity in contrast functions on the notion of solidarity. These kinds of 
incompatibilities lead Cevdet to conclude that the governance of the Ottoman polity can 
only be improved by local remedies, stemming out of the Islamic tradition. His long 
lasting effort to formulate an Ottoman civil code, Mecelle, should be seen in this 
perspective as an example of Cevdet’s firm belief in indigenous solutions to home-
grown problems. In opposition to Mithat Paşa’s proposals to adopt a form of European-
inspired civil code, Cevdet’s Mecelle, a unique effort at codifying the orthodox Islamic 
law in corporation with örf-i sultani, becomes the first Ottoman civil code that remains 
in effect until 1926.265 For Cevdet, the Roman law and Islamic law cannot be 
reconciled since they are products of different mentalities:  
   “The first code to be compiled on the continent of Europe was Corpus 
Juris Civilis, which was composed and compiled in the city of 
Constantinople thanks to the works of a group of scholars. This code 
constitutes the very basis of European law systems, and is well-known and 
respected everywhere. But it does not compare to Mecelle-i Ahkâm-ı Adliye 
[Compendium of Judical Statutes] and there exists many differences 
between the two. Because the former was accomplished thanks to the efforts 
of five or six jurists; whereas, the latter was, by five or six learned men of 
Islamic jurisprudence, extracted and compiled from the glorious Sharia, 
which is a divine command.”266 
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Later in the 19th century, the ideas of the conservative camp find expression in the 
ideology of Pan-Islamism, flourishing in the Ottoman polity first during the reign of 
Abdülhamit. The Pan-Islamists see the caliphate not only as a spiritual leadership, but 
as an expression of political sovereignty: Going beyond the mere unity of faith, all 
Muslim nations should unify politically and stand against the Western ascendancy in 
world affairs. Every Muslim should understand that unless political unity is achieved, 
Islam would loose vigor and fall prey to the Western civilization.267 This ideology of 
course stands in opposition to the liberal strand found in Ottomanism, which seeks 
unity based on the concept of Ottoman citizenship regardless of ethnic and religious 
differences, and which, to this end, employs the concept of popular sovereignty as the 
theoretical basis of the urgently needed unity. 
 
 
3.6. Doomed Birth of ‘Popular Sovereignty’: Trapped in between the Discursive 
Clash of Liberalism and Conservatism 
 
 
While the above discussion illustrates the various lines of ‘external’ 
argumentation in opposition to the concept of popular sovereignty and other associated 
ideas for a regime change, the Young Ottoman’s discourse in effect in itself embodies 
several fault lines that in the end turn their idea of popular sovereignty into a feeble 
product. Thus, although it is first through the writings of the Young Ottomans that the 
principle of popular sovereignty suffuses into the Turkish political life and becomes a 
familiar concept during 1860s and 1870s in support of the efforts for effective 
governance, it nevertheless reflects a short-lived synthesis of Western and Islamic 
liberalism designed to save a multinational dynastic Empire from collapse. In this sense, 
it contains all the contradictions of this rather odd amalgamation, and therefore its 
function remains ephemeral.  
First, let us focus on the immediate political outcome of the efforts of the Young 
Ottoman movement: The ideas of the Young Ottomans prove decisive in the 
proclamation of the first Ottoman constitution, Kanun-i Esasi, in 1876.268 In three 
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months after the constitution goes into effect, a form of parliamentary assembly opens 
its doors with 115 members, 69 of which are Muslims, while 46 come from various 
non-Muslim millets.269 Since it is not within our aim to discuss the details of the 
constitution and the activities of this first, yet short-lived, parliament,270 it will suffice to 
state that although neither of these mechanisms satisfies the demands of the Ottoman 
intellectuals in opposition to the regime,271 they nevertheless reflect the Young 
Ottomans’ fragile synthesis of Western and Islamic conceptions.  
Although Young Ottomans try to highlight liberal aspects of Islamic theology, 
their conflation of Islamic theory with European ideas nonetheless puts limits to the 
further development of a secular basis of popular sovereignty, which, in the context of a 
multi-religious Empire, could have been instrumental. As it is depicted in the first 
chapter, the theoretical construction of the modern concept of sovereignty in Western 
Europe develops in parallel to the process of secularization and the first two most 
important proponents of the concept, Bodin and Hobbes, make a radical break with the 
theological connection of sovereignty by locating its source and locus in the secular 
foundation of the state. Yet, seen from this perspective, the initial development of the 
modern idea of sovereignty in the Ottoman political thought misses a figure similar to 
Bodin or Hobbes. Instead, there is a jump to the idea of popular sovereignty prior to the 
formulation of a secular theory of political obligation.  
Moreover, although the influence of liberal constitutionalism is rather evident in 
the Young Ottoman thought, the ideas that Locke propagates in his famous A Letter 
Concerning Toleration (1689) such as the clear distinction that he draws between 
private and public life and the relegation of religion to the private life are nonetheless 
absent in the Young Ottoman writings. Kemal and Ziya Paşa make it clear in many 
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instances that while sovereignty belongs to people, the will of the people cannot 
transgress the precepts of Shariat. For Suavi too, Shariat can be the only appropriate 
medium through which God’s sovereignty can emanate onto earthly matters. In Suavi’s 
thought, ulema gains particular significance as the ultimate “interpreters of this 
incarnation of God’s sovereignty on earth”.272 Young Ottomans futilely attempt to ease 
the potential tension between the worldly and the divine by arguing that if Islamic law is 
practiced appropriately, the public will and the will of God would indeed move in 
harmony.273 In fact, they go further to point out that it is the misapplication of Shariat 
that underwrites the current ills and the backward status of the Ottoman polity.274 It is of 
course a question to be further explored whether they genuinely see no contradiction 
between the practice of Shariat (where decisions on the absolute ‘rights’ and ‘wrongs’ 
as to how one should live are already taken by God) and the pursuance of natural rights, 
or given the actual conditions of the time, they are in effect hiding their liberal proposals 
behind the veil of ‘pure’ Islam.     
 With regards to secularism, the ideas of Namık Kemal, Ziya Paşa and Ali Suavi 
are indeed behind of those earlier figures associated with the beginnings of the Young 
Ottoman movement such as Mustafa Fazıl and Şinasi, who courageously and 
innovatively seek a separation of religion from political affairs.275 It is important to 
remember that, in a famous letter addressed to the Ottoman Sultan as early as 1866,276 
Mustafa Fazıl calls for a distinction between governmental affairs and Islam, a plea that 
never finds a place in the Young Ottoman thought: 
   “But my Sultan, your Excellency knows far better than I do that religion 
and sect have control over the soul and promise us other-worldly blessings; 
thus, it is not religion and sect which set the limits for laws of nations. If 
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religion does not persist in the form of eternal truths; that is to say, if it 
intervenes in worldly affairs, it shall destroy all, so will itself then. His 
Majesty, neither Christians nor Muslims do have their own separate policies, 
for justice is of only one kind on earth. What we name politics is simply true 
justice. The reason why we have been perishing is the old course we have 
taken. This outworn course had corrupted and perverted the officials of our 
State. Then, these already-corrupt men further degraded and disgraced the 
already-outworn course. Now let us entirely abandon this course, and lay 
aside the obsolete principles, which not only failed to protect the state but 
also subverted it. Let us embrace the new laws that were established in other 
states and proved to be a source of well-being for them.”277 
In contrast to any form of secularism, the constitution of 1876 indeed affirms the 
title of the Caliphate of the Ottoman Sultan and clearly states that Islam is the religion 
of the Ottoman State (Article 3, 4, 11). Confirmation of the Islamic basis of the Empire 
inevitably contributes to the disenchantment of non-Muslim nations with reform 
movements. In fact, the principle of popular sovereignty, a notion that could have 
helped to sustain the foundation of an inclusive Ottoman citizenship, never makes into 
the constitution: the first seven articles unmistakably locate the sovereignty in the 
Ottoman dynasty without any conditions or reservations.  
Besides a lack of secular foundation and public-private distinction, Young 
Ottoman’s synthesis of Western and Eastern ‘liberalism’ is also curtailed by the lack of 
a theory of civil resistance, the sole exception to which can be found in Ali Suavi’s 
writings.278 It should be understood that in Kemal’s thought, the community could 
breach the contract only if the ruler does not follow his obligations emanating from 
Shariat; however even in this case, it can only be the joint decision of community to 
revolt, not the decision of an individual.279 This of course emerges as a significant 
contradiction in Kemal’s thought as far as his stress on the individual freedom is 
concerned.  
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In this respect, it is also important to underline the fact that the Young Ottoman 
idea of popular sovereignty never embodies a democratic revolutionary aspect. Even 
Suavi, who is sometimes praised as the first ‘democrat’ of Turkish politics280  based on 
an article he wrote in Ûlum under the title of “Demokrasi, Hükümet-i Halk, Müsâvât,” 
concludes that due to the multinational composure of the Empire, democracy could in 
no way provide a solution for the ills plaguing the Ottoman system. In fact, according to 
Berkes, the Young Ottomans do not espouse any of the political ideas that can be 
classified as part of the ideology of the European “Young” movements such as 
revolutionism, nationalism and republicanism.281 Young Ottomans, even in their most 
radical proposals, do not aspire to eradicate the Ottoman dynasty. Kemal, Ziya and 
Suavi all pay tribute to the special role of the Sultan in the Ottoman polity, and as 
mentioned before, it is the illegitimately claimed sovereignty of the Bab-ı Âli 
bureaucrats that they attack, not the institution of the Sultanate.282 Thus, Young 
Ottomans’ ideas fall short of envisaging the building of a Republic based on the 
sovereignty of the people: 
   “As long as popular sovereignty is acknowledged, so shall not the people’s 
right to have a republic? Just the opposite…. Who on earth can deny that 
right? Was Islam not a sort of a republic in its earlier phase anyway?… It is 
another fact that a republic will lead us to disaster, which no one can deny. 
But actually no one among our people can imagine of founding a republic. 
Nevertheless, despite the actual impossibility of materializing such an idea, 
this is not to say that the truth is falsified. Greeks wanted to establish a 
republic. But that was not allowed in Greece. Do they not know the fact that 
the Muslim millet, which constitutes the majority within the Ottoman 
domains, is so fond of the ruling dynasty? As a matter of fact, we are the 
ones reigning in our domains, we all take part in the government. However, 
we entrusted the executive power to the Ottoman dynasty through a 
                                                 
280Nevin Yazıcı, Osmanlılık fikri ve Genç Osmanlılar Cemiyeti. (Ankara: T.C. 
Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları. 2002), 122. 
281Niyazi Berkes also argues that the ideas of Young Ottomans cannot be 
associated with liberal constitutionalism in a substantial sense (Niyazi Berkes, 
Türkiye’de Çağdaşlaşma, 285). In Berkes’s reading, Islam emerges as the dominant 
force in the Young Ottoman thought overriding all other concerns. Yet, although not to 
deny the weight of Islam the Young Ottoman thinking, as the above presented analysis 
shows, the influence of Western liberalism over the Young Ottomans can be traced, the 
mirror images of which the Young Ottomans seek in Islamic heritage (Niyazi Berkes, 
Türkiye’de Çağdaşlaşma, 282-283). 
282Necdet Kurdakul, Tanzimat dönemi basınında siyasal ve anayasal fikir 
hareketleri. (Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı, 2000), 32-33; Ebubekir Sofuoğlu, Osmanlı 
Devletinde Islahatlar ve I. Meşrutiyet. (İstanbul: Gökkubbe Yayınları, 2004), 163. 
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legitimate covenant, we always desire that dynasty to be in power, and we 
demand a constitutional monarchy.”283 
Rather, since their major concern remains within the halting of the nearing 
collapse of the Ottoman Empire, Republicanism and Ottomanism prove as two 
incompatible ideologies and the Young Ottomans unmistakably side with the latter.284 
Despite sometimes discussing what the idea of Republic entails in the European context 
and what merits it can offer,285 Young Ottomans do not see Republicanism fit for the 
Ottoman context, since, in their view, it contradicts with the espousal of an empire 
headed by a Sultan/Caliph supported by the principle of popular sovereignty.  
 
 
 
3.7. Conclusion 
 
 
 
In conclusion, as this chapter explains, the introduction of the ideal of popular 
sovereignty to the Ottoman psyche should be evaluated in close connection to the 
ideology of Ottomanism, produced in response to the need to reinvigorate a falling 
Empire by establishing new forms of political association with and loyalty to the 
Ottoman polity. Faced against the undermined authority and the charisma of Sultans, 
their rising despotism, increasing monopoly of overbearing, yet inept bureaucracy over 
governmental affairs; making use of the newly developed ‘public opinion’ and its 
unprecedented concern with political legitimacy, and under the influence of Western 
thought currents, the Ottoman intellectuals of the time discover the ideal of popular 
sovereignty as the much-needed nodal point to articulate their demands to transform the 
Ottoman political life. In this context, popular sovereignty represents a reconciliatory 
solution for the demand to protect the rights and liberties of individuals making up the 
                                                 
283 Namık Kemal, “Usul-ü meşveret hakkında Mektuplar,” Hürriyet, 14 September 
1868. 
284Necdet Kurdakul, Tanzimat dönemi basınında siyasal ve anayasal fikir 
hareketleri, 34. 
285Some examples of the Young Ottoman discussion on “Republicanism” can be 
found in 115th, 116th, 120th and 125th issues of İbret newspaper. Ziya Paşa’s article 
entitled “İdare-i cumhuriyet ile hükümet-i şahsiyetin farkı,” Hürriyet, no. 99 is also 
illuminating in this regard.  
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Ottoman Empire, while helping to soften the absolute political rule with the introduction 
of a form of a parliamentary assembly and a constitution partially reflecting the will of 
the people.  
Although it is these guiding principles that lead the Young Ottomans to introduce 
and popularize the concept of popular sovereignty in the Ottoman mind, they 
nevertheless give birth to a child with serious ailments. Despite its liberal 
underpinnings, once void of revolutionary, secular and democratic aspects, the concept 
proves as a deficient tool for helping to introduce a more effective and participatory 
political rule in the Ottoman Empire. On the one hand, under the pervasive influence of 
the Western social contract theories and liberal constitutionalism of the 17th and the 18th 
centuries, many of the Young Ottomans find the idea of popular sovereignty conducive 
for the pursuance of their constitutional reform policy to ensure the continuity of the 
Ottoman Empire through change. On the other hand, the divergent degrees of their 
submission into the Islamic weltanschauung and their continued loyalty to the Ottoman 
Sultanate inhibit the constitution of an effective and unified ‘revolutionary’ movement 
to sustain the foundations of a secular constitutional order. At the same time, given the 
prevalence of conservative and religious statesmen’s reign over Ottoman politics, the 
discourse developed by Young Ottomans, a short-lived articulation of Western and 
Islamic liberalism designed to save a multinational dynastic Empire from collapse, 
proves a frail and ineffective product.  
While the above-discussed contradictions gradually erode the empowering role of 
popular sovereignty, one other significant dimension helps explain its eventual demise: 
the absence of the idea of ‘nation’ at its foundation. As Ottomanism eventually fades 
into the oblivion following a destructive series of wars bringing the disintegration of the 
Empire in early 20th century and as Turkish nationalism slowly takes root, it is the new 
ideal of national sovereignty that now comes to be propagated by the Ottoman thinkers 
and politicians alike. It is in the next chapter that these issues will be taken up in detail. 
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4.  CREATION: TURKISH NATION-STATE BUILDING AND THE 
POLITICAL DISCOURSE ON SOVEREIGNTY 
 
 
 
4.1. Introduction  
 
 
As discussed in the foregoing chapter, in the context of the disintegrating Ottoman 
Empire of the late 19th century, popular sovereignty was discursively ‘discovered’ by 
the Young Ottomans and was articulated with the ideology of Ottomanism with the 
purpose of replacing a number communal memberships with that of an overriding 
membership to the Ottoman state; an articulation that was considered instrumental to 
ensure the continuity of the Empire. Therefore, the idea of popular sovereignty could 
not derive its political strength from ‘the will of a single nation,’ on the contrary, it was 
a ‘liberal’286 concept brought to fore to sustain the basis of the egalitarian project of 
Ottomanism, which rather naïvely aspired to awaken and unite the population under the 
banner of the House of the Ottoman irrespective of religious and ethnic affiliations. Yet 
of course, as the growing number of internal uprisings in the early 20th century revealed, 
political liberation from the Empire as an ‘independent nation’, not legal equality within 
its jurisdiction was what mostly appealed to ethnic groups within the Ottoman Empire 
such as the Greeks, Bulgarians, Serbs, Albanians, Arabs, Kurds, and the Armenians.  
The emerging ‘national’ consciousness among these ethnoreligious groups and its 
calamitous political consequences for the Empire engendered a significant shift of focus 
among the Ottoman elite from the advocacy of Ottomanism towards the advocacy of a 
burgeoning ideology: Turkish nationalism. During the period in question, the concept of 
sovereignty became divorced from its earlier association with liberal discourses, the aim 
of which were to find the source of needed political strength in the assurance of equal 
                                                 
286The peculiarity of the Young Ottoman ‘liberalism,’ namely its frail 
amalgamation of Western liberal constitutionalism with Islamic theology has already 
been discussed in detail in Chapter 2. 
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participation of the Ottoman public to political life. Instead, ongoing international wars 
and internal revolts with an end result of the Ottoman disintegration essentially and in a 
way irrevocably led the political elite to reformulate their claims to sovereignty in the 
name of a new entity: the ‘Turkish nation’. In this setting, the newly espoused ideal of 
‘national sovereignty’ helped to sustain the legitimacy of the compelling political 
objective of demarcating and securing the boundaries of the emerging Turkish Republic 
both in terms of territory and population. 
Taking this critical conjuncture as a point of departure, this chapter analyzes the 
ways in which the idea of ‘national sovereignty’ constitutes the nodal point of the 
nationalist/republican discourse in its employment of a logic of difference, in line with 
its attempts to weaken and displace ‘internal’ and ‘external’ antagonisms and to form a 
coherent unity out of heterogeneous identities in order to be able to create a Turkish 
nation-state out of the remains the Ottoman Empire.  
To this end, the chapter first looks briefly at the political circumstances that make 
the discursive transition from the idea of popular sovereignty towards the idea of 
national sovereignty necessary in the context of the early 20th century Ottoman Empire 
and examines in this respect the ideas of the Young Turks, the early actors who 
understand and underline the need towards a reconceptualization of the source of 
sovereignty from the abstract idea of ‘the people’ to the newly surfacing concept of ‘the 
nation.’ The second part of the chapter explores the instrumental articulation between 
the concept of national sovereignty and the evolving ideologies of Turkish nationalism 
and populism. More specifically, the chapter traces the way in which the ideologues and 
the activists of Turkish nationalism produce the doctrine of national sovereignty into a 
prevalent and effective discourse of legitimacy in support of first the Turkish War of 
Independence and later on the process of Turkish nation-state building.  
This analysis illustrates the discursively empowering role that the concept of 
national sovereignty has played during the period in question and exposes its 
implications on the production of Turkish national identity and state-society relations as 
they have become shaped in the late 1920s. In this light, the chapter ends with a 
discussion of the built-in problems associated with the new republican one-party 
regime, the legitimacy of which has come to be based on the principle of “Sovereignty 
is vested Fully and Unconditionally in the Nation” as a result of a chain of equivalences 
constructed among sovereignty, Turkish nation, People’s Party and the ‘Eternal Chief’.  
 111
4.2. From ‘popular sovereignty’ towards the sovereignty of the ‘nation’  
 
 
In the political literature on sovereignty, there is a widespread negligence over the 
crucial distinction between the concepts of popular and national sovereignty; and we 
repeatedly see these two terms conflated and used interchangeably with one another. 
For instance, in an article that discusses the theoretical foundations of popular and 
national sovereignty, Mehmet Ali Ağaoğulları argues against a differentiation between 
the two concepts and erroneously goes on with a historical analysis that treats both 
concepts as identical since, as he sees it, “both are the products of the 18th century 
bourgeoisie and theoretically there are no differences between the two”.287 However, as 
illustrated in the first chapter, the historico-theoretical construction of these two 
principles rests on disparate premises of different political traditions and therefore it is 
important to keep in mind the divergent implications of locating the source and locus of 
sovereignty in the ‘people,’ or in the ‘nation.’ As we now know, the modern notion of 
the ‘nation’ refers to an essential category, which reduces the diversity in a population 
to a single criterion: that of belonging to an ethnically and culturally homogenous 
group.288  In this sense, the idea of the ‘nation’ represents an abstract unity possessing a 
moral, cultural and political essence on its own separate from and above of its 
constituent parts: the people. 
Within the perspective of this key distinction, the following analysis charts out the 
ways in which sovereignty increasingly come to be contextualized within the anti-
imperialist and nationalist position developing within the cadres of the Young Turks, a 
revolutionary group of Ottoman military and bureaucratic elite influential upon the 
course of Ottoman political developments between 1895 and 1918. As Ottomanism 
eventually looses ground and as Turkism slowly takes root as one of the defining 
ideologies of the newly emerging Turkish nation-state, it is the new idea of national 
sovereignty that now becomes propagated by the Ottoman thinkers and politicians alike, 
replacing the concept of popular sovereignty.  
                                                 
287Mehmet Ali Ağaoğulları, “Halk ya da Ulus Egemenliğinin Kuramsal Temelleri 
Üzerine Birkaç Düşünce” Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi 41, 
no.1, (1986):132. 
288Craig Calhoun, Nationalism. (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1997),18. 
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Influenced by the ideas of Social Darwinism, Young Turks believe that the only 
way to ensure survival is to attach to unifying themes such as the surfacing idea of the 
‘nation’ and in this context the principle of national sovereignty offers merits both in 
terms of centralization of power and the securing of unity against interventions of major 
international powers. However, while discovering the importance of forming a nation, it 
must be underlined that Young Turks never ascribe to the idea of the creation of a 
republic, nor advocate republicanism as an ideology. In fact, Young Turks never 
develop their ideas into a concrete and comprehensive ideology. Their political quest is 
mostly motivated by the pragmatic search of means to prevent the disintegration of an 
empire; and not by the establishment of an independent nation-state with a clearly 
delineated territory, population and a new regime based on national sovereignty.289    
In order to better grasp the development of this anti-imperialist and nationalist 
position to predominance within the Young Turk movement, it might be useful to 
briefly remind ourselves of the rupture between liberals vs. conservative/nationalists 
that was made evident in the famous congress of the Young Turks in 1902.290 In this 
congress, the leading Young Turks such as Ahmet Rıza, Bahaeddin Şakir and Nazım 
Bey stress the need for centralization and independence from the West, whereas a group 
led by Prens Sabahaddin advocates decentralist and liberal ideas mainly framed in the 
form of federalism, coupled with a demand for increased cooperation with Europe. The 
level of inclination towards allowing European involvement in governmental affairs 
divides the movement into two camps: The former group later on takes the name of 
“Osmanlı İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti” (Committee of Union and Progress) and 
eventually turns into the ruling party of the Second Constitutional Period between 1908 
and 1918. The followers of Sabahaddin unite under the banner of “Teşebbüs-ü Şahsi ve 
Adem-i Merkeziyet Cemiyeti” (Individual Entrepreneurship and Decentralization Party) 
calling for decentralization of public administration and the institution of some 
autonomous rights for religious and national minorities. However, their political 
objectives never come to be realized as Sabahaddin and his followers eventually 
                                                 
289Sina Akşin, Jön Türkler ve İttihat ve Terakki. (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 2001); 
Şerif Mardin, Jön Türklerin Siyasi Fikirleri: 1895-1908. (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 
2004). 
290Ayşe Kadıoğlu, Cumhuriyet İradesi Demokrasi Muhakemesi. (İstanbul: 
İletişim Yayınları, 1999), 78. 
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become marginalized from the leadership cadres of the Unionists.291 However, it is still 
important to note here some exemplary passages of Sabahaddin concentrating on the 
emerging idea of national sovereignty since he stands out as one of the very few 
significant political figures to ever discuss this principle from the perspective of 
individual rights and state-society relationship during the period in question. As early as 
1913, Sabahaddin realizes some inherent problems associated with the flourishing 
principle of national sovereignty: 
   “Looking from a sociological perspective, there exists no difference 
between legitimizing the central rule through monarchical rights inherited 
from a royal ancestor and alternatively resting it upon popular sovereignty. 
Under both circumstances, there shall be no change in the status of 
individuals in relation to the state. The point is not about the exercise of 
sovereignty by an assembly on behalf of one single person or all individual 
subjects, but about the monopolization of powers and sovereignty in the 
hands of a certain political class and the ceaseless domination of the state 
apparatus over private lives of individuals. 
   As seen, decentralization, namely self-administration by the citizens, is a 
phenomenon manifesting the public life in individualistic societies, whereas 
national sovereignty is a theory embodied in communitarian mentalities!”292  
In understanding the rationale behind the rising preeminence of nationalism and 
the accompanying transition from the ideal of popular sovereignty to the sovereignty of 
the ‘nation’, a brief analysis of the political ideas of the Young Turks is illuminating. In 
many aspects the Young Turk movement represents a prolegomena to Kemalism, and in 
this perspective, their stance vis-à-vis the interplay between the state, society and 
sovereignty embodies noteworthy insights into the mindset of the Republican elite. 
Before going into a more detailed analysis of some representative works of a few 
Young Turks, who has produced the most original thinking on sovereignty among the 
group, it would be useful to compare the general political position of the Young Turks 
to that of the Young Ottomans, since it is in these critical differences that we find the 
clues of the logic for the abandonment of the idea of popular sovereignty in favor of the 
concept of national sovereignty.  
 
 
 
                                                 
291Bernard Lewis, The emergence of modern Turkey. (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1992), 213; Faroz Ahmad, The Making of Modern Turkey. (London and New 
York: Routledge, 1993), 33-50. 
292Prens Sabahaddin, Türkiye Nasıl Kurtulur.(İstanbul: Liberte, 1913), 358. 
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4.2.1 Elitism and Distrust towards the ‘People’  
 
While the Young Turk movement is conventionally labeled in the Turkish 
political science literature as ‘constitutionalist’ and ‘liberal’ due to their aim to reinforce 
the ‘frozen’ Ottoman constitution and to re-activate the parliament, their so-called 
‘constitutionalism’ in effect differs in many significant ways from that of the Young 
Ottomans. To begin with, in opposition to the Young Ottomans, the Young Turks share 
a deep distrust towards the idea of the ‘people’. Penetrated by the theories of Gustave 
Le Bon, the prominent French sociologist famous for his works on theories of national 
traits and the psychological characteristics of crowds, the Young Turks see in the public 
a major irrational force that can be dangerous for the continuity of a polity unless proper 
guidance is provided.293 In this respect, the need for extensive social transformation 
through education under an appropriate elite leadership occupies the center of Young 
Turks’ reform proposals.294 For instance, Abdullah Cevdet, under the influence of his 
earlier translations of Le Bon’s leading books such as Psychologie des Foules, Les 
Incertitudes de l’Heure Présente and Lois Psychologiques de l’Evolution des Peuple, 
states:   
   “We desire the affairs of the nation to be guided by not the masses who do 
not know anything but to say ‘Nay’ but by the ministers of the people 
distinguished by their political wisdom, special qualities, freedom of 
conscience, loved by all, the protectors of just laws adorned by the freedom 
of the press.”295  
   “The spirit of the people is so sacred that it cannot be made an instrument 
in the hands of some leading figures in the press. Yet, I would dare to state 
that journalists and political authors are the free and independent guides 
leading the society. These heroes, who are capable of altering the 
consciousness and the moral course of the world, truly deserve to draw the 
attention of those who wish to see that true social education take root in this 
society.”296   
Thus, it should be stressed that while the Young Ottomans’ ideas on the notion of 
popular sovereignty are underlined by the potential that Locke and Rousseau see in the 
                                                 
293Şükrü M. Hanioğlu, Bir siyasal örgüt olarak Osmanlı İttihad ve Terakki 
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in Şükrü M. Hanioğlu, Bir siyasal düşünür olarak Doktor Abdullah Cevdet ve dönemi. 
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rationality of the people, in the case of the Young Turks, Le Bon’s mistrust of the 
masses and his concern on the implications of their irrationality dominate the Young 
Turk Weltanshauung on the state-society relationship. As Şükrü Hanioğlu rightly puts, 
“for this reason constitutionalism and representative government seemed valueless to 
the Young Turks – parliament itself was nothing more than a heterogeneous crowd”.297 
 
 
4.2.2 Anti-Cosmopolitanism and the Search for a Common Identity 
 
The stance towards cosmopolitanism and multi-ethnoreligious identities 
constitutes another fundamental difference of emphasis between the two movements. 
Dissimilar to the Young Ottomans, Young Turks tenaciously criticize the absence of a 
well-established ethnic identity among the Ottoman elite and blame this lack for the 
creation of vulnerability towards the Western influence. Despite their avoidance of 
expounding racial theories,298 Young Turks are nevertheless aware of the fact that the 
contemporary era is characterized by an undeniable power of nations and that composite 
identities erode the basis of this empowering unity. Therefore, in the eyes of the Young 
Turks, partly under the influence of German romantic movement of the late 18th and 
early 19th centuries and the ideas of Hegel and Fichte, the promotion of cosmopolitan 
liberal ideas remains as a degenerative position that have plagued the former generation 
of Ottoman statesmen and intellectuals and subsequently caused detrimental results for 
the sustainability of the Empire.299 In themselves, the Young Turks represent a more 
homogenous crowd: they all identify themselves as Turks (although ethnically some of 
them belong to different groups), the majority of them are young graduates of modern 
secular schools and most come from the bourgeois bureaucratic class.300 In contrast to 
the cosmopolitan Ottoman identity, it is most vividly in the writings of the Young Turks 
that we come across the emergence of a new identity that is now called ‘Turkish’. In 
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this respect, the articles published by Ziya Gökalp, Ali Canip and Ömer Seyfettin in one 
of the leading periodicals of the Young Turk era, Genç Kalemler, are revealing.  As an 
editorial objective, Genç Kalemler aims at the promotion of Turkism and Turkish 
nationalism through a simplified Turkish language void of Arabic and Persian 
influences.301 The contributors of Genç Kalemler display a form of romantic populism 
of reaching out to the common people through a medium, in this case the simplified 
Turkish language, which would enable them to ‘educate’ the masses. In return, this 
education would help delineate the contours of a common identity, assure their unity, 
and support the Turkish public in their quest for progress.  
In the first-issue article “Edebiyat-ı Müstakbelemiz”, Ali Canip talks about a new 
literature “inspired by the spirit and consciousness of its own, replacing the 
cosmopolitan character of the literature of the time.” Ömer Seyfettin advances the issue 
in an article entitled “Yeni Lisan” stating that a new, natural and authentic language is 
needed for the “Turks who have entered a new life, an age of awakening.”302 The 
further writings of Ömer Seyfettin also offer some important clues for depicting the 
reasons behind the shift from Ottomanism to Turkish nationalism as ‘the intellectual 
prescription’ for the reversion of the backwardness and weakness vis-à-vis the West. 
The main mission of Seyfettin’s writings prove to be the dissemination of the 
consciousness of Turkishness among masses with the purpose of establishing a strong 
Turkish nation that could stand against perils of uprootedness, degeneration and 
cosmopolitanism, reflecting the overriding themes of German romanticism. As a result 
of his long military service in the Balkans, Seyfettin realizes that these populations 
share very little in common with the Ottoman Turks. Aware of the fact that the loyalties 
of the Balkan people lie with their own ‘nations’ and that they have very weak links to 
the Ottoman Empire, Seyfettin concludes that the idea of the Ottoman nation is nothing 
more than a dream preached by the Ottoman intellectuals. Instead, influenced by the 
upsurge of nationalist feelings in these regions, he believes that Turks could regain their 
strength and status only if they manage to become a strong nation themselves. His short 
stories such as Hürriyet Bayrakları, Nakarat and Bomba exemplify his aim of showing 
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the futility of the idea of Ottomanism in the face of the strong sense of separateness and 
nationhood in the Balkans.  
Throughout these writings, Seyfettin warns Ottoman Turks to become aware of 
the potential betrayal of these nations and demands that Ottomans equip themselves 
with a separate consciousness as Turks in order to stand strong against treachery. These 
stories reveal a sense of hatred towards the non-Turk and non-Muslim communities of 
the Ottoman Empire. However, Seyfettin’s hatred is not only reserved to these groups, 
but is also directed towards the failure of the Ottoman Turks to unify their forces 
together as a nation.303 In line with the general Young Turk thinking, aspects of Social 
Darwinism are also incorporated in Seyfettin’s stories where he tries to show that in 
order for one nation to survive, the killing or the annihilation of another is justifiable if 
not necessary.304 The short story Beyaz Lale stands out as the paramount example 
representing Seyfettin’s Social Darwinist tendencies, where the Bulgarian military chief 
justifies the systematic torturing and killing of Turks in a war of survival of ‘nations.’ 
In another story entitled Primo Türk Çocuğu, Seyfettin constructs a vivid 
depiction of the ‘ideal Turk’.  The story opens up with lines from Ziya Gökalp’s well-
known poem, Turan, and portrays a child finding his Turkish consciousness and 
returning to his ‘roots’ despite being born to and raised by an Italian mother and a 
Westernized Turkish father. He discovers his ‘real Turkish essence’ through school and 
friends and changes his name from Primo to Oğuz. Joined by his “re-converted” father, 
they deny the mother, fighting and destroying whatever they see as indicative of the 
Western influence. 
These new elements in the Young Turk weltanschauung, namely the elitist 
distrust of the people, the dislike of cosmopolitanism, and the beginning of a search for 
a national identity that would support the molding of a ‘dangerous’ heterogeneous 
public into a governable body, help explain the reasons behind their gradual 
abandonment of the idea of popular sovereignty and its eventual replacement with the 
idea of national sovereignty. 
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4.2.3 Early Articulations of ‘Nation’ and ‘Sovereignty’   
 
 
In terms of the noteworthy contributions of specific Young Turks to the discursive 
articulation of sovereignty, some useful discussion can be found in the works of Tunalı 
Hilmi and Abdullah Cevdet.305 The efforts of the two are worthy of attention, since their 
ideas constitute a bridge between the concepts of popular and national sovereignty. A 
visionary article entitled “Un Projet d'Organisation de la Souveraineté du Peuple en 
Turquie” written by Tunalı Hilmi (1871-1928), a prominent politician of the Second 
Constitutional period and the early Republican era and one of the regular contributors of 
the Young Turk publications such as Meşveret, Mizan, Osmanlı and İnkılap, is a very 
little discussed, but a critical text in tracing the transition from the idea of popular 
sovereignty towards the idea of national sovereignty. Published originally in Geneva in 
1902,306 Hilmi offers innovative ideas in this article brought together under a 
constitutional proposal based on the principle of popular sovereignty. Hilmi starts off 
with a deeply pessimistic foreword, arguing that unless immediate measures are 
undertaken to reform the state structure, a civil war will be unavoidable in Turkey. To 
prevent immense destruction, he sees a pressing need to inform the public in detail 
                                                 
305As it is often discussed, the wish to get rid of the despotic grip of the Ottoman 
Sultan of the time, Abdülhamid II, constitutes the main political motive of the leading 
figures of the early Young Turk movement such as Ahmet Rıza (1859-1930), Mizancı 
Murat (1853-1912) and Abdullah Cevdet (1869-1931) (Tarık Zafer Tunaya, Hürriyetin 
ilanı. İkinci Meşrutiyetin siyasi hayatına bakışlar. (İstanbul: Arba Yayınları, 1959), 33). 
To this end, as mentioned above, their focus rests on short-term pragmatic actions rather 
than formulating and advocating extensive political theories. In effect, the Young Turks 
in general do not even bother to discuss the available options of political systems such 
as republicanism or democracy and their applicability to the Ottoman case. Needless to 
say, they also pay minumum attention to the perennial questions of political theory such 
as the source of political obligation and the demarcation of mutual rights and duties of 
the state, the society and the individual. Given this lack of attention to political theory 
and thinking, it becomes rather difficult to clearly frame Young Turk’s political ideas 
with regards to the issue of sovereignty. Yet, since the political consequences of the 
movement’s initiatives prove key in the later development of the idea of the ‘Turkish 
nation,’ in the name of which political sovereignty is eventually claimed, some ‘tracing’ 
effort is beneficial. 
306 This significant work was translated from French and published in Tarih ve 
Toplum magazine in March 1984, vol. 3 under the title "Tunalı Hilmi'nin Halk 
Hâkimiyeti Risalesi ve Anayasa Tasarısı" (Tunalı Hilmi “Tunalı Hilmi'nin Halk 
Hâkimiyeti Risalesi ve Anayasa Tasarısı,” Tarih ve Toplum, 3, 24-31.)  
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about the reform programme of the “Committee”307 by utilizing a simplified vernacular 
in all languages spoken in the Ottoman lands. The proposals following this foreword 
constitute an example of such an attempt.  
Before delving into the details of his scheme, it should be emphasized at the 
outset that Tunalı Hilmi’s vision of a political order based on popular sovereignty 
differs in important aspects from a contemporary understanding of popular sovereignty 
in linkage to democratic order. Hilmi distorts the basic premises of the idea of popular 
sovereignty by attempting to amalgamate popular principles with elitism and a 
constitutional monarchy. To start with, Hilmi makes strikingly conflicting statements 
with regards to the role of public in his suggested political system. Although Hilmi asks 
his declared audience, ‘the reformers of Turkey’, “to become the noble pioneers of 
democracy in the East”, he himself admits that his plan excludes any input from public 
opinion. Hilmi justifies the absence of public participation by reasoning that 
intellectuals should be in charge when the general population lacks the necessary 
intellectual levels to engage in political life: 
   “After taking a glance at the bill we have proposed, some people will 
probably ridicule us, thinking that we meant to prepare a parliamentary law 
without the participation of the people. Because they hold the belief that 
legislative authority belongs exclusively to the magistrates elected by the 
people. But is this really the case?….Consequently, laying all municipal and 
judicial questions aside and abandoning the idea of direct elections, we have 
set up a peculiar system to serve as a basis for a future parliament, which is 
required by the socio-economic conditions of Turkey. As much as the lack 
of the means of communication is known, so is the intellectual level of all 
the people. Laying aside some part of Turkey and its population – except for 
a few tribes – nobody can deny this fact; to claim the opposite would be a 
great lie. The least important factor to take into consideration would be the 
people’s intellectual opinions.”308  
After eliciting upon his ideas on the relation between the intellectuals and the 
population in the foreword, Hilmi goes on to offer a detailed plan as to how “popular 
sovereignty should be organized” in Turkey. Two points are particularly noteworthy in 
his scheme: i) his ideas on popular election, ii) his ideas on the nation:  
In his complex legislative system, Hilmi sets up ten different chambers, all 
organized hierarchically from the smallest unit of public administration (Köylüler 
                                                 
307The “Committee” that Hilmi mentions  is the Committee of Union and 
Progress, the governing political party of the Second Constitutional period, remaining in 
power, except a very brief interval, until 1918. 
308Tunalı Hilmi “Tunalı Hilmi'nin Halk Hâkimiyeti Risalesi ve Anayasa Tasarısı”, 
24-31. 
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Meclisi) to the larger Ahali Meclisi (National Parliament) and Âyan Meclisi (Senate) 
representing the interests of the nation at large. It is important to stress that Hilmi 
envisages popular election only for the smallest village chamber, Köylüler Meclisi, the 
members of which are to be chosen by votes of males over 21 years of age. All the 
members of other representative institutions are to be appointed, not elected, among the 
members of lower chambers and sometimes among the high-ranking state bureaucrats. 
It is also interesting to take notice of the extraordinary powers that Hilmi grants to the 
head of the public administration unit corresponding to each chamber: these public 
administrators possess a right to bring to a standstill the activities of chambers when 
deemed necessary. If the reasons for a standstill continue to hold, the members of the 
chambers are to be renewed. In effect, Hilmi goes further and gives the overall 
supervision of the functioning of chambers to the “Committee” organized in each city 
by the members of Committee of Union and Progress. It remains unclear from his 
statements whether Hilmi sees the “Committee” as a mere arbitrator between the 
executions of government and public demands, or as the ultimate decision maker on the 
fate of the governing assemblies. 
While Hilmi’s negative stance vis-à-vis popular election and his related granting 
of extraordinary powers to the bureaucrats and the Committee leadership are though-
provoking elements of his scheme, it is the second contribution of Hilmi that proves the 
most original: In the 12th article of his constitution, Hilmi declares the source of Ahali 
Meclisi and Ayan Meclisi as the nation; and in the 11th article he identifies all legislation 
with the nation. By bringing in the idea of the nation as an abstract unity constituting 
the basis of all legislative activity Hilmi takes a rather novel position within the 
Ottoman political life.  
Yet, in opposition to the later development of the principle of national sovereignty 
based on the ideas of Turkish nationalists, the dominant identity of this “nation” 
remains ambiguous in Hilmi’s proposal, often oscillating between Turkism and 
Ottomanism: Despite arguing that the language of the state should be Turkish (Art. 33), 
Hilmi concedes that Albanians and Kurds can open schools and provide education in 
their own language. Moreover, he advocates the publication of laws in whichever 
language prevails in every region. Hilmi also labels everyone from ‘Turkey’ as Ottoman 
(Her Türkiyeli Osmanlıdır.) (Article 17) and puts religious and ethnic freedoms of all 
Ottomans under constitutional protection. His model calls for a proportional 
representation in assemblies based on the population size of each religious community.  
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In introducing Tunalı Hilmi’s article ‘popular sovereignty’ and his draft for a 
constitution, the editors of Tarih ve Toplum identify Hilmi as ‘populist and Turkist’, yet 
even the above discussed opinions of Hilmi immediately following this brief 
introduction shows the limits of both his populism and Turkism. Rather, Hilmi emerges 
as a figure trapped in between the ideologies of Turkism and Ottomanism, trying to 
utilize both of their appeals towards the introduction of a new regime in the Ottoman 
Empire.   
While Tunalı Hilmi’s article and his draft constitution represent one of the most 
detailed works discussing the issue of sovereignty among the Young Turks, Abdullah 
Cevdet stands out as a much more influential figure in Turkish political thought in 
conveying the rationale behind the newly developing idea of national sovereignty. In the 
absence of a well-rounded theoretical work, Abdullah Cevdet’s political ideas on 
sovereignty can only be followed eclectically from a number of articles he published as 
the editor of a magazine entitled İçtihad from 1904 until his death. However, it should 
be noted that Abdullah Cevdet’s influence upon Turkish political thought is not solely 
confined to his original writings; his numerous translations of prominent Western 
theoretical and literary works, the most important of which are those of the French 
sociologist Gustave Le Bon, also need to be taken into consideration. Yet, for the 
purposes of our analysis, we will not go deep into Abdullah Cevdet’s ideas on 
sociology, instead we will focus on his political writings that present important steps in 
the conceptualization of sovereignty in two related ways: i) formation of the idea of a 
Turkish nation as the source of sovereignty in the Ottoman polity, ii) unprecedented 
attack on the persona and the institution of the Sultanate.  
Distancing away from the moderate approach of Young Turks towards the 
Ottoman Sultans, Cevdet openly criticizes a system based on the sovereignty of a 
hereditary dynasty. Influenced by the currents of biological materialism prevailing 
among the student of military school of medicine, Cevdet, a graduate of Askeri Tıbbiye 
and a doctor by profession, finds the members of the Ottoman family genetically 
deficient and therefore unfit for effective ruling.309 For Cevdet, the only condition for 
progress in the Ottoman lands lies in the awakening of the nation. Once the nation 
stands strong, there will be no longer need for a Sultan to unite the Ottoman subjects. In 
                                                 
309Şükrü M. Hanioğlu, Bir siyasal düşünür olarak Doktor Abdullah Cevdet ve 
dönemi, 220 and 279. 
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fact, Cevdet is very critical of labeling the population as milliye-yi Osmaniye (the 
Ottoman nation) or as memalik-i Osmaniye (the Ottoman subjects) by contending that 
this label signifies a slave mentality where a ‘nation’ would have no essence in itself, 
but is just perceived as an offshoot of the ruling family.   
   “I am of the opinion that using the term ‘Ottoman nation’ is the same as 
saying ‘Ottoman slaves’….Is there any nation or state on earth that is known 
for the name of its ruling dynasty?… You can be quite sure that the name 
you bear reeks of the putrid smell of bondage.”310 
Instead he calls “the citizens of Turkey,” not the ‘Ottoman subjects,’ to take 
charge of their political fate and to select the most competent and able leader among 
themselves:     
   “Please do note that we do not say Turkey belongs to the subjects of 
Turkey. Instead, what we say is that it belongs to its citizens. Because the 
era of subjects, monarchs, rulers and the ruled is now over. Now, it is the 
time only to become subject to equitable laws established and approved by 
the people themselves.”311  
The radical nature of his stance against the Sultan could only be appreciated by 
comparing his writings in İçtihad to the writings of other leading figures of Young 
Turks such as Ahmet Rıza and Bahaeddin Şakir in the official publications of Young 
Turks, Meşveret and Şura-yı Ümmet, often openly demonstrating their favorable views 
towards the Sultanate.312 In fact, even Tunalı Hilmi, who took pains to come up with a 
new political system based on popular sovereignty, wants to keep the Ottoman dynasty 
in tact, affirming the status of the hereditary monarchical rule supported by the title of 
the caliphate in his constitutional proposal. 
Yet in Cevdet’s view, the House of the Ottoman no longer possesses the ruling 
competency, therefore cannot represent an efficient focus of loyalty to maintain the 
State. Aware of the fact that the modern era is dominated by the states built upon the 
principle of national sovereignty, Cevdet holds, in opposition to the common belief in 
the Sultanate, that the unity of the Ottomans can be ensured only by pursuance of the 
national interests making up the Ottoman Empire. In this perspective, realism emerges 
as a fundamental characteristic of Cevdet’s political views. In contrast to the works of 
the Young Ottomans, Cevdet’s ideas on the nation does not carry romantic traits, rather 
his approbation for national unity is motivated by contemporary realities and heavily 
                                                 
310Abdullah Cevdet, “Şurayı Osmani gazetesi müdürüne,” İçtihad, November 
1906, 255. 
311Abdullah Cevdet, “Uyanınız, Uyanınız!” 1907, 37. 
312Şerif Mardin, Jön Türklerin Siyasi Fikirleri: 1895-1908, 227. 
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permeated by a discourse on interest. The following passages testify to his informed 
realism:  
   “Whatever is said, and whatever is done, it is the era of the sovereignty of 
the community [ümmet]. To try to delay the coming and reign of this era 
would be just like a state of ferocious delirium in which one stabs a dagger 
into the heart of eternity and ceases the sunrise.” 313 
   “The glue to stick together various elements and peoples of distinct faiths 
is not a royal dynasty. It is probably the common interests and well-being of 
such various elements, which would be achieved only through the 
participation of each element, each People of the Book in the rule or the 
Turkish Empire via a constitution and a parliament. No other way can be 
possible.”314  
All this - the incompetence of the Sultanate and the irreversible rise of national 
interests - leads Cevdet to conclude that the maintenance of the State requires going 
beyond a constitutional system headed by the Ottoman dynasty: without labeling his 
proposal as a ‘republic,’ Cevdet indeed envisages a political system based on national 
sovereignty and ruled by an elected head. Excerpts from three well-known articles of 
Cevdet all point to the same direction:  
   “A legitimate government means national sovereignty, rather than 
dynastic sovereignty, and what I mean is that a nation can survive only if it 
promotes its common interests and its own means of sovereignty and well-
being and further chooses the path of light and progress; not when it assigns 
a dynasty as its ruler and reason for survival.”315  
   “Instead of hoping for help from the Sultan’s grace and favor, the nation 
should pursue the means to ensure and preserve its own well-being in its 
own existence. All what is endowed is doomed to lead to habituation.”316  
   “We can chant “Long live the Sultan!”. Then, that would mean we could 
elect one among us as our Sultan. We would then appoint him through the 
gathering of the public. The Sultan should be the most virtuous, the most 
public-spirited, the wisest and the stoutest man among us. Then he shall be 
an official of ours so as to supervise the strict and equitable application and 
execution of the just laws legislated and ratified by the electorate 
representing us, namely, the citizens of Turkey. If he fails to pay due 
attention to his duty, then we shall depose and replace him with another.”317  
As it can be deduced from the above passages, for Cevdet, a great potential lies in 
the awakening of the nation and in the exercise of its common will. Yet, it should be 
                                                 
313 This quotation is fromVittorio Alfieri’s book translated by Abdullah Cevdet;  
Vittorio Alfieri, Hükümdar ve Edebiyat, trans. Abdullah Cevdet, Matbaa-ı (İstanbul: 
İçtihat Kütüphanesi, 1905). 
314 Abdullah Cevdet, “Hanedan-ı Osmani,”İçtihad, no.2, 1906, 219.  
315Ibid.222. 
316 Abdullah Cevdet, “Teselsül-ü Saltanat Meselesi,” İçtihad, May 1905, 86. 
317 Abdullah Cevdet, “Uyanınız, Uyanınız!,” 1907, 37. 
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underlined that Cevdet’s initial conceptualization of the nation does not rely upon an 
ethnic basis. A Kurd by birth, to Cevdet, the concept of ‘citizenship of Turkey’ 
represents an inclusive panacea for political revival. Yet, at any rate Cevdet too, like 
Hilmi, should not be mistaken for a democrat: whereas on the one hand he wants to rid 
the Ottoman polity from the inefficient rule of the dynastic family and while within this 
context he emphasizes the significance of national sovereignty, on the other hand, he, 
like the other Young Turks, trusts neither the ability nor the capacity of the public to 
govern the state effectively. Following the steps of Le Bon, Cevdet also concludes that 
the collective spirit of the community constitutes a major force that either can destroy or 
progress a polity. However, without proper guidance for channeling this energy, masses 
always present a danger and posses a destructive potential.318  
As the works of Tunalı Hilmi and Abdullah Cevdet testify, the idea that 
sovereignty should be vested in the nation slowly starts to take root in the mind of the 
Ottoman elite in the beginning of the 20th century in the context of an Empire at the 
verge of collapse. While the representatives of the early Young Turk movement start to 
grasp the empowering role of the concept of the nation, they nevertheless refrain from 
conceptualizing it in an exclusive relationship to Turkism. It is only after 1908, the start 
of the Second Constitutional era, that this irrevocable association becomes established. 
Now it is appropriate to turn our attention to the rise of Turkish nationalism and the role 
that the concept of national sovereignty plays in this context.   
 
 
4.3. Turkish Nationalism, Populism and Sovereignty  
 
 
In a lengthy article that interrogates the relationship between sovereignty and 
nationalism, Bernard Yack illustrates that in many cases around the globe, the doctrine 
of popular sovereignty leads to the politicization of communal identities and loyalties, 
and thereby contributes to the rise and spread of nationalism. As the need to find 
prepolitical and cultural roots that bind the abstract concept of the ‘people’ into a 
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defined political community arises, the concept of popular sovereignty inevitably 
undergoes a transformation from the simple idea of ‘the rule by the people’ or ‘the 
exercise of political authority by the many or the majority.’ Instead, the plea for direct 
popular rule or governmental sovereignty becomes replaced with what can be labeled as 
the ‘constituent sovereignty of the nation’. This new doctrine grants the supreme 
authority in the ‘nation’, which in Yack’s description refers to “an intergenerational 
community bound by an imagined heritage of cultural symbols and memories associated 
with a particular territory or territories.” In this new understanding, the prepolitical 
community, not the majority of the citizens, becomes the sovereign. Hence, “no person 
or persons, whether one, few or many could ever have the final say over how to make 
use of state’s authority”.319 Given this precedence of the “will of the nation” over the 
will of the citizens, it becomes indeed misleading to identify - as it is often the case - the 
modern doctrine of popular sovereignty with a definitive commitment to a democratic 
form of government. On the contrary, as Yack shows, this reconceptualization of 
popular sovereignty can also provide legitimacy to authoritarian regimes where leaders 
or parties can declare to embody the nation’s innate but tacit will (Yack, 2001: 518-
519). The deliberations of Yack with regards to the relationship between popular 
sovereignty, nationalism and authoritarian regimes offer some interesting illuminations 
for the Turkish case, where the discourse on popular sovereignty indeed precedes the 
emergence of and makes an important contribution to the rise of Turkish nationalism, as 
well providing a basis of legitimacy for the new political regime of the surfacing 
Turkish nation-state.  
As many scholars of Turkish history and political science discuss at length, out of 
all the ethnoreligious groups that make up the Ottoman Empire, Turks are among the 
last to cultivate a form of ‘national consciousness.’ The development of Turkish 
nationalism is in fact not only late in comparison to other nationalist currents 
destabilizing the foundations of the Ottoman Empire, but it is also a ‘derivative’ 
product, the first advocates of which are found among the immigrants of Turkish origin 
escaping from the Russian suppression. It is first in the writings of these immigrants that 
we come across persuasive discussions on the significance of formulating a political 
revitalization project based on the concept of Turkish nation. 
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Yusuf Akçura (1876 – 1935), an immigrant from Russia, who has later become 
one of the leading ideologues of Turkish nationalism and the leader of the Turkish 
nationalist movement between 1908 and 1914, is among the first to realize the potential 
that an ideology based on Turkish nationalism can offer. As Akçura puts it in a famous 
article “Üç Tarzı Siyaset” first published in 1904 in Türk magazine in Cairo, the 
Ottomans in the early 20th century have three possible political directions to follow, 
which can be labeled as Ottomanism, Islamism and Turkism.320 Although all of these 
ideologies seem as available alternatives, given the political context of the time, for 
Akçura, only one of them is a reasonable and a viable option: Turkism. In this article, in 
contrast to the majority of the Young Turks who still see an empowering potential in the 
solidification of the multiethnic and multireligious basis of the Empire to maintain the 
unity of the Ottoman territory, Akçura convincingly dismisses Ottomanism as an 
untenable ideology to recover the long-lost strength of the Ottoman State. To Akçura, 
the idea to create an Ottoman nation regardless of ‘ethnic’ and religious differences is a 
delusional inspiration driven from the premises of French nationalism. It is interesting 
to note here that Akçura compares the French version of liberal nationalism with that of 
German nationalism and advocates the latter as a model to follow. French nationalism 
of the post-revolutionary era rests on the principle of jus soil, or in other words, on the 
principle that in order to be considered a French national, a declaration of allegiance to 
the French patrie is deemed sufficient. Akçura criticizes the Ottoman statesmen of the 
Tanzimat era and the Young Ottomans for failing to see the weaknesses associated with 
such a principle in the Ottoman context. 
For Akçura, the development of a German type of nationalism based on ‘racial’ 
ties321 with its undeniable contribution to the German process of unification between 
1866 and 1871 and the victory of Bismarck over the forces of Napoleon III during the 
                                                 
320Yusuf Akçura, Türkçlüğün Tarihi. (İstanbul: Analiz Yayıncılık, 1998).  
321 Despite Akçura’s frequent referals to the ‘Turkish race’ in his writings, his 
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Kökenleri: Yusuf Akçura (1876-1935). (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1996): 
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Franco-Prussian War of 1870 is in itself a case in point to show the vainness of 
Ottomanism, an attempted, yet failed, replica of the French and American versions of 
‘liberal nationalism.’ As Akçura sees it, the Ottomans can compete with the rising 
power of the West only if they give up their fixation on maintaining the territorial unity 
of the Empire and instead focus on creating a nation out of existing ethnic and religious 
ties among the population that is left behind.322  
In a similar fashion, Akçura also condemns Pan-Islamism as an unsustainable and 
therefore indefensible ideology. As Akçura observes, the European powers already 
enjoy an unmatched influence over the lands of Islam and derivation of political 
strength through a political leadership based on Islam, as some of the Young Ottomans 
tried to accomplish, can only remain as a futile strategy. Instead, Turkism can be the 
only political path to safeguard the interests of the Ottoman state. In arriving such a 
conclusion, Akçura himself admits the influence of growing relations with Germany. To 
this end, Akçura calls for an awakening of the Turkish consciousness among the 
Ottoman elite and intellectuals and encourages them to turn their attention to a possible 
unification with Central Asian Turks living under the Russian tutelage. With Akçura, 
the early romantic populist phase of Turkish nationalism transforms into the more 
expansionist idea of Pan-Turkism, which he sees as an instrumental strategy to help the 
Ottomans constitute a powerful bloc situated between the ‘white Europe’ and ‘yellow 
Asia’.323 The Panturkist ideas find support among some influential Ottoman elite as the 
writings in nationalist publications such as Türk Yurdu reveal.324 Following Akçura’s 
lead, Turkish nationalism increasingly penetrates into the cadres of Committee of Union 
and Progress particularly after 1907,325 however, it is only after the period following the 
Balkan Wars that the Turkish nationalism becomes the guiding ideology among the 
Ottoman elite. The same period also witnesses the establishment of Türk Ocakları 
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(1912), a powerful association which brings together a large group of activists to 
promote the cause of Turkish nationalism throughout the Empire.326 
Although Akçura’s political ideas have been pioneeringly significant in the 
emergence and the following establishment of Turkish nationalism into the most 
influential ideology of the period in question, it is in Ziya Gökalp’s (1876 – 1924) 
writings that we find the most elaborate ideological formation of the necessity of 
creating a ‘Turkish nation-state’ through the help of Turkish nationalism. Similar to his 
contemporaries, Gökalp criticizes the absence of an established common identity among 
the Ottomans and underlines the need to rediscover the Turkish roots as the basis of 
needed unity:327  
   “Istanbulites saw themselves as townsmen (şehrî), whereas the residents 
of Rumelia were regarded as Albanian, those of Black Sea region as Laz and 
those of South-Eastern Anatolia as Kurds; but there was nobody around 
calling himself Turk. The term ‘Turk’ meant ‘kızılbaş’ in Eastern Anatolia 
and a ‘vulgar villager’ in Constantinople. Both at home and abroad, Turks 
were saddled with all the blame, but no Turkish people could still come 
forward to say ‘Here I am’.” 328 
Gökalp takes up this question of “is there a Turkish nation? Or is it possible to 
construct such a nation?” in detail in a number articles published in Türk Yurdu 
magazine between 1912 and 1914 and later turned into a book entitled Türkleşmek, 
İslamlaşmak, Muassırlaşmak (1918). In Gökalp’s thought, the nation is compared to an 
organism that ‘becomes fertilized, buds and grows’ on the common sacred ideal of 
independence, particularly surfacing in times of an external threat.329 Gökalp agrees 
with the Bergsonian notion that nations possess ‘a spirit’ composed of tradition and ‘a 
body’ made of up rules.330 Nations hold a collective consciousness, where individuals 
find existential meaning in this collectivity. Thus, in contrast to Akçura, Gökalp’s 
conceptualization of the nation rests more on moral and ideal unity. As he describes in 
his own words: 
   “...a nation is not a racial, ethnic, geographical, political or voluntary 
group or association. Nation is a group composed of men and women who 
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have gone through the same education, who have received the same 
acquisition in language, religion, morality and aesthetics. The Turkish folk 
express the same idea by simply saying: “The one whose language is my 
language and whose faith is my faith, is of me.”331  
For Gökalp, all aspiring nations need an ideal (mefkure), or what Laclau would 
call a horizon, to unite forces and to move forward. In Gökalp’s own words: “mefkure 
is the nurturer of the present, the creator of the future as well as the reality of the past. 
It is an ideological power to move, coming from its history of the nation and ensuring 
its leap forward.”332 In order to awaken and strengthen this progressive national ideal, a 
Turkish nationalist programme in terms of language, history, aesthetics, ethics, law, 
religion and economics needs to be advocated.333 
While it is important to underline the importance of Gökalp’s ideas in the 
formulation and the promotion of a new identity based on Turkism, what particularly 
differentiates Gökalp from his peers is his unique, and given the context of his time, 
much-needed synthesis of three disparate origins in the making of this identity. As 
Gökalp envisions, the societal consciousness presents itself in three related but different 
levels: nationalism, communitarianism (ümmetçilik) and modernism (çağdaşlık). 
Gökalp assumes that these dimensions are non-conflicting and he bases this assumption 
on his famed distinction between culture (hars) and civilization (medeniyet). While 
culture is a moral, legal and aesthetic set of national values unique for each community; 
civilization covers internationally accepted methods, scientific data and technical 
knowledge.334 Consecutively, as Gökalp sees it, it would be possible to have a unique 
culture while belonging to the Western civilization, just like the Japanese example he 
mentions with admiration.335 Gökalp states in his famous expression that this 
community is “from the Turkish nation, the Islamic ümmet and the Western 
civilization.”336     
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137. 
332 Ziya Gökalp, Türkleşmek, İslamlaşmak, Muassırlaşmak, 56. 
333Ziya Gökalp, Türkçülüğün Esasları ve Doğru Yol: Ulusal Egemenlik ve 
İlkelerin Sınıflandırılması, Çözümlenmesi ve Yorumlanması. (İstanbul: İnkılap 
Yayınları, 2001), 98 – 161. 
334Ziya Gökalp, Türkleşmek, İslamlaşmak, Muassırlaşmak, 27. 
335Ziya Gökalp, Türkçülüğün Esasları ve Doğru Yol: Ulusal Egemenlik ve 
İlkelerin Sınıflandırılması, Çözümlenmesi ve Yorumlanması. 58. 
336Ibid.65. 
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However, Gökalp’s espousal of the Western civilization does not mean that he 
approves of a cosmopolitan way of thinking; on the contrary, for Gökalp, 
cosmopolitanism presents a ‘clear and present danger’ to the constitution of the Turkish 
nation-state. Therefore, Gökalp strongly opposes the Ottoman identity that he classifies 
as cosmopolite and thereby draws an incompatible wall between the Ottoman and 
Turkish identities: 
    “Why are the two types living in the same country, the Turk and the 
Ottoman, so divergent to each other? Why is everything about the Turkish 
type beautiful and the Ottoman type ugly? When the Ottoman type 
embraced imperialism which was harmful to the culture and lifestyle of the 
Turks, it became cosmopolite and prioritized class interests above national 
ones. Indeed, as the Ottoman Empire expanded, the rulers and the ones 
being ruled became two different classes. The cosmopolite rulers established 
the Ottoman class, while the subjects constituted the Turkish class. These 
two classes did not like each other. The Ottoman class perceived itself as the 
dominant community and looked down upon the Turks as a downtrodden 
community. The Ottomans referred to Turks as the “donkey Turk”. When an 
official would visit a Turkish village, everyone would run away yelling that 
an “Ottoman is coming”337 
Although Gökalp is considered to be one of the pioneers in advocating the idea of 
nation-state in Turkish politics; especially in the articles of his first two periods that 
Halil İnalcik defines respectively as “Ottoman” and “Turkist”338 he does not associate 
the borders of Turkish nationalism with a certain piece of territory. For Gökalp, 
“homeland” is conceived to be more of a holistic ideal: “Homeland is neither Turkey, 
nor Turkistan for Turks; homeland is a big and eternal country of Turan”. Gökalp 
explains the Turan concept as “a homeland which brings all Turks together and 
excludes the ones who do not belong to this nation. Henceforth, Turan “is the totality of 
the countries where Turks live and speak Turkish.”339  
A through examination of his articles in chronological order also reveals an 
evolution in Gökalp’s ideas in relation to Turkism. While in his earlier articles 
published in Türk Yurdu magazine, Gökalp defends an understanding of nationalism 
based on a union of language, ethnicity and religion, his Turkism becomes more and 
more culture based in his articles following the War of Independence. Consecutively, 
                                                 
337Ziya Gökalp, Türkçülüğün Esasları ve Doğru Yol: Ulusal Egemenlik ve 
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338Halil İnalcık, ”Ziya Gökalp: Yüzyıla damgasını vuran düşünür,” Doğu-Batı 3,  
no.12 (2004): 14. 
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Parla’s definition of Gökalp’s nationalism as ‘a non-irredentist cultural nationalism’ due 
to the lack of an idea of a dominant race, can be considered accurate, however this 
conclusion is more valid in terms of Gökalp’s later works, particularly for his ‘third 
period’, which İnalcik categorizes as “Atatürkist”.   
It should be noted here that it is not possible to come across a discussion on the 
national sovereignty principle or to find an elaboration on the form of the emerging 
Turkish political regime in the three significant books where Gökalp shapes Turkish 
nationalism (Türkleşmek, İslamlaşmak ve Muassırlaşmak, Türkçülüğün Esasları ve 
Türk Medeniyet Tarihi). As he himself explains in his articles brought together in a 
collection under the title Yeni Türkiye Hedefleri (Objectives of New Turkey), “among 
the objectives of new Turkey, Turkism stands out in the area of culture and populism in 
the area of politics” and in this light, these books remain within what Gökalp calls the 
‘cultural area’. His specific ideas concerning the new form of political regime of the 
emerging Turkish nation-state mostly consist of his assessments of the political 
principles introduced and executed by M. K. Atatürk. Even though Atatürk states, “the 
father of my feelings is Namık Kemal and my ideas is Ziya Gökalp”, Gökalp cannot be 
considered among the pioneers in the propagation of the ideal of national sovereignty 
and its discursive utilization within the efforts of nation-state building. Nevertheless, 
this fact that does not deny the lasting influence of Gökalp upon the development of the 
concepts of “nation” and “nationalism” in Turkish politics, as well as the establishment 
of an instrumental link between nation building efforts and solidarist corporatism. It is 
mainly from these perspectives that his ideas provide the necessary theoretical and 
ideological groundwork for the founders of the Republic of Turkey.  
Until his book Doğru Yol (The Right Path), where Gökalp, following his inclusion 
to the People’s Party in 1923, undertakes a lengthy evaluation of the party programme 
prepared by Atatürk, he neither mentions national sovereignty nor does he discuss the 
concept directly (this book will be evaluated in the next section of this chapter). 
Nevertheless, Gökalp’s political views concerning populism, clearly under the effect of 
Durkheim and Rousseau, are worth mentioning since this ideology later becomes 
closely associated with the principle of national sovereignty, and constitutes one of the 
fundamental ideological underpinnings of the process of nation-state establishment. 
Especially in his articles published in Halka Doğru (Towards the People), Gökalp 
underlines the necessity of reaching towards the people as the first principle of Turkism. 
A mutual relationship underwrites his understanding of populism: while the rulers bring 
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civilization to people; they become enriched by the culture they learn from the public.340 
In most of his works, Gökalp emphasizes the value of the unique heritage of people, 
while at the same time stressing the importance of educating the public.341 According to 
him, the ‘people’ unified by a common national ideal (mefkure) constitutes the highest 
power, and therefore he does not attempt to develop a system of government or a single 
party ideology, that he places over the community. However, these views never lead 
Gökalp to advocate a regime that would resemble a liberal democracy; instead, Gökalp 
prioritizes national interests over individual interests, rights and freedoms. In a similar 
fashion, his idea of ‘society’ depends upon an organic harmonious community made up 
of necessary professions without any class consciousness, or any other identity that 
could engender differences and conflicts with regards to the national ideal. As Taha 
Parla shows in his valuable and detailed work on Gökalp, solidarist corporatism 
represents the gist of Gökalp’s sociology, a unique amalgamation that he derives from a 
plurality of intellectual traditions such as cultural Turkism, moral Sufism and Western 
corporatism.342 Traces of Gökalp’s populism based on a more democratic and pluralistic 
political understanding can be found in his articles published at a later period, after the 
establishment of the Republic, collected under the title Yeni Türkiye’nin Hedefleri. As 
these articles illustrate, Gökalp’s understanding of populism differs from that of the 
leadership cadres of the Committee of Union and Progress, who mostly perceive 
populism as a mean to impose their own ideas and values on to the people.343 On the 
contrary, especially in his later works, Gökalp explains that he uses the term populism 
as the Turkish translation for the term democracy344  and accordingly he argues that the 
fundamental principles of a government built upon populism should be the assurance of 
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 133
equality among races, nations, classes and sexes.345 Needless to say, for Gökalp, who 
comes from a solidarist corporatist tradition, “one does not have to be a Bolshevik, 
communist, collectivist or socialist” in order to seek this ideal of equality. During the 
same period, Gökalp defines populism as the “the highest and latest stage to which 
contemporary nations can reach in politics.”346  
In a significant work on the evolution of the ideology of populism in Turkey, 
İlhan Tekeli and Gencay Şaylan draw attention to three different, yet related aspects of 
the populism: i) the political aspect, ii) the cultural aspect, iii) the aspect related to the 
societal order.347 There is no doubt that Gökalp contributes greatly to the development 
of particularly the last two aspects of populism in Turkey. However, as we have 
mentioned earlier, the first aspect related to the participation of people in politics and 
administration, an ideal which later on finds concrete meaning in the principle of 
national sovereignty and becomes linked to the ideology of republicanism through 
Kemalism, is only found in his works of a later period. 
In terms of the evolution of populism in Turkey, it is also important to stress the 
fact that it is in effect the intensified interaction with Russia following the Bolshevik 
Revolution that has been decisive in shaping both the nationalist and populist 
movements in Turkey. Narodnism,348 a political movement that had become popular 
among the Russian intellectuals during the end of the 19th century with the purpose of 
“awakening” and “enlightening” the politically inactive peasant people, constitutes a 
highly regarded point of reference for the Turkish intellectuals of the time. Leading 
figures of Turkish nationalism under the influence of Russian narodnism, or the 
“Ottoman Narodnics” as Zafer Toprak refers to them, are also among the first ones to 
realize the importance of the participation of people into politics in Turkey.349 
Nevertheless, it is only during the period of National Struggle (Milli Mücadele) that it 
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becomes possible to transform this realization of the need to ‘awaken the masses’ into a 
concrete political principle rooted in the idea of national sovereignty. The analysis-to-
follow will address this process and will focus on the discursive role that the idea of 
national sovereignty plays in relation to the construction of the Turkish nation-state:  
 
 
4.4. Turkish Nation-State Building and Sovereignty 
 
 
In this section of the study, we will look at the relationship between the 
establishment of the Turkish nation-state during the 1919-1922 period, also known as 
the period of National Struggle, and the doctrine of national sovereignty. To be more 
precise, we will look at the different roles national sovereignty played in creating the 
legitimate foundations of the new Turkish nation-state, especially in drawing and 
securing borders in terms of both territory and population. In this respect, it will be 
appropriate to take a closer look at the important political documents of the period such 
as the Declaration of the Sivas Congress (Sivas Bildirgesi), the National Pact (Misak-ı 
Milli), the Law of Fundamental Organizations (Teşkilatı Esasiye Kanunu), the People’s 
Party programmes, Ziya Gökalp’s Right Path: A Classification, Analysis and 
Interpretation of National Sovereignty and Principles (Doğru Yol: Ulusal Egemenlik ve 
İlkelerin Sınıflandırılması, Çözümlenmesi ve Yorumlanması), as well as the related 
statements of M. Kemal Atatürk with the purpose of mapping the ways in which the 
ideal of national sovereignty has been discursively constructed into a prevailing 
nationalist (and later on republican) discourse to create and sustain political frontiers 
between the ‘inside’ and the ‘outside’.  
The years during which the territorial, population and political boundaries of the 
Turkish nation-state were established is known as the National Struggle Period (Milli 
Mücadele Dönemi) running between 1919 and 1922. Within this conjuncture, national 
sovereignty emerges as the most important discursive component of the political 
movement aiming on the one side to stop the Allies of the World War I from tearing the 
Ottoman territory apart and on the other side to create a national unity and a much-
needed common will to establish a new nation-state out of the remains of the Empire. 
This continual emphasis on national sovereignty can be found in the political and legal 
milestones of this period. It should also be noted that not only legal and political texts, 
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but even the names of the newspapers of the period suggest the rising preeminence of 
the ideal of national sovereignty and the elite’s parallel attempt to popularize the usage 
of the term: The nationalist resistance movement entitles its newspaper as İrade-i 
Milliye (National Will) during the period of Sivas Congress and later changes its name 
to Hakimiyet-i Milliye (National Sovereignty) during the establishment of the Grand 
National Assembly in Ankara. Atatürk himself recurrently utilizes the concept of 
national sovereignty in many occasions and public statements, turning it into a central 
signifier around which he builds the nationalist/republicanist political discourse.350 At 
the same time, through Atatürk, national sovereignty comes be articulated with other 
political ideals such as justice, freedom and equality, enhancing its discursive centrality:  
   “The supreme freedom, equality and justice could be achieved and 
preserved only and definitely through establishing the principle of national 
sovereignty. Hence, national sovereignty is the mainstay for freedom, 
equality and justice. Before the nation itself, before its right to 
independence, before its deserved right to progress and renewal, any power 
is capable of survival only if it relies upon the will of the nation. Those who 
oppose to the will and the very foundation of the nation are doomed to 
frustration.”351  
In terms of the political manifestos of the period, the closing declaration of the 
first significant ‘national’ resistance event, Sivas Congress (September 4-12, 1919), 
which was organized under the auspices of the Anatolian and Rumelia Defense of 
Rights Associations (ARMHC) established by the union of local resistance congresses 
led by merchants, local landlords and old Union and Progress Committee members,352 is 
a pioneering document in the establishment of the perceived boundaries of the new 
nation-state by the declaration of the ‘national will’ as the new sovereign of the land.  
The first and second articles of this ten article declaration on the one hand locates 
the territorial boundaries of this ‘national struggle’ around the areas left behind after the 
1918 Armistice signed between the Ottoman Empire and the Allies of the 1st World 
War, and on the other hand it delineates the contours of membership to this new 
political union within the Ottoman-Islamic communities.  
                                                 
350 Various maxims of Atatürk with regards to the issue of national sovereignty can 
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A couple of other important points for the purposes of our study are worth 
mentioning with regards to this declaration: First, the Sivas declaration does not put any 
emphasis on being Turkish or belonging to the Turkish nation as the prerequisite for 
membership to the newly established political community. The Islamic communities of 
the Ottoman Empire are seen as the natural owners/partners of this struggle. (“Bilcümle 
müslüman vatandaşlarımız bu cemiyetin azayı tabiiyesindedirler”). This statement also 
points to the importance endowed to religious homogeneity within this freshly shaping 
concept of national citizenship during the period in question. A similar approach is also 
traced in the National Pact of January 28, 1920 (Misak-ı Milli), prepared in accordance 
with the principles of the Sivas and Erzurum declarations and with the purpose of 
outlining the conditions of peace that the forces of Turkish resistance would agree upon. 
The National Pact later turns into the manifesto of Turkish nationalism during the War 
of Independence and through this pact, the imperial ideal is permanently left behind in 
exchange for a nationalist movement aiming to bring together the remaining Muslim 
communities of the Ottoman Empire.  
Second, just as it will continue until the abolishment of the Ottoman Sultanate in 
1922, the declaration of sovereignty in the name of the people still remains linked to the 
‘ultimate aim’ of the protection of the caliphate and the Sultanate (Article 2). Therefore, 
it should be stressed that it is never articulated within the context of a proclamation of a 
republic. As stated in the ninth article, the political leader of this struggle is presented as 
the ARMHC, which is positioned as exempt from self-interest and all kinds of political 
party building efforts: “Hereby [this assembly] is entirely unstained and free from all 
sorts of partisan tendencies and personal ambitions. All our Muslim compatriots are the 
natural members of the present assembly.” Hence, at this point, national sovereignty is 
mainly brought forth as an ideal to establish unity against foreign powers, and therefore 
the declaration does not foresee any kind of regime alteration and does not carry 
forward a ‘domestic’ political dimension, which can be referred to as revolutionary.  
Another important point is the statement, which clearly underlines that while 
declaring sovereignty in the name of the ‘people’, no privileges will be granted to ‘non-
Muslim communities’ that could upset the political and social balance (Article 5). With 
regards to this issue, it should also be noted here that while the Sevres Treaty, which 
was signed between the Allies of the 1st World War and the official government of the 
Ottoman Empire in Istanbul on 14 August 1920, can be considered insignificant in 
terms of a discussion on the discursive formation of the national sovereignty ideal since 
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it never actually went into force and since the founders of the Turkish nation-state were 
never a party to it, it nevertheless had a lasting impact in the mindset of the nationalist 
elite. The harsh clauses of the Treaty concerning the territorial division of the Empire 
among the Allies and the various ethnic-religious communities living under the 
Ottoman rule have contributed to the establishment of the foundations of a defensive 
approach to ‘national sovereignty’ and accordingly the Sevres Treaty has constituted the 
‘humiliating’ historical experience against which the twin ideals of the newly emerging 
Turkish nation-state, namely ‘full independence’ and ‘unconditional national 
sovereignty’ have come to be contextualized. In a similar fashion, the upcoming 
generations have inherited fears emanating from the historical legacy of the Treaty in 
terms of the imposition of minority rights in the context of this agreement: In the minds 
of the Turkish nationalists, it is this imposition of the West, which had destroyed the 
internal sovereignty of the Empire, thereby bringing its collapse. Hence, as we will 
discuss in detail in the following chapters of this study, the historical experience of 
Sevres has turned into a ‘syndrome’, which is recurrently revoked whenever concerns 
arise in relation to ethnic-religious demands in Turkey. In this respect, the ‘Sevres 
Syndrome’ has also contributed to the shaping of ‘national security’ doctrine prevailing 
in the Turkish polity up to date.  
The political document, in which we find the first legal expression of the 
fundamental dictum of Turkish politics ‘Sovereignty is vested Fully and 
Unconditionally in the Nation,’ is the Law of Fundamental Organizations (Teşkilatı 
Esasiye Kanunu), accepted after a five month discussion period in the Turkish Grand 
National Assembly on January 21, 1921. The first article of this 24-article document, 
which is considered to be the first constitution of the newly establishing Turkish nation-
state, not only implies a sharp turning point in the Turkish political life by wording that 
national sovereignty could under no conditions be restricted, but also underlines that 
people will be directly responsible for their own rule. Article 1 of this new constitution 
states: “Sovereignty is fully and unconditionally vested in the nation. The form of 
government is based on direct popular rule and the principle of self-determination” 
(Hâkimiyet bilâ kaydü şart milletindir. İdare usulü halkın mukedderatını bizzat ve bilfiil 
idare etmesi esasına müstenittir).353  
                                                 
353 The original text of the Law of Fundamental Organizations (Teşkilat-ı Esasiye 
Kanunu) can be found in İrfan Bingöl, Ülkemizde Anayasa hareketleri: sened, ferman 
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For the purposes of our research, a detailed analysis of this document with respect 
to i) the exposition of the reasons behind its preparation and acceptance ii) an evaluation 
of the specific articles in terms of their approach to sovereignty iii) discussions in the 
Parliament during and after the enactment of the Law of Fundamental Organizations 
(LFO) is important for several different reasons. First of all, the impact of the ideas of 
Rousseau and the French revolution in the preparation of this text is evident. The first 
article of the LFO reflects this close association by instituting an indivisible, unlimited 
and non-transferable understanding of sovereignty, the roots of which can be found in 
the Rousseauian conceptualization (the Rousseauian notion of sovereignty has been 
discussed in detail in the first chapter of this study). Furthermore, the principle of ‘union 
of powers’, as well as the appeal to conventionalism, or parliamentary government, are 
the legacies of the French Revolution and the period of Convention (1792-1795) that are 
traced in the first ‘constitution’ of the Turkish Republic (this issue will be taken up in 
more detail below).  
From the perspective of historical conjuncture, it should be stressed that the LFO 
was enacted right before the London Conference held with the Allied governments led 
by the English, French and Italians between February 27 and March 12, 1921, the aim 
of which was to put an end to the resistance movement headed by Mustafa Kemal. 
Thus, one of the fundamental reasons for the acceptance of the LFO was to prove to 
external powers that the Ankara government was in effect the official representative of 
the Ottoman people. Both in the congress declarations, the National Pact and the LFO, 
there is a reference to the national self-determination principle first established by the 
US President Wilson in 1918 through his famous ‘fourteen points’, which later turned 
into the reigning doctrine of international relations during the period in question. While 
on the one hand, the resistance movement constructed its international legitimacy upon 
this principle of national right to self-determination and self-rule, on the other hand, the 
two conditions that Wilson set forth conflicted with the fundamental political principle 
that Mustafa Kemal and his supporters fervently defended: ‘sovereignty unconditionally 
belongs to the nation’. As Berkes states, the two principles of Wilson, a) national 
freedom must not be a revolutionary freedom to change the withstanding political 
regimen of the state; b) the nations that previously were ruled by the defeated Imperial 
Powers (German, Austrian-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires) of the 1st World War had 
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to establish their political autonomy under the auspices of a ‘guarantee state’, which in 
return would be identified by the League of Nations.354 Therefore, the underlining of 
unconditionality as an inalienable attribute of sovereignty should be evaluated within 
the context of a response to the Wilsonian principles.  
Another fundamental reason behind the declaration of unconditional sovereignty 
framed to be executed by a direct rule through the principle of ‘union of powers’ relates 
to the efforts to eradicate internal opposition. Here it would be useful to return briefly to 
the domestic political context, in which Mustafa Kemal and his friends were 
undertaking their efforts of nation-state building: Although Mustafa Kemal aimed to 
derive the strength of his resistance movement from the will of the people with the 
congresses he organized, political groups such as Halk Zümresi and Halk Şuralar 
Fırkası, compromised of the old members of the Union and Progress Committee who 
had deeply internalized Russian narodnism, began gaining strength in the parliament 
with their programmes based on a more Russian version of ‘populism’ and as a result 
they even won the elections for the ministry of interior.355 Thus given the ascendance of 
populist bloc in the Parliament, the main target in including the principles of 
‘populism’, as it has been expressed in the LFO and presented to the Parliament on 
September 18, 1920 by Mustafa Kemal, was indeed to diffuse the opposition that was 
gaining ground through the ideology of populism.356 In this perspective, the underlying 
objective of the ‘anti-imperialist’ and 'anti-capitalist' discourse357 used in the 'Populism 
Programme' of Atatürk (a political language that never appears in the later political 
manifestos of Atatürk and his People’s Party) should be thought in line with the efforts 
of party leadership to appeal to the members of the Parliament under the influence of 
the ideological currents of Russian narodnism.    
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Taking into consideration all this historical background, it can be concluded that 
the LFO and its fundamental principle, “sovereignty is vested fully and unconditionally 
in the nation” was indeed a move to strengthen the position of Mustafa Kemal and his 
colleagues against both the ‘external’ and the ‘internal’ powers. It is evident that while 
sovereignty was being taken away from the Sultanate, this process was not a result of a 
long lasting struggle concerning the positioning of the individual and society vis-à-vis 
the state, nor was it based on the development of a philosophy of rights or political 
obligations in the Turkish polity.  
In relation to the question under study, it would be now appropriate to draw 
attention to two contradictory features of 1921 Constitution that can be considered 
unique in the Turkish political life:  The first one is a decentralized approach towards 
public administration, rooted in the principle of populism that have penetrated the 
political philosophy LFO for the reasons mentioned above; and the second is the 
centrality of principle of ‘union of powers’ within the first Constitution of the Turkish 
nation-state. While the LFO is referred to as the 'most democratic' constitution of 
Turkey by some political scientists because of this first characteristic,358 it is 
simultaneously accused of creating a platform for a dictatorial parliament due to the 
second feature. As Ahmet Ağaoğlu, who later became a founding member of the 
opposing Free Party against Atatürk, expressed in the parliament, the LFO “granted the 
First Grand National Assembly with dictatorship laws; in fact he [Atatürk] personally 
made the declaration of this law of dictatorship.”359  
As for the issue of decentralization, more than half of the articles of the LFO in 
fact involve a detailed explanation of the principles of local administration.360 The 11th 
article states that city councils would be the sole responsible for ‘estates, education, 
health, economy, agriculture, public administration and internal affairs’. Along with 
cities, the role of provincial districts, the smallest unit of local administration, is also 
expanded, where this administration unit, made up of one or a few villages, would have 
an elected council or a management board, which would act autonomously concerning 
‘judicial, economic and monetary’ issues (Article 20). All these clauses limit the 
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jurisdiction area of newly established central nation-state and foresee a decentralized 
public administration.361 In his detailed evaluation of the LFO, Tanör also links the 
importance given to local administration to the influence of the ideology of populism, 
particularly prevalent in the first parliamentary period.362  
However, in contrast to its decentralized approach to public administration, the 
LFO unites the legislative and executive powers under the authority of a single organ: 
“Executive power and the right to legislate is manifested and concentrated exclusively 
in hands of the Turkish Grand National Assembly, which is the only and true 
representative of the nation.” (İcra kudreti ve teşri salahiyeti milletin yegane ve hakiki 
mümessili olan Büyük Millet Meclisi’nde tecelli ve temerküz eder) (Article 2). 
Accordingly, it is important to underline that this constitution in effect foresees a 
parliamentary government, the example of which is the Convention established 
following the French Revolution. The president [prime minister] of the executive  
cabinet (heyeti vekile) also acts as the president of the parliament; and in this respect the 
1921 Constitution does not create a position of the Presidency of the State. In fact, it 
should also be noted that the parliament additionally resumes the judiciary power during 
this period through the establishment Independence Courts (İstiklal Mahkemeleri).363 
Although the union of powers principle of the LFO comes to a halt with the enactment 
of the Law of Supreme Commander (Başkumandanlık Kanunu), it would be appropriate 
to say that the foundations of the idea that sovereignty unconditionally belongs to the 
nation and that the sole executive of this sovereignty in the name of the nation is to be 
the Grand National Assembly is in actual fact the legacy of the 1921 Constitution.  
Hence, the historical developments following the enactment of the Law of 
Supreme Commander, the subsequent devolution of parliamentary authorities to 
Mustafa Kemal himself and thereby the appearance of an executive  power above and 
independent of the Turkish Grand National Assembly claiming to be sole representative 
of sovereignty in the name of people should all be seen in line with the events that 
eventually led to the fragmentation of the First Turkish Parliament along a number of 
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opposing political camps.364 Ahmet Demirel, in his detailed study of the so-called 
‘Second Group’, known as ‘the opposition’ in the first constitutive parliament of 
Turkey, argues that contrary to the official explanation, which positions this group as a 
reactionary and religious force with the intention of ‘preserving the Ottoman Dynasty'; 
it is indeed the increasingly dictatorial personal rule of Mustafa Kemal that the ‘Second 
Group’ fundamentally opposes. In defending their political position vis-à-vis the all 
powerful Commander-in-Chief, the ‘Second Group’ also makes use of the principle of 
national sovereignty arguing that the recent developments go against the core and soul 
of the national movement of independence, the aim of which was to establish a 
Parliament where the will of the nation could be represented.  
Demirel validates his assertion by an in-depth analysis of historical documents 
and parliamentary proceedings, which confirm the contours of the opposition of 
‘Second Group’ vis-à-vis the issues of responsibilities and liabilities of the cabinet 
(heyeti vekile), the limitations imposed on the authorities of the Parliament, the 
enactment of the Law of Supreme Commander, the method of selection/appointment of 
candidates for parliamentary membership, the independence of the parliamentary 
presidency, the establishment of Independence Courts and finally their position with 
regards to fundamental rights and freedoms. For the ‘Second Group’, the fact that 
parliamentary authority had been divided and transferred to the Supreme Commander, 
that the president of the parliament would also be the president [prime minister] of the 
executive  cabinet, that he would be responsible for the appointment of candidates for 
the parliamentary elections, and that the president of the cabinet would use his authority 
without the consent of the parliament create an unforeseen power acting over and above 
the parliament; and according to Demirel, this de facto situation in reality constitutes the 
common gist of their opposition.365  
As it can be followed from the foregoing discussions, ‘national sovereignty’ has 
been a discursively instrumentalized principle by the Kemalist government and the 
‘Second Group’ alike in order to strengthen their political objectives with regards to the 
pacification/subversion of ‘internal’ and ‘external’ threats and enemies. According to 
Berkes, the heated political discussions on the issues mentioned above do not end up 
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crushing the opposition, but on the contrary makes it tougher,366 and in return lead 
Mustafa Kemal and his colleagues to also harden their efforts to attain their respective 
objectives without compromise. The conflict between the government and the 
opposition becomes even more pronounced prior to Lausanne Peace Talks, following 
the TBMM Hukuk-ı Hakimiyeti ve Hükümranın Mümessil-i hakikisi Olduğuna Dair 
Heyet-i Umumiye decision dated November 1-2, 1922, through which the Sultanate 
come to be separated from the Caliphate and subsequently abolished. It is possible to 
find the clear manifestation of this tension, which is often expressed through the 
discussions focusing on the concept of ‘national sovereignty’, in the memoirs of Atatürk 
taken from Nutuk:  
   “Three commissions came together in a room. Hoca Nuri Efendi was 
elected as the president. The members of the Legal Commission explained 
why the Sultanate could not be separated from the caliphate uttering the 
known nonsense they always make use of. The members who could prove 
the irrelevance of this assumption did not speak up… I got up on the table in 
front of us. I gave this speech out loud: Gentlemen, I said, sovereignty and 
the Sultanate are never given to anybody through scientific deliberations and 
discussions. Sovereignty and Sultanate can only be claimed by force and 
power. The Ottoman Dynasty confiscated the sovereignty of the Turkish 
nation by force. They have continued this abuse for six hundred years. Now, 
the Turkish nation has finally said no to this and is reclaiming its 
sovereignty and its own rule. Now the issue here is not, will we leave the 
rule and sovereignty to people or not. The issue is, to legitimize legally this 
reality which has already happened. Because this will absolutely happen. I 
think it will be appropriate for the parliament and the ones gathered here to 
accept this naturally. Otherwise, the reality will come about anyway. 
However, some might have to be beheaded.” 367 
As a result of the intensification of opposition within the Parliament due to 
ongoing discussions concerning the legal abolishment of the caliphate and conditions of 
the Lausanne Peace Talks, the government calls for early elections based on the 
problems encountered during decision making and consequently the 1st Turkish 
Parliament is dissolved by a vote of simple majority.368 This decision also brings the 
end of ‘the First Parliament’ considered by many Turkish scholars as being the most 
“populist and democratic” in comparison to the ones that followed. Accordingly, 
Mustafa Kemal establishes the People’s Party on December 6, 1922 in order to clarify 
and strengthen his political programme, and on April 8, 1923 he publicly declares his 
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election statement, which includes the infamous ‘nine arrows’ that would establish the 
foundation of the Kemalist ideology later on.369 Now we will turn our focus to an 
evaluation of this programme by Ziya Gökalp, who joined the People’s Party in 1923 
and became a member of the 2nd Turkish Parliament, in a booklet entitled The Right 
Path: Classification, Analysis and Interpretation of National Sovereignty and 
Principles:370 
To start off, attention should be drawn to the title of the booklet, which already 
suggests the extent to which People’s Party builds its political legitimacy upon the 
principle of ‘national sovereignty’. Gökalp offers an explanation of the principles of the 
People’s Party under twelve different chapters and places the assessment of national 
sovereignty under the first chapter. Here, it would be more meaningful to evaluate the 
attributes of ‘national sovereignty’, as conceived by the People’s Party, with the 
sequence of importance given by Gökalp: First and foremost, it is important to 
underline that Gökalp closely associates national sovereignty with Turkish nationalism. 
For Gökalp, Turks have been under the captivity of the Ottoman Empire and been 
deprived of the freedom to identify with their own ‘nation’, while other ‘nations’ were 
left free to claim ‘if my citizenship is Ottoman, then my nationality is Arab, 
Albanian…’371 He also harshly criticizes the Ottoman tradition of cosmopolitanism and 
for the related denigration of Turks within this tradition. Seen from this perspective, for 
Gökalp, the major accomplishment of the People’s Party lies in its declaration of the 
Turkish nation as the sole sovereign of this land: 
   “Through the very successful ideological struggle of Defense of Rights 
Party following the armistice, today we are not only able to give the name 
Turk to our language, literature and nation; we are also able to call our 
government and homeland Turkish legally and officially. This is the 
clearest indication of our national sovereignty.”372  
As a matter a fact, it should be stressed here that, different from the Sivas 
Declaration, the National Pact and the 1921 Constitution, the 1923 People’s Party 
programme makes a direct reference to the Turkish nation with regards to the issue of 
sovereignty. While the programme underlines the importance of the legal equality 
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among people and explains that the People’s Party does not make any distinction 
between classes, it also states that the Party is open to the membership of “every Turk 
and all individuals coming from another origin but accepting the Turkish nationality and 
culture.”373 
The second important aspect in relation to national sovereignty in Gökalp’s 
evaluation is that it cannot be limited by any form of internal or external power. In 
Gökalp’s account, these ‘powers’ consist of “(1) foreigners endowed with privileges 
and concessions emanating from the so-called external capitulations; (2) non-Muslim 
communities with privileges emanating from the so-called internal capitulations; (3) the 
Palace, which still wants to monopolize political power; 4) reactionaries who attempt to 
use religion as an enemy to politics.”374 According to Gökalp, impositions by these 
powers over national mechanisms cannot be accepted under any conditions in the 
context of national sovereignty. Only the nations themselves have the right to limit their 
own affairs, and these limits can be defined according to national ethics and culture 
within the framework of universal logic and wisdom. Nations should stay away from 
laws which would violate individual rights; however this responsibility cannot be 
imposed by an external power. It is interesting to see that the ‘powers’ which Gökalp 
defined as the enemy of the Turkish national sovereignty in 1923 still occupy the same 
role in the ongoing discussions on the issue of national sovereignty, the only exception 
of course being the Ottoman Palace.  
The third significant aspect with regards to the evaluation of RPP’s understanding 
of ‘national sovereignty’ in Right Path booklet is the support given to the principle of 
‘union of powers’: Gökalp criticizes both the American presidential system in relation 
to its espousal of ‘separation of powers’ and the European parliamentary system in 
relation to its espousal of ‘balance of powers’. Gökalp argues that ‘separation of 
powers’ within the US system remains only on the surface and never actually functions 
the way it should,375 while he blames ‘balance of powers’ for “constituting a dangerous 
principle, which pushes cabinet members to organize a governmental coup, or to 
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surrender the country to chaos and influence of destructive powers at the most critical 
junctures.”376 Consequently, Gökalp declares, national sovereignty can only be possible 
in the context of ‘union of powers’: 
   “Accordingly, a personal rule is not only present in the monarchical 
kingdoms of Europe and the America, but even the Republics are made up 
of mixtures of personal rule and national sovereignty. A complete execution 
of national sovereignty only exists in Turkey due our principle of union of 
powers. This is because in Turkey, the authority of law is not partially 
shared with individuals, but remains completely in the hands of the 
Parliament.”377 
Furthermore, Gökalp underlines, in the chapters where he evaluates the other 
principles of the Party Programme, that the People’s Party would approach the public 
administration, law, economy and education in the context of the national sovereignty 
principle the contours of which are outlined and explained above. As once again seen in 
the foregoing assertions of Gökalp, the doctrine of ‘sovereignty unconditionally 
belonging the nation’ is in effect the heritage of a founding period based on the ‘union 
of powers’.  
Now, we will turn our attention to the implications of the politics of 
inclusion/exclusion, shaped by the doctrine of national sovereignty based on the 
principles of Kemalism, (which eventually turns into a full fledged ideology in the 
1930s following the declaration of nine arrows in the People’s Party programme of 
1923), had on the construction of the Turkish nation-state, along with the creation of 
Turkish national identity and citizenship.  
 
 
4.5. National Identity, Citizenship and Sovereignty 
 
 
In an article entitled “Sovereignty and the Nation: Constructing the Boundaries of 
National Identity,” Roxanne Lynn Doty analyzes the role of the discourse on 
sovereignty over the constitution of a national identity on the basis of a new citizenship 
policy employed during England’s transition from an empire to a nation-state following 
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the World War II.378 According to Doty, England’s approach to sovereignty during this 
period of ‘crisis’ lasting throughout the 1950s and 1960s can not be considered limited 
to merely an authority independent of external forces to make and execute laws and 
policies over a certain territory, or in other words as a principle of international 
relations: During the period in question, sovereignty indeed emerges as an internal 
political instrument, through which the United Kingdom attempts to differentiate the 
‘English’ population from the ‘colonial’ populations under the rule of its former empire 
by producing immigration and citizenship laws based on the principle of sovereignty: 
“Instead, the inside/outside boundary is a function of a state’s discursive 
authority, that is, its ability, in the face of ambiguity and uncertainty, to 
impose fixed and stable meanings about who belongs and who does not 
belong to the nation, and thereby to distinguish a specific political 
community –the inside– from all others – the outside.”379  
As many scholars of post-1924 Turkish politics and history indicate, the 
establishment of a chain of equivalences among the ‘Eternal Chief’ (M. K. Atatürk), the 
party (CHP), the state and the nation stand out as the underlying political feature of this 
period.380 In his in-depth analysis of Atatürk’s Nutuk and Söylev ve Demeçleri, Taha 
Parla expresses the various phases of this identification of the chief-party-nation in the 
following paragraph:  
   “It is obvious and consistent in itself that the absolute charismatic leader, 
who was reluctant to share the national sovereignty with nobody but the 
(indivisible and integral) nation – not even with the Parliament itself – 
would be eager to exercise that power solely through a single party under his 
own chairmanship – let us here remember from Nutuk the theme of oneness 
of the parliamentary group and the parliament itself. There exists a very 
smooth transition from a charismatic leader who, by definition, derives his 
authority or (allegedly) legitimate power from his supreme qualities and, 
should the occasion arise, from a very abstract concept of nation – that 
leader is identical to that nation – instead of any institution or collective 
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entity to a republican theory with a single party under the rule of a single 
leader: A process whose signs could be traced back to earlier phases.”381 
A validation of Parla’s above-assessment can also be found in Atatürk’s own 
words:  
   “Indeed, in civilized states ruled in accordance with the principle of 
national sovereignty, the established rule which is effectively in force is the 
tenet that the political group representing the inclinations of the nation in 
general and capable of materializing with supreme authority the interests 
appertaining thereof should take charge of the affairs of state and then it 
shall load all the responsibility upon the shoulders of the top-level 
leader.”382 
The dissolution of the 1st Turkish Parliament, the amendment of election laws, the 
relatively independent policy-making status of the government from the parliament after 
1923,383 the recognition of the People’s Party as the sole inheritor/successor of the 
national movement of independence,384 and finally the shutting down of all opposition 
parties as a result of Takrir-i Sükun decree can all be considered among the most 
important historical construction and subsequent consequences of this identification. As 
it is well known, following the decree, Turkey has been ruled by a single party 
government over 20 years with the brief exception of Free Party experience that lasted 
only three months. During the period in question, the single party government rejected 
any form of liberal parliamentarism and instead enacted a corporatist/ solidarist political 
system under the rule of a single ‘chief.’  
While Parla presents the above evaluation of the single party period in Turkey, he 
also calls for a distinction between the so-called ‘Political Kemalism’ from a “Cultural 
Kemalism’ during the period under survey: For Parla, ‘Cultural Kemalism’ constitutes a 
progressive ideology with its espousal of secularism, rationalism, a radical cultural 
revolutionism, where as ‘Political Kemalism’ remains as a more conservative ideology 
due to its solidarist/corporatist approach, authoritarianism, statism, and for its support of 
single party/single ‘chief’ rule.385 The traces of this increasingly conservative political 
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positioning can also be found in the transformation of the leading principles of 
Kemalism,  namely populism, republicanism and nationalism upon which the ‘national 
sovereignty’ of the new nation-state has been founded, during the period under 
investigation:  
Some significant differences can indeed be detected between the principle of 
populism advocated during the Turkish National War of Independence (and the initial 
years of the Republic) and the Kemalist populism of the 1930s. In the former version of 
populism, at least at the discursive level, self-rule and direct democracy (as expressed in 
the Constitution of 1921) constitutes a desired objective. However, the 1930s witness a 
transition in the perceived meaning of populism among the ruling Republican elite, the 
gist of which can be described along the line of “for the people, despite the people” 
(halk için halka rağmen).386 This transformation also becomes evident in the 1924 
Constitution, where a reference to direct popular rule no longer finds legal expression. 
This change in the formulation of the principle of populism also suggests the 
irreconcilable breaking up of its linkage to the ideal of a direct democracy, which would 
have required the institutionalization of some form of public participation within the 
political system.387 Other historical examples of this shift during the period in question 
include the rejection of the demands to associate populism with a political system based 
on class or professional representation, as well as the annihilation of political opposition 
with claims to represent the interests of social groups with competing demands.388 
Atatürk defends the necessity of a single-party rule as the best possible way to ensure 
progress, national unity and harmony in his following words:  
   “This nation has suffered so much from political parties. Here, let me 
make plain that parties in other countries were and is still always being 
established on the basis of economic motives, for there exists miscellaneous 
classes therein… We all know about the consequences witnessed due to the 
political parties established as if there existed distinct classes in our country. 
However, when the Republican Party is in question, it embraces not a part 
of but the whole nation… The Republican Party shall be a school to equip 
our people with political disciplining…. What we have achieved so far is so 
ample that these might not possibly be accomplished in the next three or 
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four years. As happens everywhere, we too might find discontented forces 
to emerge in the face of new movements and tendencies… Gentlemen, 
neither I nor any of you shall attempt to create offices based on our own 
personalities. We should all work in such a way that what we will establish 
shall be a national institution, which could only be achieved by equipping 
the people with political disciplining…. Success will certainly be attained 
through unity. If the people proceed by cooperating for a common cause, 
then they will succeed in any case.”389  
As it has been discussed in detail above, during the creation of the Turkish nation-
state, another Rousseauian attribute, ‘infallibility,’ also comes to be articulated as a 
defining feature of the Turkish notion of unconditional, non-transferable and absolute 
national sovereignty. In this perspective, the reluctance and intolerance towards any 
kind oppositional plurality within the communitarian approach adopted during the 
Turkish process of nation-state building also find its philosophical resonance in the 
ideas of the leading the political figures of the French Revolution such as Rousseau and 
Sieyes, who locate the general will, or the collective will of the nation, above 
individuals and societal groups. During this period, the unchangeable privileged 
positioning of the ‘Eternal Chief’ within the Turkish political life also carries a certain 
parallelism with the paternalistic figure of the Rousseauian ‘Law Giver,’ who ‘always 
knows what is best for the nation’ and guides the common will in that direction.   
During the single-party rule, while on the one hand, Atatürk and his People’s 
Party discursively base the legitimacy of their authority on the principle of national 
sovereignty, on the other hand, they also remain suspicious of the power of the public 
and the potential that it possesses to destabilize the current political regime when left on 
its own. In a certain way, during the period in question, discourse on sovereignty comes 
to be closely linked to idea of governmentality and the related efforts to establish 
continuity between security, population and government. 
Here it is also important to note that, since its inception, the national security-
focused politics in Turkey identifies ‘internal forces’ as the primary ‘threat’ to the 
sustainability of sovereignty. Atatürk also shares this perspective and his Nutuk presents 
a very vivid example, where leveling out of ‘internal opposition’ occupies the central 
stage of Ataturk’s political struggle starting with the Turkish national movement of 
independence and lasting until the enactment of Takrir-i Sükun Kanunu. Here, Atatürk 
himself concedes to the fact that establishing unity within the nation proves much more 
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difficult, time-consuming and complex in comparison to fighting against the invasive 
external armies:  
   “A nation which sticks together and is determined to materialize its aims 
will sooner or later be capable of making any conceited and aggressive 
enemy regret for such conceit and aggressiveness. Therefore, suppressing 
the internal revolts is certainly much more important than curbing the Greek 
offensive.”390  
Therefore, ‘the political education of the public’ becomes a prerequisite for 
ensuring its obedience to the single-party rule and its close associate, the authority of 
the state; and this can only be possible by creating an organic society with a unitary 
national consciousness and endeavoring for a common goal, as well as by officially 
identifying who could belong to this nation. In his book, Citizenship and Nationhood in 
France and Germany, Roger Brubaker391 argues that the creation of modern citizenship 
in France and Germany goes along with a politics of social closure and that in this 
context citizenship policies display a close relationship to both French and German 
nationalisms. In a similar fashion, the new Turkish Republican citizenship becomes 
constructed through the determination of boundaries that would ensure national unity 
and harmony. Seen from this light, the Kemalist nationalism also goes through a 
transformation similar to that of populism in the post-1924 era, and features a ‘double 
character’ based on how it perceives the ‘internal’ and the ‘external’ worlds.  
Ahmet Yıldız’s in-depth analysis on the construction of Turkish national identity 
between 1919 and 1938 published under the title, ‘Ne Mutlu Türküm Diyebilene’: Türk 
Ulusal Kimliği’nin Etno-Seküler Sınırları (1919-1938),392 illustrates that particularly 
after 1929, the Kemalist nationalism discards any kind of ethno-secular pluralism in 
terms of its identification of the boundaries of ‘national identity.’ As Yıldız reveals in 
detail throughout his work, while the Kemalist nationalism rejects an irredentist outlook 
in international relations and follows a peaceful neighborhood policy, its domestic 
policies in the 1930s increasingly transgress the framework of cultural nationalism and 
carry some noteworthy traits of ethnic nationalism. At the same time, while during the 
War of National Independence and the first years of Republic religion emerges as a 
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significant source of a common identity, it slowly becomes pushed to the background 
given the increasing centrality of secularism within the Kemalist ideology. Various 
works of Taha Parla and Levent Köker also support the findings of Yıldız in this 
regard.393  
In fact, the objective of achieving religious-cultural homogeneity within the newly 
established borders of Turkey is already made evident in the negotiation period of the 
Lausanne Treaty,394 the international agreement declaring the terms of Turkish national 
independence. One of the reasons behind the compromising attitude of Ankara 
government has been its perception that regions possessing complex population 
compositions such as Western Thrace, Mosul and Hatay could constitute obstacles to 
the idealized homogeneity of the new political society. The Treaty’s chief negotiator 
İsmet İnönü also supports this view in his following assessment of the outcome of the 
Lausanne Treaty:  
   “In brief, a homogeneous and uniform motherland; a state of affairs in 
which people are free from irrational restraints abroad and internal 
concessions – defining the government – within the government itself; and 
also from irrational financial obligations; the absolute right of self-defense; 
a free motherland with abundant resources. This homeland is called 
Turkey.”395  
As it is well known, one of the main objectives of the Lausanne Treaty involves 
the refutation of Greek, Armenian and Kurdish political demands. In this regard, the 
rejection to recognize different Muslim ethnic groups living within the national border 
of the new Turkish Republic as official minorities, as well as the enforced population 
exchanges between Turkey and Greece can be sited as historical examples of the 
Republican endeavor to create a homogenous political community. The ‘Turkish 
History Thesis,’ fabricated during the single-party rule also contributes to the objective 
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the construction of a coherent national identity. Çağlar Keyder expresses the underlying 
logic of this constitutional period in the following paragraph:  
   “Turkish nationalism, the legitimizing ideology of the new republic, was 
formed on this background. It is not hard to comprehend why such 
nationalism preferred an ethnic narrative. To put it another way, the notion 
of Turkishness was created so as to represent the remaining population 
homogenously with an effort to obscure a real diversity. Thus, as opposed to 
the assumed homogeneity among Greek, Turkish and Arab ethnic groups, a 
similarly contrary Turkish ethnicity was created, for which an uninterrupted 
ethnic historical narrative was constructed which can be traced back to a 
mythical past in a foreign landscape.”396  
At the same time, in this period, Islam no longer occupies a central role in the 
formation of Turkish national unity and accordingly comes to be relegated to the 
margins of RPP’s political language. We can trace more clearly the articulation of the 
principle of national sovereignty with the secular Turkish nation in the 1931 
Programme of Party in the section on the “principles of homeland, nation and state 
organization”, where a direct reference is given to Turkism on the basis of a common 
language, culture and ideal (ülkü), while religion is no longer mentioned as an attribute 
of Turkism:  
   “1- Motherland is the territory within our current political boundaries 
where Turkish nation lives with all its ancient and glorious history and with 
its historical artifacts that have survived up to the present as buried deep 
down under its soil. The motherland is a whole which can by no means be 
divided.  
2 – A nation is a socio-political community composed of citizens who are 
bound together with a common language, culture and common ideals.  
3- The primary organization of the state: The form of government of the 
Turkish nation is our current form of state based on the principle of the unity 
of powers. Thus, the Grand National Assembly exercises the right of 
sovereignty on behalf of the nation. The President and the members of the 
cabinet are elected among the members of the Assembly. Sovereignty is 
one, and unconditionally and unreservedly belongs to the nation. The Party 
is of the opinion that this is the most convenient among all existing forms of 
state.”397  
Finally, the identification of the State with the Nation, the ethno-secular 
framework of which has already been discussed, constitutes another defining feature of 
the creation and consolidation process of the Turkish nation-state. The following 
statement from Afet İnan’s book Medeni Bilgiler, a political guidebook for Turkish 
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citizens prepared under the personal supervision of and at times contribution by M. K. 
Atatürk is revealing in this respect: “Turkish nation, is a state administered by a republic 
based on public rule” (“Türk milleti, halk idaresi olan cumhuriyetle idare olunur bir 
devlettir”).398 In a similar fashion, the RPP programmes of 1931 and 1935 also define 
the rights and liabilities of the individual, society and the state to one another, however, 
as Parla points out, in contrast to the previous party programmes, here the emphasis is 
placed on the limits to the individual and societal rights imposed by the state’s raison 
d’etre and its associated authority. The 1935 programme also involves a declaration, 
which states that the activities of individuals and corporate entities can never work to 
the benefit of public good. As a result of the growing emphasis on the raison d’etat, the 
balance in state-society relationship increasingly becomes reconfigured in favor of the 
overwhelming state authority.399 The first paragraph of a speech delivered by the RPP 
Secretary General Recep Peker to explain the reasoning behind RPP’s party programme 
of 1935 is important for exposing the growing significance of the idea of the state and 
the ideology of statism among the ruling republican elite:  
   “Dear colleagues, the most visible and audible distinguishing mark of the 
new programme is that the Republican People’s Party (CHP), which has 
cooperated with the state as a single body from the very beginning, is 
gradually becoming much closer to the state.”400  
Throughout this speech, while on the one side Peker heavily criticizes and finally 
discards state organization/administration schemes offered by both socialism and 
liberalism, on the other side he describes RPP’s approach to the idea of nation-state as a 
well-ordered administration system, where ‘not everyone is allowed to say whatever 
that comes to mind.’ During these years, we also witness that the principle of statism 
extends beyond the area of economy and encompasses the political life, where the state 
is now positioned as an end in itself, encircling and at times subordinating the society: 
   “The state organization is a great entity and power. We need this reunion 
and solidarity in order to promote the nation, the strength of which we 
derive from the source of sovereignty (and we believe that this strength is 
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not only confined to words) in such a way that it could stand by, together 
with, and within the state apparatus and support it.”401  
These words also indicate the beginning of an era in the republican history, where, 
as it finally comes to be legally expressed in the Turkish Constitution of 1982, a 
complete integration between the ‘Turkish Nation’ and the ‘sacred Turkish State’ takes 
place.  
 
 
4.6. Conclusion 
 
 
In sum, the following conclusions can be derived from the foregoing analysis: 
During the period in question, the principle of national sovereignty upon which the 
political legitimacy of the process of Turkish nation-state building rests, assumes 
attributes that go beyond a Rousseauian conceptualization of sovereignty and 
increasingly resembles the Schmittian notion, where sovereignty is conceived as a 
monopolized capacity of the nation-state to decide and to act upon its decisions, 
destroying the possibility of any challenge directed to its preservation and unity. As 
discussed in depth in the first chapter of this dissertation, building on the philosophical 
traditions of German Idealism and Romanticism (particularly in relation to the theory of 
organic state, where the state simultaneously encompasses its constituent parts and 
placed above them, along with the related notion of raison d’etat) and adopting a 
version of Hobbesian absolutism, Schmitt himself advocates “an understanding of 
sovereignty as a concrete application, that means who decides in a situation of conflict 
what constitutes the public interest or interest of the state, public safety and order, le 
salut public and so on.”402 The ideas of Schmitt and the political traditions that he 
derives his assumptions from resonate in many aspects the notion of sovereignty 
discursively developed and put to use in the context of Turkish nation-state creation. To 
put it more clearly, as Schmitt sets out to formulate a novel understanding of 
sovereignty to save the Weimar Republic from political frailty and indecisiveness to 
reclaim the German grandeur and ends up with defying liberal constitutionalism with 
his definition of ‘Sovereign is he who decides on the exception’ - a reincarnated version 
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of Hobbes infamous dictum “autoritas, non veritas facit legem”; the Kemalists aspire to 
construct a nation-state out of the remains of the Ottoman Empire and end up finding 
political empowerment in the motto of ‘Sovereignty is vested Fully and Unconditionally 
in the Nation.’  
The Kemalists discursively construct a chain of equivalences centering around 
this motto, which in return brings the notion of sovereignty developed during the period 
in question close to that of a Schmittian theorization: (i) sovereignty becomes 
exclusively linked to the ‘Turkish nation’, the boundaries of which grow to be clearly 
demarcated by the single-party ‘politics of social closure’ differentiating between 
‘friend’ and ‘enemy’; (ii) the collective will of the nation in-making finds its guidance 
and meaning in its amalgamation into the raison d’etat; (iii) the state and its raison are 
identified with the RPP and the Kemalist ideology; and finally to complete this 
discursive chain of signification (iv) the RPP is ruled by an ‘Eternal Chief’, who is 
endowed with the power to decide on the exception. 
Also in line with the Schmittian rejection of checks and balances, the Kemalist 
notion of sovereignty depends on the principle of union of powers and the indivisible 
organic integration foreseen between the Turkish nation and the Turkish state. At the 
same time, national sovereignty, as conceived and put to use by the Kemalist regime, 
helps in constructing political frontiers to delineate the ‘inside/outside’ both in terms of 
territory and population, clearly marking the distinction between the Schmittian seminal 
antithesis between 'friend' and 'enemy'.  
Seen from this perspective, ‘national sovereignty’ constitutes the nodal point of 
the Kemalist discourse in its employment of what Laclau and Mouffe calls a logic of 
difference: Kemalist nationalist/republican discourse attempts to ‘homogenize’ and 
‘totalize’ the political space by trying to undermine and displace ‘internal’ and 
‘external’ antagonisms to the margins of society. To this end, it builds a political 
discourse based on the ideal of national sovereignty which in return contributes to the 
formation of a coherent national identity and a collective will to sustain the efforts of 
nation-state building. In so doing, it also hegemonizes and wipes out opposing 
antagonistic discourses, as the cases of the 1st Turkish Parliament and the subsequent ill-
fate of opposition parties such as Free Party (Serbest Fırka) and Progressive Republican 
Party (Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası) reveal. Since this process of homogenization 
“proceeds not through the construction of equivalential chains between actual 
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democratic demands, but through authoritarian imposition,”403 the Kemalist discourse in 
the long term proves unsuccessful in the neutralization of social dislocations and the 
incorporation of popular support, opening the way for its own hegemonic demise. It is 
in the next chapter that we will address the implications of this constituent period and its 
‘unconditional’, ‘indivisible,’ ‘non-transferable’ and ‘infallible’ notion of sovereignty in 
the context of the post-1980 Turkey, where the prevailing political model upon which 
the Turkish nation-state is established come to be increasingly challenged by forces of 
globalization and fragmentation.   
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5.  DISRUPTION: GLOBALIZATION OF TURKEY AND THE POLITICAL 
DISCOURSE ON SOVEREIGNTY 
 
 
 
5.1. Introduction 
 
 
The post-1980 period, where the monopoly of the Turkish nation-state over 
sovereignty comes to be increasingly challenged by growing supranational and 
subnational demands for the dispersion of central authority as a result of the process of 
globalization of economic, political and social relations and the parallel integration of 
Turkey into this evolving system, contributes to the emergence of two opposing 
discourses in Turkish politics: The first one, produced mainly by the Kemalist 
military/republican elite with the purpose of reinvigorating the etatism of the 1930s, 
centers on the myth of ‘indivisible, unreserved and unconditional national sovereignty’ 
deriving its strength from the complete union of the Turkish nation and the state. In 
opposition to the problems associated with this nationalist/statist approach to 
sovereignty, the second discourse, created by the amalgamation of ‘democratic’ 
demands, defends the ‘people’ and the individual vis-à-vis the all powerful nation and 
the state, plurality vis-à-vis homogeneity, and globalization vis-à-vis the central state. 
This discourse criticizes the doctrine of ‘unreserved and unconditional national 
sovereignty’ and finds the deconstruction of this myth particularly important in 
connection to the exposition of the ongoing conflict in the relationship between the 
state, political authority and legitimacy.  
Faced against this background, this chapter aims to analyze the discursive roles 
that the concept of sovereignty plays within these two competing discourses. More 
specifically, the main objective of this chapter is to discover the ways in which the 
opposing Turkish political ‘power blocs’ attempt to defend their respective political 
ideologies by reverting to various discursive strategies focusing on the concept of 
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sovereignty. In order to better grasp the reasons that give rise to this ‘discursive battle’, 
the chapter starts out by discussing the repercussions of the parallel progression of 
globalization and fragmentation in the post-1980 Turkey. This part strives to situate the 
need for the reconstruction of the Turkish political discourse on sovereignty within the 
context of the disruption brought by the transition from a closed economic and political 
system to an increasingly globally integrated society, accompanied by a parallel 
transition from military rule to functioning party politics. It is argued that the universal 
collapse of statism, the transformation of national forms of statehood and the 
persistence of political conservatism in the face of the emergence of new forms of 
identity politics mark the background of this discursive battle. 
The second part of the chapter highlights noteworthy theoretical openings in 
relation to the concept of sovereignty within the context of a changing international and 
domestic political order often characterized by a transition from the ‘modern nation-
state’ to the ‘post-modern global’ system. An assessment of international discussions 
centering on the concept of sovereignty proves particularly important to understand the 
ways in which versions of the global political discourse on sovereignty becomes 
reproduced in Turkey to cope with paradoxical processes taking place in the post-1980 
era: a progressive international integration advancing hand in hand with a progressive 
decentralization of authority and fragmentation of society. 
Posed against this historical and theoretical context, the third part of the chapter 
exposes the discursive maneuvers centering around the nodal point of sovereignty in 
Turkey, where each of the competing political forces strive to impose its own particular 
and irreconcilable demands to shape the shifting political order. This analysis illustrates 
how and why the discourse focusing on the concept of sovereignty employs a ‘logic of 
equivalence’, which seeks to divide social space by condensing meanings around two 
antagonistic poles, namely ‘statists’ vs. ‘democrats’. It is claimed that, in this period, the 
concept of sovereignty becomes an ‘empty signifier’ to create new antagonisms that 
either try to defend or erode the hegemony of nationalist/statist political discourse in 
Turkey.  
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5.2. Globalization, Postmodernity and Turkey 
 
 
Beginning with the 1980s, the prevailing doctrine of sovereignty, upon which the 
legitimacy and hegemony of the Turkish nation-state over the society have been built, 
comes to be increasingly challenged by forces of globalization and fragmentation. Prior 
to analyzing the discursive roles that the concept of sovereignty plays within the 
discourses developed to cope with this ‘crisis’, it would be first meaningful to try and 
explain briefly why the 1980s constitute a breaking point in Turkish political history:   
The weakening of the power and the capacity of the state to collectively represent 
the increasingly diversified societal demands due to globalization of economic, political 
and cultural relations in the post-1980 period also creates associated problems for the 
nation-state led Turkish modernization project in execution since the 1920s. In fact, 
during the 1980s, Turkey appears to be a country stuck in between ‘modernity and 
postmodernity.’404 One of the underlying reasons of this situation of ‘in-betweenness’ 
relates to the fact that in Turkey modernization in effect remains as an ‘unfinished 
project.’ On the one hand, while in the eyes of the republican elite, modernity represents 
the ultimate, yet still unachieved level of development for Turkish society, on the other 
hand, mostly under the influence of postmodernist thought currents, the Turkish 
experience with modernity becomes subject to critical scrutiny. According to Hasan 
Bülent Kahraman, the main target of this critique involves the questioning of the 
relationship between the central authority and modernity:  
   “Modernity was a process of establishing power, and that is why it came 
to form its own institutions. In order to secure the central authority, it 
invented new measures and mechanisms. On the other hand, the postmodern 
era was designed to dissolve and eradicate the power in question, and to free 
the individual as much as possible. The shock suffered by the nation-state, 
new interpretations with regard to questions of identity, body and subject as 
well as the civil society’s pains of expansion were all products of this new 
quest.”405 
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The Turkish case of modernization comes to be particularly criticized for its close 
association with the authoritarian face of modernity, rather than displaying the 
emancipatory aspects embedded in the modern epistemology. As it is well-discussed, 
what mainly differentiates Turkish experience with modernity from that of the West is 
that in Turkey, modernity does not ‘naturally’ emerge out of economic, social and 
political transformation and does not depend upon an intellectual tradition; rather it 
unfolds as a ‘top-down’ project imposed over the society by the statist/republican 
elite.406 As in every project, Turkish modernity has a carrier agent, the state, and a 
clearly defined object, the society to be molded in the image of modern men and 
women.407 Due to the privileged position of the state within this project, while 
institutional modernity develops in Turkey, the emancipatory features of modernism 
never penetrates into and becomes internalized by different levels of Turkish society. In 
this perspective, the Turkish case of modernization contradicts the vision set forth by 
Marshall Berman, who describes the geist of modernity in the following words: 
“Modern men and women must become the subjects as well as the objects of 
modernization; they must learn to change the world that is changing them, and to make 
it their own.”408  
Accordingly, Turkish state-led modernity project, where social heterogeneity as 
well individual rights and freedoms become relegated to the margins of politics, faces a 
deepening crisis of legitimacy and representation starting with the 1980s and 
intensifying during the 1990s.409 As Ahmet İnsel describes, the 1980s are the years in 
which ‘Turkey’s painful experience with global change turns into a deep societal 
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depression.’410 One of the main leitmotifs of this depression relates to the ongoing 
conflict between the economic and political ideologies determining the course of 
Turkish development during the years under investigation: On the one side, given the 
pressing need for Turkish economic transformation in the face of the universal collapse 
of command economies and etatism following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, as 
well as the global discrediting of economic models based on import substitution,411 
Turkish economy increasingly liberalizes and integrates into the world markets under 
the leadership of Turgut Özal. On the other side, while this economic liberalism 
dissolves the monopoly of the Turkish state over economic matters and subsequently 
creates new economic power hubs, political change in no way corresponds to this far-
reaching transformation. On the contrary, conservatism emerges as the common 
denominator of politics during this period, confined to the limits demarcated by the 
1982 constitution drafted right after the military coup of 1980 and approved by a public 
referendum under strict restrictions on political freedoms.412 According to Ali Yaşar 
Sarıbay, a schizoid-paranoid articulation marks the globalization process of Turkey, a 
country stuck in between economic liberalism and political conservatism: 
   “The schizoid dimension universally provides non-Western societies with 
dynamism of change, whereas the paranoid dimension, by its restraining 
nature, forces these societies to remain as they are, both of which constitute 
the immutable basis for a tension that defies any solution. On the other hand, 
since recognition at the global level eventually requires schizophrenia, under 
the guidance of deterritorialization and decodification, the following risks 
for the societies in question may come to the fore: i) Fragility and variability 
of political identities, ii) plasticization of their own sovereignty, iii) 
artificialization of their social production (recoding production as 
consumerism).”413   
As these schizoid-paranoid articulations determine the course of Turkey’s 
transition to ‘postmodern capitalism’, movements bringing together identity related 
demands of different religious and ethnic groups try to fill in the distance created 
between the central state, the society and the individual. In opposition to the rising 
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preeminence of identity politics, the ‘Kemalist Bloc’ further tightens its grip over the 
society with the purpose of maintaining the privileged position of the Turkish state 
within politics.414 Nur Betül Çelik draws our attention to the fact that this defensive 
political conservatism developed in the 1980s mostly in relation to the efforts to unify 
the increasingly polarized political scene in effect feeds into further fragmentation of the 
public space:   
   “The political conservatism of the post-1980 era, fostered by an emphasis 
on harmony and unity and a fear of politics, and guaranteed by the military 
with a carefully drafted constitution, was suggested as a Kemalist answer to 
the fragmentation and polarization of the post-1980 political system. 
Ironically, it triggered the pluralisation of and diversification of extra-
parliamentary forms of political activity and a proliferation of new sites of 
identification for popular struggles and for the rearticulation of their popular 
demands on the national political level.”415  
If we are to express in the psychoanalytic terminology of discourse theory, Turkey 
faces a situation of “the return of the repressed” in the 1980s, where heterogeneous 
demands based on counter religious or ethnic identities assume an increasing visibility 
against the homogenous national identity acting upon an imaginary community and 
simultaneously find their representational correspondence within the political realm. 
The growing influence of Islamic identity in Turkish politics stands out as one of the 
most critical developments of the period in question.416 Political Islam rises mainly 
through void created by the postmodernist dissolution of hegemonic paradigms417 and in 
this respect religion represents “the most significant and effective candidate to fill in 
this lack of utopia and state”.418 While on the one side, political Islam makes use of the 
postmodernist undermining of the central authority, on the other side it closely 
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associates itself with modernist terminology. Hence, during the period under study, 
Islamism eventually develops into an alternative communitarian ideology that in itself 
comes to be confined within the limits of modern identity.419  
As a result of the above-mentioned developments changing the relationship 
between the state and the societal actors, political discourse also transforms in the post-
1980 Turkey.420 While the decentralist spill over effects of globalization lead to the 
reallocation of economic and political power; in defense, the centralist/statist forces 
adapt their discursive strategies to respond to the ascendancy of politics of 
identity/recognition employed by different societal groups such as the Islamists and the 
Kurds. Consequently, the prevailing model of the Turkish nation-state, the legitimacy of 
which depends upon the ‘unreserved and unconditional national sovereignty’ weakens 
and opens the way to a new discursive battle centering on the concept of sovereignty. 
While the rest of the chapter will be primarily devoted to an analysis of these discursive 
formations and their relationship to sovereignty, the following section will first focus on 
the deliberations on sovereignty at the global level during the period in question. This 
brief survey proves particularly important for assessing the repercussions of these 
discussions over Turkish politics and for evaluating the ‘profoundness’ of the discursive 
clash taking place in Turkey during the 1980s and the 1990s.  
 
 
5.3. Reconfiguring Sovereignty in the Era of Globalization and Postmodernity 
 
 
This following part analyzes the reproduction of the global political discourse on 
sovereignty within the two leading narratives of the late 20th century, namely 
globalization and postmodernity. In a world of increasingly nominal boundaries 
transgressed by processes of integration and fragmentation, the contemporary discourse 
on globalization and postmodernity problematizes sovereignty’s exclusive relationship 
to the nation-state and searches for ways to reconceptualize the concept to adjust to the 
new norms of global governance. While the reconfiguration of sovereignty first and 
                                                 
419Nilüfer Göle, “Modernleşme Bağlamında İslami Kimlik Arayışı” 70-81. 
420Nilüfer Göle, “80 Sonrası Politik Kültür,” in Türkiye'de politik değişim ve 
modernleşme, eds. Ersin. Kalaycıoğlu and Ali Yaşar Sarıbay (İstanbul: Alfa Yayınları, 
2000), 425.  
 165
foremost requires the acknowledgement of the supranational ascendancy over the 
nation-state, it also necessitates a response to sub-national political demands arising 
from fracturing national identities. As Walker puts it,  
   “One part of the puzzle concerns life within states, and involves the 
difficulty of reconciling the pluralistic claims of people with the 
universalistic claims of state authority. In this context, the meaning of 
sovereignty oscillates both between unrestrained power and legitimate 
authority and between the primacy of the people and the primacy of the 
state as the locus of power and authority.”421  
Thus, the imminent challenge of the new global era involves “transcending the 
national and the international, while it also inescapably requires new forms of both,”422 
and the new discursive openings on sovereignty try to tackle this challenge at all three 
levels.  
In terms of the question of sovereignty, theories of globalization primarily draw 
attention to the need for a reconceptualization of the concept in the face of the so-called 
demise or break down of the modern nation-state. To this end, this new thinking on 
sovereignty centers around the question whether or not the idea of state sovereignty can 
be sustained given the ‘disjunctures’ between shifting economic and political structures 
of the global system and the traditional concept of sovereignty. In order to better 
understand what type of ‘disjunctures’ problematize the concept of sovereignty based 
on Hinsley’s classic description of ‘final and absolute authority in the political 
community’, David Held’s analysis on the gaps between the idea of a national 
community and the pattern of global interconnections provides some useful insight. 
Held talks about five important gaps that increasingly challenge an understanding of 
sovereignty with reference to the nation-state:423 
The first ‘gap’ involves a progressively integrated world economy, the dynamics 
and outreach of which transcend and destabilize national control. Held’s second gap is 
related to the overwhelming presence of hegemonic powers and power blocs in the 
international arena such as the NATO and the European Union, which constrain in 
various significant areas the decision-making power of the nation-states. The third gap 
is constituted by the wide-spread web of influential international organizations such as 
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United Nations, World Trade Organization (WTO), International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
and the World Bank, which again in many ways restrict the sovereign decision-making 
capacity of nations and yield way to mechanisms of collective decision-making. The 
fourth gap is expressed in the deepening and widening power of international law over 
domestic legislation practiced through the rulings of organizations such as the European 
Court of Human Rights, International Court of Justice and by the existence of 
international treaties such as the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and the United Nation’s Declaration of Human 
Rights. Considering all of these restrictive structures functioning above the nation-state 
level, Held puts forth the idea of ‘the end of domestic policy’ as his final gap.  
Faced with these momentous challenges to the classical conception of 
sovereignty, Held argues that it becomes all the more necessary to make a theoretical 
distinction between de jure sovereignty - ‘supreme legal authority, competence or 
entitlement’ and de facto sovereignty - ‘a supreme ability to induce [people] to take a 
desired course of action, by bringing some sort of pressure to bear upon them’.424  
Given the changes of the late 20th century, while de jure sovereignty might remain in 
tact, de facto sovereignty, which determines the autonomy of the nation-state, has in 
fact becomes diminished. As a result, the nation-states of the 20th century are faced with 
a certain ‘loss of sovereignty’425:  
   “In short, the idea of de jure sovereignty remains compelling, especially 
with regard to the state’s capacity to wield coercive power. However, the 
cooperation of states in an ever more complex international system, which 
limits their autonomy and infringes their sovereignty, undermines the 
cogency of those traditions of sovereignty  – stemming from Hobbes, on the 
one side and Rousseau on the other – which interpret sovereignty as an 
illimitable and indivisible form of power. Instead, if sovereignty as a 
concept is to retain analytical and normative force – as the rightful capacity 
to take final decisions and make and enact the law within the given 
community – it has to be conceived as divided among a number of agencies 
and limited by the very nature of this plurality and the rules and procedures 
which protect it. Such an idea is implicit in the Lockean conception of 
political community, and is central to the tradition of political analysis, 
which does not locate or reduce sovereignty to either state or society. 
However, it requires further extension to the new international 
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circumstances in which the state is located today, a task which modern 
political theory has rarely begun.”426  
Extending on the arguments proposed by Held and following the prevalent 
theoretical current of ‘endisms’ of the 1990s, Camilleri and Falk present a forceful 
discussion as to why we should be speaking of the ‘End of Sovereignty’ in the shrinking 
and fragmenting world of contemporary politics.427 In Joseph A. Camilleri and Jim 
Falk’s view, the theory of sovereignty ‘seems strangely out of place in a world 
characterized by shifting allegiances, new forms of identity and overlapping tiers of 
jurisdiction.428 Similar to Held, they link the need to declare ‘the end of sovereignty’ 
with five macro trends, which they associate with the ‘postmodern condition’: (i) the 
internationalization of trade, finance and corporate organizations, (ii) the globalization 
of the security system, (iii) the rapid transformation of technology, (iv) the 
accompanying spread of ecological problems and (v) the emergence of new social 
movements with a both local and transnational consciousness.”429 
In the face of this evolving relationship between the international community, the 
nation-state and the civil society accompanied by the shifting paradigm between 
political authority and community, Camilleri and Falk propose to conceptualize 
sovereignty not as a fact, but rather as ‘a claim about how the way political power 
should be exercised.’ Their work possesses a special value for pointing out the various 
connotations the concept has acquired over the centuries; in particular from its 
association with notions of national interest, national independence and national 
security. As Camilleri and Falk discuss, it is precisely because of these connotations that 
the concept of sovereignty persists, while its actual relevance is indeed under serious 
challenge in today’s political order.430 In a similar fashion, Held also considers 
sovereignty still cogent due to its discursive usage to determine ‘friend’ and ‘foe’ and to 
marshal the means of violence in the relations within and between states.431 
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Within the globalization discourse, Stephen Krasner’s two influential books 
Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy432 and Problematic Sovereignty: Contested Rules 
and Political Possibilities433 are also worth mentioning in introducing new perspectives 
with regards to the ‘problem of sovereignty.’ After defining sovereignty as an 
“organized hypocrisy,” Krasner makes a compelling case for the need to reconstruct the 
political discourse to include the possibility of ‘shared sovereignty’ in opposition to the 
orthodox concept of ‘absolute sovereignty.’ For Krasner, the idea of  ‘shared 
sovereignty’ offers an opportunity to better promote international and domestic 
governance, as well as advancing democracy by means of helping to build sub and 
supra state level political structures, crafting better policies with more international 
expertise, and by restraining abuses of political power.434  
The dedication of a whole issue of Harvard International Review to the question 
of ‘The End of Sovereignty?” in 1995 is yet another powerful illustration of the 
prevalence of the debate over the concept of sovereignty in the 1990s.435 In this issue, 
the analysts join their arguments in declaring that the concept of sovereignty, defined as 
the absolute authority of a state over its territory, has lost its relevance in our 
contemporary world, where international organizations and other non-state actors have 
assumed greater importance. However, similar to Held, Krasner, Camilleri and Falk, 
they find it still premature to declare sovereignty as a dead concept and explore various 
ways to reconfigure the theory of sovereignty to fit the demands of the new political 
order. While the theories of globalization and the global state expose the shortcomings 
of the conventional understanding of sovereignty, at the same time they open the way to 
a search for a renewed understanding of the principle responding to the conditions of 
our ‘postmodern’ world.  
One such attempt is found in the advocacy of the ‘sovereignty of the individual’ 
in opposition to the principle of illimitable state sovereignty - an increasingly appealing 
idea often expressed within the growing literature on human rights in the 1990s. 
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Informed by the liberal theories of sovereignty, the main thrust of the human rights 
discourse centers on the need to usurp some of the powers once defined by the 
boundaries of state sovereignty in defense of individual rights.436 This discursive 
position puts forward the need to rethink and reformulate the concept of sovereignty to 
allow more room for the protection of individual rights. Increasingly assuming a 
privileged position among the international community, the human rights discourse 
problematizes the conceptualization of sovereignty as a fixed legal principle; and by 
exposing the inherent tension between the protection of human rights and the 
upholding of absolute state sovereignty, it links the discussion on sovereignty with the 
questions of legitimate political authority and the appropriate nodes of national and 
transnational governance. In fact, the human rights discourse stands right at the 
intersection between the so-called external and internal dimensions of sovereignty and 
by blurring this distinction it supports openings for ‘postmodern’ or ‘post-structural’ 
questioning of the concept. 
Some noteworthy ideas involving such an attempt can be found in an article 
entitled “The state of liberal sovereignty.”437 Here, Raia Prokhovnik argues that instead 
of declaring sovereignty as ‘dead, bankrupt or redundant,’ it is more useful and relevant 
in today’s environment to find an alternative conceptualization, which discards the 
myth that ‘the autonomy that sovereignty confers has to mean absolute and only 
negative freedom to act.’438 By distancing the concept from its association with 
absolutist theories dating back to Bodin, Hobbes and Rousseau, Prokhovnik disposes 
the traditional view that equates sovereignty with absolute state sovereignty as a 
functional fiction and develops ideas for a reconceptualized sovereignty based on more 
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flexible forms. In so doing, Spinoza’s notion of sovereignty characterized by the 
absence of a centralized state offers a starting point.439 Prokhovnik identifies three 
important features of a reconceptualized sovereignty: (i) with regard to the state and 
sovereignty, intermediate positions should be elucidated between a conception of single 
unity and one of fragmentation or dissolution; (ii) the vital role played by the state in 
mediating processes of governance above and below itself should be reconfirmed; (iii) 
the internal and external dimensions of sovereignty should be acknowledged as the 
parts of a single discourse and thereby the understanding of sovereignty as a ‘barrier 
concept’ should be discarded. As a result, a reconceptualized sovereignty should 
envisage an orderly set of possible connections in which the state is a focus of identities 
rather than a definer of a single overarching identity itself. 440  
In short, throughout the 1990s, the above-discussed debate within the discourses 
of globalization and postmodernity challenges an understanding of sovereignty as a 
final, exclusive and illimitable form of public power. Particularly, these discussions 
prove significant for highlighting the rising frictions between the state, the civil society 
and the individual, emerging from the conflicting claims to sovereignty in the name of 
the state, emphasizing the link between absolute authority over a defined territory and 
population, vs. claims to sovereignty in the name of the ‘people’ and the ‘individual.’ In 
a certain way, the theorists of both globalization and postmodernity utilize new 
discursive strategies and vocabulary within the shifting economic, political and social 
context of the late 20th century to re-expose the perennial tension between the 
Hobbesian/Rousseauian notion of sovereignty modeled on single, unitary and 
hierarchical model of the nation-state over the society and individual political subjects 
vs. the liberal Lockean notion that envisages mechanisms to defend the rights of the 
society and the individual against the state. In confronting this unrelenting challenge, 
they provide a solid theoretical background to better evaluate the discursive battle over 
the concept of sovereignty that takes place in the post-1980 Turkey among the two 
opposing political camps of ‘statist/nationalists’ vs. ‘democrats.’  
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5.4. Statist/Nationalist Discourse and Sovereignty 
 
5.4.1. Rediscovery of Kemalism as Atatürkism in the post-1980 period 
 
 
The concept of sovereignty constitutes one of the fundamental reference points of 
the statist/nationalist discourse, reconfigured as ‘Atatürkism’ after the 1980s. Before we 
look at the role that sovereignty plays in enhancing the foundations of legitimacy of the 
statist/nationalist discourse, it would be first appropriate to try and understand why 
Kemalism was reconfigured as Atatürkism during the period under surveillance. In 
order to do that, we need to first start thinking about Kemalism as ‘a hegemonic 
discourse in dissolution.’441 As explained earlier, this dissolution closely relates to the 
undermining of the strong and fully independent nation-state envisaged within the 
Kemalist ideology and the corresponding insustainability of the homogenous and 
organic societal structure mostly due the effects of globalization during the post-1980 
period. In view of this actual ‘disruption’, the ‘Kemalist Bloc’ established by the 
historical partnership of the military, bureaucracy and intellectuals, and shaped by a 
defensive statist/nationalist outlook, reconstructs the Kemalist discourse as Atatürkism 
with the purpose of bringing back the initial spirit of the Republic of Turkey and 
thereby returning back to the ultimate ‘era of happiness’ (Asr-ı Saadet) epitomized in 
the 1930s. As Nur Betül Çelik expresses, in the 1980s and 1990s, “Kemalism 
transformed from a hegemonic discourse that managed to function as an imaginary 
horizon into a discourse struggling for hegemony, a mythical space that strives to 
survive in the political arena.”442 
The objective to establish ‘national unity and order’ by re-enforcing the fading 
principles of Atatürk represents the publicly declared reason behind the military coup of 
the 1980. Kenan Evren, the general in charge of the coup and the 7th President of the 
Republic of Turkey, states in his speech delivered on the day of the coup d’etat: 
   “The Military has been forced to take over political control in order to 
bring well-deserved prosperity and welfare to the honorable Turkish nation, 
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to institute unity of our homeland and nation, to revitalize the principles of 
Atatürk, the efficiency and strength of which are increasingly under attack 
and to re-establish the authority of the state."443  
In support of the attainment of the fundamental objective of the period, the 
establishment of ‘national unity and harmony’, the military and the bureaucratic elite 
'rediscover’ Atatürkism as a unifying ideology during the 1980s. Atatürkism comes to 
be positioned as a ‘local’ ideology stemming out of and belonging to this land 
especially against the 'external' ideologies like socialism and communism, which are 
seen as the problematic source of political polarization in Turkey. Instead, Atatürkism is 
presented as the ‘natural’ ideology, which should be internalized by each ‘Turk’. 
Examples of this inclination can also be seen in the speeches of Kenan Evren and in the 
book Atatürkist Thought and Approach published by the Land Forces Headquarters 
(Kara Kuvvetleri Komutanlığı) in 1982:  
   “The only way of thinking for the Turkish nation can be Atatürkism 
reflecting and embodying the realities of its own country and people. The 
Turkish nation always renews and strengthens its faith and belief from this 
source.”444  
   “If we are Turkish, if we are the children of this country, if we claim to 
work for the prosperity of this nation, then we need to remember that great 
Turk, we need to learn the MADE IN TURKEY KEMALISM, and we need 
to completely abide by his principles and evaluate their consequences. 
Otherwise, if we adopt foreign ideas just because they are exported and 
presented as good, would not we in fact be denying our TURKISHNESS?445  
It is important to underline that while Kemalism becomes ‘reconfigured’ as 
Atatürkism it at the same time becomes more conservative.446 It increasingly adopts a 
state-centric approach to citizenship, emphasizing and extending solidarist aspects of 
Kemalism and associated obligations of citizens to the state at the expense of individual 
rights and liberties.447 In an article entitled “What is Atatürkism?”, taken from 
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Atatürkism series of the Turkish General Staff (Genelkurmay Başkanlığı), Reşat Kaynar 
also points to the prioritization of the state within the Atatürkist ideology:  
   “[Atatürkists’] efforts to reach the level of contemporary civilization do 
not only stay at the political realm and the supra-structure. They extend 
towards the social and economic infrastructure and they intend to prosper 
the people, for the people, and with the strength of the people. To this end, 
in realization of their objectives to prevent class conflicts, to realize societal 
peace and to recover from an underdeveloped social structure, they 
prioritize constructive, regulatory and dictating role of the state.”448  
Within this process of reconfiguration, sovereignty constitutes the "nodal point" 
of the new Atatürkist discourse. The central role given to sovereignty in connection to 
the efforts to support the penetration of this ideology to the different segments of 
Turkish society and to ensure its subsequent internalization proves important for a 
number of different reasons. In this respect, it becomes necessary to discuss first the 
features of sovereignty accompanying the 'reconfigured’ ideology of Atatürkism and 
secondly to identify the areas upon which the instrumentalization of national 
sovereignty within this discourse focuses.  
Among the primary sources to be examined in order to further enlighten the 
issues under discussion are the 1982 Constitution of the Republic of Turkey, the 
publications of the Turkish General Staff, Land Forces Headquarters and the National 
Security Council concerning Atatürkism and the ‘meaning and scope of the state’, the 
publications of the Higher Institution of Atatürk Culture, Language and History 
(AKDTYK), a state organization established with the 1982 Constitution, as well as the 
presentations delivered during the annual National Sovereignty Symposiums, initiated 
after 1980 in commemoration of April 23rd, the National Sovereignty and Children's 
Day in Turkey. 
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5.4.2. The Political Philosophy of 1982 Constitution and Sovereignty 
 
 
The 1982 Constitution was prepared following the coup d’etat of 1980, by a 
commission headed by the Constitutional Law Professor Orhan Aldıkaçtı, established 
within the Consultative Parliament (Danışma Meclisi), the 40 members of which were 
assigned directly with the decision of the National Security Council (NSC) and 120 
members by the NSC upon the nomination of the Governor's Offices. Its approval took 
place during a period where serious political and administrative prohibitions were in 
place.449  Therefore, the Constitution’s approach towards sovereignty in many ways 
reflects the political philosophy of the military and bureaucrats of the period. In order 
to understand the approach to sovereignty represented in the Constitution, it would be 
suitable to seek answers to three different, yet related questions: (i) What is the source 
of sovereignty? (ii) Who or which institution(s) are given the right to exercise 
sovereignty? (iii) What is the scope of the exercise of sovereignty and what are the 
limits imposed upon it? 
The Preamble and the 6th article of the 1982 Constitution state that ‘Sovereignty 
is vested fully and unconditionally in the nation’. As Bülent Tanör and Necmi 
Yüzbaşıoğlu also underline, the unconditionality mentioned here concerns the source of 
sovereignty.450 It is clearly stated that sovereignty belongs to the Turkish nation, not 
the Turkish citizens or the ‘people’. In general, the understanding of sovereignty in the 
1982 Constitution proves ‘national’ and closely relates to the principle of nationalism, 
envisaging an absolute superiority of the collective will of the nation over the will of 
individuals. As it will be mentioned further on, this approach does not comply with the 
needs of ethnic and cultural pluralism.451 
In terms of the exercise of sovereignty, the 6th article states: “The Turkish Nation 
shall exercise its sovereignty through the authorized organs as prescribed by the 
principles laid down in the Constitution. The right to exercise sovereignty shall not be 
delegated to any individual, group or class. No person or agency shall exercise any state 
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authority which does not emanate from the Constitution.”452 In this article, the first 
point to draw attention to is the fact that the right to exercise Turkish nation’s 
sovereignty is given to several organs. As discussed in the third main chapter of this 
study, the 1921 and 1924 Constitutions have brought together the legislative and 
executive powers under one institution, declaring the Grand National Assembly the sole 
responsible for the exercise of sovereignty. The authority of the Parliament in this 
regard was also superior in the 1961 Constitution, mainly foreseeing a parliamentary 
regime. However, a general evaluation of the articles of 1982 Constitution shows that 
the executive power assumes an increasing leverage in relation to the right to exercise 
sovereignty. Executive branch comes to be strengthened against the legislative and at 
the same time the independence of judiciary also becomes curtailed.453  
The first point to underline here, concerning the executive power, is the 
superiority of the President to the government and the administration in the context of 
this Constitution. The President has gone from the symbolic and non-responsible 
position foreseen in the 1961 Constitution to a position endowed with extraordinary 
powers with the 1982 Constitution.454 This scope of this supreme authority is explained 
under one of the longest articles of the Constitution, Article 104. Although there is no 
need to go into the details of this article, it is important to stress that parliamentary 
legitimacy over the exercise of sovereignty comes to be notably weakened. According 
to Parla, “the erosion of parliamentary legitimacy, which began in 1961, turned into a 
landslide in 1982.”455  
The second important point to be underlined concerning the exercise of 
sovereignty based on the superiority of the executive is the exceptional role given to 
the National Security Council within this branch. Through the 118th Article of the 
Constitution and the Law 2945, the authority to ‘define and implement national 
security’ is granted to the National Security Council. Although the definition of 
‘National Security’ does not exist in the Constitution, the Law 2945, dated 1983 
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concerning the National Security Council and its Secretariat states: “National security 
refers to the protection and safeguarding of state’s constitutional order, its national 
existence, integrity, its political, social, cultural and economic interests as well as 
contractual rights in the international arena against all forms of internal and external 
threat.”456 Evidently, within the broad context of the authority to ‘define and implement 
national security’, the National Security Council assumes significant executive 
functions in Turkey. This also makes it possible for the military bureaucrats, who are 
represented in the NSC outnumbering the civilians, to have a central role in the 
exercise of sovereignty. 
Since the articles concerning the scope of and the limits imposed upon the 
exercise of sovereignty are scattered in the Constitution of 1982, it is possible to 
answer the above-mentioned third question only through a general assessment of the 
Constitution: The 1982 Constitution adopts a much more centralized approach in 
comparison to the 1961 Constitution concerning the scope of the exercise of 
sovereignty. It is also more protective in limiting and sharing the 'nation-state' 
sovereignty with supranational or subnational bodies. One important point to mention 
here is the hierarchy of international and national law determined in the Constitution. 
Unlike some of the European Constitutions including Germany, Italy and Denmark, the 
1982 Constitution does not include a clause stating that sovereignty cannot be 
exercised against the terms of international agreements to which Turkey is a party.   
In terms of the allocation of powers among central and decentralized 
administration, the 1982 Constitution strengthens the central state at the expense of 
regional structures, completely blocking any form of federalism.457 In the cultural area, 
the establishment of the organizations such as the Turkish Radio and Television 
Organization (TRT), the Council of Higher Education (YÖK) and the Higher 
Institution of Atatürk Culture, Language and History (AKDTYK) stand out as the 
examples of the centralist and statist approach of the 1982 Constitution. 
The broad limitations concerning individual rights and freedoms constitute 
another conservative aspect of the 1982 Constitution compared to other constitutions. 
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According to the 1982 Constitution, fundamental rights and freedoms can be restricted 
“with the purpose of protecting the indivisible integration of the state with its country 
and its nation, the national sovereignty, the republic, the national security, the public 
order, general peace, general ethics and general health” (Article 13).  
If we are to summarize what has been discussed so far, ‘Atatürkism’, as it has 
been reconfigured in the 1980s through a renewed emphasis put on its statist, 
nationalist and solidarist aspects, stands out as the official ideology of the 1982 
Constitution. The constitutional approach to sovereignty also reflects this ideology, 
where sovereignty comes to be conceived as an empowering concept mostly in 
connection to the strengthening of the authority of state institutions, rather than 
imposing limits upon and instituting checks and balances among them. This legal 
interpretation of ‘nationalist, statist and solidarist’ sovereignty within the 1982 
Constitution later on comes to be incorporated into the political discourse of the 
Atatürkist bloc, constituting one of its central signifiers. The next section particularly 
deals with the role that the concept of sovereignty plays in relation to the 
internalization, fortification and reinforcement of the political values defended by this 
bloc. 
 
 
5.4.3. Statist/Nationalist Discursive Strategies and Sovereignty  
 
 
To start with, one of the key roles that the concept of ‘national sovereignty’ plays 
within the statist/nationalist discourse relates to the need to bridge the increasingly 
widening representational gap between the ‘nation’ and the ‘state’ during the 1980s. To 
express more clearly, ‘national sovereignty’ emerges as a conducive discursive device 
in the hands of the nationalist/republican elite to ‘remind’ the Turkish public of the 
actual value endowed to ‘public will’ within the Atatürkist ideology. The fact that 
Atatürk has chosen to base his political regime upon the principle of ‘national 
sovereignty’ rather than a ‘personal rule’, as it was the reigning norm at the time, is 
often mentioned as a proof of the support that Atatürk and his followers have given to 
the idea of democracy. In fact at times, Atatürkists take this argument a step further and 
claim that Atatürk’s declaration of the nation as ‘the unconditional sovereign of the 
land’ places Turkey in a unique position among democracies and even makes it “the 
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most advanced democracy” based on the assertion that this ‘unconditional national 
sovereignty’ does not exist elsewhere.458 
This discourse presents national sovereignty as a sacred value, a ‘gift’ of Atatürk 
to the Turkish nation, and underlines that if it were not for the determination and 
persistence of Atatürk, people could never have claimed their sovereignty in Turkey.459 
According to the Atatürkist thought, the idea of national sovereignty is born with 
Atatürk and granted to the Turkish political life by him; and there can be no 
sovereignty outside or beyond his way of thinking:  
   “It is important to perceive and evaluate this principle, which the Turkish 
nation has sincerely adapted and internalized, through Atatürk’s 
understanding. This is because it is this great genius who has brought, 
presented, implemented and established this principle. Mustafa Kemal’s 
approach to national sovereignty proves clear, open to democracy, humane 
and modern.”460   
   “The principle of national sovereignty for the first time has been brought 
and established in Turkish history and the Turkish state structure by Atatürk. 
Making this principle one of the foundations of the National Struggle and 
the State that he established stands out as one of the most important factors 
behind the success of Atatürk.”461  
   “For the last 65 years, the children of this nation have been enlightened, 
raised and matured under the light and the warmth of the national 
sovereignty sun born on April 23rd, 1923. National sovereignty was not born 
with all its conditions at once. This has happened nowhere. It is a tree 
planted by our supreme leader Atatürk. As all trees do, it needs to be taken 
care of, loved and protected. We need to learn our lesson from the fallen 
situation of national sovereignty in nations who have not cared for this 
responsibility no matter how developed they are. This is why Atatürk has 
given the responsibility to protect the republic, one of the most important 
indicators of national sovereignty, to young souls and minds. We must fulfill 
this mission and be worthy of his trust.”462  
While on one hand the discursive utilization of national sovereignty contributes to 
the attempts to re-establish the damaged link between ‘democracy’ and Atatürkism, on 
the other hand, the Atatürkists argue that displaying a clear consciousness of 
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nationhood is the prerequisite for the institution of freedom within democratic regimes. 
According to Turan Feyzioğlu, who is one of the most important representatives of 
‘Right Atatürkism’ (Sağ Atatürkçülük) and also the author of the book Atatürk and 
Nationalism, “the wellbeing and even the existence of democracy comes to be in 
danger when there is a lack of national unity”463 and it is exactly in this perspective that 
the principle of sovereignty becomes an “empowering idea”.464 By underlining the 
“magical, enticing and empowering” role that the principle of national sovereignty 
plays in situations such as the Turkish War of Independence, to Feyzioğlu, sovereignty 
represents the most important political tool for the establishment of ‘national unity’.465 
Henceforth, Feyzioğlu’s arguments represent an example to the strong connection 
built between the concept of sovereignty and nationalism. In this respect, it would be 
first appropriate to draw attention to the fact that sovereignty is always used with the 
preceding adjective ‘national’ within the Atatürkist discourse. As it has been argued in 
the third chapter, there are important historical and theoretical differences between 
‘popular sovereignty’ and ‘national sovereignty’ and given these traditions, the 
inseparable use of the adjective ‘national’ with sovereignty within this discourse indeed 
points to a political preference: In reaction to the increasing public visibility of the 
Kurdish identity, developed during the period in question within the framework of a 
micro-nationalism mirror imaging the Turkish macro-nationalism, the Atatürkist 
discourse identifies the source of sovereignty with the Turkish nation, thereby 
contributing to the determination of the Turkish identity as the unifying supra-identity 
in Turkey.  
In an article where Ahmet Mumcu evaluates the characteristics of sovereignty, he 
first emphasizes the relationship of the concept to ‘nationhood’ and ‘independence’ and 
than examines its association with republicanism and democracy. According to 
Mumcu, “national sovereignty” underlines the following realities: that sovereignty 
belongs to a single nation and that this nation embodies a clear sense of nationhood. In 
light of these realities, Mumcu reaffirms that the nation which possesses sovereignty is 
indeed the Turkish nation.466 Feyzioğlu also claims that the fact that Atatürk used the 
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principle of sovereignty and Turkishness together in the same sentence in the report he 
sent after arriving in Samsun on May 22, 1919, reveals and confirms the inseparable 
connection between the two.467 In a similar fashion, Hamza Eroğlu also positions 
national sovereignty as the best assurance of national unity in his presentation at the 1st 
National Sovereignty Symposium: 
   “Even if it is not the same in other countries, the national sovereignty 
principle has a special value and place in Turkey. First of all, the philosophy 
of the National Struggle depends on national sovereignty. The national 
sovereignty principle has served to sustain national unity and harmony in 
the country, as well as constituting an ideal providing the source of strength 
for the next generations.”468  
         As it can be seen, sovereignty represents a significant discursive tool in terms of 
supporting the notion of ‘national unity and harmony’, the fundamental objective of 
Turkish politics after the 1980s and in this sense it has been closely linked to the values 
of Turkish nationalism. Also during this period, we come to witness the production of a 
firm association between the idea of a ‘strong nation-state’ and national sovereignty, 
based upon the chain of equivalences discursively constructed among the unity of the 
nation, the state, and the homeland: 
   “The Turkish State is based on the union and the integration of the 
Turkish nation with its country, and national sovereignty and full 
independence. This is why the Turkish state is very powerful.”469  
   “Maybe if call sovereignty ‘superior state power’, then its definition can 
become clearer. Yes, sovereignty means the display of superior state power 
in all areas… Sovereignty, before anything else, must stem out of the people 
of that country. If sovereignty comes from the outside, then there is no state, 
there is only a colonial possession. Sovereignty is also unique. As there is 
no power superior to it, there is also no power equal to it.”470  
Through an article in the 1982 Constitution, which does not exist in the 1921, 
1924 and 1961 Constitutions, the establishment of ‘national unity and harmony’ indeed 
becomes defined as a state objective and responsibility.471 As expressed in the 1982 
Constitution, the legal objective of ‘national unity and harmony’ comes to be supported 
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by the ‘complete and indivisible integration of the state with its country and its 
nation’472 and accordingly it comes to be emphasized that state sovereignty, which 
derives its strength from the Turkish nation, can neither be divided nor shared:  
   “The state sovereignty over the country is complete. It is indivisible and 
will not accept any form of participation. This power that is called 
sovereignty exists naturally within the state structure, it has not been given 
by anybody.”473  
Here, it is important to stress this paradoxical relationship: although on one hand, 
the discursive utilization of national sovereignty principle supports the efforts to bring 
Atatürkism closer to people and to the idea of democracy, on the other hand it also 
contributes to the legitimacy of the statist ideology advocated by Atatürkism. In the 
way it is manifested in Turkey, statism carries a meaning beyond a name given to an 
economic development model. According to Ahmet İnsel’s definition, statism 
corresponds to “a holistic political world where all societal dynamics are put under the 
surveillance and control of the state, where all societal developments are evaluated 
through the lens of the state interest, and where no independent societal formation is 
granted an autonomous sphere of legitimacy outside of the state.”474 This 
comprehensive nature of statism in the Turkey is also pointed out by Levent Köker:  
   "The fact that statism goes beyond being a principle of economic policy 
and involves a role of ‘political-ideological surveillance’ show that among 
the objectives of Kemalism in relation to the ultimate level of societal 
development, economic development and the strengthening of the nation-
state assume priority and that democratization as well as the ideal of 
individual freedom occupy a secondary status subject to conjunctural 
cycles.”475  
It is possible to find an example of the above-mentioned holistic approach in an 
article entitled “The Dynamic Ideal of the State in Atatürkism” written by the 
Commander of Land Forces of the time, General Necdet Öztorun and published by the 
Turkish General Staff Headquarters under Atatürkism series. According to Öztorun, the 
‘dynamic ideal of the state’ consists of three sections: (i) ‘moral’ (manevi) objectives 
involving efforts to develop the sense of national unity and national feeling among the 
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Turkish nation, as well as the material objectives of the Turkish nation, (ii) individual 
objectives, and (iii) the development of national culture in order to achieve the 
identified material and moral objectives. In its shortest definition, the dynamic ideal of 
the Turkish state covers all objectives towards the constitution and upholding of 
Turkish nation’s unity.476 In this framework, The Turkish Armed Forces represents the 
‘the basis of the highest state structure’ and it has been given the duty to protect and 
safeguard the Turkish Republic against all internal and external enemies.477  
Within the articles which have internalized this holistic approach to statism, we 
also come across an increasingly state-centric conceptualization of sovereignty. For 
instance, in his book National Sovereignty according to Atatürk, Ahmet Mumcu 
defines sovereignty as a “superior state power” and draws attention to the fact that 
sovereignty fully and unconditionally constitutes the foundation of the Turkish state.478 
Going a step further, Mumcu also claims that the state and national sovereignty 
represent two identical terms in the mind of Mustafa Kemal.479 Atatürk expresses that 
sovereignty naturally exists in the state concept and wisely discards any discussion as 
to the “where and how” sovereignty comes into being.480 As an evidence for Atatürk’s 
state-centric approach towards sovereignty, Mumcu draws attention to the following 
statement taken from Medeni Bilgiler:  
   “It [sovereignty] is such a political power that it already and naturally 
exists in the state concept and the state has the necessary competence to 
exercise it over the people and to protect the nation externally against other 
nations. This political power is called ‘will’ or ‘sovereignty’.”481  
Another example of this emphasis on the state is detected within Atatürkism 
series published by the Turkish General Staff Headquarters, which argues that 
sovereignty belongs to the state, and that the Parliament and the Government stand for 
mere means in the implementation of this sovereignty.482 In fact, the firm linkage 
                                                 
476Necdet Öztorun, “Devletin Dinamik İdeali,” Atatürkçülük (İkinci Kitap): 
Atatürk ve Atatürkçülüğe ilişkin makaleler. Ankara: Genel Kurmay Basımevi, 1983. 
368. 
477Ibid.354-355. 
478Ahmet Mumcu, Atatürk'e göre milli egemenlik, 8. 
479Ibid.13. 
480Ibid.11. 
481Afet İnan, Medeni Bilgiler, 27.  
482Genelkurmay Başkanlığı, Atatürkçülük (Üçüncü Kitap). Atatürkçü Düşünce 
Sistemi,  22. 
 183
between sovereignty and the idea of a strong nation-state is rather an expected 
emphasis for a discourse, in which the state and the nation come to be completely 
identified with one another and thereby conceptualized as inseparable from one 
another. This integration is also reflected in the book entitled The Concept and Scope of 
the State published by the National Security Council. According to this publication, the 
responsibilities of the state and the nation complement each other, and in order to make 
this integration eternal the state is held the primary responsible for the protection of 
internal and external balances. This is why the state undertakes regulatory measures in 
order to “ensure that all real and legal persons, public and private organizations and 
institutions, political units, political parties and the judicial, executive, legislative and 
other representational organs of the state act within the confines of raison d’etre of the 
state and display common consciousness, attitude and behavior towards the attainment 
of national objectives.”483 In order to protect internal balances the state must watch (i) 
political (ii) ethnic and (iii) developmental distances.484 If these internal balances 
cannot be protected from internal and external influences, the disintegration of the state 
cannot be prevented:  
   “A state will live and develop only if it shortens political, ethnic and 
developmental distances in its country by using all of its economic and 
moral potential and prevents their external abuse. A state, which does not or 
cannot do this, is either doomed for extinction or can only exist 
figuratively.”485 
The usage of the concept of ‘national sovereignty’ in relation to its support for the 
foundations of a strong nation-state also finds frequent expression within the anti-
globalization (anti-imperialism) and anti-westernization discourses in Turkey, produced 
mainly by leftist- nationalist Kemalist intellectuals and political activists grouping 
themselves under the label of ‘National Front’ (Ulusalcı Cephe). This front constantly 
keeps the issue of national sovereignty on the public agenda in line with their purpose of 
‘protecting the full independence of national state against the ‘imperialist’ forces’. The 
roots of this intellectual tradition go back to Kadro and Yön magazines; and during the 
1980s and 1990s writers and journalists gathered around Cumhuriyet newspaper such as 
Mümtaz Soysal, İlhan Selçuk, Uğur Mumcu and Atilla İlhan become the leading 
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representatives of this ‘leftist-nationalist’ discourse. The political positioning of this 
group can be summarized along the following lines: 
   “The six arrows of RPP comes to be reinterpreted as a result of the 
political developments of the 1990s and turns into republicanism positioned 
against democracy, nationalism against globalization, the European Union 
and the Kurdish movement, secularism against political Islam, populism 
against ‘rentier class’ (köşe dönmecilik), statism against the free market and 
revolutionism against ‘frozen’ Atatürkism.”486  
At this point, a closer look at the ideas of Attila İlhan, one of the most important 
ideologues of the ‘Nationalist Front’ and a compelling critique of the ‘loss of national 
sovereignty’, may bring light to better deconstructing the relationship between the issue 
of national sovereignty and anti-globalization/anti-westernization discourse. To İlhan, 
globalization equals to ‘imperialist integration’ and thereby he sees it as a “dissolve and 
rule” trap for developing countries.487 According to İlhan, globalization dates back to 
August 2, 1990, when the President of the United States has declared that the ‘new 
world order has begun’.488 In this light, he associates globalization with the exploitation 
of the developing countries through interventions of international organizations and 
multinational corporations. The “globalitarian state”, which İlhan claims to have 
emerged during this period, ultimately aims to bring an end to nation-states and national 
markets.489  
In Turkey, the undermining of the nation state begins with Turgut Özal, through 
the rule of whom the ‘globalitarian state’ is let free to achieve its objective by “making 
us believe that we are becoming more democratic and civil” and by “putting us to sleep 
with privatization and globalization lullabies.”490 In this context, İlhan firmly rejects a 
comparison between Atatürk and Özal, claiming that while the first one is a hero 
advocating full independence, the second one is a “Tanzimat Grand Vizier” propagating 
interdependence with the West.491 İlhan states that the Turkish National Independence 
War, which he defines as the Anatolian Movement, is in fact a war against liberal 
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globalization and in this respect draws a parallelism between the Galiyef movement 
against “Stalinist communist globalization” and Turkish War of Independence.492  
He especially underlines in his article “National Sovereignty and Full 
Independence” that national sovereignty must be defended until the end if Turkey is to 
get rid of its dependent status. To this end, he calls for the revitalization of the spirit of 
National Struggle:  
   “Today, in order for us to be convinced of the fact that the ones claiming 
to defend his [Mustafa Kemal] nationalism is actually doing so, they must 
first and foremost advocate the full ‘independence’ of our country against 
foreigners looking for privileges once again and pursue a perfect 
implementation of the ‘National Sovereignty’ principle.”493  
İlhan’s objective of achieving Turkey’s full independence by the protection of 
‘national sovereignty’ involves a rejection of NATO and the EU, which he defines as 
‘new tools for re-partitioning the areas of influence’ and similarly he deems necessary 
to cut off the involvement of the organizations such as the IMF, the World Bank and the 
OECD in Turkish affairs to re-enforce our national sovereignty over the economy. In 
opposition to all these supranational organizations, İlhan often refers to history, 
particularly to those episodes that relate to the fall of the Ottoman Empire and 
constantly revokes the so-called Sevres Syndrome. He states, in many different 
occasions, that the real objective of this global order, which he shortly calls the ‘system’ 
under the control of the West, is to divide Turkey under the camouflage of 
democratization and human rights.494 According to İlhan, the ‘West’ cannot look at 
“Turkey as a legitimate republic and to Turks as a strong nation coming from the depths 
of history”495 and accordingly seeks the complete surrender of Turkey not only in 
external but also internal politics. In İlhan’s mind, the division or erosion of national 
sovereignty eventually gives way to the “re-preparation of the social and political 
conditions for the execution of the ‘division plan’ foreseen in the Sevres Treaty, and the 
subsequent destruction of the secular and democratic Turkish supra-identity, which has 
been established by the Anatolian people through the Anatolian revolution and reform”.  
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As a solution to all these criticisms, İlhan and his friends propose to re-strengthen 
the Turkish nation-state through a nationalist ideology. The need to come together under 
the banner of the ‘National Front’ is formulated as such: “It is a must for each person 
who wants to live freely in this country to be on the same side. The differences in 
ideologies lose their importance here. Because this is exactly a situation similar to that 
of the War of Independence.”496 It is said that even the extreme nationalists and 
Muslims should be on this side in order to protect the nation-state against globalization, 
‘a reincarnated version of the crusades’. 
The main framework of the solution which the ‘National Front’ offers for 
advocating national sovereignty against global powers involves a ‘national cultural 
struggle’ to be led in parallel to the establishment of a ‘fully independent economy’ and 
a ‘fully independent defense industry’.497 The period to be taken as an example for this 
objective is the ‘nationalist’ period prior to Mustafa Kemal’s death: the ‘National Front’ 
blames his successor İnönü for taking Turkey off the Atatürkist road and despite 
“Atatürk’s opposition to the West” for initiating an alignment process closer to the 
West, the point after which degeneration has begun in Turkey.  
As seen, within the discourse of the ‘National Front’, national sovereignty is 
positioned as the most important, even a sacred value, which is always under threat and 
in need of protection. Actually, whatever notion that the discourse wants to be against, 
‘national sovereignty’ is always perceived and positioned to be under the ‘threat’ posed 
by that notion. An example which can be given at this point is the position the 
nationalist discourse takes against cultural diversity. In line with this continual 
perception of threat, it is held that the ultimate objective of multiculturalism relates to 
the destruction of “national sovereignty”:  
   “A secular and democratic country made up of citizens who are equal in 
the eyes law no matter what ethnic origin they come from, and free, sharing 
a mutual country and culture, who own a mutual history and economy! 
They are naturally nationalist, but there is no racism in their nationalism, it 
is patriotic nationalism, this is why it is also anti-imperialist, meaning that it 
would never accept any kind of infringement upon its authority within its 
own borders coming from other strong states (economies), because 
‘sovereignty is not given, it is taken’, and this is how he did it, he 
strengthened his national democratic revolution with an anti-imperialist war 
of independence. Now, it is this ‘national sovereignty’ which they intend to 
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first weaken and then dissolve under the curtain of ‘tolerance’ and through 
the fallacy of multiculturalism!...”498  
As the foregoing discussion reveals, the West is positioned as the force which 
provokes the breaking up of national identity in Turkey, while multiculturalism is 
perceived as a cover to strengthen the demands of the minorities living in Turkey.499 In 
this perspective, Charles Taylor and ‘Western’ thinkers like him advocating the idea of 
multiculturalism and their Turkish ‘impersonators’ known as ‘liberals, Second 
Republicans and NGOs’ are the heavily criticized political actors, against which the 
discourse of ‘Nationalist Front’ comes to be united. According to the ‘National Front’, 
most of the organizations introduced as NGOs in Turkey, who are also so-called 
‘proponents of democracy’, are actually ‘tools of the western capital’ and work to 
weaken the Turkish Republic. According to İlhan, the Turkish people are put to sleep 
with the ‘story of civil society’, and thereby alienated from politics. This is exactly the 
way in which the political parties, which could be capable of standing against the 
‘system’, are emptied of popular support in Turkey.500 What needs to be done about 
these ‘threats’ increasingly directed against our ‘national sovereignty’ is summarized by 
İlhan in the following passage: 
   “For every Kemalist, it is an indispensable principle that ‘the Turkish 
Republic shall survive forever’. The facts ‘sovereignty unrestrictedly and 
unconditionally belongs to the nation’ and ‘it can by no means divided’ join 
together to constitute an integrity.”501 
 
 
5.5. Second Republican/Democratic Discourse and Sovereignty 
 
 
A new political discourse mainly made up of democratic demands in opposition to 
the nationalist/statist ideology and melted in the same pot by being popularly defined as 
‘Second Republican’ assumes an increasing level of visibility within the Turkish 
political life starting in the late 1980s and continuing throughout the 1990s. Within this 
discourse, the concept of sovereignty also acts as a frequently referred signifier and in 
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most cases constitutes a point of departure for the critique extended towards the 
nationalist/statist discourse. However, prior to delving upon a more detailed analysis on 
the relationship between the ‘democratic discourse’ and sovereignty, it would be 
appropriate to briefly look into the reasons underlying the emergence of such a 
discourse, as well as its political motives and the articulation of differing political 
positions within this so-called Second Republican discourse.  
The utilization, or to put it more appropriately, the re-utilization of the term 
‘Second Republican’ in Turkish politics corresponds to the beginnings of the 1990s, 
when, as Aslandaş explains in his Popüler Siyasi Terimler Sözlüğü, the term becomes 
divorced from its association with the political regime established in the aftermath of 
the 1960 coup and becomes recontextualized within the demands for neo-liberal 
democratization of the post-1980 Turkish polity: Mehmet Altan, one of the pioneers in 
identifying himself as a ‘Second Republican’ and thereby becoming one of the 
producers of this discourse, declares the ultimate objective of Second Republicanism as 
‘to democratize the Republic established in 1923.’ Opinion leaders and writers such as 
Etyen Mahçupyan, Murat Belge, Ali Bayramoğlu, Asaf Savaş Akat, Cengiz Çandar and 
Mehmet Barlas, as well as other figures clustered around magazines and newspapers 
such as Türkiye Günlüğü, Polemik, Yeni Yüzyıl, Sabah can be considered among the 
main actors of this discursive construction.502 Yet, it would not be correct to solely limit 
the actors of the ‘democratic’ discourse with those that defend neo-liberal values. Here, 
it should be underlined that an array of thinkers and figures coming from disparate 
political backgrounds are associated with the so-called ‘Second Republican’ discourse. 
In effect, ‘Second Republicanists’ are mostly assembled in the same ‘front’ by political 
actors standing in opposition to demands for further democratization. In other words, 
rather than distinguishing its own self, in a way, the ‘Second Republican’ discourse 
becomes reified by its antagonistic other due to the perception of a ‘common threat’. In 
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this context, we witness at times the articulation of Islamist demands and at times social 
democratic or socialist demands to this discourse. Therefore, the preference for the label 
‘Second Republican’ in this dissertation should be seen in relation to the lack of a better 
term to collectively identify similar lines of argumentation against the central state, as 
well as the doctrine of sovereignty that it safeguards, and should not be perceived as a 
disregard to the variety of political positions presented within this discourse. 
In a certain way, political demands put forth through the ‘Second Republican’ 
discourse reflect the increasing influence of globalization and postmodernity discourses 
during the last quarter of the 20th century. In an article analyzing the relationship 
between postmodernism and Second Republicanism, Birkan Uysal Sezer draws our 
attention to the similarities between the postmodern critique of central authority and the 
Second Republican questioning of the prevailing political, economic and social system 
in Turkey:   
   “There exists a significant resemblance between the attitudes of 
postmodernism and those of the Second Republic in terms of their points of 
departure; their economic and cultural foundations and perspectives; their 
methods of approach towards the state, the individual and the society; and 
their analyses and prescriptions in general. This resemblance is not a 
coincidence; rather, it originates from the fact that they both seek to form a 
new formulation of culture and politics, or a new ideology in the face of 
changing world conditions.”503  
In effect, the Second Republican discourse in general displays the traces of a 
search to integrate Turkey into the global order and to this end its main themes center 
around the demands to minimize the state, particularly in relation to loosening its tight 
grip over the economy and societal matters, as well making its functioning transparent 
and its officials accountable to public inquiry. At the same time, Second Republican 
discourse refutes a monolithic approach to national identity as envisaged by the 
nationalist/statist elite and instead extends a critique of the Turkish modernity project in 
respect to its close connection to central authority and efforts at homogenization of the 
society.  
One of the main themes of the Second Republican discourse relates to the 
questioning of the exclusive relationship between sovereignty and the Turkish nation-
state in terms of both economic and political relations, given the deepening and the 
widening impact of globalization in Turkey. The actual enactment of ‘popular 
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sovereignty’ first and foremost requires to put an end to the state’s economic 
sovereignty, an act that would also eradicate the economic power of the 
military/bureaucratic elite and thereby giving way to the democratization of the Turkish 
polity. Second Republicans remind us of the fact that one of the underlying motives in 
the creation of concepts such as the nation, the national flag and the patrie following 
the French Revolution relates to the dependence of the French bourgeoisie to the local 
market. In this sense, the demise of the ideal of ‘national economy’ is best 
demonstrated by the unproblematic abandonment of national currency as well as 
national borders in France, the homeland of nationalist symbols, in exchange for a 
deeper integration with the European Union.504 
In this direction, the Second Republican discourse often emphasizes the necessity 
to abandon state control over economic activity and to introduce the idea of 
‘minimal/technical state’ in Turkey. This line of argumentation reveals the close 
association of the Second Republican discourse with neo-liberal currents prevailing at a 
global level during the 1980s and the 1990s, a connection which at the same time 
proves to be its main source of criticism. Second Republicans stand out as the primary 
proponents of globalization shaped by neo-liberal policies in the post-1980 Turkey and 
to this end they extend a compelling critique towards the understanding of ‘indivisible’, 
‘unreserved’ and ‘unconditional’ sovereignty reigning in the Turkish polity. They draw 
public attention to the incompatibility of such an understanding with contemporary 
realities of the global world and underline the fact that it is no longer possible to speak 
of an absolute sovereignty given the rising influence of international and supranational 
institutions over domestic affairs of nation-states. In his book, Türkiye’nin Halleri, 
Murat Belge undertakes a lengthy discussion on the current political and economic 
situation of the global order and concludes that the nation-state is ‘a defunct 
phenomenon’ despite the continual defense of its ideology in Turkey.505 To Belge, this 
resistance to come to terms with the demise of the nation-state also proves responsible 
for the relegation of Turkey to the periphery of the international order. According to 
Belge, the undermining of state’s sovereignty both in the economic and political realms 
turns out to be a positive notion for two related reasons: (i) it weakens the ideological 
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obstacle before the creation of a universal culture of humanity;506 (ii) and it contributes 
to the recognition of the incapability of nation-states’ to overcome global problems by 
themselves and accordingly facilitates a closer integration of countries with 
supranational institutions.507 All this points to the fact that, embracing the universal 
culture of humanity and internalizing the democratic side-effects of globalization can 
only be possible in Turkey by first recognizing the pressing need to reconceptualize and 
recontextualize sovereignty beyond the Turkish nation-state.  
 
 
5.5.1. Democratic vs. Republican Tension in relation to ‘Popular Sovereignty’  
 
The first fundamental criticism extended by the Second Republican discourse to 
the prevalent doctrine of statist/nationalist approach to sovereignty relates to its 
‘democratic deficit’: The Second Republicans argue that since its inception, the Turkish 
Republic disregards people’s sovereignty and in this respect ‘real popular sovereignty’ 
never comes to be exercised in the Turkish polity. With respect to this argumentation, 
the first noteworthy aspect is the preference for the utilization of the term ‘popular 
sovereignty’ in place of ‘national sovereignty’. Second Republicans not only prefer to 
use ‘popular sovereignty’, but at the same they exalt the concept with emotive 
connotations and normatively link it with the ideal of democracy. As it has been 
discussed in the second main chapter of this dissertation, ‘popular sovereignty’ enters 
Turkish political life through the efforts of Young Ottomans with the purpose of 
refuting absolutist dynastic sovereignty and relocating the source of sovereignty in the 
novel concept of Ottoman citizenship. Nevertheless, distancing themselves away from 
the idealization of the Young Ottoman movement within the Islamic discourse, Second 
Republicans take the constitutive period of the Republican regime as their reference 
point in illustrating the never-fulfilled possibility of introducing a genuine form of 
‘popular sovereignty’ in the Turkish polity. Kemalists put an end to dynastic 
sovereignty, however despite the official claims, they never actually grant sovereignty 
to the ‘people’ since the single party regime never endows the public with a real right to 
choose. In this regard, we also observe the ‘mythification’ of the first parliamentary 
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period within the Second Republican discourse in connection to the ‘forever-lost’ 
potential to establish a republican regime based on democratic popular sovereignty. As 
it is often mentioned, the pacification of ‘defenders of popular sovereignty’ in the First 
Turkish Parliament including ‘democracy fighters’ such as Hüseyin Avni Ulaş opens 
the way for the institution of a regime based on single party/single ruler and the 
subsequent establishment of absolute state sovereignty never leaves room for any kind 
of societal initiative to flourish.508 Henceforth, efforts aimed at the introduction and the 
consolidation of the republican regime exclude democracy, as well as an understanding 
of popular sovereignty based on democratic premises:     
   “A republic is defined as ‘a form of government in which sovereignty is 
vested in the people exercised either by direct popular rule or through a 
popularly selected body of representatives’. However, "popular sovereignty" 
cannot be ensured without democracy… When it is not nurtured by 
democracy, republic is reduced to a “political” maneuver in the struggle for 
power. As a matter of fact, in 1923, power was monopolized in the hands of 
the army in general, and of Mustafa Kemal in particular... Had a democratic 
republic been established, then a pluralist regime would have been secured 
and the people would come to attain sovereignty through which they would 
have control over the state … This inadequacy witnessed during the rise of 
our republic is the reason behind the fact that a period of nearly seventy 
years was shaped by a mentality which was far from being democratic.” 509 
In effect, as the Second Republicans themselves declare, their main request 
involves the ‘democratization of the Republic and thereby the actual realization popular 
sovereignty’ in Turkey. They draw attention to the fact that democracy does not find a 
place among the Six Arrows of the Republican regime and in this regard they also 
strongly refute the republican arguments that attempt to associate the principle of 
‘populism’, one of the arrows of the Kemalist ideology, with democracy. As it is often 
held within the Second Republican discourse, the affiliation of these two concepts 
mainly stems from the efforts of the elite “to represent Kemalism as democracy with the 
purpose of holding onto their sovereign position within the Turkish polity prevailing 
since the 1930.”510 In contrast, for the Second Republicans, the republican version of 
‘populism’ emerges as a principle some features of which - such as solidarism and 
corporatism - can indeed be associated with fascism. Within the framework of populist 
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ideology, the principle of national sovereignty based on a homogenous and organic 
national will contradicts with the pluralism envisaged as the gist of a democratic order. 
The argument that the unfolding of Turkish republicanism has been void of democratic 
content and given this lack that the ideal of ‘national sovereignty’ has been a mere 
signifier establishing only a rhetorical link between republicanism and democracy, also 
finds reflection in the following passage of Parla:      
   “Republicanism means anti-monarchism and anti-theocratism, which is 
certainly progressive and progressionist enough. Yet, the scope of Kemalist 
republicanism goes far beyond that. It is a sort of anti-democratic 
republicanism imbued with a system of charismatic chief, a hierarchical – 
both actually and officially – system of sub-chiefs, a single-party rule, state-
controlled elections and national assembly and so on. Traditional political 
institutions and theories of legitimacy (sultanate-caliphate) have now been 
superseded by the rhetoric of national sovereignty which implies the will of 
the chief’s party, which stands out as the guiding figure, and even the 
ultimate arbiter of national sovereignty.”511  
In the interviews with the leading representatives of Second Republicanism 
collected in a book entitled İkinci Cumhuriyet Tartışmaları, we recurrently come across 
the assertion that no natural/innate relationship exists between democracy and 
republicanism and therefore that these two concepts need to be treated separately. The 
examples of Saddam’s Iraq and Hafız Essad’s Syria are brought forth as historical 
evidence illustrating the fact that republican regimes do not necessarily entail a 
democratic order; whereas in contrast, parliamentary monarchies such as the United 
Kingdom, the Netherlands and Belgium represent some of the best-functioning and 
most advanced democracies in the world.512 Accordingly, the contributors of the book 
primarily argue that democracy stands out as the best means to get rid of the 
authoritarian tendencies embedded in republican regimes.   
Second Republicans also claim that within the ‘First Republic’, the real Sovereign 
of the land does not appear to be the Nation as it is claimed, but rather, the bureaucracy 
and the military assume this role.513 According to Altan, in the creation and 
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consolidation of the First Republic, the ‘military will’ replaces ‘popular will’, posing ‘a 
threat to public will similar to that of religious reactionism and territorial separatism.’514 
Murat Belge also constructs a certain parallelism between the constitutive periods of 
Turkish and German nation-state building in relation to the central role played by the 
military in these two countries.515 In this context, the privileged position granted to the 
National Security Council in the execution of sovereignty and the independence of 
Turkish General Staff from the Ministry of Defense represent some noteworthy 
examples to the fact that, within the Turkish polity, the ‘elected’ representatives of the 
public remain in disposition to ‘appointed’ officials of the republican institutions. This 
situation in itself testifies to the lack of democratic culture in Turkish politics.516 Faced 
against this imbalance, “the parliament considered as the kabe of popular 
sovereignty”517 never possesses sovereignty in the Turkish context and in this respect 
the ‘people’ do not embody the actual source of sovereignty in Turkey. 
 
 
5.5.2. Deconstructing the Relationship between National Sovereignty and Turkish  
Nationalism  
 
‘Democrats’ blame the ‘National Front’ not only for developing a discourse of 
‘national sovereignty’ exclusively tied to the idea of the nation-state with the purpose of 
rebuffing any form intervention, but also for using it as a defensive shield against the 
demands for recognition of societal diversity coming mainly from subnational groups in 
search of representation:   
   “This response; that is, the construction of a discourse of state sovereignty 
as the basic criterion for establishing social order upon differences and 
dissensions in social life, and in this sense, the establishment of a 
synchronicity and synonymity relationship between state sovereignty and 
social order, entails the need for the state to treat social demands from the 
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perspective of ‘friend-and-foe’. And within the frame of this attitude, it 
further prioritizes the legal framework maintaining the sovereignty of the 
state before the principle of the rule of law.”518  
What should particularly be stressed about Fuat Keyman’s foregoing assertion is 
that, one of the main functions of sovereignty is perceived to be the upholding of 
antagonisms such as the ‘inside/outside’, ‘we/they’ and ‘friend/enemy. This function 
closely relates to another dimension of the critique put forth by the ‘democratic front’ 
against the prevailing doctrine of sovereignty in Turkey: the support that the concept of 
national sovereignty provides to the foundations of the ideology of Turkish 
nationalism. An analysis of the relationship between Turkish nationalism and 
sovereignty’s functioning as a ‘barrier concept’ is found in Baskın Oran’s book entitled 
Atatürk Milliyetçiliği: Resmi İdeoloji Dışı bir İnceleme. Here, Oran argues that both 
national sovereignty and populism stand out as the key principles supporting the 
legitimacy of Turkish nationalism. According to Oran, during times requiring ‘national 
unity and harmony’ as it was the case during the Turkish War of Independence, 
‘national sovereignty’ emerges as a powerful instrument to mobilize popular support, 
rather than constituting an end in itself: 
   “The aim was a national independent state, and just as a pluralistic 
approach with regard to the regime, ethnic composition, ideology and 
leadership was curtailed and – as shall be seen – abandoned as soon as ends 
were achieved, so was the concept of national sovereignty, which was 
always kept as a symbol but underwent alterations as required by the model 
Mustafa Kemal had in mind. Through a constitutional amendment made 
after the independent nation-state was materialized, the concept of national 
sovereignty came to be synonymous with the elite, and in particular with the 
Gazi himself. While, before the War of Independence, the popular Assembly 
elected Mustafa Kemal, after the independence each and every member 
would be elected by the Gazi himself.”519  
Along the same line, Oran also highlights that the exaltation and the sanctification 
of national sovereignty closely relate to the question of constructing a homogenous 
society. Especially during the Turkish War of Independence, where ensuring the 
support of different ethno-religious groups proves important than ever, Mustafa Kemal 
brings forth the ideal of ‘national sovereignty’ to unite the remaining population in the 
Ottoman lands under the same cause. Oran points to the fact that the exclusive 
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identification of sovereignty with the Turkish nation corresponds to a later period 
following this War.520 According to Oran, the fabrication of Turkish History and 
Language Thesis during the early years of the republican regime should also be seen in 
the context of strengthening the linkage between the identity of the Sovereign nation 
and Turkishness. 521 
While on the one side the Republican elite tries to create ‘horizontal 
homogenization’ with the idea of ‘non-privileged, classless and integrated society’ 
based on the twin principles of national sovereignty and  populism, on the other side, it 
marks the contours of the new identity of this society within Turkish nationalism 
shaped by the positivist and secular nation-state.522 This approach also puts the 
concepts of ‘sovereign nation’ and ‘minorities’ against one another.523 The association 
of nationalism with ‘Turkishness’ rather than ‘patriotism for the homeland’ and the 
related request from different ethnic/cultural groups to declare their loyalty to 
‘Turkishness’ rather than ‘Turkey’ starting with the mid-1920s eventually lead to the 
creation of antagonisms based on the binary opposition of ‘we vs. they’ in the Turkish 
polity.524  
Accordingly, the possibility of instituting a pluralistic and democratic ideal of 
‘popular sovereignty’ in Turkey first and foremost requires a distancing away from the 
current nationalist/statist approach to sovereignty and a subsequent development of a 
new concept of citizenship void of the exclusionist tendencies embedded in the current 
one in effect. In this context, the Second Republican approach to the Kurdish question 
in Turkey does not envisage the creation of a nation-state for every nation,525 but rather 
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to eradicate traces of ethnic nationalism from the nation-states in existence through the 
introduction of a citizenship policy that would embrace multicultural demands:   
   “Once the obligations have been assigned by establishing the notions of 
belonging and participation, it will then be necessary to shift the focus of 
life towards citizenship. This would allow us to attain a transnational 
lifestyle that ensures legal protection at every necessary level. Otherwise, 
we would get stuck in the solutions offered by nationalist problematic, 
which comes up with a seemingly more “radical” or “progressive” discourse 
such as “federation” and “autonomy”, but actually has nothing to do with 
progressivism.”526  
         In fact, Second Republicans argue that the main objective of all ethnic and 
cultural groups living in Turkey should be to support the existence of individuals, who 
could claim that they are simultaneously the citizens of Turkey and the world.527 The 
fact that the Turkish nation-state is not only Sovereign vis-à-vis the society and the 
individual but also that it rejects any form of international surveillance over its 
domestic matters constitutes one of the fundamental obstacles before achieving this 
objective:  
   “Rejecting the legitimacy of any conflict within the society from the very 
beginning, conceiving it as nothing but an abstract form of nationality and 
envisioning a sociality only under its own auspices, the Turkish Republic 
once again displays some aspects of Ottoman patrimonialism in a much 
loyal manner while seeking for absolute hegemony over the society.”528 
As it has been discussed in the previous sections of this chapter, beginning with 
the 1990s ‘individual sovereignty’ comes to be a popular concept within the political 
science literature particularly in relation to the growing influence of human rights 
discourse at the global level. This concept develops mostly in reaction to the 
authoritarian and inward-looking features of nation-state sovereignty. It is primarily 
within the Second Republican/democratic discourse that we find the repercussions of 
the discourse demanding extended individual rights and liberties. An exemplary 
reflection of this trend can again be found in the articles of Murat Belge, particularly 
within the ones concentrating on the exclusion of ethnic and cultural diversity in 
Turkey. According to Belge, as states are deemed sovereign within the international 
order, so should the individuals be declared ‘sovereign’ within the states.529 In a similar 
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fashion, Bülent Tanör and Mithat Sancar also discuss in-depth in their various books 
and articles the problems associated with the continual prioritization of the objective of 
‘the state’s survival’ (devletin bekası) at times over the rule of law and at times over the 
individual sovereignty.530 Here, the main target of criticism again proves to be the 
restrictive political philosophy of the 1982 Constitution:      
   “With its obvious preference in favor of the state, and accordingly with its 
lack of recognition for human rights as a superior structural status, as well 
as with its attempt to abstract human rights from the universal context, the 
Constitution of 1982 revealed that its aim was not to recognize sincerely the 
potential power of human rights. The actual objective of the present 
constitution is to curb, suppress and further neutralize the potential power of 
human rights so that they would never constitute any obstruction to the state 
authority.”531  
 
 
5.5.3 Articulation of Democratic and Islamic Discourses: The Case of Medina 
Contract   
 
While the democratic discourse of the 1990s criticizes the statist/nationalist 
approach to sovereignty from many angles, we nevertheless do not come across serious 
systematic efforts for the deconstruction, the transformation or the replacement of the 
concept of sovereignty within this discourse. Given this lack, the only approach that is 
worth analyzing in this chapter involves the discussions revolving around the Medina 
Contract initially brought forward by the Islamist intellectuals. Before moving on to the 
relations between these deliberations and the transformation of the perceptions of 
sovereignty, a look at the articulatory development between the democratic and Islamic 
discourses in the 1990s would be orderly:  
In reality, the shrinking of the gap between the Islamist and the Democratic 
discourses is closely related to the notions of globalization and postmodernity that have 
impacted the development of Islamism in Turkey after 1980s. On one hand, 
globalization creates the opportunity for the Turkish Islamist movement to move 
beyond national borders and to establish a network with other Islamist movements 
around the world. In return, this opportunity helps Turkish Islamism to adopt a language 
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concentrating on rights, freedoms and democratization, the concepts which have been 
amplified in the global political literature.532 On the other hand, the economic and 
cultural liberalization of Turkey, enhanced mainly by the forces of globalization, also 
provides representational space for the Islamists to create new areas of political 
strength. In other words, the failure of the culture of national developmentalism in 
Turkey also brings forth the dissolution of the relationship between Turkish nationalism 
and Islam. At the same time, the elements of postmodernist discourse associated with 
demands of equal rights for different beliefs and identities, also come to be adopted by 
the Islamists. In fact, according to Haldun Gülalp: “Islamism not only has many aspects 
in common with the postmodern critique of modernity, but also goes further to point to 
the failures of nationalism and modernity, offering an alternative ideology.”533  
At this point, it becomes necessary to take a closer look at the transformation and 
the differentiation taking place within the Islamist groups in the 1990s. As widely 
accepted, after the coup of 12 September 1980, the state has used “Islam as a political 
leverage tool to forge unity, solidarity and stability among the Turkish public, which has 
been politically fragmented and has lost its common good.”534 Consequently, as the 
religious and nationalist ideologies were articulated especially after the 1980s, the 
conservative political outlook labeled as the ‘Turk-Islam synthesis’ has come to 
dominate the period. In one way, the nationalist-conservative discourse that defined the 
orbit of Islamism presenting itself as a victim of colonial politics up until 1960’s535  has 
been reconfigured  and reproduced in a stronger manner in  the 1980s. The political tone 
and the defense of this manner can be found among some of the ranks of the 
Motherland Party in the 1980s and the in the Welfare Party in the 1990s. But it would 
be a mistake to assume Islamism as a monolithic movement in this period: Contrary to 
the proponents of ‘National Outlook’, who were grouped around the Welfare Party in 
the political arena, a group that grew in importance in the cultural and philosophical 
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arenas called the ‘New Muslim Intellectuals’ has carried forward “a new, more pluralist 
brand of Islamism with international concerns and claims”. It is possible to find these 
ideas developed by “Muslim Intellectuals” like Ali Bulaç, Rasim Özdenören, İsmet 
Özel and Abdurrahman Dilipak in publications such as Bilgi ve Hikmet ve Tezkire. It is 
mostly through the efforts of these new ‘Muslim Intellectuals’ that we witness the 
articulation of Islamic and democratic discourses joined together in their demands for 
further democratization and recognition of diversity.   
As mentioned above, the most important suggestions from the Islamists in terms 
of the problematization of the dominant nationalist/statist approach towards sovereignty 
are engendered within the discussions centering around the Medina Contract. In the 5th 
issue (1994) of the Bilgi ve Hikmet magazine titled “What is the formula for living 
together? The Medina Contract”, it is proposed that the principle of participation needs 
to replace the principle of sovereignty in order to create a public modeled on tolerance 
and harmony. In reality, this proposition comes as an important advancement suggesting 
that the current conception of sovereignty has hit its expiration date and that the 
political system in Turkey needs to be redesigned bearing in mind this reality. The 
discussions that started with the Medina Contract in this period can be considered 
‘unique’ in relation to the attempts to construct a pluralist social structure organized 
around novel political principles excluding the overriding concept of sovereignty in 
Turkey.  
In the historical context, the Medina Contract is a document that has been 
conceived to count as a Constitution/Social Contract, prepared under the leadership of 
Prophet Muhammad after his migration to Medina from Mecca. Islamic philosophers 
suggest that the main aim of the document is to establish a common legal ground and 
public structure for all the different religions and cultures that lived together in Medina 
under Hz. Muhammad’s leadership. It is also emphasized that the Medina Contract is a 
‘historical reality’ contrary to the idea of ‘social contract’ which has been developed as 
a utopia/fiction by Rousseau and Locke in the western political thought. (Bulaç, 2004: 
512). The reason behind bringing forward this document into light in the Turkey of 
1990s relates to the attempts to support the claims that since its inception, the Turkish 
Republic has not been based on a ‘social contract’ that adopted a multicultural public 
structure and that it needs a new contract to resolve the crisis of representation and 
legitimacy that the current Republic faces. Ali Bulaç attests the significance of the 
Medina Contract for Islamists with similar words: 
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   “Medina Contract offers a blueprint for a society where all social blocs 
would interact on the basis of participation instead of “sovereignty” …. 
Here we should underline the primary constituent principle to be derived 
from the Document: An ideal project which is righteous, equitable, pays 
respect to law and is designed to ensure true peace and stability among the 
people. All these should come into existence as a contract among various 
(religious, legal, philosophical, political, etc.) groups.”536 
The drafting process of this contract envisages the determination of points of 
consensus with respect to each article as a result of a free process of deliberation, to 
which representatives of each social group contribute. While consensus is a requirement 
for the articles relating to the public/political realms, divergence is relegated to the 
private/civil realms. According to Bulaç, it is only through the application of this 
constitutive method that a ‘unity in diversity’ can be achieved.537 It is also underlined 
that within this context, the Prophet in no way acts as a ‘Sovereign’ (hâkim) but rather 
represents an ‘arbitrator’ (hakem).538 
One other dimension of the discussions centering on Medina Contract involves a 
critique of the ‘indivisibility’ of the current doctrine of sovereignty reigning in Turkish 
politics. The demands of the Islamic groups for the widening and the increased 
protection of private sphere correspond to the decentralist approach outlined in the 
Article 4 and 11 of the Contract: While Medina Contract delegates the administration of 
matters related to defense and judiciary to the central authority, other ‘private’ areas 
such as legislation on culture, science, arts, economy, education and healthcare come to 
under the responsibility of civil and local authorities.539 
The last point worthy of notice here with regards to the Medina Contract is the 
discussion among the Islamic intellectuals about the possibility of instituting a multiple 
juridical code. They defend the position that in plural societies not a single, but a 
multiple systems of law could indeed co-exist and that in case of a conflict among these 
systems, the decision of a supreme court made up of the representatives of each legal 
system could be taken into account.540 This argument can of course be associated with 
                                                 
536Ali Bulaç, “Medine Vesikası ve Yeni Bir Toplum Projesi,” Modern 
Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce: İslamcılık. (İstanbul: İletişim, 2004) 
537Ibid.508. 
538Ibid.509. 
539Ibid.510-11. 
540Ibid.509. 
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the Islamic demands to re-introduce Islamic law to the Turkish polity foreseen to 
function in ‘civil’ areas parallel to the secular Turkish legal code. 
Finally, it should be underlined that the discussion initiated by the revocation of 
Medina Contract does not confine to the limits of Islamic groups, but rather its 
repercussions can also be traced in ‘leftist’ publications such as Birikim, as well as the 
newspapers of the period. While it is an ongoing discussion whether or not all the 
above-mentioned aspects find correspondence in the historical document of Medina 
Contract itself, nevertheless, what proves particularly important for the purposes of this 
dissertation is the fact that both democratic and Islamic demands articulate in the same 
discourse developed against the prevailing doctrine of sovereignty in Turkey, and that a 
new discursive debate in connection to the incorporation of multicultural and pluralistic 
demands marks the political scene during the 1990s. 
 
 
 
5.6. Conclusion 
 
 
 
In sum, the following conclusions can be reached based on the foregoing analysis: 
(i) In response to the weakening of the authoritative monopoly of the nation-state due to 
a growing determination of economic, political and cultural relations within the ongoing 
interaction between the global/national/local networks during the 1980s and the 1990s, 
the doctrine of national sovereignty comes to be discursively instrumentalized by the 
nationalist/statist political forces and constitutes the nodal point of their defensive 
discourse. (ii) Accordingly for the nationalist/statist bloc, and within the context of a 
reconfigured Atatürkism of the post-1980 Turkey standing right at the intersection point 
of the ideologies of nationalism and etatism, sovereignty represents an empowering 
concept, the utilization of which contributes to the efforts to reinvigorate the geist of 
‘national unity and harmony’ necessary for upholding raison d’etat and to this end 
strengthening the notions of both the nation and the state. (iii) Within this framework, 
the ideal of ‘national sovereignty’ turns into an ‘empty-signifier’ rhetorically and 
discursively put to use to conceal the growing rupture between the political values and 
identity related demands of the rising numbers of ethnic/cultural/ideological groups in 
Turkey and the ‘nationalist/statist front’ safeguarding the republican regime. 
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In return, the ‘democratic discourse’ produced mainly in opposition to the 
nationalist/statist position and which assumes higher levels of public visibility and 
political influence during the 1990s, criticizes this prevailing and predominant 
understanding of sovereignty mainly in relation to three overriding aspects: (i) Since its 
inception, the Turkish Republic lacks a democratic core and therefore in Turkey 
‘popular sovereignty’ never exists in actuality; (ii) faced against the contemporary 
reality of globalization and fragmentation and as a result of related supranational and 
subnational pressures, it is no longer possible to uphold a doctrine of ‘indivisible’, 
‘unreserved’ and ‘unconditional’ sovereignty conceived in exclusive relationship to the 
Turkish nation-state; (iii) in resistance to de facto undermining of the nation-state, 
sovereignty emerges as a discursive device functioning primarily to strengthen the 
foundations of Turkish nationalism and thereby contributing to the attempts to exclude 
social heterogeneity and associated rights and freedoms from the public realm. While 
the critique extended by the ‘democratic discourse’ towards the nationalist/statist 
instrumentalization of sovereignty proves significant in terms of deconstructing the 
chain of equivalences constructed between the state, authority and legitimacy, 
nevertheless within this discourse there is a lack of a serious undertaking in connection 
to a transformation or reconfiguration of sovereignty to respond to growing 
supranational and subnational demands. In fact similar to the statist/nationalist 
discourse, the approach of the democratic discourse of the 1990s to the question of 
sovereignty proves retrospective rather than progressive: The traces of this retrospective 
approach can be followed in the exaltation of the ideal of ‘popular sovereignty’ and in 
this respect the ‘mythification’ of the First Parliamentary period, as well as the seeking 
of the foundations of a new conceptualization of sovereignty within the Islamic history.   
The need for radically recasting and reconfiguring the prevailing doctrine of 
statist/nationalist sovereignty in the Turkish polity reappears, and this time more 
forcefully, on the public agenda in the 2000s, during Turkey’s accession process into 
the European Union. The analysis of the production of corresponding discursive tactics 
and maneuvers centering on the concept of sovereignty within the two competing 
discourses positioned along the antagonistic camps of ‘Europhile democratic coalition’ 
vs. ‘Euroskeptic nationalist/republican coalition’ will be taken up in the chapter to 
follow.     
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6.  TRANSFORMATION: EUROPEANIZATION OF TURKEY AND THE 
POLITICAL DISCOURSE ON SOVEREIGNTY  
 
 
 
6.1. Introduction 
 
 
 
Turkey and the European Union have more than a 45-year-old contractual 
relationship, which was provided with a clear road map on December 1999 when 
Turkey was finally recognized as an official candidate for accession at the Helsinki 
European Council. The granting of candidate status to Turkey was linked to the 
expectation that the Turkish government would undertake a number of significant 
reforms to meet the Copenhagen criteria for EU membership. These accession criteria 
that were laid down at the 1993 Copenhagen European Council states:   
   “Membership requires that candidate country has achieved stability of 
institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and 
respect for and, protection of minorities, the existence of a functioning 
market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure 
and market forces within the Union. Membership presupposes the 
candidate's ability to take on the obligations of membership including 
adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union.”541 
To the fulfillment of the Copenhagen political criteria, the Turkish parliament 
adopted far-reaching amendments to the Turkish Constitution and enacted a number of 
significant legislative ‘harmonization packages’ throughout 2001 and 2004 with an end 
result that the European Council decided to open accession negotiations with Turkey in 
December 2004. The formal accession negotiations were finally launched on 3 October 
2005. It is now over two years that Turkey and the EU have been sitting at the 
negotiation table, yet, while the talks are progressing at a technical level, the political 
                                                 
541European Commission, Directorate General for Enlargement,  “http://ec.europa. 
eu/enlargement/enlargement_process/accession_process/criteria/index_en.htm” (accessed 
on 24.02.2007) 
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relations between the two partners have soured over a number of critical issues and the 
progression of accession negotiations came close to a stalemate.  
Set against this background, this chapter aims to analyze the impact of Turkey’s 
European Union accession prospects and the accompanying ‘democratization’ process 
on the polarization of the public space and the articulation of dispersed political 
positions along two antagonistic discourses: a pro-EU ‘democratic coalition’ advocating 
‘full membership’ vs. a Euroskeptic ‘republican/nationalist coalition’ defending ‘full 
independence.’ It is argued that within the discursive battle among these opposing 
camps, the concept of sovereignty functions as an empty-signifier that, given the 
impossibility of fullness either in terms of independence or membership, sustains the 
legitimacy of these continual, yet contradictory ideals. 
In order to do this, the chapter starts out by a discussion of the dynamics of 
Turkey’s ‘Europeanization’ and ‘democratization’ process during the 2000s. This 
section shows that Turkey’s European integration instigates its own dialectical process 
of reform and resistance, where traditional binary oppositions determining the course of 
Turkish political life such as left/right, progressive/reactive, liberal/conservative 
gradually dissolve. At the same time, ‘Europeanization’ blurs the distinction between 
the outside/inside and thereby going beyond being a matter of international relations, it 
brings forth a critical questioning of the domestic political system in place, which 
inevitably involves the problematization of the prevailing doctrine of sovereignty.     
In order to elucidate the reasoning and motives behind the discursive 
instrumentalization of the concept of sovereignty during the process in question, the 
third and final section undertakes an analysis of the opposing discourses developed by 
two antagonistic camps, namely the so-called ‘Europhile democratic’ coalition vs. 
‘Euroskeptic republican’ coalition centering around the two distinctive, yet related 
‘sovereignty battles’. The first ‘battle’ relates to the question whether or not it would be 
possible, or desirable, to maintain the unconditional and unitary understanding of 
sovereignty in the Turkish polity given the prospects of EU membership. This debate 
leads to a dichotomically divided political space among the advocates of ‘full 
independence’ arguing that the EU integration means an ‘end’ to or ‘loss’ of national 
sovereignty vs. the advocates of ‘full membership,’ defending ‘pooling of sovereignty’ 
to the EU in return for further democratization and global integration of Turkey.  
Spinning off from this discursive debate, the second ‘battle’ concentrates on the 
‘heart of the matter:’ the ongoing conflict over the legitimate source and location of 
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sovereignty in the Turkish polity. Thereby, the resilient conflict between ‘public will’ 
vs. ‘raison d’etat’ also becomes articulated to the discursive chain of equivalences 
created to sustain the basis of two antagonistic discourses marking the boundaries of 
political polarization of the post-2000 Turkey. Here, we once again come across the 
discursive manipulation of the concept of sovereignty, this time through the attempts to 
either erode or defend the legitimacy of the current balance of power in Turkish politics 
between the ‘elected’/’democratic’ vs. ‘appointed’/‘republican’ institutions.   
 
 
6.2. ‘Europeanization’ of Turkey and the Question of Sovereignty 
 
 
The European accession process distorts the conventional boundaries between the 
‘inside’ and the ‘outside’ and simultaneously facilitates economic and political 
convergence between the European Union and the state aspiring to become a member. 
Often, as it has been the case with the previous waves of enlargement, this convergence 
accompanies a process of democratization and thereby requires a significant structural 
transformation with regards to the dynamics of nation-state politics. Based on Kevin 
Featherstone and Giorgios Kazamias’s analysis, Kıvanç Ulusoy identifies six ways in 
which the political structure in the member and candidate states transforms during the 
course of European integration: “(i) a process of institutional adaptation within 
government in relation to the coordination of EU policy and strategy; (ii) a process of 
transformation in the structural power of domestic actors – executive  and technocrats, 
sub-national actors and institutions and the strengthening of civil society; (iii) an 
adjustment of the domestic macroeconomic policy regime, affecting state-economy 
relations; an issue of exerting a new dynamic within the domestic party system; (iv) a 
pressure to redefine national identity; (v) a strategic tool in the pursuit of foreign policy 
interests.”542  
                                                 
542Kıvanç Ulusoy, “The Challenge of European Governance to Turkşsh Politics 
and Political Structure” Towards Accession Negotiations: Turkey’s Domestic and 
Foreign Policy Challenges Ahead. Proceedings from the Third Annual EU-Turkey 
Conference, Siena, 20-21 October, 2003, eds. Natalia Tocci and Ahmet Evin. (Florence, 
Italy: Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, 2004), 35. [Roman numbers are 
my addition] 
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Thus, in all these aspects, the course of ‘Europeanization’ initiates a debate in the 
accession country that goes beyond the question of international relations and entails a 
critical questioning of the domestic political system in place, which inevitably involves 
the concept of sovereignty. In Turkey too, the European integration has been linked to a 
challenge posed to the nation-state, both in terms of coping with an ongoing ‘pooling of 
sovereignty’ away from the central state to supranational institutions of the European 
Union, as well as a parallel necessity for the ‘devolution of sovereignty’ towards 
regional and local administrative units.543 At the same time, the democratization process 
accompanying Turkey’s integration into the EU has also contributed to the 
strengthening of civil society as well as political pluralism, gradually leading to a 
reallocation of authority from the ‘center’ to the ‘periphery,’ and thereby opening the 
way to the reconfiguration of the two traditionally antagonistic poles of the Turkish 
political system as famously theorized by Şerif Mardin.544  
As a result, following 1999, the Turkish political discourse has been colonized by 
two broad coalitions ‘the Europhiles’ vs. ‘the Euroskeptics’, positioning themselves in 
relation to their approach towards the issue of European Union membership and its 
associated requirement of ‘democratization’. Before charting out the discursive 
strategies employed by these ‘coalitions’ in defense of their political positions and 
presenting an analysis of the different functions that the concept of sovereignty assume 
in this regard, it is first necessary to remind us a little more in detail the context that has 
lead to the division of Turkish political space among these two contrary discourses: 
As it has been mentioned in the introduction of this chapter, the recognition of 
Turkey as an official candidate for accession to the EU in 1999 constituted a turning 
point in the long-lasting relationship between Turkey and the EU. In return, Turkish 
government prepared and approved a ‘National Program’ in March 2001, which spelled 
out a road map for the harmonization of Turkish law and regulations with those of the 
EU, including a program for aligning with the Copenhagen political criteria. This 
impetus to reform materialized in a consecutive series of significant constitutional 
                                                 
543Ziya Öniş, “Domestic politics, international norms and challenges to the state: 
Turkey-EU relations in the post-helsinki era,” in Turkey and the European Union: 
domestic politics, economic integration, and international dynamics, Eds. Ali Çarkoğlu 
and Barry Rubin, (London and Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2003), 11 
544 Şerif Mardin, “Türk Siyasasini Açıklayabilecek Merkez-Çevre İlişkileri,” Dün 
ve Bugün Felsefe 1, (İstanbul: BFS Yayınları, 1985), 167-195 
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amendments and legislative changes (the so-called ‘harmonization packages’). The first 
wave of major constitutional amendments (2001), three ‘harmonization packages,’ as 
well as a new Turkish Civil Code were adopted by the ruling three-party coalition of the 
center-left Democratic Left Party (DSP), the center-right Motherland Party (ANAP) and 
the nationalist-right Nationalist Action Party (NAP) between 2001 and 2002. The 
outcome of these extensive constitutional and legislative reforms included the easing of 
general restrictions on fundamental rights and liberties (such fundamental freedoms as 
the freedom of expression and dissemination of thought, freedom of the press and 
freedom of association), the lifting of death penalty in peace time, the amending of the 
structure of National Security Council (NSC); the elimination of a provisional article 
entailing a prohibition on the judicial review of the legislative acts of the NSC regime 
between 1980 and 1983, making it more difficult for the closure of political parties, the 
shortening of pre-trial detention periods, the introduction of new measures for the 
prevention of torture and finally allowing to broadcast in languages and dialects other 
Turkish.545  
The second wave of reforms came after conservative/Islamic-right Justice and 
Development Party (JDP) won the parliamentary elections of November 2002 with over 
a third of vote (34.3%) and formed a single-party government with 363 seats in the 
Parliament. The only opposition party that managed to receive votes above the national 
threshold of 10% was the Republican’s People’s Party (CHP), which obtained 178 seats 
with 19.4 % of the vote. Given the prospects of launching formal accession negotiations 
with the EU, the new majority government adopted five major ‘packages’ of political 
reform in 2003 and 2004,546 another series of constitutional amendments (May 2004), as 
well as a new Penal Code (2005) and a new Law (2004) and Directive (2005) on 
                                                 
545Serap Yazıcı, “The impact of the EU on the liberalization and democratization 
process in Turkey,” in Turkey and the EU Enlargement, eds. Richard Griffiths and 
Durmuş Özdemir, (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2004), 95-95; -  
(William Hale, “Human Rights, the European Union and the Turkish Accession 
Process,” in Turkey and the European Union: domestic politics, economic integration, 
and international dynamics, eds. Ali Çarkoğlu and Barry Rubin (London and Portland, 
OR: Frank Cass, 2004), 109;  European Commission, The Regular on Turkey’s Progress 
Towards Accession, Brussels, 2002; and European Commission, The Regular on 
Turkey’s Progress Towards Accession, Brussels, 2003. 
546 These were enacted in January 2003 in Act No. 4778 (the fourth package), in 
February in Act No. 4793 (the fifth), in July in Act No. 4928 (the sixth), and in August 
in Act No. 4963 (the seventh), European Commission, Regular Report on Turkey’ 
Progress Towards Accession, Brussels, 2003, 23 
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Associations. These reforms introduced critical measures to align relations between 
civil and military authorities in Turkey, including fundamental changes to the duties, 
functioning and composition of the National Security Council, enhancing the 
transparency of defense expenditures and limiting the jurisdiction area of Military 
Courts. At the same time, the new measures further strengthened the fight against 
torture, broadened the scope of fundamental freedoms, enshrined the primacy of 
international and European human rights conventions over domestic law in the 
Constitution, abolished State Security Courts and improved cultural rights for religious 
and ethnic groups in Turkey.547  
As a result, in 2004, the Regular Report on Turkey’s Progress Towards Accession 
prepared by the European Commission concluded that “the reform process has clearly 
addressed major issues and, importantly, highlighted a growing consensus in favor of 
liberal democracy.”548 Accordingly, the European Council decided, “on the basis of a 
report and recommendation from the Commission, that Turkey sufficiently fulfils the 
Copenhagen political criteria,” and thereby the accession negotiations were finally 
launched in October 2005.  
While these sweeping constitutional and legislative changes opened Turkey’s way 
towards the European Union accession, the reform movement also engendered major 
opposition from the republican and nationalist political groups, voiced mainly through 
the opposition parties in the Parliament, notably the Nationalist Action Party (between 
1999 and 2002 and again after 2007) and the Republican People’s Party (since 2002). 
Thus, ‘Europeanization,’ has engendered a process of reform and resistance, where 
traditional binary oppositions determining the course of Turkish political life such as 
left/right, progressive/reactive, liberal/conservative have blurred. In a way, rather than 
being an end in itself, the European accession process has been instrumentalized as a 
mean to find answers to Turkey’s overarching political challenges.  
As discussed in the introduction of this study, from the perspective of discourse 
theory, a project employing the logic of equivalence “seeks to divide social space by 
                                                 
547European Commission, Regular Report on Turkey’ Progress Towards 
Accession, 2003 and European Commission, Regular Report on Turkey’ Progress 
Towards Accession, 2004. 
548European Commission, Regular Report on Turkey’ Progress Towards 
Accession, 2004, 15. 
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condensing meanings in two antagonistic poles;”549 in other words, the logic of 
equivalence “functions by splitting a system of differences and instituting a political 
frontier between the two opposed camps.”550 And in so doing, it produces and makes 
use of empty-signifiers, necessary for organizing societies on the basis of ideals that are 
indeed unattainable due the lack of social closure. Thus, in a similar fashion, the project 
of Turkey’s ‘Europeanization’ and the ‘democratization’ process it stipulates instigated 
a discursive battle, which has polarized public space and articulated a number of 
dispersed political positions along two antagonistic poles: a pro-EU ‘democratic 
coalition’ advocating ‘full membership’ vs. a Euroskeptic ‘republican/nationalist 
coalition’ defending ‘full independence.’ Within this discursive battle, the concept of 
sovereignty has functioned as an empty-signifier, maintaining the legitimacy of these 
ongoing, yet contradictory ideals, despite the impossibility of fullness either in terms of 
independence or membership.  
Prior to going into the dynamics of this discursive debate centering around the 
concept of sovereignty during the integration process between the EU and Turkey 
throughout early 2000s, it is first necessary to identify its major actors and their 
underlying motives: As explained, Turkey’s European integration process has been a 
catalyst for reshuffling traditional coalitions and the so-called ‘blocs’ in Turkey and for 
bringing other-wise politically disparate groups together either in their discursive 
support for or opposition to the democratization momentum achieved in Turkey with 
the push of European Union membership prospect.  
The first and the so-called Europhile ‘democratic coalition’ has been 
predominantly made up of groups in search of the demise of the state’s overwhelming 
and hegemonic authority over society and individuals. To this end, this coalition views 
Turkey’s potential membership to the EU as a critical process for ensuring the effective 
implementation of the rule of law, the respect for and protection of minorities and 
human rights, as well as for putting in place a well-functioning ‘civilian’ political order 
in Turkey. Particularly Islamic and Kurdish political movements, liberals, social 
democrats and the majority of Turkey’s business community (mostly represented under 
the banner of TÜSİAD) fall under this category.  
                                                 
549Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: 
Towards a Radical Democratic Politics, 110. 
550David Howarth, Aletta J. Norval, and Yannis Stavrakakis, Discourse theory and 
political analysis: Identities, hegemonies and social change, 11. 
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Here it is important also to note that the EU integration process has not only 
engendered new alliances in Turkey, but has also destabilized the existing ones, the 
Islamic bloc being the most noteworthy example. The establishment of Justice and 
Development Party (JDP) in 2001, as an offshoot of the Islamic parties under the 
leadership of Necmettin Erbakan, also meant a certain break away from the 
nationalist/inward-looking strand of Islamic politics.551 In contrast to the ‘Nationalist 
Outlook’ (Milli Görüş) line of Erbakan, advocating ‘national developmentalism’ and 
‘Union of Islamic Countries against the West” propagated under his project of 
establishing a ‘Just Order’ in Turkey,552 JDP adopted the language of liberal 
internationalism, supporting enhanced global engagement of Turkey both at political 
and economic levels.553 At the same time, while the stances of the left and center-right 
parties remained ambiguous with regards to the EU accession process-instigated 
democratization momentum in Turkey, JDP presented itself as the new ‘champion’ of 
democratic and pluralistic movement. Yılmaz links the success of the party to its ability 
to amalgamate various themes of appeal to politically eclectic groups under the same 
discourse:   
   “As far as the political accomplishments of the AKP are concerned, the 
most striking among these would be that it allowed such a great diversity of 
approaches to be expressed in such an empathic manner of encoding. This 
points to the fact that the AKP has established a substantial hegemony over 
Turkish politics at the grassroots as well as academic levels. The primary 
reason behind this hegemony was not what the AKP has done, but rather, 
the fact that it has managed to articulate contrasting discourses in an 
ambiguous and eclectic manner in itself. It has further succeeded in 
mobilizing the support of many different circles through its various 
approaches: The support of those who traditionally endorse foreign 
intervention to improve the conditions at home through its approach 
towards issues such as Cyprus and the EU; of all mainstream parties – 
whether rightist, liberal, conservative or social democrat – thanks to its 
economic policies, and of more radical circles such as Islamists and leftists 
through its discourse on human rights and freedoms.”554  
                                                 
551 M. Emin Yaşar, “İskenderpaşa Cemaati,” Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce: 
İslamcılık. (İstanbul: İletişim, 2004), 338. 
552Ruşen Çakır, “Milli Görüş Hareketi,” Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce: 
İslamcılık. (İstanbul: İletişim, 2004), 557-568. 
553Nuh Yılmaz, “İslamcılık, AKP, Siyaset,” Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce: 
İslamcılık. (İstanbul: İletişim, 2004), 610-611; Ruşen Çakır, “Milli Görüş Hareketi,” 
573. 
554Nuh Yılmaz, “İslamcılık, AKP, Siyaset,” 614. 
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While trying to distance itself away from a close, and in a way politically more 
restrictive, association with the Islamic movement and thereby extending its area of 
political maneuver, JDP introduced a new terminology to Turkish political life by 
defining itself as a ‘conservative-democrat’ mass party.555 This novel combination tries 
to bring together traditionalism/conventionalism556 in respect to social and cultural 
issues with a ‘democratic’ outlook underlining the significance of strengthening civil 
society and politics, respecting diversity, extending freedoms and locating the 
‘individual’ at the center of politics.557 Or in other words, while the emphasis on 
conservatism links JDP to the Muslim Weltanschauung, the ‘democrat’ suffix associates 
the political project of the JDP with the objective of transforming the ‘authoritarian’ 
underpinnings of the Kemalist state. At the same time, this ‘conservative-democrat’ 
ideology declares its support for economic liberalism558 and global integration, as long 
as that integration does not destroy local cultures.559 
Thus, during the 2000s, ‘globalized conservatives’560 joined under the banner of 
JDP have positioned themselves as one of the leading proponents of the parallel 
                                                 
555In a conference entitled “Uluslararası Muhafazakarlık ve Demokrasi 
Sempozyumu” organized by Society of Liberal Thought in 2004, Prime Minister 
Erdoğan delivered a speech describing JDP as a party, which embraces a political 
position combining the concepts of conservatism and democracy. This speech was 
utilized as a prologue to Conservative Democracy booklet, prepared by Yalçın 
Akdoğan, the political advisor to the Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and a 
columnist at Yeni Şafak daily newspaper. This booklet has been labeled as the 
‘summary ideology’ of the Justice and Development Party and can be reached at JDP’s 
official website: www.akp.org.tr. In this booklet, Akdoğan explains the motives of JDP 
for associating itself with ‘conservative-democracy’ under four headings: “(i) To 
normalize politics; (ii) To reposition politics within a realistic framework; (iii) To create 
a unique conservative party; (iv) To produce and conduct an encompassing strategy of 
politics (kuşatıcı bir siyaset tarzı üretmek)” (Yalçın Akdoğan, Muhafazakar 
Demokrasi,11-12). 
556 In his book Türk Sağı ve AKP, Hasan Bülent Kahraman argues that the political 
position of JDP cannot be labelled with the term ‘conservatism’ in the sense of the 
Western context, since JDP and its leadership does not possess the necessary ideological 
formation in this regard. Instead, Kahraman offers to think JDP’s position within the 
line of ‘traditionalism’ or ‘conventionalism’. Please see  Hasan Bülent Kahraman, Türk 
Sağı ve AKP. (İstanbul: Agora, 2007), 146-151. 
557Yalçın Akdoğan, Muhafazakar Demokrasi. Retrieved 10.15.2007 from 
http://www. akparti.org.tr/muhafazakar.doc 
558Ibid.17-19. 
559Ibid.4. 
560Ruşen Çakır, “Milli Görüş Hareketi,”575. 
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processes of ‘Europeanization’ and ‘democratization’ in Turkey. And in this respect, 
one of the most remarkable developments of the post-2000 Turkey has been a rather 
unprecedented and odd articulation of ‘Islamic,’ ‘democratic,’ ‘liberal,’ and 
‘conservative’ approaches to politics against the discourse of, what Ziya Öniş calls, 
‘defensive nationalists’. 
This opposing ‘defensive nationalist’ Euroskeptic (and at times ‘Eurorejectionist') 
coalition consists of the nationalist groups and the republican elite, mainly united in 
their reluctance “to relinquish their ‘sovereignty’ over key areas of policy that would 
directly undermine their privileged positions or interests.”561 As far as the republican 
elite is concerned, during the post-2000 period, its position vis-à-vis the Turkish 
integration into the EU gradually shifts from advocacy towards a ‘conditional support’, 
and the reasoning behind this transformation is best expressed in the following passage 
by Çağlar Keyder:   
   “When the European Union recognized the candidate status of Turkey in 
the Helsinki Summit held in December 1999, the state elite and politicians 
in Ankara were utterly astounded. Such an obvious possibility of 
transferring sovereignty could be reckoned as equivalent to admitting the 
fact that the era of national independence and the top-to-bottom process of 
nation-building was now over, and that there was no need for the 
unquestionable role of the state in social engineering anymore…. The state 
elite had led itself to an impasse. As soon as they discovered the situation 
they were in, they began to go through the possible problems that could 
arise during the accession process to the European Union. Consequently, the 
army in particular but also the members of the bureaucracy and the judiciary 
revealed their dissenting stances for the first time. Once it was understood 
that there could be no bargaining upon the Copenhagen criteria, various 
comments were made on why the Turkish state would not be able to 
implement these… The main issue was, of course, revolving around whether 
the Turkish society and its political elite were willing to relinquish the 
nation state.”562 
Faced against the above-outlined context, the following part analyzes the ‘battle’ 
between the ‘Europhile democratic’ vs. ‘Euroskeptic republican’ coalitions, a 
discursively constructed antagonism marking the boundaries of polarization in the post-
2000 Turkish politics, in order to understand how the main actors of each discourse 
strategically attempt to utilize the concept of sovereignty in defense of their respective 
political ideals:  
                                                 
561Ziya Öniş, “Domestic politics, international norms and challenges to the state: 
Turkey-EU relations in the post-helsinki era,” 10-11. 
562Çağlar Keyder, Memalik-I Osmaniye’den Avrupa Birliği’ne, 236-237. 
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6.3. ‘Europhile Democratic’ vs. ‘Euroskeptic Republican’ Discourses  
 
 
For the reasons discussed above, Turkey’s journey into the European Union 
during the 2000s needs to be conceived as a process that not only instigated a debate 
over the possibility of ‘sharing sovereignty’ with or ‘pooling sovereignty’ to a 
supranational institution (in this case the EU) through overlapping dynamics of 
multilevel governance, but going beyond that, as a process that have shaken the very 
foundations underlying the current doctrine of sovereignty upon which the Turkish 
political system has been built. In this respect, it should be stressed that the reshuffling 
of traditional power hubs as a consequence of the reform process of the post-2000 
period has first and foremost contributed to the exposition of the ongoing conflict over 
the legitimate source and location of sovereignty in Turkish politics. However, prior to 
discussing the ‘real heart of the matter’, we will first concentrate our analysis on the 
discursive instrumentalization of the concept of sovereignty within the first and in a way 
‘external’ dimension of the debate centering on the question whether or not it would be 
possible or desirable to ‘share sovereignty’ with or ‘pool sovereignty’ to the European 
Union, given the current understanding of sovereignty in Turkey as ‘unconditional’ and 
‘indivisible’. Here, on the one side, we witness the articulation of the ‘conservative-
democratic’ and the ‘liberal-democratic’ arguments in a single discourse in underlining 
the necessity for a renewed understanding of sovereignty in Turkey to respond to the 
democratization of political life as a result of ‘Europeanization’ (foreseen through both 
participation in the EU’s supranational governance structures and strengthening of 
subnational administrative units). On the other side, the ‘nationalist/republican bloc’ 
associates the EU accession process with an end to ‘Turkish national sovereignty’ and 
therefore a loss of ‘full independence’, demolishing the twin ideals sustaining the raison 
d’etre of Kemalist Republican regime. Presented below is a more detailed analysis of 
the discursive dynamics surrounding this ‘sovereignty battle’: 
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6.3.1. ‘Sovereignty Battle’ I: ‘Full Membership’ vs. ‘Full Independence’ 
 
 
During the period in question, the leadership cadres of the Nationalist Action 
Party (NAP), a coalition member in the three-party 57th Government in effect between 
May 1999 and November 2002 and an opposition party in the current Parliament (23rd), 
stand out as one of the leading political ‘spokesmen’ of the Euroskeptic view563 in 
relation to the perceived threat of European Union membership to Turkish national 
sovereignty. In understanding the scope of the discursive strategies employed by NAP 
to highlight the potential ‘dangers’ of EU membership on the Turkish conceptualization 
of ‘absolute and unconditional sovereignty,’ it is useful to look a little closer at various 
speeches delivered and articles written by the party leadership:564  
To start with, NAP concentrates its Euroskeptic discourse on the antagonistic 
relationship that it builds between the protection of Turkey’s national interests and the 
country’s projected road to integration with Europe. NAP describes the ongoing process 
as a “one-sided imprisonment” and instead calls for “a partnership based on fairness and 
integrity” between the EU and Turkey.565  For NAP, given its historical background and 
social structure, Turkey constitutes a ‘unique case’ displaying a number of critical and 
‘non-transgressable’ national sensitivities and in this respect the party blames the EU 
for intentionally overlooking and at times provoking these points of rupture. While on 
                                                 
563Among the significant secondary sources, which point to NAP’s 
‘spokesmanship’ for the anti-European discourse during the period under survey, are 
three articles Nergis Canefe and Tanıl Bora, “Intellectual Roots of anti-European 
sentiments in Turkish Politics: The case of radical Turkish nationalism” in Turkey and 
the European Union: Domestic Politics, Economic Integration, and International 
dynamics, eds. Ali Çarkoğlu and Barry Rubin, (London and Portland, OR. Frank Cass. 
2003), 127-148; Ziya Öniş, “Domestic Politics, International Norms and Challenges to 
the State: Turkey – EU relations in the post-Helsinki Era” in Turkey and the European 
Union: Domestic Politics, Economic Integration, and International dynamics, 9-34 and 
Gamze Avcı, “Turkey’s Slow EU Candidacy” in Turkey and the European Union: 
Domestic Politics, Economic Integration, and International dynamics, 149-170. 
564 The collective gist of NAP’s approach with regards to the question of Turkey’s 
European integration can be found in two key documents: Türkiye ve Siyaset, 
March/April 2002 (a quarterly journal published by NAP and this whole issue is 
dedicated to the Turkish-EU relations) and Devlet Bahçeli, Son Gelişmeler Işığında 
Türkiye’nin AB Üyeliği ve Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi: Temel Yaklaşım Biçimimiz ve 
Görüşlerimiz. (Ankara; Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, 2002). 
565Devlet Bahçeli, “Türkiye-AB İlişkilerinde kırılma noktaları ve gerçekçi bakış 
açısının önemi,” Türkiye ve Siyaset. (March/April 2002): 8-10. 
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the one hand NAP charges certain European leaders and EU institutions, notably the 
European Parliament, for carrying out a ‘hidden agenda’ to upset the internal balance 
with regards to the territorial and national integrity of Turkey, NAP does not 
categorically reject Turkey’s EU membership, instead underlines its conditional support 
along these lines:   
   “European Union membership of Turkey should be achieved by 
preserving our national unity and integrity as well as our frame of unitary 
state. The utmost efforts should be taken to materialize the membership 
through a process of transformation and reform which would not harm the 
fabric of our society, not destroy our common values and not jeopardize 
internal peace and stability.”566  
Within the discourse of NAP, it is the Copenhagen political criteria that draw most 
attention and criticism with respect to its perceived threat to national sovereignty.  First 
of all, for NAP, the impositions of the EU carried in the context of the fulfillment of the 
Copenhagen criteria prove very much in line with the political interests of PKK and 
therefore remain open to much abuse in the Turkish case: 
   “The demands of the European Union from Turkey in the name of the 
Copenhagen criteria match the political objectives of the terrorist 
organization. In the face of this fact, it is not possible to evaluate these 
demands as innocent requests required for democratization.”567  
The associated demands such as the annulment of death penalty inclusive of 
crimes related to terrorism, the permission of broadcasting and education in languages 
and dialects other than Turkish all reveal the EU’s support for Kurdish secessionist 
claims and that the European ‘reinterpretation’ of this criteria in the Turkish case mainly 
targets the “Southeastern question in Turkey.”568 Thus, for NAP, the linkage of the 
Copenhagen criteria to the Kurdish question emerges as an intentional design to 
distance, and not to converge, Turkey with the EU.  
Besides the issue of ‘enhancing the basis of secessionist threat and terrorism under 
the cover of democratization’, the question of Cyprus emerges as the second point of 
focus in NAP’s Euroskeptic discourse. Here too, NAP charges the EU for its ‘double 
standard’ in extending membership invitation to a divided island, while failing to end 
the isolation of Turkish Cypriots and disregarding Turkey’s recognition demands for 
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. In this perspective, Bahçeli warns the EU not to 
                                                 
566Devlet Bahçeli, Son Gelişmeler Işığında Türkiye’nin AB Üyeliği ve Milliyetçi 
Hareket Partisi: Temel Yaklaşım Biçimimiz ve Görüşlerimiz, 59. 
567Ibid.102. 
568Ibid.60-61 and 74-86. 
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force Turkey for a trade-off between its national interests in Cyprus and EU 
membership, and to this end makes it clear that in the case that Turkey is faced with 
such a decision, under no conditions TRNC’s independence could be sacrificed for 
integration with the EU.569  
While the above-presented discussion demarcates the main themes of NAP’s 
political discourse in relation to the protection of unitary and absolute sovereignty of the 
Turkish nation-state faced against a potential EU membership, a more specific and legal 
discussion on NAP’s position with regards to the incompatibility of European and 
Turkish approaches to sovereignty is outlined in an article by Muharrem İskenderoğlu 
entitled “Avrupa Birliği Hukuku ve Milli Egemenliğin Devri” published in the EU-
Turkey relations issue of Türkiye ve Siyaset, the official journal of the party. The article 
starts off by a critique of the advocates of a constitutional reform in Turkey in order to 
make it legally possible for the ‘transfer of Turkish sovereignty’ to the European Union 
and accuses the Europhile circles for either not coming to terms with or concealing the 
‘real  meaning’ of this transfer:  
   “Turkish War of Independence has been regarded as synonymous with 
national sovereignty, just as the spirit and the very existence of the Turkish 
Republic were evaluated as synonymous with the Turkish nation’s right to 
national sovereignty. It will not be easy and easily acceptable as it is 
thought to share or transfer national sovereignty, the founding philosophy of 
the Turkish Republic, even for the sake of accession to the European Union 
as a full-fledged member. In this context, it should be remembered that 
almost all European countries had called for a referendum at the stage of 
ceding sovereignty and realizing EU membership, and never took such vital 
decisions without asking the opinion of their own people. Furthermore, the 
mentioned countries largely share common beliefs and cultures. 
Nevertheless, they have been extremely meticulous as regards the transfer 
of sovereignty. It is obvious that a country like Turkey, which, only 80 
years ago, was imposed with the map of the Treaty of Sevres; possessing a 
different culture and religion; and facing never-ending impediments on the 
way to its full membership, should act in a much more deliberate and 
prudent manner.”570 
Thus, İskenderoğlu sets out to decipher the potential perils of this requested 
‘transfer’ of sovereignty to the EU through following arguments: First, he declares that 
the ultimate aim of the EU is to form a federal or a confederal ‘United States of 
                                                 
569Devlet Bahçeli, Son Gelişmeler Işığında Türkiye’nin AB Üyeliği ve Milliyetçi 
Hareket Partisi: Temel Yaklaşım Biçimimiz ve Görüşlerimiz, 83-91. 
570Muharrem İskenderoğlu, “Avrupa Birliği Hukuku ve Milli Egemenliğin Devri,” 
Türkiye ve Siyaset Dergisi, (Mart-Nisan 2002): 59. 
 218
Europe;’571 Then, he underlines the distinction between international law and the 
supranational law of the EU and argues that the supranational nature of European law 
and its extension in multiple areas of policy-making are indeed designed to ‘confiscate 
the sovereignty of the Member States’ to support the legal basis of the foreseen political 
union.572 Here, he also criticizes the European conception of sovereignty for destroying 
the principle of sovereign equality among states and for subordinating national 
sovereignty of the Member States to the sovereignty of the European Union. For 
İskenderoğlu, Turkish sovereignty represents the last fortress to be ‘confiscated’ in 
order to realize the dream of ‘Greater Europe’, encompassing De Gaulle’s vision 
extending from the Atlantic to the Ural mountains. The fulfillment of this dream 
requires the disintegration of both Turkey and Russia.573  
Next, İskenderoğlu undertakes an analysis of the constitutional structures of 
France and Germany and explains under what conditions the legal transfer of national 
sovereignty has been possible in these countries. Set against these explains, he positions 
Turkey as a unique and different case, where such legal arrangements could lead to the 
destruction of Turkish national unity, a hard-won achievement despite the historical 
lack of social and cultural homogeneity.574 After exposing the ‘concealed potential 
linkage’ between the requested Turkish transfer of sovereignty to the European Union, 
the dissolution of Turkish national unity and the establishment of European political 
union, İskenderoğlu contends that an amendment to the Article 6 of the Turkish 
Constitution can only be foreseen following the approval of the Turkish nation based on 
a referendum result. And then, during the referendum period, it would be up to 
‘responsible intellectuals and politicians’ to show Turkish public that the EU is not the 
only alternative for Turkey’s future endeavors. As this analysis illustrates, NAP already 
positions itself against the foreseen future pressures to amend the Turkish constitutional 
conception of sovereignty to fit Turkey into the supranational political structure of the 
EU.  
One other important actor of the post-2000 Turkish politics in respect to the 
‘sovereignty dispute’ contextualized within Turkey’s European integration is 
                                                 
571Muharrem İskenderoğlu, “Avrupa Birliği Hukuku ve Milli Egemenliğin 
Devri,”46-48. 
572Ibid.49-52. 
573Ibid.55-56. 
574Ibid.54-55. 
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Republican People’s Party (RPP), the main opposition party in the Turkish Parliament 
since 2002. Having M. K. Atatürk as its founding father and its roots in the 
establishment of the Turkish Republic, the party positions itself as the “assurance of 
national sovereignty” and “the guardian of the Republican regime” in Turkey.575 
Trapped in between its self-ascribed guardianship of ‘Turkish national sovereignty’ and 
its historical support for ‘Westernization’, RPP portrays what can be called an 
‘ambiguous’ position with regards to the issue of Turkey’s potential membership to the 
EU and this ambiguity is reflected in its official documents and public contact.576 
Between 2002 and 2007, the party line in fact toughens from a more supportive 
outward-looking stance towards a conditional inward-looking support for Turkey’s 
integration into the EU: In 2002, RPP labels the objective of EU membership as a 
crucial societal transformation project and as the best assurance of a strong and 
globally-integrated Turkey and to this end pledges to proceed with the Turkish 
accession process in the fastest pace possible. Yet in 2007, the focus shifts towards a 
“decisive protection of Turkish national interests” in the face of growing skepticism 
towards the intentions of European leadership and “the government’s one-sided 
concessions” to the EU. This shift can also be observed in the headline taken from 
2007 election campaign booklet: “Our EU Target: A full membership based on equal 
conditions and respectful of our principles of ‘Nation-State, Unitary State and Secular 
State.’”577 This time, there is also an emphasis on the idea of a ‘strong’ and ‘principled’ 
Turkey with or without the EU.  
This changing perception of the party towards the issue of Turkey’s European 
integration should be evaluated within the broader context of the growingly 
conservative/nationalist political position adopted by RPP between 2002 and 2007. This 
                                                 
575Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, Parti Meclisi Çalışma Raporu, 31. Olağan Kurultay, 
19–20 Kasım 2005, Ankara. Retrieved 10.07.2007 from http://www.chp.org.tr. 
576In the official website of the party, there is a section dedicated to the EU–
Turkey relations under the heading of “World and CHP”; however, there is no text or 
document attached under this field. Thus, while the RPP publicly declares a conditional 
support to the EU membership, the official party position is not elaborated in-depth and 
comprehensively in a collective form. Given this lack, the only possible sources for 
extracting the contours of the RPP discourse with regards to the EU include the RPP 
General Election Pledges/Programmes (2002 and 2007), the reports of the party 
conventions and Central Administration Committtee (Merkez Yönetim Kurulu - MYK) 
meetings, as well as public speeches/statements delivered by the party leadership. 
577CHP Seçim Pusulası 2007. Retrieved 10.07.2007 from www.chp.org.tr. 
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development becomes evident through a comparison of the party’s 2002 and 2007 
election programmes: The 2002 election campaign mainly focuses on the need for “a 
new start” in Turkish politics to end corruption and to achieve economic growth, 
prosperity and social justice. However, given the improvements in Turkish economy, 
the escalation of PKK terrorism and the polarization of Turkish politics over the issues 
of secularism and political Islam during the five years leading to the general elections of 
2007, RPP’s 2007 campaign now concentrates primarily on the perception of ongoing 
threat – both internal and external - directed towards the unity of the Turkish nation-
state and its secular Republican regime.578 Turkey is portrayed to be at a point of no 
return and the only solution forward is presented in achieving ‘a republican integration.’  
In the defense of Turkey’s national interests vis-à-vis ‘the internal and external 
threats’, RPP makes use of a discursive strategy focusing on the concept of sovereignty, 
which usually runs along these lines: Emphasizing party’s foundational principles 
developed by Atatürk and his supporters, RPP positions itself as the legitimate 
successor of the ‘anti-imperialist’ Turkish national movement of independence, Kuvva-i 
Milliye and Müdafaa-i Hukuk, the achievements of which were the establishment of a 
fully independent Turkish nation-state, deriving its strength from the institution of a 
common national identity and solidarity based on the principle of national sovereignty. 
Therefore, RPP emerges as the ‘natural guardian’ of this principle against all foreign 
and domestic influences that might undermine the power and integrity of the Turkish-
nation state.579 Hence, within the discourse of RPP, ‘national sovereignty’ becomes 
equated with ‘full independence’ and to the fulfillment of its self-imposed mission to 
protect these two republican ideals, upon which the Kemalist regime has been 
established, RPP justifies its increasingly insular and defensive approach to 
international relations as well domestic politics. In this perspective, RPP in many 
occasions criticizes JDP for forging an alliance with neo-liberals, and for “together 
                                                 
578The change in the political positioning of the party is also evident in the 
presentation of  main issues in RPP 2007 Election Pledge in the following order (from 
top to bottom): (i) terror and security, (ii) secularism, (iii) foreign policy, (iv) human 
rights, (v) judiciary, (vi) corruption, (vii) economy and so on; the least important ones 
being (this time from bottom to top) (i) RPP’s relationship with international social 
democracy, (ii) environment and tourism, (iii) transportation, (iv) public administration 
and urbanization, (v) regional development, (vi) youth and women, (vii) education and 
culture; CHP Seçim Pusulası 2007. Retrieved 10.07.2007 from www.chp.org.tr. 
579CHP 30. Olağan Kurultayı Temel Sorunlar ve Temel Çözümler Bildirgesi, 
Ankara, 2003. Retrieved 10.07.2007 from www.chp.org.tr 
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executing new foreign policy inclinations and a process of 
privatization/’foreignification’ (yabancılaştırma) going against our tradition of fight 
against imperialism and full independence.”580 In opposition to a ‘politics of global 
concessions’, RPP describes the safeguarding of the Lausanne Treaty of 1922 as its 
raison d’etre:  
   “It is our raison d’être to stand forth as the protector of the Treaty of 
Lausanne… Celebrating the 82nd anniversary of the treaty through panels 
and meetings held in several province and district centers, our party, 
particularly with the activities it organized in Istanbul and Ankara, once 
more reminded all reactionaries – first and foremost the AKP – who have 
attempted to offer alternatives against the secular democratic republic and 
so-called liberals (neo-liberals, second republicans) as well as all foci of 
power at home and abroad of the following message: ‘We shall always stand 
forth as the protector of the TREATY OF LAUSANNE and shall never 
allow any breach of the TREATY.’”581  
With regards to RPP’s outlook on the broader issue of foreign policy and Turkish 
involvement in world affairs, “submissionism” (“teslimiyetçilik”) now appears as a 
frequently revoked term in the party’s language, recurrently appearing in official 
documents and various speeches delivered by the RPP Chairman Deniz Baykal and the 
Deputy Chairman Onur Öymen, particularly in relation to the issues of Turkey’s EU 
membership, Cyprus, Iraq and US relations.582 An example of this outlook can also be 
found in a speech delivered by RPP Deputy Chairman Onur Öymen:  
   “National interests of states require independence before everything else, 
and independence is not a concept that can vary with changing 
circumstances. Let us here remember what Atatürk said in the year 1923: 
‘Independence of the Turkish state is sacred, and is to be secured and 
preserved forever.’ The concept Atatürk used together with independence is 
‘sovereignty’. The aphorisms of Atatürk regarding sovereignty and 
independence are not confined to the circumstances of the time. All these 
also pertain to the future of this country, and further possess the attribute of 
an advice, and even a bequest for future generations. Could we really argue 
that since the circumstances have changed, independence has lost its former 
insignificance? Was not there any system of alliances during Atatürk era? 
And did he himself not make Turkey a member of Balkan Pact and 
Saadabad Pact? Did entering into pacts or alliances eliminate the 
                                                 
580 Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, Parti Meclisi Çalışma Raporu, 31. Olağan Kurultay, 
(Ankara, 19–20 Kasım 2005), 18  (Retrieved 10.07.2007 from www.chp.org.tr) 
581Ibid.14 
582CHP 30. Olağan Kurultayı Temel Sorunlar ve Temel Çözümler Bildirgesi, 
Ankara, 2003; CHP’nin 31. Kurultayına Sunulan Temel Çözümler Bildirgesi, 19-20 
Kasım 2005, Ankara.; Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, Parti Meclisi Çalışma Raporu, 31. 
Olağan Kurultay, 19–20 Kasım 2005. 
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sovereignty and independence of any state? Of course, it did not, and nor it 
does today…. Atatürk’s perspective cannot be regarded as one against such 
alliances and the sharing of sovereignty in such a manner. What Atatürk 
opposed was submission. For him, submission meant bowing to the will of 
other countries, which did not only entail losing one’s independence, but 
also losing his dignity.”583 
This discursive emphasis on ‘submissionism’, giving up not only national 
independence but also national dignity, introduces another normative dimension to the 
‘sovereignty debate’ and at the same time articulates the political arguments of RPP and 
the ‘Nationalist Front’ (Ulusalcı Cephe) under the same discourse. As discussed in 
detail throughout the previous chapter, within the discourse of ‘Nationalist Front’, the 
defense of ‘national sovereignty’ and ‘full independence’ constitute the two most 
important complimentary/identical political ideals for safeguarding Kemalism and the 
Republican regime based on this ideology. In this perspective, the leading 
representatives of the ‘Nationalist Front’ (Ulusalcı Cephe) such as Atilla İlhan, Erol 
Manisalı, Suat İlhan, İlhan Selçuk, Necla Arat, Hüsnü Merdanoğlu, Arslan Bulut, 
Alpaslan Işıklı, Halit Kakınç and various other writers/opinion leaders mainly 
concentrated around the publications such as Cumhuriyet, İleri, Kızıl Elma, and Türk 
Solu join in the statist/nationalist discursive line in declaring Turkey’s potential 
membership to the EU as an end to both national sovereignty and independence.584 The 
gist of ‘Nationalist Front’ position with regards to the issue of sovereignty and Turkey’s 
European integration is expressed in the following quote from Suat İlhan:  
   “If we share national sovereignty – which Atatürk had added as cement to 
the foundation stone of this state and society – and its indispensable and 
natural prerequisite; namely independence, with the institutions of the EU, 
then this country will be deprived of these virtues and will end up simply as 
                                                 
583Onur Öymen, ”Dış Politikanın Dünü ve Bugünü,” Atatürkçü Düşünce Derneği 
Semineri, 9 June 2004. Retrieved 10.18.2007 from http://www.onuroymen. 
com/docs/konusma72.doc. 
584 The collective and examplary thrust of ‘Nationalist Front’ arguments against 
Turkey’s EU integration can be found in the following publications: Hüsnü 
Merdanoğlu, Küreselleşme Sürecinde Atatürkçü Düşünce: Türkiye’nin Avrupa 
Birliği’ne Üye Olma Girişimine Atatürkçü yaklaşım, (Ankara: Güldiken Yayınları, 
2001); Suat İlhan, AB’ye Neden Hayır? Jeopolitik bir Yaklaşım, (İstanbul: Ötüken, 
2001); Suat İlhan, Avrupa Birliği’ne neden Hayır?: 2 (İstanbul: Ötüken, 2002); Erol 
Manisalı, Türkiye-Avrupa İlişkilerinde Sessize Darbe. (İstanbul, Derin Yayınları, 2002); 
Erol Manisalı, 'Avrupa Birliği', çıkmaz sokak! (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 2005); Atilla 
İlhan (ed.) “...bir millet uyanıyor!...” (Ankara ve İstanbul: Bilgi, 2005); Erol Manisalı, 
Hayatım Avrupa. (İstanbul: Truva Yayınları, 2006), Selim Somçağ, AB – Kıbrıs – 
Ermenistan: Bir Teslimiyet Güncesi, (İstanbul: 2006 Yayınevi, 2006). 
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a province of the EU … If we are admitted as a member of the EU, then the 
true nature of our independent republic, which was founded by Atatürk and 
is based on the principle of unrestricted and unconditional national 
sovereignty, will be distorted.”585  
Here, it is important to note that ‘Nationalist Front’ differentiates between 
‘developmentalism/modernism’ and Westernization, arguing that Westernization 
becomes a target for Turkey only following the policies of İsmet İnönü that display a 
stark contrast to the nationalist developmentalism of Atatürk.586 Therefore, the current 
Europhile coalition is blamed for deviating from the way of Atatürk and instead opting 
for İnönü’s direction, which is identified with a return to the Tanzimat period, preparing 
the ground for fulfilling Europe’s perpetual intention ‘to disintegrate and rule Turkey’.587 
As a result, ‘Nationalist Front’ concludes that Atatürkist thought and European 
integration can never exist in parallel to one another since Europe always searches for 
‘subjects’ with the intention of colonization.588 The European perception of Turkey as a 
‘subject’ and never as ‘an equal partner’, let alone a ‘friend’, is a frequently referred idea 
in the writings of ‘Nationalist Front’ and in this regard the ‘defense of sovereignty’ is 
often brought up as means to protect Turkey’s national integrity in face of one-sided 
European demands. Thus, within the discourse of the nationalist/statist camp, sovereignty 
assumes meanings beyond a legal and a political concept, and often becomes charged 
with emotive/affective connotations, an example statement of which declares: “In the 
history of humanity, the notion of sovereignty carries the meaning of honor, pride, 
dignity and respect.” 589 
In this perspective, the European Union accession process represents the latest 
stage of Turkey’s colonization by Europe, finally allowing Turkey’s enemies to fulfill 
their objectives: The bringing up of the ‘Kurdish question’, ‘the Cyprus issue’ and 
‘Armenian claims’ during Turkey’s accession process to the EU stands out as the most 
                                                 
585Suat İlhan, Avrupa Birliği’ne neden Hayır?: 2 (İstanbul: Ötüken, 2002), 36-37.   
586Atilla İlhan, “...bir millet uyanıyor!...” (Ankara ve İstanbul: Bilgi, 2005), 59-60. 
587Ibid.133. 
588Suat İlhan, AB’ye Neden Hayır? Jeopolitik bir Yaklaşım, (İstanbul: Ötüken, 
2001), 95; Hüsnü Merdanoğlu, Küreselleşme Sürecinde Atatürkçü Düşünce: 
Türkiye’nin Avrupa Birliği’ne Üye Olma Girişimine Atatürkçü yaklaşım, (Ankara: 
Güldiken Yayınları, 2001). 
589 Hüsnü Merdanoğlu, Küreselleşme Sürecinde Atatürkçü Düşünce: Türkiye’nin 
Avrupa Birliği’ne Üye Olma Girişimine Atatürkçü yaklaşım, 61. 
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vivid example of these ‘hidden intentions’.590 Moreover, similar to NAP, ‘Nationalist 
Front’ also blames the Copenhagen Criteria for trying “to dissolve national unity and 
harmony by creating new minorities within the Turkish nation, by forcing Turkey to 
recognize to so-called Armenian ‘genocide’, by giving the Kurds political autonomy or 
the right to a federal state and for transferring the administrative rights of the Tigris and 
Euphrates rivers to an international regime.”591 The example of Yugoslavia is often 
revoked to blame the EU for having a contribution in the disintegration process of 
nations.592 As a result, as Sadi Somuncuoğlu claims: 
   “The negotiations period and the preceding process were subjected to 
more than 100 conditions which would lead to the dissolution of Turkey, 
and thus unblocked the way towards the alienation of sovereignty even 
before the accession to the EU; foreseeing the shrinking and total 
subjugation of Turkey; and literally a transition to ‘a postmodern mandate 
rule’.”593  
In sum, the prospects of Turkey’s European accession and the related tensions 
centering on the issue of sovereignty contribute to the articulation of demands of the 
nationalist-right with the traditional forces of the ‘Left’ in Turkey, and in this context, 
the issue of sovereignty acts as a nodal point that helps to unify these seemingly 
disparate groups through the formation of a hegemonic conservative-nationalist 
discourse concentrating on the defense of ‘national sovereignty’ vis-à-vis the ‘threat’ 
posed by the European Union. This position puts the nationalists/statist coalition in 
direct confrontation with the so-called ‘democratic coalition,’ the composition of which 
has been discussed in the preceding section. The ‘Nationalist Front’ labels this coalition 
as ‘komprador aydınlar’594 or as ‘neo-tanzimatçılar’ for their claimed failure to 
                                                 
590Selim Somçağ, AB – Kıbrıs – Ermenistan: Bir Teslimiyet Güncesi, Arslan 
Bulut, “Küresel saldırıya küresel cevap,” in “...bir millet uyanıyor!...”; Cüneyt 
Yenigün, “Milli Egemenlik ve Supranasyonalizm İkilemi: Türkiye ve Avrupa 
Birliği’nin dış politikalarının analizi” in Tüm yönleriyle Türkiye-AB ilişkileri, eds. 
Mustafa Aykaç and Zeki Parlak, (İstanbul: Elif Kitapevi, 2002). 
591Arslan Bulut, “Küresel saldırıya küresel cevap,” 99. 
592Alpaslan Işıklı, “AB ve GOP kıskacında Türkiye,” ...bir millet uyanıyor!... ed. 
Atilla İlhan, (Ankara ve İstanbul: Bilgi, 2005), 160. 
593Sadi Somuncuoğlu, “Ahval ve şeriatimiz, ‘Aydınlar cepheye’ diyor,” ...bir 
millet uyanıyor!... ed. Atilla İlhan, (Ankara ve İstanbul: Bilgi, 2005), 266. 
594 For Atilla İlhan the term of ‘komprador aydınlar’ refers to the manipulation of 
a local intellectual, “chosen among the local population, his religion, language and 
culture converted, or to put it more correctly made void of any culture, and accordingly 
submitted to the will of the dominant metropolitan country” (Atilla İlhan, İntibâh 
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distinguish between Westernization and modernization595 and for their wish to sacrifice 
Turkey’s ‘full independence’ in exchange of ‘full membership’ to the EU. Presented 
below is a discursive analysis of the strategies employed by the ‘democratic coalition’ 
in defense of Turkey’s ‘democratization’ and ‘Europeanization’ process and the 
discursive instrumentalization of sovereignty within this framework:   
Among the ‘conservative Muslim-democrats’, the ideas of Yalçın Akdoğan, often 
referred as one of the leading ideologues of the Justice and Development Party, 
constitute a good example for the representation of the arguments used within the 
‘Muslim-democratic’ discourse in terms of underlining the need to think Turkish 
potential membership to the EU beyond the ungrounded concern for ‘loss of 
sovereignty.’ In his book Kırk Yıllık Düş, Yalçın Akdoğan responds to rising concerns 
among the public on the EU’s ‘hidden agenda to destroy Turkish national sovereignty.’ 
He summarizes the main tenets of the anti-EU nationalist/statist discourse in five 
statements: (i) “The EU wants to divide us and our territorial integrity”; (ii) “The EU 
membership means a loss of our religious, national and cultural identity”; (iii) “Along 
with the loss of our national identity, we will also loose our national sovereignty”; (iv) 
“Turkey will give up its independence and thereby will no longer be able to guard its 
national interests”; (v) “Finally, whatever concessions we give, the EU will never let 
Turkey in.” Throughout his book, Akdoğan presents lengthy explanations as to why all 
these arguments are groundless and why on the contrary the EU membership would 
benefit Turkey in terms of the expansion of freedoms and the expansion of Turkey’s 
global standing. Thus, rather than indicating a ‘loss of sovereignty,’ the EU accession 
process strengthens the policy-making capacity of the Turkish state, helping to maintain 
its unitary structure and political system (In this sense, Akdoğan’s ideas resemble that 
of Milward’s argument on the European rescue of the nation-state). A similar line of 
argumentation can also be found in JDP’s 2001 Party Programme as well as its election 
pledges in 2002 and 2007, therefore Akdoğan’s ideas mainly explains JDP’s approach 
to the question of sovereignty within the context of Turkey’s European integration.   
Another figure the ideas of whom can be brought forth for better grasping the 
position of the ‘democratic coalition’ with regards to the issue of sovereignty and the 
                                                                                                                                               
Başladı (İleri ve Türksolu Yazıları,72) and he describes this position as “the summit of 
slavery” (Atilla İlhan, İntibâh Başladı (İleri ve Türksolu Yazıları), 79). 
595Atilla İlhan, İntibâh Başladı (İleri ve Türksolu Yazıları),16. 
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European integration is Mustafa Erdoğan, a constitutional law professor596 and a 
founding member of Society of Liberal Thought (Liberal Düşünce Topluluğu - LDT), a 
non-profit Turkish think tank, which has particularly attracted public attention for its 
organization of a symposium bringing together the issues of Islam, democracy, 
conservatism and liberalism under the same topic.597 In a number of books and articles 
published in the post-2000 period,598 Erdoğan calls for a reconfiguration of the 
prevailing doctrine of sovereignty in Turkey due to the following reasons: (i) First, he 
underlines that the identification of the ‘Turkish nation’ in its totality as the source of 
sovereignty reflects authoritarian and nationalist tendencies underlying the political 
philosophy of the republican regime and to this end, he calls for the deconstruction of 
this innate relationship, where the new source of sovereignty should be linked to the 
concept of ‘citizenship’ rather than the ‘nation’, as it is the case in many European 
countries.599 (ii) Second, given the increasing influence of globalization and the 
accompanying evolution of the world political order, the current unitary and 
unconditional approach to sovereignty is no longer tenable in Turkish politics. This 
situation marks the end of Bodinian and Hobbesian conceptualization of sovereignty 
and thereby initiates a new era where a renewed configuration needs to take into 
account the requirements of the parallel processes of integration and fragmentation, 
which at times stand in conflict with the nation-state itself. As a result, nation-states will 
                                                 
596 Mustafa Erdoğan has also been among the three nominees of the current 
government to represent Turkey as a judge on the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECHR).  
597 It is also in this conference, “Uluslararası Muhafazakarlık ve Demokrasi 
Sempozyumu” organized by Society of Liberal Thought (LTD) in 2004, that Prime 
Minister Erdoğan delivered his famous speech describing JDP as a ‘conservative-
democrat’ party. This speech was also utilized as a prologue to Conservative 
Democracy booklet discussed above. 
598 The gist of Mustafa Erdoğan’s arguments in this regard crystallizes in a number 
of books such as Mustafa Erdoğan, Anayasal Demokrasi (Ankara: Siyasal, 2001); 
Mustafa Erdoğan, Türkiye Avrupa Birliği’nin eşiğinde mi? Dersimiz özgürlük, (İstanbul, 
Pınar Yayınları, 2002); Mustafa Erdoğan, Türkiye'de Anayasalar ve Siyaset, (Ankara: 
Liberte, 2003), and a few articles published in the 2000s, the most important ones of 
which include Mustafa Erdoğan, “Küreselleşme, hukuk ve Türkiye,” in Avrupa Birliği 
sürecinde Türkiye: siyasal, ekonomik ve toplumsal dönüşüm, sorunlar ve tartışmalar, 
eds. Turgay Uzun and Serap Özen (Ankara: Seçkin Yayıncılık, 2004) and Mustafa 
Erdoğan, “Egemenliğin Dünü ve Bugünü,” Hukuk ve Adalet: Eleştirel Hukuk Dergisi 6-
7, (2005). 
599Mustafa Erdoğan, Türkiye'de Anayasalar ve Siyaset,143; Mustafa Erdoğan, 
Türkiye Avrupa Birliği’nin eşiğinde mi? Dersimiz özgürlük, 307. 
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have to come to terms with the ongoing undermining of their de facto sovereignty and 
accordingly adapt to the reality of ‘divided’ sovereignty, ‘shared’ mostly with 
subnational and supranational entities.600 (iii) On a more normative note, Erdoğan 
declares his approval for globalization-led “loss of sovereignty” of the nation-state 
under two conditions: a. if this devolution occurs in favor of the ‘individual,’ and b. if it 
takes on a more democratic face, respecting diversity and local cultures.601    
The first point to be made on Erdoğan’s above assessment relates to the 
positioning of Turkey’s potential membership to the European Union as means for 
reaching a renewed understanding of sovereignty in Turkey, the demarcations of which 
have just been outlined. Throughout Erdoğan’s works, Europe and the constitutions of 
European countries always represent a central point of reference. Erdoğan underlines 
the significance of the transition from ‘international law’ to ‘supranational law’ 
especially in the context of the European Union602 and disapprove of the Turkish elite 
and the political class for their failure to recognize the critical impact of this transition 
on the conventional understanding of sovereignty. Most importantly, for Erdoğan, 
Europeanization of Turkey first and foremost requires a move away from the defense of 
sovereignty based upon the notion of ‘full independence’ and to this end, he links the 
success of Turkey’s integration process with the EU to the transformation and 
reconfiguration of the contemporary doctrine of national sovereignty in Turkey. In his 
own words: “Turkey resists against this process [EU accession process] because it is a 
state, which over-depends upon a rhetoric of sovereignty based on ‘full 
independence.”603 Overcoming of this resistance can only be possible with continued 
political reforms and making the necessary changes in the Turkish Constitution, and to 
Erdoğan, the constitutional reforms of 2001 and 2002 cannot suffice in this respect.604   
With regards to the need for the reconfiguration of the Turkish doctrine of 
sovereignty in the context of post-2000s, this time we witness the convergence of the 
‘Europhile liberal’ and the ‘conservative-democratic’ positions in arguing that this 
much-needed ‘paradigm shift’ would eventually help democratization of Turkey by 
                                                 
600Mustafa Erdoğan, “Küreselleşme, hukuk ve Türkiye,” and Mustafa Erdoğan, 
“Egemenliğin Dünü ve Bugünü.” 
601Mustafa Erdoğan, “Küreselleşme, hukuk ve Türkiye,”18-19 and 28. 
602Ibid.19. 
603Ibid.24. 
604Ibid.27. 
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bringing fundamental freedoms to everyone, as well as strengthening the effectiveness 
of Turkish polity by boosting Turkey’s involvement in the international regime.605 The 
liberal discourse mainly centers on the perennial question of how to empower the 
individual vis-à-vis the omnipotent Turkish nation-state and in this respect, the 
Copenhagen Criteria is conceived to embody the potential to break out of this persistent 
impasse: 
   “Those who seek to make Turkey’s obstinate attitude on the Copenhagen 
Political Criteria and the spirit of the Copenhagen Criteria, in general, a 
matter of bargain are not at all aware of the epistemological rupture shaping 
the 21st century Europe. The rupture has originated from the fact that, in 
order to establish a state of permanent peace, the nation states created since 
the Enlightenment Era agreed to share their realm of sovereignty with other 
nation states; accepted to transfer their powers to supranational (federal) and 
sub-national (local and regional) bodies; and aimed at securing their welfare, 
security and stability by sharing a great part of their sovereignty. This kind 
of worldview highlights the individual, not the state. As a matter of fact, the 
parties to the escalating argument about the candidacy and prospected 
membership of Turkey to the EU are the state and state elites, who deny 
their ideological bankruptcy; cling very firmly to their realm of sovereignty; 
and thus, are content with their own National Program which they 
formulated on the basis of “Ankara criteria”, on the one hand, and the 
society which amply deserves the Copenhagen Criteria, on the other. It is 
getting more and more obvious for us that the interests of each party are not 
the same; however, this time and for the first time in our state tradition, 
survival of the state depends on aiming at the interest of the society; that is, 
EU membership.”606  
It is argued that within the ongoing process of globalization Turkey is indeed 
presented with two main options, either it could integrate itself with the European 
project based on the rule of law, plurality and multilateralism, or it could opt for a closer 
alliance with the US, choosing a unilateral approach to conflict and a conservative 
approach to politics.607 While the US model would contribute to the conservation of the 
status quo, the European model points to a ‘paradigm shift’ with regards to the question 
of sovereignty, which in return would help to overcome the resilient state-society 
                                                 
605Cengiz Aktar, Avrupa yol ayrımında Türkiye. (İstanbul: İletişim, 2001); Cengiz 
Aktar, Avrupa okumaları. (İstanbul: Pusula Yayıncılık, 2003); Can Baydarol, AB 
Sürecinde medeniyetler buluştuğunda. (İstanbul: Universal Yayıncılık, 2004); İhsan D. 
Dağı, İnsan hakları, küresel siyaset ve Türkiye. (Bağcılar, İstanbul: Boyut Kitapları, 
2000); İhsan D. Dağı, Batılılaşma korkusu: Avrupa Birliği, demokrasi, insan hakları. 
(Ankara: Liberte, 2003). 
606Cengiz Aktar, Avrupa okumaları, 29- 30. 
607Çağlar Keyder, Memalik-I Osmaniye’den Avrupa Birliği’ne, 236-246. 
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antagonism within the Turkish polity. Jean Monnet’s famous dictum, “we are not 
building a coalition among states, but peoples” is revoked to illustrate the gist of the 
European project608 and the Turkish integration into this ‘people’-centered project is to 
contribute to the transformation of the prevailing doctrine of sovereignty in Turkey and 
would destabilize its exclusive linkage to the nation-state. 
Thus, the process of European accession converges the conservative and liberal 
discourses in their accusation of the republican/statist elite to try to hold on to their 
‘illegitimate’ yet ongoing ‘sovereignty’ in Turkish politics, blocking the quests for 
change through democratization and Europeanization.609 Within this context, the 
liberals draw attention to the discursive instrumentalization of ‘national sovereignty’ as 
an obstacle to Turkey’s process of ‘democratization’ and ‘Europeanization’:  
   “To claim that ‘Democracy has long been an unsolved problem in 
Turkey,’ means the same as stating that there have always been influential 
circles in this country who are happy with living under the present regime – 
if this is not the case, why could it not have been solved for so many years? 
The principal catchword these circles use in their contention to attract the 
public is “national sovereignty”. There are many people who are prone to 
stick to this motto and any sort of stance would suit to them, whether leftist 
or socialist. Yet, in fact, if we are to categorize them within a spectrum from 
moderate to extremist, these would be those who simply lack democratic 
culture, those with authoritarian/Bonapartist tendencies, conservative 
xenophobes, those affected by fascist tendencies and pure fascists, 
respectively. Considering them as a sum, they would amount to quite a high 
figure.”610  
Henceforth, the unfolding of the ‘Europeanization’/’Democratization’ discussion 
in Turkey in the early 2000s reveals that before being able to discuss how to align the 
‘unconditional and absolute’ notion of Turkish national sovereignty with the so-called 
‘post-Westphalian’ European order, it is first necessary to clarify the underpinnings of 
the domestic allocation of power and authority in the Turkish polity. In a way, the 
European-led democratization process finally makes it possible to pose the question: 
“Who is really sovereign in the Turkish polity: the state or the people?” In  this respect, 
one of the most visible and polarizing debates on the concept of sovereignty in Turkey 
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609Eser Karakaş, Sivil Siyaset, Küresel ekonomi, (İstanbul: Gündem Yayınları, 
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is instigated in the spring of 2005 by a series of controversial public statements made by 
the President of the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TBMM) Bülent Arınç, and the 
President of the Constitutional Court Mustafa Bumin. This dispute between the then-
leading figures of the two important institutions of Turkish politics has produced a 
country-wide debate as to the appropriate source, locus and attributes of sovereignty in 
the Turkish context - a dispute that has so far not been settled. Therefore, the case 
deserves a closer look: 
 
 
6.3.2. ‘Sovereignty Battle’ II: ‘Public Will’ vs. ‘Raison d’Etat’ 
 
 
 During the National Sovereignty Week,611 mainly targeting the ruling Justice and 
Development Party’s recent policies on the head scarf issue, the Constitutional Court 
President Bumin announced a public warning, which stated that the Turkish Parliament 
could not attempt to lift the current ban on the wearing of religious head scarf in schools 
and public institutions, even if the Parliament amended the Constitution in this regard. 
The first public response to this statement came from the President of TBMM (also a 
leading member of the ruling JDP party) who declared in a TV programme that the 
Turkish parliament derives its legislative power from popular sovereignty and therefore 
it would not share this power with any other state organ and would not accept any kind 
of infringement on its decision-making capacity. Commenting in a press-release 
following his much-debated TV interview, Arınç stated:     
   “As a politician and as a Member of the Parliament, I cannot tolerate any 
allegation to overshadow the legislative power of the National Assembly. I 
cannot accept such an allegation, and it is not my problem at all. I am doing 
that because I respect the personages who led this country from the War of 
Independence to the Republic, from Republic to a mighty and powerful 
state, and further the National Assembly itself. Mine is not a reactive 
behavior. I believe those who watched the television programme yesterday 
understood that the question was legally and constitutionally treated. Turkey 
is not ownerless, neither is our National Assembly. On the contrary, its 
owner is our 70 million people. The National Assembly is not the whipping 
boy of anyone.  In accordance with Article 7 of the Constitution, the 
                                                 
611 Every year, the week of 23 April is celebrated as the ‘National Sovereignty 
Week’ in Turkey to commamerate the inauguration of the first meeting of Turkish 
Grand National Assembly in 23 April 1920.   
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Turkish Grand National Assembly exercises sovereignty on behalf of its 
people and is entrusted with legislative power, which is an absolute one. 
There exists no mechanism that is capable of restricting, overshadowing, 
dividing and breaking apart the legislative power. The National Assembly 
exercises legislative power on behalf of its people and in the name of 
sovereignty.”612 
Continuing with his public remarks, Arınç argued that the Parliament has all the 
legitimate popular power at its hands to change the Turkish Constitution with the only 
exception of ‘non-amendable’ articles of 1, 2 and 3, also implying that it has the 
necessary legal backing to shut down the Constitutional Court if deemed necessary. 
TBMM President also criticized the privileged role endowed to the Constitutional 
Court in Turkey by stating that this institution exists in no European country other than 
Turkey and that we should all be reminded of the Article 153 Paragraph 2 of the 
Turkish Constitution, which only grants a supervisory role to the Constitutional Court 
for overseeing constitutional compatibility of the legislation in effect or in progress and 
not a power to legislate. In further defending the superlative position of the Turkish 
Parliament within the Turkish polity, Arınç referred to a saying, originally used in the 
British context, “besides turning a man into a woman, and a woman into a man, the 
Parliament is all-powerful.”613 
In order to comprehend the background of this reaction, besides the legal 
framework of the issue, here it becomes important to first underline the ongoing 
institutional tension between the Parliament and the Constitutional Court, a situation 
particularly evident in the post-2000 Turkey. The Constitutional Court has been 
regarded in Turkey, especially among the Republican elite, as one of the leading 
‘guardian’ institutions of the political values of the current Republican regime and in 
return the institution has positioned itself as one of the main critiques of the ruling JDP 
government and its religiously oriented policies. By declaring the Parliament as the 
sole legitimate representative of public will and therefore national sovereignty, Arınç’s 
move has been interpreted mostly within the republican/nationalist circles as an attempt 
to erode the legitimacy of this ‘guardian’ institution. It is particularly from this 
                                                 
612 The original press release, which has been published on the official website of 
Turkish Grand National Assembly by the Presidency of the Parliament, can be reached 
at the following address, http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/develop/owa/tbmm_basin_ 
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613 Bülent Arınç’s quote is taken from an article that appeared at Radikal 
Newspaper on 4 May 2005, http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=151613. 
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perspective that the sovereignty debate has become closely linked to the discursive 
battle between the so-called ‘democratic’ vs. ‘republican’ forces in Turkey.  
Here, it becomes also useful to remind ourselves briefly the discussion presented 
in the fourth chapter of this dissertation, which points out the fact that through the 
Article 6614 of the current Turkish Constitution, the execution of ‘Turkish nation’s 
sovereignty’ is indeed delegated to several state institutions and that the Constitution 
does not single out the Parliament as the sole representative organ as it was the case in 
previous Constitutions of 1921 and 1924. (Actually, Arınç himself refrains from 
making direct referrals to Article 6 and instead uses Article 7 which spells out the 
responsibilities of the legislative organ). For this reason, the current regime in Turkey 
cannot be categorized as Parliamentarism as conceived in Arınç and his supporters’ 
referral to the United Kingdom. Instead, the Turkish Constitution foresees a separation 
of powers among the different organs of the Turkish State and intentionally refrains 
from upsetting this balance in favor of the Parliament. In fact, in the opposite, as it has 
also been discussed in the preceding chapter, the 1982 Constitution shifts the balance 
of power in favor of the Executive and endows the President as well as the National 
Security Council with a privileged position within this political system. Hence, if 
anything, the current Constitution can be criticized for failing to create a balance of 
power among the organs, but not for failing to put in place a system of separation of 
powers. 
Given this background, TBMM President’s comments on sovereignty and the 
perceived exclusive role of the Turkish Parliament have stirred a wide-spread reaction 
among politicians and high ranking state officials, as well as the Turkish press and its 
commentators. Arınç’s statements were backed up by the majority of columnists 
writing in dailies such as Yeni Şafak, Zaman and D.B. Tercüman,615 mostly in relation 
                                                 
614The Turkish version of the Article 6 of the Turkish Constitution states: Türk 
Milleti, egemenliğini, Anayasanın koyduğu esaslara göre, yetkili organlar eliyle 
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615Among the articles that defend the statements of Arınç are Ahmet Kekeç, 
“Türkiye'de bir "Anayasa Mahkemesi sorunu" var!”, Yeni Safak, 3 May 2005; Ahmet 
Taşgetiren, “Arınç gerçeği söylüyor”, Yeni Şafak, 3 May 2005; Mustafa Ünal, “Meclis, 
Bumin'in şamar oğlanı mı?”, Zaman, 4 May 2005; Mustafa Erdoğan, "Söz'ün bittiği 
yer", D.B. Tercüman; Ömer Lütfi Mete, “Darbeci mayasıyla yargı devleti”, Sabah, 3 
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to the need to realign the balance of power in Turkish politics in favor of the ‘elected,’ 
therefore, ‘democratic’ forces: The ‘appointed’ authorities had to finally come to terms 
with the fact that they do not represent the ‘public will’ and therefore have no 
legitimate part in the execution of sovereignty.  
In opposition to Arınç’s statements, the leader of Republican People’s Party 
(CHP) Deniz Baykal, the President of Institution of High Education (YÖK) Erdoğan 
Teziç, Former President of the Constitutional Court Yekta Güngör Özden, and the 
Former President of Turkey Süleyman Demirel criticized Arınç in a series of public 
statements for not grasping Turkish political realities and for trying to undermine the 
current regime by declaring the Parliament under the majority rule of his party as 
omnipotent:   
   “Now the era of mottos ‘We can do everything’, ‘I can do whatever I 
wish’ is all over. One could win 34 percent of all votes, but cannot come 
forward to say ‘I have secured a two-thirds majority in the parliament, so I 
could do whatever I wish.’ No way! No one will allow you to do that.’ The 
current debate has proven that people could contend with each other, which 
will change nothing in Turkey anyway. It is true that sovereignty is 
represented by the Turkish Grand National Assembly in Turkey. Yet, it is 
another fact that this sovereignty is exercised through the constitutional 
institutions of our country.”616  
   “In the Constitution there exists the relevant stipulation on the exercise of 
sovereignty. Legislature, executive power and the judiciary; all these 
authorities have their own responsibilities. In the speech he delivered, the 
Chairman of the Constitutional Court did not express his personal views, 
but instead the already-issued court decisions. What he did was to state a 
legal fact. The authorities of the legislature are exercised as well within the 
framework of the Constitution.”617   
Joining the public debate in opposition to TBMM President’s position and taking 
the issue beyond the ‘elected’ vs. ‘appointed’ confrontation, columnists such as Tufan 
Türenç, Nuray Mert, Hasan Bülent Kahraman, Erdal Şafak and İsmet Berkan618 drew 
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attention to the absolutist underpinnings of Arınç’s conceptualization of sovereignty 
and contended that, rather than ‘democratizing’ the Turkish polity – as Arınç and his 
supporters claimed -  an advocacy of such an understanding could instead create a 
platform for the justification of “tyranny of the majority”:  
   “The concept of absolute and unconditional national sovereignty, which 
has been semantically expressed and proposed to embody the notion of self-
determination implied by democracy, assumes a new meaning as the society 
embarks upon a self-control over its own affairs. Let us here remark that a 
society’s self-control is again a product of its own sovereign will. 
Otherwise, in a society where sovereignty is still not checked by the people 
themselves and through (national or transnational) institutions created upon 
their own will, democratic will of the majority could lead to an annihilation 
of democracy. Hence, before everything else, the main point is about 
fetishization of the concept ‘National Assembly’, which entails that 
democracy is an ultimate and close-ended proposition. Neither democracy 
nor the National Assembly is licensed to do whatever they wish in the name 
of sovereignty. This does not have to do with sovereign rights, but rather 
with sovereign authority, and the power of democracy is about restricting 
this sovereign authority. Those who so desire could once more reflect on the 
concept ‘separation of powers’.”619  
The issue of separation of powers indeed emerges as an argument strongly 
brought forth during the period under survey to disapprove of the understanding of 
sovereignty proposed by the President of TBMM. As the opponents of Arınç’s position 
point out, in the context of a democracy - where an understanding of democracy is not 
confined to elections but to a political system of effective checks and balances 
functioning under the rule of law - no exercise of sovereignty can be unconditional and 
unrestrained. Especially in representative democracies such as in Turkey, a majority 
achieved after a single election repeated every five years cannot provide a legitimate 
basis for ‘unconditional’ policy-making. Within this critical position, it is also 
interesting to note the frequent referrals to the fate of the Democrat Party and the 
abrupt end to its rule by the military coup of the 1960. Many commentators warn JDP 
government for not repeating the ‘mistake’ of the Democrat Party, where the party has 
been blamed for following a unilateral approach to policy-making based on its 
parliamentary majority, disregarding the tacit ‘nodes of power’ in Turkish politics. In 
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fact, Arınç and JDP is reminded620 of the fact that the Constitutional Court itself has 
been a creation of the 1961 Constitution, established in the aftermath of the 1960 coup 
in order to ‘pre-warn’ the political system of its growing ‘imbalances’:       
   “Constitutional Court was introduced to our country with the Constitution 
of 1961, before which the Parliament had exactly the power Mr. Arınç 
describes or longs for. This absolute power in the hands of the Democratic 
Party, which was culminated in the statement “You are capable of even 
restoring the caliphate if you so desire” by Adnan Menderes – the prime 
minister of the era – relegated Kırşehir’s provincial status to that of a district 
in order to punish the city since it elected Osman Bölükbaşı as the MP, and 
it also established the Investigatory Commission (Tahkikat Komisyonu), a 
body with extraordinary powers, in order to silence the opposition and the 
press. All these regulations led Turkey to the coup d’état of 27 May 1960. 
This is exactly what Mr. Baykal and Mr. Bumin referred as ‘the peril’ and 
‘the painful experience’. I believe Mr. Arınç should think about the 
following facts at length: Had there existed then a Constitutional Court to 
reject the unconstitutional and tyrannical laws proposed by the government, 
would the coup d’état of 27 May have taken place? In short, the 
Constitutional Court is a safety net for the government, and even for the 
regime. Thus, we should appreciate its value…”621  
While the leadership of JDP (including Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan) 
did not publicly support TBMM President’s interpretation of the supreme position of 
the Parliament in the execution of ‘popular sovereignty,’ soon enough, JDP put posters 
and banners all around major Turkish cities highlighting the infamous statement: 
‘Sovereignty is vested Fully and Conditionally in the Nation.’ A similar campaign 
reappeared during the much contested election process of the 11th President of the 
Turkish Republic by the Turkish Grand National Assembly during the summer of 2007, 
revealing once again JDP’s repeated tendency to seek political legitimacy for its 
actions through the recurrent utilization of this popular slogan. 
Here, it is important to indicate that JDP’s standing vis-à-vis the issue of 
sovereignty differentiates with regards to the so-called ‘internal’ and ‘external’ 
dimensions, where on the one hand, JDP leadership and ideologues support the liberal 
idea of ‘shared’/’divided’/‘pooled’ sovereignty in order to continue with the further 
integration of Turkey to the international system and the EU, the JDP discourse 
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displays absolutist features with regards to the question of how sovereignty should be 
executed within the Turkish polity. 
This central paradox is also evident within the works of Mustafa Erdoğan, the 
ideas of whom have been discussed above. Along with his numerous books and articles, 
where he deals particularly with the problems associated with the prevailing doctrine of 
sovereignty in Turkish politics, Mustafa Erdoğan is also known for his influential 27-
page report “Türkiye için bir Demokratikleşme ve Sivilleşme Perspektifi”622 prepared 
for and published by Union Foundation (Birlik Vakfı), a non-profit foundation, the 
founding members of which include Turkey’s current Prime Minister Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan, Cemil Çiçek, Minister of Justice under 58 th and 59th Governments and Deputy 
Prime Minister and Government Spokesperson under 60th Government, Ali Coşkun, 
Minister of Industry of the 58 th and 59th Governments, Abdülkadir Aksu, Minister of 
Interior of the 58th and 59th Government, as well as Ömer Dinçer, Under-Secretary of 
Prime Ministry during 58th Government and Member of the current Parliament. While 
as a constitutional law professor and throughout his writings in this capacity, Erdoğan’s 
arguments carry much parallelism with the globalization and the EU-related discourse 
on sovereignty (as they have been discussed in the fifth chapter and the beginning part 
of this study) it is in his more politically-oriented writings that we find a certain 
distancing away from his earlier support for developing a liberal notion of 
‘shared’/’divided’ sovereignty within the Turkish polity.  
In his report “Türkiye için bir Demokratikleşme ve Sivilleşme Perspektifi”, 
Erdoğan criticizes the current domestic political system in Turkey for guarding a 
‘pluralistic’ institutional structure, where the legitimate representatives of public will, 
namely the government and the Parliament, are forced to share ‘nation’s sovereignty’ 
with appointed officials. In order to change this situation, Erdoğan calls for the 
establishment of a much-needed ‘liberal-democratic governance model’ in Turkey, 
which should include primarily three features: First, it should be based on ‘public will’ 
and regular elections stand out as the best way to identify the legitimate representatives 
of this will. At the same time, all other state organs need to derive their legitimacy from 
this collective will, if they have to have a share in the execution of sovereignty. This 
requires also the popular election of the President of Turkey as well as the parliamentary 
selection of the Constitutional Court members. Additionally, the necessary 
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democratization of the judiciary can only be possible through the introduction of a jury 
system, along with increased public participation in selection and appointment of judges 
and public prosecutors. The second important feature of ‘liberal-democratic 
governance’ is ‘the majority’s right to rule’. Erdoğan explains the content of this right 
as such:  
   “This right refers to the fact that the majority is entitled to take all the 
decisions as regards the public life, provided that basic rights and legal 
assurance of individuals are properly respected. To put it another way, there 
should not exist any reserved spheres that the rule of majority cannot 
involve in, and any bureaucratic institutions or mechanisms that would 
invalidate the political choices of the majority.”623  
Third, the ‘liberal-democratic governance’ should also protect minority rights, 
including political, cultural and individual rights. Obviously enough, the first two 
principles in Erdoğan’s conceptualization of ‘liberal-democratic governance model’ 
involve suggestions that goes against a liberal approach to government, the essence of 
which is the institution of effective checks and balances under the rule of law, and in 
this perspective, his propositions can rather be associated with a ‘majoritarian’ 
understanding of democracy and not with a ‘pluralistic democracy’. Erdoğan clearly 
defends this overwhelmingly ‘majoritarian’ position in his second principle and the 
protection of minority rights seems as a feeble compensation in face of this 
‘majoritarian’ approach.  
Hence, while Erdoğan encourages the ‘sharing’ of sovereignty with supranational 
and subnational entities in support of Turkey’s integration into the global system and to 
Europe, his ideas prove much more ‘absolutist’ in respect to domestic political life. 
Moreover, his ‘participatory’ scheme leaves little room for the independence of 
judiciary and thereby restricts the execution of the rule of law within the confines of the 
will of the majority. Looking from this perspective, Erdoğan seems to defend an 
understanding of democracy, reminding us mostly the Europe of 1940s, and not a 
‘pluralistic democracy,’ which is in effect in Europe of the 2000s. In this sense, 
Erdoğan’s arguments prove akin to those of Bülent Arınç, TBMM President under the 
58th and 59th Governments, discusses in detail above. 
Within this framework, while liberal and conservative Muslim-democratic 
demands become articulated in the same discourse in relation to their criticism of the 
priority given to raison d’etat over the ‘public will’ in the execution of sovereignty in 
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the Turkish case (and therefore of the lack of a balance of power in Turkish politics), 
their positions diverge as to the question of ensuring an effective system of separation 
of powers in the Turkish polity. The predominant conservative Muslim-democratic 
approach towards sovereignty gives precedence to ‘public will’ not only over the raison 
d’etat (as liberals would agree), but at the same time going beyond that they declare this 
precedence ‘unconditional’ and it is in their reluctance towards the executive of a 
system of checks and balances that they diverge from the liberal outlook. 
 
 
6.4. Conclusion 
 
 
The discursive debates put under investigation in this chapter illustrate that during 
the period in question the notion of ‘sovereignty’ functions as a nodal point in the 
articulation of dispersed demands around two antagonistic poles, creating opposing 
discursive formations represented by a ‘Europhile democratic coalition’ vs. a 
‘Euroskeptic republican/nationalist coalition’. Based on this conclusion, following 
observations can be made with regards to the relationship between the parallel processes 
of ‘Europeanization’ and ‘democratization’ and the simultaneous polarization of the 
public space that they entail in the context of post-2000 Turkey: 
(i) Turkey’s European integration process generates political tensions emanating 
from its accompanying requests of “stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the 
rule of law, human rights and respect for and, protection of minorities”. Accordingly, on 
the one side, groups in opposition to this ‘democratization’ process develop a discourse 
of resistance that creates and makes use of various signifiers. In the production of this 
discourse, a chain of equivalences becomes constructed around the central fear of ‘loss 
of sovereignty’ that leads to the articulation of the demands of the nationalist-right with 
the traditional forces of the ‘Left’ in Turkey.  Here, the defense of ‘national sovereignty’ 
becomes identified with the defense of ‘full independence’ and requires a 
‘republican/nationalist integration’ against the ‘submissionism’ (teslimiyetçilik) of the 
‘Europhiles’ allegedly displaying a neo-Tanzimat outlook.  
(ii) On the other side, the prospect of ‘full membership’ and the dynamics it 
unleashes bind together a ‘Europhile democratic coalition’, who sees Turkey’s potential 
EU membership as an opportunity to question the prevailing doctrine of ‘unconditional’ 
 239
and ‘unitary’ notion of sovereignty in the Turkish polity, which is conceived to give 
priority and preference to ‘raison d’etat’ over ‘public will’. Hence, the ‘pooling of 
sovereignty’ away from the central state to supranational institutions of the European 
Union, as well as a parallel ‘devolution of sovereignty’ towards regional and local 
administrative units, represent means to destabilize the prevailing status quo in the 
Turkish political system. Here, the conservative-Muslim and liberal democratic 
discourses converge in their accusation of the republican/statist elite to try to hold on to 
their ‘illegitimate’ yet ongoing ‘sovereignty’ in Turkish politics, blocking the quests for 
change through democratization and Europeanization. However, the discursive 
articulation of ‘Europhile coalition’ seems less stable due to a significant point of 
rupture that concerns a central paradox with regards to the issue of exercise of 
sovereignty within the domestic political system. While the leadership of JDP and the 
associated academia/analysts support the idea that sovereignty can be ‘shared’, or to put 
it in the more EU-friendly terminology, ‘pooled’ to supranational and subnational 
entities as foreseen through Turkey’s increased integration into the global system and to 
Europe, their approach to sovereignty proves much more ‘absolutist’ in relation to 
domestic politics.  
(iii) The ongoing debate over the legitimate source and exercise of sovereignty 
exposes the domestic dimension of the problems associated with the prevailing doctrine 
of sovereignty in the post-2000 Turkey and at the same time reveals the limited nature 
of the dynamics at work to configure/reconfigure the concept in line with the exigencies 
of Turkey’s European integration. Instead, through this political battle, we once again 
come across the discursive utilization of the concept, this time within the attempts to 
either erode or defend the legitimacy of the current balance of power between the 
‘elected’/’democratic’ vs. ‘appointed’/’republican’ institutions of Turkish politics. 
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7.  CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
Taken as a whole, the following conclusions can be derived from this study: First 
and foremost, this dissertation reaffirms the necessity to think sovereignty not simply as 
law, but sovereignty as politics. In line with and in support of the deconstructionist 
approaches, it divulges the ongoing history of political contestation involved with the 
concept of sovereignty in Turkey and exposes its various discursive utilizations in 
connection to the purposes of competing ideologies in the critical turning moments of 
Turkish politics. In rejecting the prevailing view that presents sovereignty as a fixed, 
neutral and timeless organizing principle of modern politics, it suggests that sovereignty 
itself has turned into a ‘sedimented discourse’ in the Turkish polity, often concealing 
the historical contingency of the concept and its embeddedness in power relations. In 
order to expose the discursive formations through which sovereignty comes to be 
institutionalized into an ‘essentially uncontested’ political doctrine in Turkey, this 
dissertation attempts to ‘bring back in’ the historico-political production/reproduction of 
sovereignty in relation to prevalent ideologies in Turkish politics. To this end, this study 
illustrates the ways in which sovereignty is discursively used; at times as an 
empowering resource to support the legitimacy of ideologies such as Ottomanism, 
Turkish nationalism, populism, statism, and republicanism; and at times as a key 
‘democratic’ discursive tool to question the prevailing political system in Turkey.  
While this dissertation offers a critical analysis of the functioning of sovereignty 
as a discursive strategy in Turkish politics and thereby exposes the problems associated 
with the concept, it neither attempts to offer superior alternatives nor outlines the 
necessary features of a reconceptualized sovereignty. Instead, this study highlights the 
reasons that enhance the ambiguity, ergo the centrality of the notion, ensuring its 
problematic persistence. Rather than continuing with the debate whether or not 
sovereignty is redundant or obsolete in the face of growing globalization and 
fragmentation, it provides insight as to reappraise the implications of the role that 
sovereignty plays in conditioning the coherence of opposing political ideologies.  
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In 1895, Gustave Le Bon, the French sociologist the works of whom had a 
pervasive influence over the Young Turks’ weltanschauung, expresses his ideas on the 
impact of ‘words’ over the psychology of crowds in the following paragraph taken from 
his famous book Psychologies des Foules:  
   “The power of words is bound up with the images they evoke, and is quite 
independent of their real significance. Words whose sense is most ill 
defined are sometimes those that possess the most influence. Such, for 
example are the terms democracy, socialism, equality, liberty, etc., whose 
meaning is so vague that bulky volumes do not suffice to fix it precisely. 
Yet it is certain that a truly magical power is attached to those short 
syllables, as if they contained the solution of all problems. They synthesize 
the most diverse unconscious aspirations and hope of their realisation.”624    
As the foregoing analysis reveals, in the context of Turkish politics, sovereignty 
emerges as a ‘word’ conceived in the Le Bonian sense, or to put it more precisely in the 
terminology of discourse theory, as an empty-signifier embodying a sufficiently broad 
plurality of meanings to allow certain power blocs to discursively use the term in 
different historical moments to establish political alliances through the construction of a 
‘chain of equivalences.’ Seen from this perspective, sovereignty primarily serves the 
purpose of creating political frontiers and thereby its varying discursive utilizations over 
time and space contribute to the defense of competing ideologies and values benefiting 
from its instrumentality in connection to the production of political identities and the 
upholding of associated antagonisms.  
The above-summarized core finding of this research finds validation in the 
specific historical ‘moments’ of Turkish politics put under investigation; therefore, it 
would be first  appropriate to provide a presentation of the main conclusions derived 
from each ‘case’ in the section-to-follow:   
Our first period of study concentrated on the dissolution of the hegemonic political 
order in the Ottoman Empire during the last half of the 19th century, creating 
destructive, yet at the same time productive structural dislocations that simultaneously 
shattered available political identities and contributed to the production of novel 
discourses upon which new identities became established. We have been able to see that 
within this framework of profound changes in the composition of both Ottoman 
territory and population and the related demise of political autonomy, as well as 
authority, the emerging group of lower ranking, yet ‘enlightened’ Ottoman bureaucrats 
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‘discovered’ the empowering role that the ideal of ‘popular sovereignty’ could play in 
the pursuance of their main political motive: the preservation of the Ottoman Empire 
through the creation of a new ideology, Ottomanism.  
In this context, we have traced how ‘popular sovereignty’ turned into one of the 
central ‘signifiers’ of a surfacing political discourse reflecting a synthesis of Western 
and Islamic liberalism, introduced to Ottoman political life mainly through the efforts of 
the Young Ottomans. Within this discourse, the espousal of the modern concept of 
popular sovereignty served a double purpose: (i) By identifying the ‘people’ as the 
source of sovereignty, the principle of ‘popular sovereignty’ established the political 
and legal foundations of the novel concept of ‘Ottoman citizenship’, where different 
ethno-religious groups living under the House of the Ottoman would be granted equal 
rights and freedoms in return for their continued allegiance to the Empire. (ii) The 
bringing forth of the ideal of ‘popular sovereignty’ onto the public agenda also 
contributed to the curtailment of absolutist policies of the ruling bureaucrats and 
accordingly supported the efforts to establish more participatory and effective 
governance in the Ottoman Empire.  
Accordingly, the chapter showed how Ottoman political space came to be divided 
along two antagonistic poles through the employment of a logic of equivalences 
constructed around the notion of sovereignty: On one hand, united in their attempts to 
safeguard conventional norms of sovereignty, the conservative/religious political 
alliance declared popular sovereignty as incompatible with the Islamic tradition, held 
‘Ottoman subjects’, untrustworthy and incompetent for consultation and at the same 
time brought in a perception of ‘threat’ directed against the privileged position of the 
Millet-i Hakime, the ruling Muslim communities of the Empire. On the other hand, 
‘popular sovereignty’ helped the articulation of the demands of the ‘enlightened 
Ottoman bureaucrats’ pushing for the introduction of a constitutional order in the 
Ottoman polity, the legitimacy of which had traditionally depended upon the 
unchallenged and sanctified doctrine of dynastic sovereignty. This dichotomically 
divided political space pointed out the fact that the genesis of the debate on the modern 
concept of sovereignty in Turkish politics was indeed closely convoluted with the 
demands of competing political ideologies and that, in this respect, the concept of 
sovereignty played a central role in binding together the antagonistically positioned 
discourses. However, the ideal of ‘popular sovereignty’ remained short-lived due to its 
association with liberal underpinnings void of secular and revolutionary (in terms of a 
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regime change) aspects. Most importantly, the absence of the collective will of a nation 
at its foundations, during an era where the ideal of nation-state increasingly replaced 
that of multi ethno-religious empires, explained its eventual disappearance.   
Our second period of investigation focused on the creation of the Turkish nation-
state out of the remains of the Ottoman Empire through two simultaneous wars, namely 
the Turkish War of Independence fought to recover the Allied-partitioned Ottoman 
lands of Anatolia, and an internal ‘war’ waged on ethnic, religious and political groups 
of opposition revolting against the Turkish national movement. The research on this 
period revealed that it is first through the political works of the Young Turks and in 
relation to the rising ideology of Turkish nationalism that the concept of ‘national 
sovereignty’ started to take root in the psyche of the secular military/bureaucratic elite, 
the class in charge of Turkish nation-state building efforts during the first quarter of the 
20th century. 
The Young Turks drew two main conclusions from their observation of the 
disintegrative consequences of ethnic-religious uprisings joined together by a form of 
national consciousness posed against the allegiance to the Ottoman dynasty: first, the 
‘people’ were not to be trusted; second, the idea of ‘nation’ presented an empowering 
concept to mobilize forces to reclaim political authority within a newly defined territory 
and a corresponding population. The Young Turks found the philoso-theoretical 
confirmation of their actual observations in the teachings of the leading French 
sociologists of the time such as Durkheim and Le Bon (mostly in relation to their 
distrust towards the potential consequences of uncontrolled societal dynamics) and in 
the Romantic Nationalism of Rousseau, Herder and Hegel (in terms of the espousal of 
the idea of an organic nation in opposition to degenerative effects of cosmopolitanism). 
As it was shown, the political and intellectual legacy of the Young Turks proved 
influential upon the development of Turkish nation-state building led by Mustafa Kemal 
and his followers, the contours of which came to be demarcated by solidarist 
nationalism and elitist social engineering.    
This chapter also illustrated that given the need to find a new basis of political 
legitimacy for the Kemalists’ attempts to construct the frontiers of the emerging Turkish 
nation-state, the ideal of ‘national sovereignty’ constituted a useful discursive principle 
in two related ways: (i) ‘Externally’, the linkage established between national 
sovereignty and the national right to self-determination played a part in securing the 
international legitimacy of the resistance movement. (ii) ‘Internally’, the instrumental 
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articulation between the concept of national sovereignty and the leading discourses of 
the time, namely Turkish nationalism and populism, helped efforts to create ‘horizontal 
homogenization’ with the idea of ‘non-privileged, classless and integrated nation’, in 
the name of which the supreme political authority was being claimed. In this sense, 
particularly during the years of the National Struggle (1919–1922), national sovereignty 
was an important discursive factor in uniting the population in the remaining Ottoman 
lands under the same cause.  
The conceptualization of sovereignty arising from these needs found its clearest 
legal expression in the Law of Fundamental Organization of 1921, the so-called ‘First 
Constitution’ of the bourgeoning Turkish nation-state, which declared: “Sovereignty is 
fully and unconditionally vested in the nation. The form of government is based on 
direct popular rule and the principle of self-determination.” Here, the findings of the 
chapter drew our attention to the fact that the prevailing doctrine of indivisible, 
unconditional and non-transferable sovereignty in the Turkish polity in effect represents 
the legacy of this short-lived constituent period, where sovereignty was to be exercised 
through the principle of union of powers collected under the Turkish Parliament. At the 
same time, this formulation of sovereignty reflected the intellectual influences of both 
the French Revolution and Russian Narodnism, as well as denoting a response to the 
Wilsonian principles. Hence, while the political/intellectual conditions engendering the 
necessity to construct such a doctrine gradually disappeared and accordingly a new 
approach towards sovereignty started to take shape following the proclamation of the 
Republic, the discursive utilization of the statement ‘Sovereignty is Fully and 
Unconditionally vested in the Nation’ survived and eventually turned into one of the 
fundamental and timeless dicta of Turkish politics.   
To this end, the second chapter also underlined the differences with regards to the 
Kemalist approach to the issue of sovereignty between the period of National Struggle 
(1919-1922) and the post-1923 period, and observed that following the establishment of 
the single party rule, the Kemalist nationalist/republican discourse increasingly 
attempted to ‘homogenize’ and ‘totalize’ the political space by establishing a 
representational monopoly over the ‘collective will.’ By basing the legitimacy of its 
political objectives upon the all-encompassing ideal of ‘national sovereignty’, the 
Kemalist discourse employed a logic of difference, through which it sought to weaken 
and displace ‘internal’ and ‘external’ antagonisms in order to form a coherent unity out 
of heterogeneous identities to effectively carry on with its nation and state building.  In 
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doing so, it constructed a chain of equivalences along the following lines: (i) 
sovereignty became exclusively linked to the Turkish nation, the boundaries of which 
grew to be clearly marked by the single-party ‘politics of social closure’ differentiating 
between ‘friend’ and ‘enemy’; (ii) the collective will of the nation in-making found its 
direction and meaning in its integration into the raison d’etat; (iii) the State and its 
raison were identified with the RPP and the Kemalist ideology; and finally to complete 
this discursive chain of signification, (iv) the RPP came to be ruled by an ‘Eternal 
Chief’, possessing an omnipotent responsibility to decide. 
As a result, during the period in question, the principle of national sovereignty 
upon which the political legitimacy of the Turkish nation-state rests, assumed attributes 
that went beyond a Rousseauian conceptualization of sovereignty and increasingly 
resembled the Schmittian notion, where sovereignty is conceived as a monopolized 
capacity of the nation-state to decide and act upon its decisions, subsequently 
obliterating challenges directed against its perpetuation and solidity. As it was 
demonstrated, the historical traces of this tendency were tracked down in the dissolution 
of the First Turkish Parliament, where the gist of main opposition was indeed related to 
the Kemalists’ dismissal of the power of the Parliament. The closure of subsequent 
opposition parties such as Free Party (Serbest Fırka) and Progressive Republican Party 
(Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası) also stood out as historical events contributing to 
the consolidation of an approach towards sovereignty in the Turkish polity similar to 
that can be found in the ideas of Schmitt.   
The third period of investigation shifted our attention to the post-1980 Turkey, 
where this modern Kemalist construction of sovereignty came under serious challenge 
by the simultaneous processes of globalization and fragmentation experienced in the 
Turkish polity. Within the context of disruption brought by the transition from a closed 
economic system to an increasingly globally integrated society, accompanied by the 
emergence of new forms of identity politics in face of the deepening political 
conservatism of the ruling elite, we witnessed the division of the political space along 
two overriding and antagonistically positioned discourses: On one hand, in seeking to 
defend the eroding monopoly of the Turkish nation-state over sovereignty against 
growing supranational and subnational demands for the dispersion of central authority, 
the military/republican elite constructed a discourse based upon a reconfiguration of 
Kemalism as Atatürkism, emphasizing its solidarist, nationalist and statist features. This 
discourse derived its strength from a chain of equivalences created by the identification 
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of the state with its nation and country, corresponding to order and harmony in Turkey. 
In this respect, the safeguarding of ‘indivisible, absolute and unconditional national 
sovereignty’ constituted its nodal point.  
As discussed in detail in the fourth chapter, this discursive approach towards 
sovereignty found its legal reflection in the 1982 Constitution of the Turkish Republic. 
In opposition to the parliamentarism foreseen in the 1921 and 1961 constitutions, 1982 
Constitution delegated the right to exercise Turkish nation’s sovereignty to several state 
organs. While this Constitution instituted a clear separation of powers, it nevertheless 
failed to establish a balance among powers, endowing the Executive organs an 
enhanced political weight vis-à-vis the Legislative. Both the Presidency and the 
National Security Council assumed an increasing leverage in relation to the right to 
exercise sovereignty. At the same time, the 1982 Constitution adopted a more centralist 
approach to administration and accordingly proved very protective against limiting and 
sharing the 'nation-state' sovereignty with supranational or subnational bodies. As a 
result, through this Constitution sovereignty came to be re-constructed as an 
empowering concept mostly in connection to the strengthening of the authority of 
central state institutions, rather than imposing limits upon and instituting effective 
checks and balances among them. 
Building upon the political underpinnings of the 1982 Constitution, the 
‘Nationalist/Statist Front’ put the principle of sovereignty to use mainly in relation to 
three strategies fortifying its discourse and accordingly reinforcing the link between its 
political values and the societal sensitivities: (i) The ideal of national sovereignty was 
re-emphasized within the nationalist/statist elite’s attempts to fill in the representational 
distance, increasingly widening between the ‘people’ and the Atatürkist ideology in the 
post-1980 period. In this perspective, ‘Nationalist/Statist Front’ presented national 
sovereignty as a sacred value, a ‘gift’ of Atatürk to the Turkish nation symbolizing the 
actual significance given to ‘public will’ within the Kemalist project. ‘National 
sovereignty’ was positioned as an ideal born with Atatürk and was accordingly 
colonized by the Atatürkist discourse, which stressed that there could be no sovereignty 
outside or beyond this way of thinking. (ii) At the same time, in reaction to the 
increasing public visibility of the Kurdish identity, developed during the period in 
question within the framework of a micro-nationalism mirror-imaging the Turkish 
macro-nationalism, the Atatürkists emphasized the exclusive link between ‘the right to 
supreme authority of the land’ and the Turkish nation. Thereby, ‘national sovereignty’ 
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was also a discursive resource used in connection to the determination of the Turkish 
identity as the unifying monolithic identity in Turkey. (iii) Finally, the 
‘Nationalist/Statist Front’ closely identified the safeguarding of ‘indivisible, absolute 
and unconditional national sovereignty’ with the preservation of a ‘strong and 
independent nation-state’ against the forces of globalization and ‘imperialism’. 
Particularly with respect to this strategy, the chapter revealed the increasing articulation 
of the demands of the political groups of the ‘left’ and the ‘right’ into a defensive 
nationalist/statist discourse. During the period in question, the defense of the 
sovereignty of the nation-state came to be charged by emotive and affective 
connotations and was subsequently presented as a core republican value under 
‘external’ and ‘internal’ threat, therefore in need of constant care and protection.  
On the other hand, the 1980s and the 1990s witnessed the emergence of a counter 
discourse, produced mainly in opposition to the nationalist/statist position, articulating 
demands in support of the ‘people’ and the individual vis-à-vis the all powerful nation 
and the state, plurality vis-à-vis homogeneity, and globalization vis-à-vis the central 
state. In support of these political values, this ‘Second Republican/Democratic’ 
discourse set out to deconstruct the myth of ‘absolute and unconditional national 
sovereignty’ along the following lines: (i) The introduction and the consolidation of the 
Republican regime lacked a democratic core, and therefore the Turkish polity excluded 
an actual realization of ‘popular sovereignty’ as understood within the democratic 
tradition. Given the absence of a relationship between democracy and republicanism in 
Turkey, the bureaucracy and the military emerged as the real Sovereign of the land, and 
not the ‘people’. (ii) In lack of democratic premises underlying the concept of 
sovereignty, the ‘ideal of national sovereignty’ primarily functioned as a discursive tool 
supporting the foundations of Turkish nationalism and statism, mainly constituting an 
obstacle before the political attempts to represent social demands emanating from 
heterogeneous identities. In these respects, the findings of the research highlighted the 
articulation of the neo-liberal democratic discourse and the Islamic discourse during the 
period in question, joining together in their demands for further democratization and 
recognition of diversity. However, while the critique extended by the ‘democratic 
coalition’ towards the nationalist/statist instrumentalization of sovereignty proved 
important in challenging the legitimacy of the nation-state-centric approach, 
nonetheless, we have also seen that this discourse failed to offer an alternative 
configuration of sovereignty to respond to growing supranational and subnational 
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demands. Similar to the statist/nationalists, the approach of the democrats of the 1990s 
to the question of sovereignty proved retrospective rather than progressive. 
Our fourth period of study focused on the post-1999 period, during which Turkey 
embarked upon an official process of integration with the European Union. The chapter 
showed that Turkey’s European Union accession road map instigated a process of 
reform and resistance, which polarized the political space along two overriding 
discourses: a pro-EU ‘democratic coalition’ advocating ‘full membership’ vs. a 
Euroskeptic ‘republican/nationalist coalition’ defending ‘full independence.’ In the 
articulation of dispersed political positions into these two opposing camps, the concept 
of sovereignty functioned as an empty-signifier, which, given the impossibility of 
fullness either in terms of independence or membership, helped to maintain the 
legitimacy of these contradictory horizons.  
To substantiate this argument, the chapter examined in detail two related and 
simultaneous ‘sovereignty battles’ taking place in the post-2000 Turkey and illustrated 
the ways in which the concept of sovereignty was instrumentalized by the 
antagonistically positioned political camps: In terms of the first debate surrounding the 
question whether or not it would be possible or desirable to ‘share sovereignty’ with or 
‘pool sovereignty’ to the European Union, the ‘nationalist/republican bloc’ associated 
the EU accession process with an end to ‘Turkish national sovereignty’ and a loss of 
‘full independence’, thereby with the undermining of the twin ideals sustaining the 
raison d’etre of Kemalist Republican regime. It was also noted that within the 
‘Euroskeptic nationalist/republican’ discourse sovereignty assumed meanings beyond a 
legal and a political concept, and became charged with affective components to portray 
an image of Turkey under siege. Henceforth, ‘the defense of national sovereignty’ 
became the nodal point that further stabilized the coalition established between the 
nationalist right and the nationalist left in Turkey.  
In opposition to the Euroskeptic discourse and in support of the need to 
reconfigure the Turkish doctrine of sovereignty in the context of European integration, 
we have seen how the articulation of the ‘conservative-Islamic-democratic’ and the 
‘liberal-democratic’ arguments into a single discourse took place during the 2000s. The 
Europhile democratic discourse argued that ‘sharing of sovereignty’ with supranational 
and subnational units would eventually help the democratization of Turkey by bringing 
fundamental freedoms to everyone, as well as strengthening the effectiveness of Turkish 
polity by boosting Turkey’s involvement in the international regime.  
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It was further illustrated that the blurring of the distinction between the 
outside/inside through ‘Europeanization’ and the associated repercussions have carried 
the domestic debate in Turkey far beyond the confines of the issue of ‘sharing 
sovereignty’ with the European Union. Instead, it has brought forth a critical 
questioning of the domestic political system in place, and has shaken the very 
foundations underlying the current doctrine of sovereignty in Turkish politics, which 
was conceived to give priority and preference to ‘raison d’etat’ over ‘public will’. The 
exposition of the ongoing disagreement over the appropriate source and exercise of 
sovereignty has been particularly important for the purposes of this study in terms of 
demonstrating the persistent conflict beneath the most cliché statement of Turkish 
politics: “Sovereignty is vested Fully and Unconditionally in the Nation.”  
The latest manifestation of the continuing relevance and significance of further in-
depth research on the issue of sovereignty in the Turkish politics is found in the 
framework of the process of a new and so-called ‘civil’ constitution-making currently 
underway in Turkey. Although so far the debate has mainly concentrated on the chosen 
method and drafting process, as well as on the question whether or not there is actually 
a need for a new constitution in Turkey,625 a separate discussion also started to take 
shape with regards to its specific proposals. Within this framework, the redefinition of 
Article 6, dealing specifically with the issue of sovereignty, has already drawn much 
attention and criticism, making sovereignty once again a main subject of political 
                                                 
625A collection of articles on these issues includes Murat Yetkin, "Anayasa 
AKP'nin mi, AK Parti'nin mi?", Radikal, 4 September 2007; İsmet Berkan, Anayasadan 
Esas Beklenen", Radikal, 8 September 2007; Korkmaz İlkorur, "Anayasa Tartışmaları", 
Radikal, 11 September 2007; Haluk Şahin, "Yeni Anayasa Fırsat mı, Tuzak mı?", 
Radikal, 14 September 2007; Haluk Şahin, "Yeni Anayasa Kimin Projesi?", Radikal, 15 
September 2007; Anayasa ve 'Beyaz Türkler', Taha Akyol, Milliyet, 14 September 
2007; Fikret Bila, “Yeni anayasa Tartışmaları”, Milliyet, 14 September 2007; Türker 
Alkan, Sivil anayasa ne demek? Radikal, 15 September 2007; Derya Sazak, 
“Anayasanın anlamı,” Milliyet, 14 September 2007; Oktay Ekşi, “Değişmesi gerekli mi 
değil mi?” Hürriyet, 15 September 2007; Mümtaz Soysal, "Anayasa Tepkisi: İki", 
Cumhuriyet, 5 September 2007; Mümtaz Soysal, "Anayasa Tepkisi: Dört", Cumhuriyet, 
8 September 2007, Necati Özgen, "Anayasa Tartışmaları...", Cumhuriyet, 11 September 
2007, Orhan Erinç, "Tepki Anayasası", Cumhuriyet, 15 September 2007; Şahin Alpay, 
"Özlenen Sivil ve Demokratik Anayasa", Zaman, 8 September 2007; Cengiz Çandar, 
“Önce 301; sonra Yeni Anayasa”, Referans, 15 September 2007; İsmet Berkan, 
“Destekçisiyiz”, Radikal, 12 December 2007.  
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controversy in Turkey. The publicly declared626 suggested revision in Article 6 (now 
Article 5) brings two significant amendments: (i) First, it poses international and 
supranational limits on Turkish national sovereignty, an issue of much controversy with 
regards to the so-called ‘transfer’ of sovereignty to the European Union as a result of 
Turkey’s accession process. (ii) By naming solely the legislative, executive and judicial 
organs responsible for the exercise of sovereignty (instead of the more vague 
terminology of ‘responsible organs’ used in the current constitution), the new proposal 
first aims to clear the ongoing tension in Turkey on the question of separation of 
powers, second it attempts to leave out other state institutions claiming to act on behalf 
of Turkish nation’s sovereignty. At the same time, this new constitutional proposal 
rearranges the balance of power among the legislative, executive and judiciary organs; 
re-shifting the weight in favor of the Parliament. It also foresees a popular election of 
the President, the powers of whom have been curtailed to the framework envisaged in 
1961 Constitution, while the National Security Council is turned into a consultative 
body, the members of which come to be appointed by the Prime Minister. In this regard, 
the new Constitutional proposal displays a certain distancing away from its earlier 
connection with the constitutions of Continental Europe and instead embodies clauses 
that prove akin to those found in the Anglo-Saxon constitutional tradition.  
As the ruling party’s efforts set out to redefine the relationship between the 
Turkish state and the society through a new contract,627 the current public debate reveals 
that the disagreement over the legitimate source and locus of sovereignty and the related 
conflict between public will and rasion d’etat indeed constitute the real thrust of the 
matter. However, it is also observed that the attempts within the new constitutional 
proposal to institute the precedence of public will over raison d’etat comes to be closely 
associated with the conflicting interpretations of secularism in Turkey and the head 
scarf issue in this regard. Henceforth, the current beginnings of a debate on the new 
Turkish Constitution foreshadows the continuity of the controversy over the issue of 
                                                 
626 The details of the constitutional proposal were shared with the Turkish media 
on 13 September 2007 and the full text can be reached at the following internet address: 
http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/news/ 419856.asp. 
627For a more detailed discussion on the constitution making and the contractual 
relationship between the state and the society please see, Hasan Bülent Kahraman, 
‘Anayasa sözleşme mi değil mi?’, Sabah, 18 September 2007 and Hasan Bülent 
Kahraman, ‘Demokratik sivilleşme mi türban mı?,’ 13 September 2007.  
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sovereignty in Turkish politics and reveals once again the need to further examine the 
dynamics of this conflict from the perspective of political theory.  
As a result, the foregoing discursive analysis of the post-2000 Turkey shows that 
before being able to discuss how to align the Turkish national sovereignty with the so-
called ‘post-Westphalian’ European order, it is first necessary to clarify the current 
underpinnings and agree upon the main tenets of domestic allocation of power and 
authority in the Turkish polity. This compelling task first and foremost requires the 
location of the unconditional, absolute and state-centric doctrine of sovereignty 
prevailing in the Turkish polity into the domain of politically contestable. It is only by 
exposing the highly politicized and contentious nature of this doctrine that we can evade 
the risk of limiting our understanding of the pluralistic political possibilities implicated 
in contemporary transformations of sovereignty. 
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